The technical niceties of the common law are not regarded in
admiralty proceedings. It is sufficient if an information set forth
the offense so as clearly to bring it within the statute upon which
the information is founded. It is not necessary that it should
conclude
contra formam statuti.
The district court of the district where the seizure was made,
and not where the offense was committed, has jurisdiction of
proceedings
in rem for an alleged forfeiture.
If the seizure is made on the high seas, or within the territory
of a foreign power, the jurisdiction is conferred on the court of
the district where the property is carried and proceeded
against.
A municipal seizure, within the territory of a foreign power
does not oust the jurisdiction of the- district court into whose
district the property may be carried for adjudication:
The prohibitions in the Slave Trade Acts of 10 May 1800, c. 205,
and of 20 April, 1818, extend as well to the carrying of slaves on
freight as to cases where the persons transported are the property
of citizens of the United States, and to the carrying them from one
port to another of the same foreign empire as well as from one
foreign country to another.
Under the fourth section of the Act of 10 May 1800, c. 205, the
owner of the slaves transported contrary to the provisions of that
act cannot claim the same in a court of the United States, although
they may be held in servitude according to the laws of his own
country. But if, at the time of the capture by a commissioned
vessel, the offending ship was in possession of a noncommissioned
captor who had made a seizure for the same offense, the owner of
the slaves may claim the section only applying to persons
interested in the enterprise or voyage in which the ship was
employed at the time of such capture.
These were the cases of several vessels, and their
Page 22 U. S. 392
cargoes of African slaves. The information filed in the case of
the Constitution was as well on behalf of the United States as of
George M. Brooke, a Colonel in the army of the United States. The
first count, after stating the seizure of this vessel with a
valuable cargo on board and eighty-four African slaves by the said
Brooke, on waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten tons
burden and upwards, alleges that the said vessel, being a vessel of
the United States, owned by citizens of the United States, was
employed in carrying on trade, business or traffic, contrary to the
true intent of an act of Congress, passed on 10 May, 1800,
entitled, "an act to prohibit the carrying on of the slave trade
from the United States to any foreign place or country," that is to
say, was employed or made use of in the transportation of slaves
from one foreign country to another,
viz., from Havana to
Pensacola, both places belonging to the King of Spain, contrary to
the form of the said act, whereby the said vessel and her cargo
became forfeited.
It was admitted by the counsel for the respondents that the
second and third counts were unsupported by the evidence, and they
were therefore abandoned.
The fourth count charges that certain citizens of the United
States did, in June, 1818, take on board or transport from one
foreign place or country to another certain negroes in a vessel for
the purpose of holding, selling, or otherwise disposing of them as
slaves or to be held to labor or service. In the case of the
Merino, the information
Page 22 U. S. 393
contains three counts, the second of which alone was relied upon
by the counsel for the respondent, and this states that on the ___
day of June, 1818, certain citizens of the United States received
on board of the said vessel, belonging to citizens of the United
States, and transported from one foreign place or country,
viz., from Cuba to Pensacola, a certain number of negroes
for the purpose of holding the said negroes as slaves, and that the
said vessel, with her cargo and the negroes, were, on 21 June,
1818, seized on the high seas by Capt. McKeever, commander of the
United States ketch
Surprise, and were brought into the
District of Mobile for a violation of the laws of the United
States, and particularly of the 4th section of the act of 1818.
The information in the case of the
Louisa and her cargo
was substantially the same as the one last mentioned, the second
count being also founded on the 4th section of the act of 1818.
The evidence in these cases established the following facts,
viz., that the above vessels, owned by citizens of the
United States and registered as such, sailed from certain ports in
the United States to Havana, where they each received on board
certain goods, as also a number of slaves, newly imported from the
coast of Africa, the latter belonging to subjects of Spain,
residents either of Havana or Pensacola, to be transported from the
former to the latter place. The
Merino cleared out at
Havana on 2 June, 1818, for Mobile, and the
Constitution
and
Louisa on the 10th of the same month, for New
Orleans.
Page 22 U. S. 394
The owners of these vessels, however, engaged to land the slaves
at Pensacola on their respective voyages to New Orleans and Mobile.
