The value of the matter in dispute in this Court is the test of
jurisdiction.
Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.
S. 165.
Where the only question is the amount of indebtedness, which the
security was sold to satisfy, that is the measure of the amount in
controversy, and the counterclaim for return of the property sold
cannot be added to the amount of the debt to determine the amount
in controversy and give this Court jurisdiction.
Harten v.
Loeffler, 212 U. S. 397,
distinguished.
The mere fact that suits are tried together for convenience does
not amount to a consolidation, and where the understanding of the
trial judge was that there was no consolidation, this Court will
not unite the actions so that the aggregate amount will give
jurisdiction.
A judgment of the intermediate appellate court reversing and
remanding with instructions to enter judgment for plaintiff in
accordance with its decision without fixing a definite amount is
not such a final judgment as will give jurisdiction to this
Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 220 U. S. 216
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are two suits commenced in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila on the same day, February 25, 1905, and numbered
in that court as cases Nos. 3363 and 3365, respectively. In each
suit, the International Banking Company was plaintiff and Francisco
Martinez and another person as the guardian of Martinez were
defendants. After the present appeals were taken, Martinez died,
and his administrator has been substituted in his stead.
We shall separately summarize the proceedings below in the two
cases to the extent it is necessary to do so to understand the
proper disposition to be made of the appeals.
Case No. 79 was a suit of an equitable nature brought by the
bank against Martinez to foreclose a mortgage upon the steamer
Germana, sell the steamer, and collect an alleged debt of
30,000 pesos, claimed to be secured thereby. By the answer and
cross-bill, it was asserted that, at the time of executing the
mortgage, Martinez was mentally incapacitated, and hence legally
incompetent; that the whole transaction was void for fraud, duress,
and conspiracy; that the alleged indebtedness was a part of the
subject matter of the instrument sued on in the other case, the
effect of which instrument was to supersede the mortgage sued on in
this, and that plaintiff had wrongfully taken and held possession
of the steamer and refused to account for its profits. As
affirmative relief, the setting aside of the whole transaction was
demanded, as also the return of the steamer and an accounting of
its profits.
The Court of First Instance in substance sustained these
defenses, dismissed the plaintiff's suit, and directed a return of
the steamer.
Page 220 U. S. 217
It was decided in the judgment:
"This case was tried together with case No. 3365, it being
agreed that the evidence taken on the trial pertinent to either or
both cases should be considered by the court in the respective
cases."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands reversed
this judgment, held that the transaction was valid, and entered the
following judgment:
"It is ordered that the judgment appealed from the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, dated March 29, 1906, be, and
the same is hereby, reversed, and the record remanded to the court
from which it came, with directions to that court to enter judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendants, Francisco
Martinez and his guardian, Vicente Ilustre, for the sum of P.
28,599.13, and interest at the rate of eight percent per annum from
the first day of January, 1904, with costs, and that the steamship
Germana, if said judgment is not paid, be sold in
accordance with law to pay and satisfy the amount of said judgment.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court."
Case No. 80. -- This case was brought to recover a judgment for
159,607.81 pesos, with interest, and, in default of payment, for
the foreclosure of an instrument alleged to be a mortgage, the sale
of certain real estate described in the mortgage, execution in the
event of a deficiency, and for general relief. By answer and
cross-bill, the same general defenses were set up as in the other
suit. It was further averred that the alleged consideration for the
instrument sued on was "padded and fictitious," contained
duplications of the same item, and included the item of 30,000
pesos which was the subject of the other case; also that the
instrument sued on was not in law a mortgage, but was an agreement
for the transfer of property with right of repurchase (
pacto de
retro), and that the defendant had never refused to perform
such contract, but that the plaintiff had failed to perform its own
obligations thereunder;
Page 220 U. S. 218
also that the plaintiff had wrongfully taken possession of the
property in question and received its rents and profits. The
defendant demanded that the entire transaction be set aside, that
plaintiff's suit be dismissed, and that plaintiff account for the
rents and profits it had received.
The Court of First Instance found against the plaintiff, and
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant guardian for the gross
amount of the rents adjudged to have been unlawfully collected by
the plaintiff. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, and was there docketed as case No. 3,472. The
appellate court held "that the evidence is not sufficient to
establish any of the defenses or counterclaims," and
"that the defendant Martinez at the time the action was
commenced, was indebted to the plaintiff in at least the sum of P.
159,807.81, was fully established by the evidence."
The court, however, decided that the instrument claimed to be a
mortgage was not such, but was
"a promise to sell real estate upon certain terms, and
contemplates a subsequent contract of sale which should contain the
terms stated in this document,"
and that sufficient facts were stated in the complaint "to
constitute a good cause of action for the specific performance of
the contract." After referring to the fact that plaintiff had been
in possession of certain of the real property described in the
complaint and collected rentals therefrom, the court concluded its
opinion as follows:
"The net amount collected should be applied in reduction of the
sum of 159,607.81 pesos, which, according to the evidence, the
defendants owe to the plaintiff. When the case is remanded, the
defendant should have an opportunity to question the expenses
claimed to have been met by the plaintiff in connection with its
possession of these buildings, which it has deducted from the gross
amount received. "
Page 220 U. S. 219
After a consideration of the whole case, we hold that the
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the court below, with costs,
declaring that Francisco Martinez is justly indebted to it in the
sum of 159,607.81 pesos, less such sum as that court may decide
should be credited to Martinez for the net receipts from the real
estate in question in this case, with interest on the balance from
February 25th, 1905 at eight percent per annum, and ordering that
Francisco Martinez and Vicente Ilustre, as guardian of Francisco
Martinez, execute and deliver to the plaintiff, within a time to be
fixed by the court, such a contract as is contemplated by the
contract of June 15th, 1903, which should be substantially in the
form of the instrument above referred to of date February 12th,
1904, omitting therefrom, however, the steamer
Germana.
The judgment should contain a provision that whatever may be
realized from the sale of the
Germana under the judgment
in case No. 3471 shall be considered as a partial payment when
realized upon the amount found due in this action.
"The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is
remanded with instructions to that court to enter judgment for the
plaintiff in accordance with the views hereinbefore expressed. No
costs will be allowed to either party in this court."
The following judgment was subsequently entered:
"It is hereby ordered that the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, appealed from and dated March 29,
1906, be reversed and the case remanded to the court from which it
came, with directions to the judge to enter judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in accordance with the decision of this court,
without special provision as to the costs of this appeal."
The present separate appeals from the aforementioned judgments
of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands were then taken. The
petition for the allowance of the appeal in the first case (No. 79
here; No. 3471 in the Supreme
Page 220 U. S. 220
Court of the Philippine Islands) expressly recited that the
amount in controversy therein "is 30,000 pesos, equivalent to
$15,000 U.S. currency." It was, however, asserted that the cause
was "an incident and part of the same transaction and controversy
involved in cause No. 3472," and that the two cases "were . . .
consolidated and tried together in the Court of First Instance."
The appeal was allowed by one of the associate justices of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. In doing so he
declared
"that . . . there was not a strict consolidation of the two
cases . . . between the same parties by virtue of an express order
of the court, and in accordance with the procedural law, and . . .
the amount in litigation in the first of the said cases does not
exceed $15,000 United States currency."
However, substantially upon the ground of the "connection and
intimate relation" between the cases,
"the doubt produced by reasons advanced as to whether or not the
appeal interposed in case No. 3471 is admissible, notwithstanding
the fact that the amount involved does not reach the sum of $25,000
United States currency,"
was left to be determined by this Court. The appeal in the
second case was allowed by the same justice, it being recited that
it appeared "that the amount involved exceeds $25,000 United States
currency."
In the argument at bar, counsel for appellee moved that the two
appeals be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this Court. We
therefore first proceed to consider this question.
The claim of want of jurisdiction in No. 79 is based upon the
contention that the questions presented in the case could only be
reviewed provided the value of the matter in controversy exceeds
$25,000 (ยง 10, ch. 1369, Act July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691, 695), and
that the value is less than that sum. We are of opinion that the
objection is well taken. True, it is contended for the appellant
that the
Page 220 U. S. 221
amount awarded to the plaintiff by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands was 28,599.13 pesos and interest, and that the
defendant's counterclaim for the vessel and the receipts from the
use of the same amounted to 38,000.00 pesos, and that the two
amounts should be aggregated in determining the value of the matter
in controversy. The case of
Harten v. Loeffler,
212 U. S. 397, is
cited as authority. But conceding that cases may arise where the
amount of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff may be combined with
the sum demanded in a dismissed counterclaim of a defendant, to
determine whether the jurisdictional value exists, manifestly this
is not a case for the application of the doctrine. The value of the
matter in dispute in this Court is the test of our jurisdiction.
Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165.
What therefore is that matter,is the question to be considered.
Plainly it is whether Martinez was indebted to the bank, as
adjudged below, since, if the indebtedness existed, the amount
thereof is the extent of the loss which the estate of Martinez can
sustain, because, irrespective of what might be the proceeds of
sale of the vessel or of other property of the estate of Martinez,
if realized upon, no more of such proceeds could be taken than
would be sufficient to satisfy the judgment. The jurisdictional
value, however, plainly would not exist even if the vessel and its
profits were treated as the matter in dispute, since, as we have
seen, the appellant only asserts that the value of the vessel and
the profits aggregated 38,000 pesos, less than $25,000.
See, in this connection, the case of
Peyton v.
Robertson, 9 Wheat. 527, approvingly cited in the
Hilton case,
supra.
We are unable to assent to the view that the case should be
treated as having been consolidated with No. 80 -- in other words,
that the two cases are in realty but one. The suits were separately
commenced, and although tried together, this was done for
convenience, and the cases were tried not upon the theory that they
were consolidated, but
Page 220 U. S. 222
as being separate and distinct suits. Thus, it is recited in the
record that, at the commencement of the trial, on February 28,
1906, it was stipulated
"that these two cases, Nos. 3363 and 3365, may be tried
together, and that the defendants may amend their answer in 3365 as
soon as they have opportunity, as of this date."
Again, in the course of the examination of one Taylor, a witness
for the plaintiff, counsel for the defendant objected to a
question, whereupon the following colloquy ensued:
"Mr. Odlin: We are trying both cases together, but I can take
him off the stand and put him back."
"Mr. Gibbs: If this question is asked with reference to 3365, I
desire to make the further objection to the introduction of the
evidence, for the reason that the complaint in that case does not
state a cause of action."
The understanding of the trial judge that there was in fact no
consolidation of the two cases is evidenced by the judgment which
was entered by him, and that the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands entertained the same view is shown by the judgment which it
entered.
As to No. 80. The objection is that the judgment of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands is not a final one. This
objection must prevail for the reason that, although involving a
decision upon the merits of the case, the judgment of the supreme
court contemplates and requires further proceedings in the lower
court, not inconsistent with its opinion.
Clark v. Roller,
199 U. S. 541. The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands did not, in its judgment,
as was done in the judgment entered in case No. 79, fix and
determine the precise amount for which the trial court should enter
judgment. On the contrary, its direction was that judgment be
entered "in favor of the plaintiff, in accordance with the decision
of this Court." On referring to the opinion, it is seen that the
supreme court deemed that the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial
determination of the amount of the indebtedness of Martinez
Page 220 U. S. 223
to it. It is patent that the court found that the exact amount
could not be determined without further proceedings, since it in
effect left the case open in the trial court for a hearing upon the
question of the amount of expenses incurred by the bank in and
about the real property of Martinez of which it had taken
possession. Thus, in the opinion of the appellate court, it was
said:
"The net amount collected should be applied in reduction of the
sum of 159,607.81 pesos, which, according to the evidence, the
defendants owe to the plaintiff. When the case is remanded, the
defendant should have an opportunity to question the expenses
claimed to have been met by the plaintiff in connection with its
possession of these buildings, which it has deducted from the gross
amount received."
It follows that, although the appellate court fixed the rights
and liabilities of the parties, it in effect referred a question in
the case to the subordinate court for further judicial action;
hence its judgment was not final for the purpose of an appeal or
writ of error.
Drake v. Kochersperger, 170
U. S. 303;
Clark v. Kansas City, 172 U.
S. 334. Until therefore the trial court by its judgment
ascertains and fixes the actual indebtedness of the plaintiff, and
complies with the other directions contained in the mandate, it
cannot be said that a final decree has been entered in the cause.
Indeed, on the very face of the decree of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, it is manifest that this Court, if it took
jurisdiction, could not finally dispose of the case in the event it
affirmed the judgment below, since all it could do would be to
consider the matters determined by the supreme court, and do as
that court did, remand the cause for further proceedings in order
that the rights of the parties might be thereafter finally passed
upon. But the foundation upon which rests the doctrine which, as a
general rule, limits the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to
final judgments, is that
Page 220 U. S. 224
cases should not be brought here by piecemeal through the medium
of successive appeals.
The motion to dismiss the appeal in each of the cases must be
granted.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.