In an action of ejectment in New Mexico, the trial court was of
opinion that the boundaries under which plaintiff claimed did not
include the land in dispute, and the supreme court of the territory
affirmed on the ground of defect in plaintiff's grant and that the
evidence as to possession was too vague to raise a presumption in
place of proof, and this Court affirms the judgment.
Where both parties move for a ruling, and there is no question
of fact sufficient to prevent a ruling's being made, the motions
together amount to a request that the court find any facts
necessary to make the ruling, and, if the court directs a verdict,
both parties are concluded as to the facts found, and unless the
ruling is wrong as matter of law, the judgment must stand.
Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 220 U. S. 498
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action of ejectment for about 50 acres in Section 21,
Township 15 North, Range 8 East, in the County of Santa Fe, New
Mexico, which the defendant holds under mining claims dating from
1885 to 1892, and located under the laws of the United States. It
was brought after the plaintiff's failure to establish title, under
a Mexican grant, to a large tract of which this land is alleged to
be a part, in the Court of Private Land Claims, and in this Court
on appeal.
Sena v. United States, 189 U.
S. 233.
Id., 189 U. S. 504. The
decree left open the question whether the plaintiff had a perfect
or imperfect title, and was without prejudice of further
proceedings, as, in case of a perfect title, the statute
establishing the Court of Private Land Claims did not require a
confirmation by that court. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, § 8, 26
Stat. 854, 857;
Richardson v. Ainsa, 218 U.
S. 289. The former decision was put on the ground of
laches, but, in the present suit, the plaintiff offered some little
additional evidence of acts indicative of possession later than any
proved before. Both parties, however, moved that the court should
direct a verdict.
Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U.
S. 154;
Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 210 U. S. 1. The
court of first instance was of opinion that the boundaries of the
grant under which the plaintiff claims were not proved to include
the land in dispute, and directed a verdict for the defendant. The
judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the territory on the
ground that the
Page 220 U. S. 499
grant did not appear to have been confirmed, as required by a
Spanish ordinance of October 15, 1752, 2 White's New Recop. 62, 63
[*51], and that the evidence of possession, etc., was too vague to
raise a presumption in place of proof. The plaintiff took a writ of
error and brings the case here.
The grant under which the plaintiff claims was made to Joseph de
Leyba in 1728. Subject to what was said in the former decision (
189 U. S. 189 U.S.
233,
189 U. S.
237), the boundaries on the north and east may be
assumed to be established, but the others give rise to the trouble.
They are "on the south by an arroyo called Cuesta del Oregano; on
the west by land of Juan Garcia del las Rivas." To translate these
words into things, the plaintiff put in evidence a grant to Miguel
Garzia de la Riba of the sitio of the old pueblo the Cienega, dated
August 12, 1701, and a grant of the same property from Miguel to
his son, Juan Garcia de la Riba, dated March 12, 1704, the latter
bounding the property on the east by the Penasco Blanco de las
Golondrinas and on the south by the canada of Juana Lopez. He also
put in the will of a son of Joseph de Leyba, under whom the
plaintiff claims, describing the land granted to his father as
bounded on the west with lands of the old Pueblo of the Cienega.
Penasco Blanco was shown to be a known natural object. It lies to
the north of the north boundary of the Leyba grant, but the
plaintiff says that it is to be presumed that the eastern boundary
of the Riba grant, and therefore the western boundary of the Leyba
grant, was a north and south straight line passing through the
Penasco Blanco, and that such a line would include the land in
dispute.
But there are great difficulties in the way of this conclusion.
It appears that, in 1788, a grant was made of land in or known as
Los Cerrillos, title under which was confirmed by the Court of
Private Land Claims. This tract extends to the east of the line
drawn by the plaintiff
Page 220 U. S. 500
through the Penasco Blanco, the eastern boundary extending
southeast and northwest from a point north of the northerly
boundary of the Leyba grant to near the eastern boundary of § 21,
containing the lands in dispute, as is indicated by the diagram
below.
image:a
There is nothing adequate to contradict the presumption in favor
of this grant, and it at once makes impossible the hypothesis that
the Cienega, the land of Juan Garcia given as the western boundary
of the Leyba grant, extended to a straight line running south from
the Penasco Blanco through the Cerrillos grant to the west of
section 21. Furthermore, the southern boundary of the Cienega was
the Canada of Juana Lopez. This seems to have been to the west of
Los Cerrillos, and again to exclude the supposed straight line. The
southern boundary of Leyba depended on contradictory testimony as
to the existence on an arroyo of the Cuesta del Oregano in the
neighborhood, and was thought by the trial judge not to be made
out. With regard to the presumption
Page 220 U. S. 501
as to boundaries, it is to be observed that the northern
boundary is supposed to be a more or less irregular road, that the
eastern is another road running irregularly northeast and
southwest, and the southern, as contended for, continues the same
line in a somewhat more northerly direction, so that the outline of
the supposed grant resembles the peninsula of Hindostan.
There are other serious questions that would have to be answered
before the plaintiff could recover, adverted to in the former
decision of this Court and in the opinions of the two courts below
in the present case. But, as it is desirable not to draw into doubt
any claim that the plaintiff may have to other land not now in
suit, we confine ourselves to the ground taken by the trial court.
It seems to us impossible to say that the plaintiff produced
evidence sufficient to disturb the defendants' mining claim and the
possession that it has held so long under the laws of the United
States. As both parties moved for a ruling, and as there was
nothing more, according to
Beuttell v. Magone,
157 U. S. 154, it
stood admitted that there was no question of fact sufficient to
prevent a ruling being made, and the motions together amounted to a
request that the court should find any facts necessary to make it,
so that, unless the ruling was wrong as matter of law, the judgment
must stand. But it hardly is necessary to invoke that principle in
this case.
Judgment affirmed.