It is not a condition precedent to prosecutions for violation of
the Pure Food and Drug Act that an investigation or hearing be had
in the Department of Agriculture.
Where a statute provides for notice in one case and permits
prosecutions without notice in another case, it shows that there
was no intent to make notice jurisdictional.
Repeals by implication are not favored, nor is there a
presumption that a law passed in the interest of public health was
intended to hamper prosecutions of offenses against the statute
itself.
A statute will not be construed as grafting exceptions on the
criminal law in favor of offenders against that particular statute
in the absence of clear and unambiguous expressions.
Citizens are furnished the surest safeguards against malicious
prosecutions by the Fourth Amendment.
Section 4 of the Pure Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906, c.
3915, 34 Stat. 678, does not repeal Rev.Stat., §§ 771 or 1022,
making it the duty of the district attorney to prosecute all
delinquents for crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority
of the United States, nor does it limit him to prosecute only those
offenders who have had a hearing before the Department of
Agriculture.
Page 222 U. S. 275
The defendants maintained an establishment in New York where,
after filtering Croton water drawn from the city pipes, adding
mineral salts, and charging it with carbonic acid, the water was
bottled and sold as "Imperial Spring Water." In October, 1908, a
food and drug inspector applied to a druggist in Newark, New
Jersey, for several bottles of this water. The druggist, not having
them in stock, ordered them from the defendants, who shipped them
from New York to the druggist in Newark. He delivered them to the
inspector, who paid therefor.
The judge, in his opinion, treats the prosecution as having been
instituted by the inspector, though this does not affirmatively
appear in the record, and the defendants were not indicted until
April, 1910, when they were found guilty of shipping misbranded
goods in interstate commerce. They moved in arrest of judgment on
the ground that it was not alleged that they had been given notice
and a preliminary hearing by the Department of Agriculture,
contending this was a condition precedent to the return of a valid
indictment. The judge held that such hearing must be granted in all
cases where the prosecution was instituted by the Department of
Agriculture or its agent (181 F. 587), and from a later order
sustaining the motion in arrest, the government brought the case
here under Criminal Appeals Act.
Page 222 U. S. 279
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal courts have not agreed as to the effect of the
provision for notice and hearing, found in § 4 of the Pure Food and
Drug Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 768, c. 3915.
United States
v. Nine Barrels of Olives, 179 F. 984;
United States v.
Twenty Cases of Grape Juice, 189 F. 331. Whether it confers a
right upon the defendant, or results in imposing a duty upon the
district attorney can be determined by a brief examination of a few
of the provisions of the act.
Under the Pure Food Law, not only a manufacturer, but any dealer
shipping adulterated or misbranded goods in interstate commerce, is
guilty of a misdemeanor. In aid of enforcement of the statute, it
is made the duty of the Department of Agriculture to collect
specimens of such articles so shipped, and the Bureau of Chemistry
is required to analyze them. But, even if the specimen, on
analysis, is found to be adulterated, there is no requirement that
the case should be turned over at once to the district attorney,
for the reason that the "party from whom the sample was obtained"
might be a dealer holding a guaranty from his vendor that the
articles were not adulterated. In such case, the dealer is not
liable to prosecution, but the guarantor (§ 9) is made "amenable to
the prosecutions, fines, and penalties."
Page 222 U. S. 280
The act therefore declares (§ 4) that when, on such examination
by the Board of Chemistry, the article is found to be adulterated,
"notice shall be given to the party from whom the sample was
obtained. Any party so notified shall be given an opportunity to be
heard." If it then appears that he has violated the statute, the
Secretary of Agriculture is required to certify that fact, together
with a copy of the analysis, to the proper district attorney, who
(§ 5), without delay, must "institute appropriate proceedings," by
indictment, or libel for condemnation, or both, as the facts may
warrant.
But the act also contemplates (§ 5) that complaints may be made
to the district attorney by state health officials. In that class
of cases, no doubt because the state agents investigate without
giving a hearing, the district attorney is not obliged to prosecute
unless such state officers "shall present satisfactory evidence of
such violation." But the very fact that he must do so in that event
recognizes that he may begin proceedings against a defendant who
has not been given a notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In providing for notice in one case, and permitting prosecutions
without it in another, the statute clearly shows that there was no
intent to make notice jurisdictional. This view is strengthened by
the fact that it contains no reference to giving notice to anyone
except "to the party from whom the sample was obtained." And if, on
the hearing given him, it appears that he is a dealer holding a
guaranty, the act, in providing for proceedings against such
guarantor, contains no suggestion that a new notice shall be given
him before an indictment can be submitted to the grand jury.
In cases like the present, or where foreign goods are labeled as
of domestic manufacture and
vice versa, no scientific
examination may be necessary. But usually a chemical analysis will
be required to determine whether an article is adulterated. The
Bureau of Chemistry is
Page 222 U. S. 281
equipped to do that work, so that, in practice, most
prosecutions will be based on reports made by the Department of
Agriculture after notice. But the hearing is not judicial. There is
no provision for compelling the presence of the party from whom the
sample was received; if he voluntarily attends, he is not in
jeopardy; an adverse finding is not binding against him, and a
decision in his favor is not an acquittal which prevents a
subsequent hearing before the Department, or a trial in court.
The provision as to the hearing is administrative, creating a
condition where the district attorney is compelled to prosecute
without delay. When he receives the Secretary's report, he is not
to make another and independent examination, but is bound to accept
the finding of the Department that the goods are adulterated or
misbranded, and that the party from whom they had been obtained
held no guaranty. But the fact that the statute compels him to act
in one case does not deprive him of the power voluntarily to
proceed in that and every other case under his general powers. If,
for any reason, the executive department failed to report
violations of this law, its neglect would leave untouched the duty
of the district attorney to prosecute "all delinquents for crimes
and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States."
Rev.Stat. §§ 771, 1022. So, an improper finding by the Department
would no more stay the grand jury than an order of discharge by a
committing magistrate after an ordinary preliminary trial. For the
statute contains no expression indicating an intention to withdraw
offenses under this act from the general powers of the grand jury,
who are diligently to inquire and true presentment make of all
matters called to their attention by the court, or that may come to
their knowledge during the then present service.
Repeals by implication are not favored, and there is certainly
no presumption that a law passed in the interest
Page 222 U. S. 282
of the public health was to hamper district attorneys, curtail
the powers of grand juries, or make them, with evidence in hand,
halt in their investigation and await the action of the Department.
To graft such an exception upon the criminal law would require a
clear and unambiguous expression of the legislative will.
It was argued that the privilege of a preliminary hearing was
granted so as to prevent malicious prosecutions. But, had such been
its intention, the statute would have required that a hearing
should be given to all persons charged with a violation of the act,
and not merely to those from whom the sample was received. A
further answer is that, as to this and every other offense, the
Fourth Amendment furnishes the citizen the nearest practicable
safeguard against malicious accusations. He cannot be tried on an
information unless it is supported by the oath of someone having
knowledge of facts showing the existence of probable cause. Nor can
an indictment be found until after an examination of witnesses,
under oath, by grand jurors -- the chosen instruments of the law to
protect the citizen against unfounded prosecutions, whether they be
instituted by the government or prompted by private malice. There
is nothing in the nature of the offense under the Pure Food Law or
in the language of the statute which indicates that Congress
intended to grant violators of this act a conditional immunity from
prosecution, or to confer upon them a privilege not given every
other person charged with a crime. The judgment is
Reversed.
