Habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the functions of a writ
of error, and this court is concerned only with the questions of
whether the information is sufficient, or whether the committing
court properly applied the law if that court had jurisdiction to
try the issues and render the judgment.
Harlan v.
McGourin, 218 U. S. 442.
The provisions and prohibitions of § 1176 of the Revised
Statutes relating to the District of Columbia are not limited to
transactions previously licensed by the Act of August 23, 1871, but
expressly include gift enterprises conducted in any manner, whether
defined in said act or otherwise.
Section 1177 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of
Columbia punishes a recognized category of offenses within the
power of Congress to punish, and is not controlled or rendered
invalid by a definition of the prohibited crime in an earlier
statute which has been repealed.
Where the statute defining the crime is valid, it is within the
range of judicial consideration to determine whether the acts of
the accused are within the definition, and if the court has
jurisdiction, its judgment cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus.
The Police Court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to
try persons charged on information of violating § 1177 of the
Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia prohibiting
engaging in gift enterprises, and the judgment of that court
determining that the acts of accused fell within the definition of
gift enterprise is not reviewable on habeas corpus proceedings.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality and construction
of §§ 1176, 1177 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District
of Columbia prohibiting and punishing gift enterprises, and the
validity of a conviction thereunder, are stated in the opinion.
Page 219 U. S. 212
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. By information
filed in the Police Court of the District of Columbia, the
petitioner was charged with engaging "in
Page 219 U. S. 213
the business of a gift enterprise" in violation of § 1177 of the
Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia. Thereupon an
agreed statement of facts was filed by which it appeared that the
petitioner, as the managing officer of the Sperry & Hutchinson
Company, was conducting, within the District, its business of
issuing and redeeming so-called "trading stamps" in the particular
manner set forth. It was stipulated that the statement should be
considered as a part of the information, and the petitioner made a
motion to quash. This motion was sustained, and the petitioner was
discharged. On writ of error, the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia reversed the judgment of the Police Court and ordered
the cause to be remanded for further proceedings in conformity with
its opinion. Application was made to this Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was refused. 218 U.S. 673. The petitioner was
then arraigned in the Police Court, pleaded not guilty, and waived
trial by jury, and the case was submitted to the court upon the
agreed statement. Judgment of guilty was entered, and the
petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine. He then obtained leave of
this Court to file the present petition.
The only question before us is whether the Police Court had
jurisdiction. A habeas corpus proceeding cannot be made to perform
the function of a writ of error, and we are not concerned with the
question whether the information was sufficient, or whether the
acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is
to say, whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found
that the court had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the
judgment.
Ex Parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38;
Ex Parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193;
Ex Parte Parks,
93 U. S. 18;
Ex
Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651;
In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731;
Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U. S. 612;
In re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481;
Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138;
Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U. S. 540;
Hyde v. Shine,
199 U.S.
Page 219 U. S. 214
62,
199 U. S. 83;
Whitney v. Dick, 202 U. S. 132,
202 U. S. 136;
Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146,
211 U. S. 148.
This rule has recently been applied in a case where it was
contended in a habeas corpus proceeding that the record should be
examined to determine whether there was any testimony to support
the accusation. And this Court, affirming the judgment which
discharged the writ, said by MR. JUSTICE DAY:
"The contention is that, in the respects pointed out, the
testimony wholly fails to support the charge. The attack is thus
not upon the jurisdiction and authority of the court to proceed to
investigate and determine the truth of the charge, but upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to show the guilt of the accused. This
has never been held to be within the province of a writ of habeas
corpus. Upon habeas corpus, the court examines only the power and
authority of the court to act, not the correctness of its
conclusions."
Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442.
We come, then, to the grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the
Police Court is assailed. It is urged that the prohibition
contained in the statute under which the information was brought is
unconstitutional in that it violates the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States by depriving the petitioner of
liberty and property without due process of law. The information
rested on § 1177 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District
of Columbia, which makes it a crime "in any manner" to engage "in
any gift enterprise business" in the District. If this section be
read alone, no basis appears for the argument of invalidity. It
cannot be said that the words "gift enterprise business" are so
uncertain as to make the prohibition nugatory, or that they
necessarily include conduct which lies outside the range of
legislative interference in the exercise of the police power. While
these words are general, they may be regarded as embracing a class
of transactions which the legislature is competent to condemn.
Thus, a "gift enterprise"
Page 219 U. S. 215
has been defined to be
"a scheme for the division or distribution of certain articles
of property, to be determined by chance, amongst those who have
taken shares in the scheme."
Bouvier's Law Dict. (Rawle's Rev.), p. 884; Black's Law Dict. p.
539; Anderson's Law Dict., p. 488.
See also Lohman v.
State, 81 Ind. 15, 17;
Winston v. Beeson, 135 N.C.
271, 279;
Randle v. State, 42 Tex. 580
But it is said that § 1177 must be read in connection with §
1176, which in turn has reference to the act of the Legislative
Assembly of the District of Columbia, approved August 23, 1871. The
argument in substance is that these statutes furnish a controlling
definition of the words "gift enterprise business," as used in §
1177, and that, if this be so, the section must be held
unconstitutional.
The act passed in 1871 by the Legislative Assembly of the
District of Columbia, to which reference is made, was entitled, "An
Act Imposing a License on Trades, Business, and Professions
Practised or Carried on in the District of Columbia." It provided
as follows:
"The proprietors of gift enterprises shall pay $1,000 annually.
