A question of fact under the slave trade acts. Condemnation
pronounced.
The claim of seamen for wages on a voyage undertaken in
violation of the slave trade acts out of the proceeds of the
forfeited vessel in the registry rejected.
The claims of seamen for wages and of materialmen, for supplies
where the parties were innocent of all knowledge of, or
participation in the illegal voyage preferred to the claim of
forfeiture on the part of the government.
Materialmen have a lien which may be enforced by a proceeding in
the admiralty
in rem for necessaries or supplies furnished
in a port to which the vessel does not belong.
MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This vessel, with her lading found on board at the time of
seizure, were libeled for an infraction of the laws prohibiting the
African slave trade.
The causes of forfeiture alleged in the libels comprise all
those contained in the 1st section of the act of 1794 and those of
the 2d section of the act of 1818 with the exception of the offense
of being laden for the prohibited trade.
Page 22 U. S. 410
The claims filed to this libel were
1. That of one Vinente, a Spanish subject, who alleges her to be
a regularly documented Spanish vessel engaged in traffic sanctioned
by the laws of Spain. This claim goes both to vessel and cargo.
2. Of certain seamen, who demand compensation for their wages
from the proceeds of the vessel.
3. And lastly of several materialmen who claim the payment of
their bills, alleging the vessel to be foreign, and their being
employed in her equipment and repairs by the captain, and one
Strike as his agent.
The court below condemned the vessel but restored the cargo, and
from that decree the Spanish claimant has not appealed. The fate of
the vessel therefore is irrevocably fixed, but the United States
having appealed from the decree of restitution in favor of the
cargo, that appeal gives rise to a complicated inquiry.
The court below repelled every other charge against the vessel
except that of having been "caused to sail" with a view to be
employed in the prohibited traffic. But "being caused to sail" is
not among the offenses enumerated in the latter part of the 2d
section of the act of 1818, under which alone the lading of the
vessel is subjected to forfeiture. That offense is among those
enumerated in the enacting clause of the section, but in the
forfeiting clause it is dropped, and if, therefore, the case of
this vessel exhibits no other offense than that which in the decree
below was
Page 22 U. S. 411
made the ground of her condemnation, the decree restoring the
cargo would be well sustained; hence it becomes necessary to review
the whole case.
One John Gunn, it appears, built and equipped this vessel in the
port of Norfolk as a packet, intending her for sale, but falling in
debt, it became necessary to raise a sum of money upon her hull,
and he accordingly took her to Baltimore for that purpose. When
there, he addressed himself to one Maher, who advanced him the
money, and instead of an hypothecation in ordinary form, Gunn
executed a bill of sale to Maher, admitted on all hands to have
been intended to serve only as the means of enabling Maher to
expedite the vessel on a voyage to Cuba, there to be sold, and to
account with Gunn for the proceeds as well of freight as of
sale.
This purpose Maher appears soon to have abandoned for an
enterprise of a very different nature. The vessel was put up for
freight and various applications ensued, but Maher undertook
himself to load her for St. Jago de Cuba, and Gunn left Baltimore
under the persuasion that her destination was fixed. Some time,
however, having elapsed and not hearing of her sailing, he writes
to Maher on the subject and is then informed that he had dispatched
her in ballast to St. Jago de Cuba under the care of Strike, a
personage who, from that time, makes a conspicuous figure in the
res gesta. For no sooner does she arrive at St. Jago than
she is colorably conveyed to Vinente, but still under the absolute
control of Strike, and without having
Page 22 U. S. 412
shipped an article, appears at once with a valuable cargo on
board, the property also of Strike, furnished with a Spanish
coasting license, on a voyage to Havana, thence to Matanzas, where
a part of her cargo is sold and she is completely equipped,
colorably a Spaniard but really an American, for the African
trade.
On her voyage thence to the coast of Africa, she is pursued by
hostile vessels, and in the chase sustains damage which compels her
to put into Baltimore to refit. There she encounters Gunn, her
original and equitable owner, but who finds in her nothing of her
original character but what served to identify his vessel and
expose to him how his confidence had been abused and his property
forfeited through his own indiscretion in conveying her to Maher.
In the present cause, his interests are out of the question, and he
appears only as a witness on behalf of the prosecution.
It is immaterial to inquire whether this vessel was in the
inception of her voyage, "laden" for the illegal purpose for which
she was caused to sail. The court below has attached much
importance to the omission of this allegation, and certainly, as a
substantive offense, the vessel could not have been condemned for
that cause unless comprised among the allegations in the libel.
