The United States court at a particular place named is a
sufficient designation of the only court of the United States held
at that place, which has jurisdiction of the case, and an order
transmitting a case under the Act of June 28, 1898, c. 517, 30
Stat. 511, to the United States court at Paris, Texas, is
sufficient to transfer the case to the District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Texas and to give that court
jurisdiction.
Page 219 U. S. 80
Where the record is not here, and the jurisdictional facts are
admitted, and the order recited that the court was well advised in
the premises, this Court will not hold that the court to which the
case was removed on petition of plaintiff in error himself did not
acquire jurisdiction because the petition did not state all the
jurisdictional facts required by the statute authorizing the
removal.
While the repeal of a statute giving special jurisdiction to a
court may operate to deprive that court of the jurisdiction so
conferred, the mere enactment of a subsequent statute which
obviates future application of the earlier statute does not amount
to its repeal or affect jurisdiction already acquired.
The provisions of the Oklahoma Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, c.
335, 34 Stat. 267, as amended March 4, 1907, c. 2911, 34 Stat.
1287, transferring criminal cases pending in the United States
courts of the Indian Territory to the courts of Oklahoma did not
repeal the Act of June 28, 1898, c. 517, 30 Stat. 511, or affect
cases which had already been transferred under that act to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
In this case,
held that it was not error for the trial
court to refuse to allow the wife of one accused of murder to
testify.
Logan v. United States, 144 U.
S. 263.
There was no error on the part of the trial court in denying a
motion for a new trial based on affidavits of some of the jurors
that they agreed to the verdict on the understanding between
themselves and other jurors that the punishment of the degree found
would be less than that imposed by the court.
Mattox v. United
States, 146 U. S. 140.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 219 U. S. 86
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Hendrix was indicted in the United States court in the Indian
Territory for the crime of murder, for killing one Roler W. Voss.
On his motion, the case was transferred for trial to the United
States court for the Eastern District of Texas at Paris, Texas. The
order transferring the case recited that it was made on the motion
of Hendrix, "the court being well advised in the premises."
On the fourth of March, 1909, in the district court, he objected
to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the crime was
committed in the State of Oklahoma, and
"that, under the Act of Congress known as the 'Enabling Act,'
passed June 16, 1906, all criminal cases pending in the United
States court within the Indian Territory were transferred to the
district courts of the State of Oklahoma and of the county of said
state where the alleged offense is said to have been
committed."
A motion was made to send the cause to such county, to the end
that the offense
"be tried in the county and state where alleged to have been
committed, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States
and the statutes made in pursuance thereof."
The motion was supported by the affidavit of the attorney of
Hendrix, which stated that he was instrumental in having the cause
removed to Paris, Texas, on account of the prejudice of the
presiding judge of the Southern District of the Indian Territory,
and that,
"under the federal statute permitting said removal to be made,
the same was done by Will Hendrix on my advice and suggestion,
especially for the reason before mentioned. . . . "
Page 219 U. S. 87
The motion was denied. Hendrix was convicted and sentenced to
hard labor for life in the penitentiary of the United States at
Atlanta, Georgia.
A motion for a new trial was made, stating as the grounds
thereof certain rulings upon evidence, and the action of the court
in denying the motion to transfer the case to Garvin County,
Oklahoma. And the same grounds constitute the assignments of error
in this Court.
Another ground is urged in the argument. It is urged that the
district court at Paris, Texas, did not have jurisdiction of the
person of Hendrix, because, as it is contended, the order of the
court changing the venue of the case directed it to be transmitted
"to the United States court at Paris, Texas," and did not designate
the district court, as required by the statute. "There were
district and circuit courts," it is said, "for the Eastern District
of Texas at Paris, Texas, but no court by the name of the
United States court.'" And it is asked, "to which of these
courts was this case transferred?" The question is easily answered.
The statute under which the change of venue was made
provides
"that, whenever a member of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations is
indicted for homicide, he may, within thirty days after such
indictment, . . . file . . . his affidavit that he cannot get a
fair trial, . . . and it thereupon shall be the duty of the judge .
. . to order a change of venue in such case to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas at Fort Smith,
Arkansas, or to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas at Paris, Texas. . . ."
30 Stat. 511, c. 517. Reading the order of the court changing
the venue of the case in connection with the statute, the order is
not uncertain. Besides, the record was transferred and filed in the
district court at Paris, Texas, and Hendrix was tried in that
court. In other words, the case was removed to the only United
States court at Paris, Texas, designated by the statute,
Page 219 U. S. 88
and tried in the only United States court there in which it
could be tried.
It is further contended that such district court had no
jurisdiction of the person of Hendrix because the order of removal
did not recite "the jurisdictional facts or findings authorizing
such change of venue," nor are such facts or findings shown by the
record. That is, it is not shown that he was a member of the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. To both objections it might be
immediately answered that a complete record of the case is not
here. The affidavit upon which the order of removal was made is not
here. It is not denied that an affidavit was filed, as required by
the statute, and it may be assumed that it was sufficient to
justify the action of the court. It is admitted that Hendrix is an
Indian and a member of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. The
motion for change of venue was made by him, and could only have
been made by him, and the order recites that the court granted the
motion, "being well advised in the premises." This means advised by
Hendrix in the way provided by the statute. And it has indubitable
confirmation in the affidavit of his attorney, filed in support of
the motion to send the case back to Oklahoma. It is stated that the
motion for removal was made "under the federal statute permitting
said removal to be made."