Every person who shall sell or offer for sale any real estate or
article of merchandise of any description whatever, or any ticket
of admission to any exhibition or performance, or other place of
amusement, with the promise, expressed or implied, to give or
bestow, or in any manner hold out the promise of gift or bestowal,
of any article or thing, for and in consideration of the purchase
by any person of any other article or thing, whether the object
shall be for individual gain or for the benefit of any institution,
of whatever character, or for any purpose whatever, shall be
regarded as a gift enterprise:
Provided, That no such
proprietor, in consequence of being thus taxed, shall be exempt
from paying any other taxes imposed by law, and the license
herein
Page 219 U. S. 216
required shall be in addition thereto."
Laws of the District of Columbia, 1871-72, Part II, pp. 96,
97.
Congress, by act of February 17, 1873, c. 148, 17 Stat. 464,
disapproved and repealed this legislation, and enacted the
prohibitions which later were incorporated in § 1176 and 1177 of
the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, as
follows:
"SEC. 1176. So much of the Act of the Legislative Assembly of
the District of Columbia entitled, 'An Act Imposing a License on
Trades, Business, and Professions Practised or carried on in the
District of Columbia,' approved August twenty-third, eighteen
hundred and seventy-one, as authorizes gift enterprises therein,
and licenses to be issued therefor is disapproved and repealed, and
hereafter it shall be unlawful for any person or persons to engage
in said business in any manner as defined in said act or
otherwise."
"SEC. 1177. Every person who shall in any manner engage in any
gift enterprise business in the District shall, on conviction
thereof in the Police Court, on information filed for and on behalf
of the District, pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or
be imprisoned in the District jail not less than one nor more than
six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
It will be observed that, while § 1176 refers to the District
Act of 1871, and to "gift enterprises" as therein described, it
does not treat that description as exclusive. It assumes that there
are other gift enterprises than those defined in the Act of 1871.
It denounces the former not less than the latter. It does not limit
its provisions to the transactions which previously had been
licensed under the Act of 1871, but expressly includes gift
enterprises conducted "
in any manner, as defined in said act or
otherwise."
The purpose of the provision of §1176 was to disapprove and
repeal the former authorization, but not to establish
Page 219 U. S. 217
an exclusive definition based upon it. The language of § 1176
conclusively negatives such an intention. It follows that § 1177 is
not controlled by the definition to be found in the Act of 1871.
Even if it were assumed that the condemnation contained in § 1176
of the transactions particularly described in the Act of 1871 was
too sweeping, and that Congress went beyond its power in giving the
prohibition so wide a scope, this would not affect the provision of
§ 1177, relating, as we have seen, to a recognized category of
offenses for which it was within the power of Congress to prescribe
punishment. Whether it be read alone or in the light of its
context, § 1177 cannot be adjudged invalid. And it is upon this
section that the information in question was based.
We have, then, a statute with valid operation. This being
established, there can be no question that it conferred upon the
Police Court, by its express terms, jurisdiction of the offense,
and that court tried and convicted the petitioner.
But it is insisted that the facts do not support the conviction.
The argument ignores the nature of this proceeding, unless it be
meant that no colorable question was presented; that, on the agreed
statement of facts, and viewing the statute as prohibiting
transactions involving the element of chance, there was such an
obvious and palpable want of criminality that the judicial judgment
cannot be said to have been invoked, and that therefore the court
had no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the statute had
been violated.
Such a contention is without merit. It is by no means manifest
that the scheme or enterprise in which the petitioner was engaged
lay outside the range of judicial consideration under the statute.
On the contrary, the agreed statement of facts presented questions
requiring the exercise of judicial judgment, and the case falls
within the well established rule. Given a valid enactment, the
Page 219 U. S. 218
question (assuming it to be one demanding judicial examination)
whether a particular case falls within the prohibition is for the
determination of the court to which has been confided jurisdiction
over the class of offenses to which the statute relates.
As said by Chief Justice Marshall in
Ex Parte
Watkins, 3 Pet.193, on p.
28 U. S.
203:
"The judgment of such a tribunal has all the obligations which
the judgment of any tribunal can have. To determine whether the
offense charged in the indictment be legally punishable or not is
among the most unquestionable of its power and duties. The decision
of this question is the exercise of jurisdiction, whether the
judgment be for or against the prisoner. The judgment is equally
binding in the one case and in the other, and must remain in full
force unless reversed regularly by a superior court capable of
reversing it."
And in
Ex Parte Parks, 93 U. S.
18, on p.
93 U. S. 20, the
Court said:
"Whether an act charged in an indictment is or is not a crime by
the law which the court administers (in this case the statute law
of the United States) is a question which has to be met at almost
every stage of criminal proceedings; on motions to quash the
indictment, on demurrers, on motions to arrest judgment, etc. The
court may err, but it has jurisdiction of the question."
In hearing this application, this Court does not sit to review
the correctness of the conclusion of the Police Court as to the
violation of the statute by the petitioner, or of the decision of
the Court of Appeals of the District as to the sufficiency of the
information filed against him. The question here is not one of
guilt or innocence, but simply whether the court below had
jurisdiction to try the issues. And, as we find that the statute
conferred that jurisdiction, the application for a writ of habeas
corpus must be denied.
Rule discharged and petition dismissed.