On their arrival within or near to the Bay of Pensacola, that place
was found in possession of the American army under the command of
Gen. Jackson. The
Merino was seized by the United States
ketch
Surprise, commanded by Capt. McKeever, within a mile
and a half of Fort Barancas, inside the bar, and within the harbor
of Pensacola. The
Constitution was taken possession of by
Col. Brooke, of the United States army, under the guns of Fort
Barancas, then in possession of the United States forces. The
Louisa was captured by Capt. McKeever in the ketch before
mentioned outside of the bar at Pensacola, standing in. These
vessels, with their goods on board and the negroes, were sent to
the District of Mobile for adjudication. The Constitution, having
on board an agent of Col. Brooke, was boarded off Mobile Point by
the United States revenue boat and was carried in and reported by
Capt. Lewis, commanding said boat, to the collector as having been
seized by him, the agent reporting the seizure as having been made
by Col. Brooke.
The informations against these vessels and their cargoes were
filed in the General Court for the Territory of Alabama, from
whence the proceedings were removed into the District Court of
Alabama, where the vessels and their cargoes were severally
condemned as forfeited to the United States, but the distribution
was reserved for the future order of the court. From these
Page 22 U. S. 395
sentences of condemnation the claimants of the vessels and the
cargoes appealed to this Court.
Page 22 U. S. 399
MR. JUSTICE WASHINGTON delivered the opinion of the Court, and
after stating the case, proceeded to enumerate the objections made
by the counsel
Page 22 U. S. 400
for the appellants to the several decrees of the court
below.
1. That the regular admiralty process was not issued in these
cases.
2. That the informations do not conclude against the form of the
statute.
3. That the District Court of Alabama had not jurisdiction, the
seizures having been made, not within the waters of that state, or
on the high seas, but within the jurisdiction of a foreign
nation.
4. That the acts of Congress on which these informations are
founded were intended to apply exclusively to the suppression of
the slave trade from the coast of Africa or elsewhere for the
purpose of holding or disposing of the subjects of the trade, as
slaves, and not to the carrying of them when in a state of slavery
from one foreign country to another.
1. That the proceedings in these cases were not conducted with
the regularity usually observed in admiralty causes must be
admitted. But the Court is of opinion that all objections of this
nature were waived by the appearance of the parties interested in
the property seized and filing their claims to the same. In each
case, a warrant issued to the Marshal to seize the property libeled
and to cite and admonish all persons claiming an interest in the
same to appear before the court and to show cause why the same
should not be condemned as forfeited to the United States. This
process was returned executed, and claims were interposed for the
several vessels and their
Page 22 U. S. 401
cargoes by the asserted owners thereof. Upon the strictest rules
which govern in courts of common law, objections to the regularity
of the process to enforce an appearance would be considered as
removed by the appearance of the party and pleading to the
merits.
2. The second objection is without foundation in fact in
relation to the information against the
Constitution and
her cargo, and we think it inadmissible in point of law in the
other two cases, the count relied upon in those informations
stating expressly that the seizure was made for a violation of the
4th section of the act of 1818, the title of which is accurately
set forth. For all the purposes of justice and of notice to the
claimant of the charge which he was called upon to answer, this
must be deemed sufficient, and the addition of the technical words
contra formam statuti is altogether formal and
unnecessary. In the cases of
The Samuel, 1
Wheat. 9, and,
The Hoppet, 7
Cranch 389, it was observed by this Court that technical niceties
of the common law as to informations, which are unimportant in
themselves and stand only on precedents, are not regarded in
admiralty information, the material inquiry in the latter cases
being whether the offense is so set forth as clearly to bring it
within the statute upon which the information is founded.
3. The objection raised to the jurisdiction of the District
Court of Alabama is principally grounded upon the 9th section of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. which provides
"That the district courts shall have exclusive original
cognizance
Page 22 U. S. 402
of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of
the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are
navigable from the sea, by vessels of ten or more tons burden,
within their respective districts, as well as upon the high
seas."