The inference is palpable that the jurisdictional fact that
Hendrix was an Indian was presented to the court and constituted
its ground of action, action which, we may say, was imperatively
required by the statute.
The next contention of Hendrix is that jurisdiction was taken
from the district court in Texas by § 20 of the act to enable the
people of Oklahoma to form a constitution and a state government,
as amended March 4, 1907. By that section, it was provided that all
causes, civil and criminal, pending in the United States courts of
Oklahoma Territory, or in the United States courts in the
Indian
Page 219 U. S. 89
Territory at the time those territories should become a state,
not transferred to the United States circuit court or district
courts in the State of Oklahoma, should be proceeded with, held,
and determined by the courts of the state, with rights of appeal to
the final appellate court of the state and to the Supreme Court of
the United States. And it is provided that
"all criminal cases pending in the United States courts in the
Indian Territory not transferred to the United States circuit or
district courts in the State of Oklahoma shall be prosecuted to a
final determination in the state courts of Oklahoma under the laws
now in force in that territory."
34 Stat. 1287, c. 2911.
The argument is that, by certain acts of Congress, explained in
In re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, the
United States courts in the Indian Territory were given
jurisdiction of offenses committed in the territory against the
laws of the United States, and that the laws which conferred
jurisdiction on the United States courts held in Arkansas, Kansas,
and Texas, outside of the limits of the territory, were repealed.
But we have seen that, by § 29 of the Act of June 28, 1898, a
change of venue of cases in the United States courts of the
territory could be invoked by a member of the Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations, and that, under the statute, the venue of the pending case
was, on the motion of Hendrix, changed to the district court at
Paris, Texas. It is, however, contended that the power of the court
to make the order
"had been taken away and repealed by the Act of Congress known
as the 'Enabling Act,' and the State of Oklahoma had been erected
and the state courts had succeeded to the jurisdiction of the
United States courts in the Indian Territory."
The "Enabling Act," it is urged,
"makes no exception or provision saving cases pending in the
United States court in the Indian Territory, nor any provision
saving cases then pending in any of the United States courts"
at Paris,
Page 219 U. S. 90
Texas, or in the Eastern District of Texas, on change of venue,
and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to try Hendrix. To
support the contention it is argued that when the jurisdiction of a
cause depends upon a statute, the repeal of the statute takes away
the jurisdiction and causes pending at the time fall unless saved
by provision of the statute. Many cases are cited to support the
proposition, and other cases to sustain the view that, "if an act
conferring jurisdiction is repealed without reservation as to
pending cases, they fall with it." The effect would have to be
admitted if the imputed cause existed. The Act of June 28, 1898,
under which the change of venue was ordered, was not repealed. The
conditions of its future application, of course, disappeared with
the admission of the state in the Union, but what had been done
before that time was not abrogated, nor was the statute repealed.
It had performed its office as to the pending case, but even if we
should consider it necessarily as a continuing power, not
completely fulfilling its purpose by the transfer simply of a case
from one court to another, we cannot regard it as having been
repealed, nor that jurisdiction had been taken from the district
court at Paris, Texas. The "Enabling Act" provides only for the
transfer of cases to the courts of Oklahoma which were pending in
the District Court of the Territory of Oklahoma and in the United
States courts of Indian Territory. That this case was so pending
was the conception of counsel when the motion was made to transfer
it to the district court of Gravin County, Oklahoma, and the same
conception is expressed in the argument. And it is necessary to
meet the words of the Enabling Act, which embraced, as we have
seen, only cases pending in the courts of Oklahoma and Indian
territories. The foundation of the conception seems to be that the
venue of the case was not legally changed to the District Court at
Paris, Texas, and that it was still pending in the United States
court in
Page 219 U. S. 91
the Indian Territory when the Enabling Act was passed, and was
transferred by the act to the courts of the state. To this
operation of the act we cannot assent. The act is explicit in its
terms and provisions. It was careful in its accommodations for the
new conditions -- the change of the territories into a state, and
in the adjustments made necessary by the creation of new
jurisdictions, state and federal. There was no such necessity for
cases transferred to other jurisdictions still adequate to dispose
of them. The contention is therefore untenable.
It is assigned as error that the wife of Hendrix was not allowed
to testify in his behalf to certain matters which, it is contended,
were "vitally material to his defense." The ruling was not error.
Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263.
On the motion for new trial, affidavits of four jurors were
offered, stating with some detail that they did not understand the
legal effect of the verdict. Only one of the affidavits is in the
record. The maker states that, by finding the defendant guilty, as
charged in the indictment, without capital punishment,
"he did not understand what the punishment would be on such a
verdict, and agreed to it on the understanding that the punishment
would only be two years in the penitentiary."
He further states that he was in favor of a verdict for
manslaughter, and would never have consented to the verdict had he
thought or believed it "would carry with it a life penalty." The
motion for new trial, as we have said, was denied. We see no error
in the ruling.
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.
S. 140.
The other errors assigned are not pressed in the argument.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents.