Section 5 of the Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891, c. 577,
26 Stat. 826, gives a direct review of the judgment of the circuit
court as to its jurisdiction not upon general grounds of law or
procedure, but of the jurisdiction of the court as a federal court.
Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191
U. S. 275;
Bache v. Hunt, 193 U.
S. 523.
Where jurisdiction by diversity of citizenship exists, the
question of whether the circuit court has jurisdiction to enforce
the decree of another sovereignty is a question of general law, and
not a question peculiar to the jurisdiction of the federal court as
such, and a direct appeal will not lie to this Court from the
judgment of the Circuit Court.
Page 219 U. S. 176
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court of a
direct appeal under § 5 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of
1891, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here upon a question involving the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Massachusetts to entertain the action. It was begun in the circuit
court by Selma T. Hagg, a citizen of Sweden, against the Fore River
Shipbuilding Company, a corporation of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. The object of the suit was to recover damages under
the Employers' Liability Act of Massachusetts (Revised Laws, c.
106, § 73), and was for the death, without conscious suffering, of
her husband, Charles A. Hagg, an employee of the defendant company,
resulting from an injury received in the defendant's forge shop in
Quincy, Massachusetts. The action resulted in a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff below. The defendant below moved the
court to dismiss the action on the ground that it was without
jurisdiction, for the reason that the Massachusetts statute was of
a penal character, and therefore an action upon it could be
maintained only in the courts of Massachusetts. The case comes here
upon certificate of the judge of the circuit court, and the
question stated is
"whether or not the statute under which the plaintiff's action
was brought was of such a penal character that the circuit court
did not have jurisdiction of said action."
In behalf of the defendant company, now plaintiff in error, it
is contended that a penal action of this character
Page 219 U. S. 177
can be brought only in the courts of Massachusetts, and it is
insisted that such is the rule applicable to cases of this
character as between separate and distinct sovereignties. It is
argued that the act under which the suit was brought is a penal
statute, and it is insisted that the wrong done as primarily an
offense against the public, and the relief sought not of the class
of actions remedial in their nature, wherein recovery is given in
the form of compensation to the widow or children of the deceased,
which actions have been sustained in the courts of states other
than those enacting the statute.
The question presented, therefore, is whether, owing to the
character of the Massachusetts act, the courts of another
sovereignty will enforce its provisions, or whether the sole remedy
is under the laws of the commonwealth enacting the statute.
This Court takes notice of its own jurisdiction, and whether the
question is raised by the counsel or not, inquires of its own
motion whether there is jurisdiction to entertain any given case
before it.
Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v.
Swan, 111 U. S.
379-382.
In that case, Mr. Justice Matthews, who spoke for the Court,
said:
"On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental
question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this Court and then of
the court from which the record comes. This question the Court is
bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise
suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to
it."
We shall then inquire, has this Court jurisdiction to entertain
this attempt at a direct review of the circuit court's judgment
certified here upon the question of jurisdiction? By the Court of
Appeals Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c. 517), a writ of
error may be taken directly from a circuit court to this Court in
certain cases, among which is "any case in which the jurisdiction
of
Page 219 U. S. 178
the court is in issue," and it is further provided, "[i]n such
cases, the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the
Supreme Court from the court below for decision." The question then
is, does this case involve a question of jurisdiction reviewable in
the manner sought in this case by writ of error to the circuit
court?
The court has had frequent occasion to determine what is meant
in the statute providing for review of cases in which the
jurisdiction of the court is in issue, and it has been held that
the statute means to give a review not of the jurisdiction of the
court upon general grounds of law or procedure, but of the
jurisdiction of the court as a federal court.
A leading case on this subject, and one frequently cited with
approval since its decision, is
Louisville Trust Company v.
Knott, 191 U. S. 225. In
that case, a state court had taken jurisdiction of an action in
equity in which a receiver was asked for, and none had been
appointed at the time when another suit was begun in the circuit
court of the United States, and a receiver appointed therein.
Thereafter, the state court which had first taken jurisdiction
appointed a receiver, and upon its direction, that receiver
intervened in the federal court and asked to have the property
turned over to him. The circuit court of the United States
maintained its own jurisdiction, and refused to give the property
to the state receiver. The case came to this Court upon certificate
of a question involving the jurisdiction of the circuit court of
the United States. This Court dismissed the writ of error for want
of jurisdiction, holding that the question presented was one of the
equity jurisdiction of one court as against the like jurisdiction
in another court, and did not present a distinctive question as to
the jurisdiction of the federal court as such. The former cases
were reviewed, and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, who spoke for the Court,
said:
"The question of jurisdiction which the statute permits
Page 219 U. S. 179
to be certified to this Court directly must be one involving the
jurisdiction of the circuit court as a federal court, and not
simply its general authority as a judicial tribunal to proceed in
harmony with established rules of practice governing courts of
concurrent jurisdiction as between each other."
See also, in this connection,
Bache v. Hunt,
193 U. S. 523, in
which the same principle is announced.
Applying the rule thus settled to the case under consideration,
there was jurisdiction in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Massachusetts under the Judiciary Act, as the
plaintiff was a citizen of Sweden and the defendant shipbuilding
company a corporation of Massachusetts. Thus, having jurisdiction,
it was at liberty to decide all questions properly before it,
including the one whether, under the applicable principles of law,
a court of another sovereignty would enforce a cause of action
based upon the Massachusetts statute. But the determination of that
question did not involve the jurisdiction of the circuit court as a
federal court. It was a question to be decided upon the application
of the same principles as would apply had the action been brought
in a court of another state or nation. Whether other sovereignties
would enforce penal actions of the character alleged to arise under
the Massachusetts statute was not a question peculiar to the
federal jurisdiction of the court. It was general in its nature,
and to be determined upon principles controlling in other courts as
well as those of federal creation.
Without enlarging the discussion, and applying principles
thoroughly settled in this Court, we are of opinion that a direct
writ of error will not lie from the determination of the circuit
court of the United States to exercise its jurisdiction in the
present case. The writ of error is therefore dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
Dismissed.