Where the court below had authority to make an order directing
the performance of an act, irrespective of a constitutional
question raised, the denial of a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
one committed for contempt for refusing to obey such order does not
necessarily involve the construction or application of the
Constitution, and a direct appeal from the judgment denying the
writ does not lie to this Court under § 5 of the Judiciary Act of
1891.
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the
functions of a writ of error.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court on
appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of the United States in
a habeas corpus proceeding, are stated in the opinion.
Page 220 U. S. 557
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is disposed of by the opinion delivered in No. 963,
ante, p.
220 U. S. 549. It
thus arose:
The district attorney, on his committal for contempt in refusing
to obey the order directing him to return certain books and papers,
on being taken into custody sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and
from the judgment discharging the writ prosecuted this appeal. The
petition in habeas corpus, after averring the facts as we have
stated them in the opinion in No. 963, alleged that the commitment
for contempt was based "solely and exclusively on an order of this
court made and filed on the 15th day of March," and that the
court
"was without jurisdiction to compel your petitioner, as United
States attorney for this district or in any other capacity, to
surrender to the persons now under indictment and awaiting trial .
. . books and papers which came into his lawful and official
custody as aforesaid, and are necessary to a prosecution still
pending against said defendants."
It was then averred that
"your petitioner verily believes that, for the reasons above
stated the order adjudging him guilty of contempt, and his
commitment pursuant to said order, in the custody of the marshal,
were without legal right, authority, or jurisdiction of any kind,
and are utterly void and ineffective, and that his detention and
imprisonment thereunder are in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, and in violation of his rights, privileges, and
immunities thereunder."
The right to come directly to this Court is controlled by § 5 of
the Judiciary Act of 1891, which authorizes an appeal in certain
cases. It is plain that the only portion of that subdivision which
can possibly have application here is that which relates to cases
"involving the construction or application of the Constitution of
the United States."
Page 220 U. S. 558
But, as we have seen in No. 963, no question as to the
construction or application of the Constitution of the United
States, in the correct sense of those words, was involved in the
order committing for contempt. While it is true that the court, in
passing upon the application for the return of the books and
papers, expressed the opinion that, as the Act of seizing them
violated the constitutional rights of the petitioners, they were
entitled to an order for return, this did not cause it to come to
pass that the order committing for contempt involved the
application or construction of the Constitution. In every aspect,
this is the case, since the authority of the court to consider and
decide the application for the return of the books and papers
existed wholly irrespective of whether there was a constitutional
right to exact the return of the books and papers. That is to say,
it was within the power of the court to take jurisdiction of the
subject of the return, and pass upon it, as the result of its
inherent authority to consider and decide questions arising before
it concerning an alleged unreasonable exertion of authority in
connection with the execution of the process of the court. The case
therefore is but an attempt to cause a writ of habeas corpus to
serve the functions of a writ of error.
For the reasons stated in case No. 963, we think the contention
that a constitutional question was involved in this case upon the
existence of which the right to appeal to this Court depended is so
wholly devoid of merit as to require here, as it did in the other
case, a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. The appeal is,
therefore,
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.