It is contended, that the seizures in these cases were not made
upon the high seas or upon waters within the District of Alabama,
and therefore the jurisdiction was not conferred on that court. The
section above recited marks out not only the general jurisdiction
of the district courts, but that of the several district courts in
relation to each other in cases of seizures on waters of the United
States navigable from the sea by vessels of a particular burden. If
made within the waters of one district, the jurisdiction attaches
to the court of that district and the suit must be there
prosecuted. The jurisdiction, in these cases is given to the court
of the district not where the offense was committed but where the
seizure is made. But where the seizure is made on the high seas,
the jurisdiction is conferred upon no particular district court,
and it may therefore be exercised by the court of any district into
which the property is carried, and there proceeded against. In like
manner, if the seizure be made within the waters of a foreign
nation, as was done in these cases, cognizance of the cause is
given, under the general expressions of the section as to civil
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to the court of the
district into which the property
Page 22 U. S. 403
is conducted and on which the prosecution is instituted. The
illegality of the service in this latter case has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction, as was decided by this Court in
the case of
The Richmond,
9 Cranch 102.
4. The last objection involves the merits of these causes. In
the case of the
Constitution, the counsel for the
appellees rely upon the first and fourth counts in the information,
and in the two other cases on the second count. But we think that
the first count in the first of these cases must be put out of
view, because although it charges a violation of the act of 1794,
it states the offense within the words of the Act of 10 May, 1800,
and yet it alleges it to have been committed contrary to the form
of the act of 1794, the title of which is specially recited. This
was no doubt a mistake of the proctor, but it partakes too much of
substance to be the foundation of a sentence of condemnation in a
case so highly penal as this is. But that count is not, in the
opinion of the Court, material to the decision of that case,
because, we are all of opinion that the fourth count is fully
supported by the evidence in the cause, and warrants the sentence
of condemnation pronounced by the inferior court. This count is
strictly within the 4th section of the act of 1818, and so is the
second count in the informations against the
Merino and
Louisa and their cargoes.
The argument relied upon by the counsel for the appellants was
that the policy of our laws from the year 1794 down to the latest
act of legislation has been confined to the suppression of
Page 22 U. S. 404
the slave trade and to prevent, as far as could be done, the
bringing into bondage those persons who were free in their own
country, and that since the condition of persons already slaves
cannot be changed or made worse by their removal from one
slave-holding country to another, the acts of 1800 and 1818 ought
not to be so construed as to prohibit citizens of the United States
being concerned in such removals.
It may well be doubted, whether even the act of 1794, the first
which passed upon this subject, can fairly receive the narrow
construction which is contended for, since it prohibits the fitting
of vessels within the United States not only for the purpose of
procuring from any foreign kingdom the inhabitants thereof to be
transported to some foreign country to be disposed of as slaves,
but also for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in
slaves to any foreign country, apparently embracing the two cases
of free persons of color whose condition is changed by being
brought into a state of slavery and also persons already slaves and
intended to be used as subjects of traffic. Be this as it may, the
language of the acts of 1800 and 1818 leaves no reasonable doubt
that the intention of the legislature was to prevent citizens of or
residents within the United States from affording any facilities to
this trade, although they should have no interest or property in
the slaves themselves and although they should not be immediately
instrumental to the transportation of them from their native
country. By the former of these laws, the offense is made to
consist
Page 22 U. S. 405
in the employment of a vessel belonging to citizens of the
United States or to persons resident within the same in carrying
slaves from one foreign country or place to another, no matter for
what purpose. By the latter, it consists in the taking on board or
transporting from Africa or from any foreign country or place any
negro, &c., in any vessel, for the purpose of holding or
disposing of such person as a slave or to be held to service,
&c., where those acts are performed by citizens of or residents
within the United States.
It cannot be questioned but that the case of the
Constitution, as stated in the information, and proved by
the evidence, is literally within the provisions of the latter act.
The slaves seized in that vessel were taken on board of her by a
citizen of the United States in one foreign place for the purpose
of their being held to service or labor. The Court does not feel
itself justified in restraining the general expression of this law
upon the ground of a supposed policy the reality of which, to say
the most of it, is very questionable. The sentence, therefore, of
the court below in the case of this vessel and her cargo must be
affirmed.