But as to the liability of the lading found on board at the time
of the seizure to forfeiture under the act, that consequence is
made to depend upon the liability of the vessel herself to
condemnation, and although this Court is not
Page 22 U. S. 413
prepared to carry that forfeiture beyond the limits of an
intimate connection with the prohibited voyage, it is of opinion
that in this case that connection is so intimate as to leave no
doubt of its liability to the full extent of the liability of the
vessel. If, then, the evidence will sustain any one of the offenses
alleged in the libel, which offense is made a ground of forfeiture
by law, the cargo must share the fate of the vessel.
One of those allegations is that she was fitted out, and,
contrary to the opinion of the court below, we think the evidence
establishes that she was fitted out for the prohibited trade. This
conclusion we place on the ground assumed in the cases of the
Emily and
Caroline, decided at the present term.
The general purposes of the enterprise in its inception are
affirmed by the ground on which the court below founded its
sentence against the vessel, and are fully made out by her
subsequent conduct. This point being established, it follows that
acts which otherwise would be indifferent and might be intended as
well for an innocent as a prohibited enterprise become offenses
with a view to their purpose. Besides these, the utter
improbability that this voyage could have been undertaken from
Baltimore to St. Jago without many acts which would amount to a
fitting out, we have the positive words of Maher himself, the
dux facti in the transaction, in his letter of 28 October
to Gunn, in which, when speaking of having dispatched the
Page 22 U. S. 414
vessel to St. Jago, he says, "Mr. Strike has an account of all
her expenses in fitting out."
This charge, therefore, we consider as established against her,
and this is one of the enumerated offenses which subject vessel and
lading to forfeiture.
The court below having subjected the vessel to forfeiture and
the proceeds being in the registry, was then called on to
distribute those proceeds among the various claimants, the seamen
and materialmen. Among the former it dismissed all except that of
Pietro Rosso. From the decree, as to those whose claims are
dismissed, there is no appeal, and the Court is not called on to
pass an opinion upon the grounds of the decision as relates to
their claims. But the decree in favor of Pietro Rosso is appealed
from by the United States, and it becomes necessary to examine that
part of the decree which awards him both his account and precedence
in payment of it.
We think it erroneous and that it must be reversed, since it is
impossible to believe that he entered this vessel without a perfect
knowledge of her character and destination. Spanish masters, in
common with all others, may commit infractions of the act of 1818
within the ports of the United States, and it is easy to conceive
that engaging a crew, as well as many other acts of preparation for
this trade, may be committed by a vessel coming lawfully into the
ports of this country. If the plea of stress of weather and other
incidental embarrassments be set up as taking a
Page 22 U. S. 415
vessel out of the action of the laws against the slave trade, it
is incumbent on the party who claims benefit of the excuse to
establish it. In the present instance, this seaman was engaged in
the port of Baltimore, and so far was the vessel from a want of
seamen, that we find the master actually refusing recruits when
offered by Strike to be put on board his vessel. If one seaman may
be engaged, why may not a crew?; the offense is the same in
essence, though not in magnitude. The general policy of the law is
to discountenance every contribution, even of the minutest kind, to
this traffic in our ports, and the act of engaging seamen is an
unequivocal preparatory measure for such an enterprise. This part
of the decree therefore must also be reversed.
The next question arises on the claims of the materialmen, or
rather of those whose claims were sustained in the court below.
From those which were rejected there is no appeal.
On this point the material facts are these: that this vessel,
although appearing under the character of a foreign vessel, was in
reality in her home port, and this whether considered as the
property of Gunn or of Maher and Strike. The questions then arise
on what does the privilege of materialmen depend? On the state of
facts or on their knowledge or belief of facts? On the actual
absence of a vessel from her home port, other power given to the
shipmaster in another port to subject his vessel to admiralty
process and implied lien in favor of materialmen? And lastly,
whether the prior forfeiture of the
Page 22 U. S. 416
vessel to the United States precludes their general rights and
places them on the footing of subsequent purchasers, whether with
or without notice of the forfeiture?
These questions are all solved by a reference to the nature,
origin, and objects of maritime contracts. The precedence of
forfeiture has never been carried further than to overreach common
law contracts entered into by the owner, and it would be
unreasonable to extend them further. The whole object of giving
admiralty process and priority of payment to privileged creditors
is to furnish wings and legs to the forfeited hull, to get back for
the benefit of all concerned -- that is, to complete her
voyage.
There are two considerations that fully illustrate this
position. It is not in the power of anyone but the shipmaster, not
the owner himself, to give these implied liens on the vessel, and
in every case the last lien given will supersede the preceding. The
last bottomry bond will ride over all that precede it, and an
abandonment to a salvor will supersede every prior claim.
The vessel must get on; this is the consideration that controls
every other, and not only the vessel, but even the cargo, is
sub modo subjected to this necessity.
For these purposes, the law maritime attaches the power of
pledging or subjecting the vessel to materialmen, to the office of
shipmaster, and considers the owner as vesting him with those
powers by the mere act of constituting him shipmaster. The
necessities of commerce require,
Page 22 U. S. 417
that when remote from his owner, he should be able to subject
his owner's property to that liability without which, it is
reasonable to suppose, he will not be able to pursue his owner's
interests. But when the owner is present, the reason ceases, and
the contract is inferred to be with the owner himself, on his
ordinary responsibility, without a view to the vessel as the fund
from which compensation is to be derived. From this view of the
subject, this Court will be best understood when it speaks of the
home port of the vessel, an epithet which, it is very easy to
perceive, has no necessary reference to state or other limits. And
from this view of the subject it results both that the forfeiture
does not ride over the rights derived under maritime contracts,
whether they be called liens or privileges, and that the real
owners of a vessel, who have themselves contributed to give her a
foreign aspect or character, hold out the foreign captain to
materialmen as one legally authorized to exercise the rights and
powers over his vessel which appertain to a foreign vessel. They
are thus precluded by their own act from denying her foreign
character. In case of wreck and salvage, it is unquestionable that
forfeitures would be superseded, and we see no ground on which to
preclude any other maritime claim fairly and honestly acquired.
We concur, then, in the opinion of the court below that the fair
claims of seamen and subsequent materialmen are not overreached by
the previous forfeiture, and that, even in the homeport, a vessel
may be subjected to the liabilities of
Page 22 U. S. 418
a vessel in a strange port by being falsely held up as foreign
by her owners. And the question will now be considered whether
these materialmen have sustained their claims against this vessel
upon that principle.
With this view, the claims must be examined separately.
The large claim of Maher himself the real owner but affected
agent of the vessel has been properly rejected, and he has not
appealed.
That of Despreux for $1,856 was sustained in the court below,
and from that the United States appeals.
This item, we are of opinion, is affected by express notice.
Guion swears that upon the arrival of the vessel at Baltimore, he
gave notice to Despreux of her American character, warned him
against repairing her, and received for answer that he was secured
for the repairs. There is nothing in the transcript to repel this
evidence, but many circumstances to corroborate it. He therefore
does not bring himself within the rule.
There is, however, one item in this account, to the amount of
$300 or $400, which was certainly good against all the world. This
was for wharfage, but the credits in the account will more than
cover it, and having been paid by Maher, or Strike, his employer,
it is but reasonable that the payments should be applied to the
item entitled to precedence.
The three claims of Hubbard & Co. for $72.04, James Ramsay
for $645.99,
Page 22 U. S. 419
and Richard Coleman for $256.03 have nothing in their
circumstances to distinguish them from each other. They all allege
the vessel to be foreign, and as she was, in fact, not foreign, the
question is whether there was an imposition practiced upon them
under circumstances calculated to deceive and mislead men of
ordinary vigilance.
We are of opinion there was not. It appears that immediately on
the vessel's arrival, she was libeled by Gunn, and although some
difficulty has existed in the cause in consequence of Gunn's
libel's not having been inserted in the transcript, yet there are
documents connected with it inserted which sufficiently explain the
tenor and purport of the libel if any doubt could be entertained
what that tenor was. These are the answer and claim to it, and a
retraction of that claim, from which it appears that during the
whole time these materialmen were furnishing this vessel, she was
under arrest by the court of admiralty under a libel claiming her
as American property in her home port, which claim the retraction
of the answer filed to the libel fully admits. There was, then, to
say the least of the facts, enough to put reasonable men upon
inquiry. Despreux, it appears, was put upon inquiry and obtained
security, and with ordinary prudence or vigilance these materialmen
may have done the same. Many facts in the case concur to affect
them with suspicion of positive knowledge of her real character. We
think they have not sustained the exception made in the court below
in their favor
Page 22 U. S. 420
from the general doctrine that such claims cannot be sustained
against a vessel in her home port.
The decree of the court below, therefore, so far as the appeal
of the United States brings it before this Court, will be reversed
and the proceeds of the vessel and cargo adjudged to the United
States.
Decree reversed.
DECREE. This cause came on to be heard, &c., on
consideration whereof it is ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and DECREED that so
much of the decree of the circuit court as affirms the decree of
the district court dismissing so much of the libel as relates to
the lading of said vessel, and also so much thereof as sustains the
several claims of Pietro Rosso, Joseph Despreux, Hubbard and Carr,
James Ramsay, and Richard Coleman, be, and the same hereby is
annulled. And it is further DECREED and ORDERED that the proceeds
of the cargo or lading of the said schooner
St. Jago de
Cuba and so much of the proceeds of the sale of the said
schooner as is embraced in the appeal to this Court be and the same
are hereby condemned as forfeited to the United States, and that
the proceeds of the said schooner
St. Jago de Cuba and her
cargo be distributed according to law, for which purpose this cause
is remanded to the said circuit court with instructions to make
such distribution.