The same decision would, of course, be made in the cases of the
Merino and the
Louisa and their cargoes if it
were not for the circumstance that the second count in the
informations against those vessels alleges that the citizens of the
United States who took the slaves on board at the Havana did so for
the purpose of holding them as slaves, which allegation is not
proved by the evidence in those cases. They were taken on board
Page 22 U. S. 406
merely as passengers, to be delivered at Pensacola to their
owners or to those to whom they were consigned. The sentences in
these two cases must therefore be reversed and the causes remitted
to the district court with directions to permit the libellants to
amend, it being obvious to this Court from the evidence that the
negroes taken on board of those vessels were transported for the
purpose of their being held to service.
The three remaining cases, present the claims of the asserted
owners of the slaves transported in the above vessels, from Havana
to Pensacola, which were brought before the court below in the form
of libels for restitution. To these libels no claims were filed,
and the sentence of the court in each of the cases was "that the
slaves remain subject to the laws of Alabama," from which decision
appeals were taken, and as they amount substantially to a
dismission of the libels, it becomes necessary to examine their
correctness. The ownership of the slaves, as claimed by the
respective libellants, appears to the Court to be sufficiently
established. It is in proof that slavery was and is permitted to
exist in the Island of Cuba, either by particular ordinances of the
Spanish government or by custom; that the slaves in question were
imported into that island from Africa by Antonio de Frias, and were
shipped at Havana for Pensacola by these libellants as their
property under a passport regularly granted by the Governor-General
of Cuba, the slaves claimed by the libellants, other than Frias,
having been purchased from him by those libellants. It would
Page 22 U. S. 407
seem unreasonable to require other or better proof of ownership
in property of this description than these facts furnish.
The only question, then, is whether these persons are prevented
from claiming restitution of these slaves by any law of the United
States. The only act which bears upon this subject is that of 10
May, 1800, the 4th section of which, after declaring that it should
be lawful for any of the commissioned vessels of the United States
to seize any vessel employed in carrying on trade, business, or
traffic, contrary to the intent and meaning of that act or the act
of 1794, enacts, that
"All persons interested in such vessel or in the enterprise or
voyage in which such vessel shall be employed at the time of such
capture shall be precluded from all right or claim to the slaves
found on board such vessel and from all damages or retribution on
account thereof."
There can be no question but that this section is strictly
applicable to the claimants of the slaves on board the
Merino and
Louisa, those vessels having been
seized whilst employed in carrying on trade forbidden by the act of
1800, by a commissioned vessel of the United States. The case of
the claimants of the slaves on board of the
Constitution
is different. That vessel, with her cargo, was seized in the bay of
Pensacola by a military officer, and was conducted by his agent to
Mobile for the purpose of being libeled for his use. The 1st
section of this act, which declares the forfeiture of any vessel
belonging to a citizen of the United States employed in
transporting slaves from one foreign country to another,
Page 22 U. S. 408
contains a provision that the said vessel may be libeled and
condemned for the use of the person who shall sue for the same. The
right to seize the vessel and slaves on board would seem to be a
necessary consequence of the right to enforce the forfeiture. The
possession of the vessel, then, being lawfully vested in Col.
Brooke, at the time she was boarded by the revenue boat off Mobile
Point, it could not with any propriety be asserted that she was
employed in carrying on trade contrary to law at the time she was
so boarded. Her employment in such trade was completely terminated
by the first seizure, and she was on her way for adjudication when
the second seizure was made. If, under these circumstances, a
capture of the vessel could not be legally made by the revenue
boat, then the claims of the owners of the slaves on board is not
precluded by the 4th section of the act of 1800, the sentence above
quoted applying only to persons interested in the voyage in which
the vessel was employed at the time of such capture.
The Court is therefore of opinion that in the case of Antonio de
Frias and David Nagle against eighty-four African slaves, the
sentence of the court below is erroneous and ought to be reversed,
and that a decree of restitution ought to be made.
Sentence in the case of the Constitution affirmed. Sentences
in the cases of the Louisa and Merino reversed, with leave to
amend. Sentence reversed as to the claim of Frias and Nagle, and
restitution decreed.
