Noble State Bank v. Haskell, ante, p.
219 U. S. 104,
followed to effect that a state statute establishing a Bank
Depositors' Guaranty Fund and requiring banks to contribute thereto
is not unconstitutional as depriving the banks of their property
without due process of law or denying them the equal protection of
the law.
A state law which affects the needed charges to cure an existing
evil by creating motives for voluntary action instead of by
compulsion may still be a police regulation.
One who can avail of benefits given by a state statute cannot
object to the statute as denying him equal protection of the law
because he does not choose to put himself in the class obtaining
such benefits.
The Bank Depositors' Guaranty Fund of 1907 of Kansas, is not
unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the law because it
applies only to banks which contribute to the fund, or on account
of preferences between classes of depositors, or because
incorporated banks with a surplus of ten percent have privileges
over unincorporated banks.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 219 U. S. 125
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity brought by many state banks of Kansas
to prevent the enforcement of the Kansas law
Page 219 U. S. 126
providing for a bank depositors' guaranty fund. The defendants
demurred. The circuit court, while holding the act
unconstitutional, dismissed the bill on the ground that the
appellants did not show that their rights under the Constitution
were infringed, and therefore did not state a case within the
jurisdiction of the court. 175 F. 365, 375, 381, 382. The ground of
complaint was that the law imposed certain conditions upon sharing
the benefits and burdens of contributors to the Guaranty Fund, that
the appellants would not or could not contribute, and that, unless
they did, the effect of the law would be to drive them out of
business. It was complained also that, whereas theretofore the
plaintiffs would have been entitled to share
pro rata in
the assets of an insolvent bank to which they had given credit, now
depositors with such of their debtors as should go into the
guaranty system would be preferred. Again, various conditions of
the scheme not affecting the plaintiffs were pointed out as
unreasonable and arbitrary, and the whole act was alleged to be
unconstitutional and void. There was added a charge that the act
required taxation to meet the expenses of carrying out the scheme.
To all this the court replied that, so far as the plaintiffs were
concerned, it did not appear that they could not change their
condition so as to enable themselves to contribute, and that the
possible preference of other creditors was put as a pure
speculation, it not being averred that any guaranteed bank indebted
to any of the plaintiffs had failed, to which it might be added
that the plaintiffs are free to withdraw their credits and collect
their debts now. The charge as to taxation did not state a case
under the Constitution, and violation of constitutional rights was
the only ground for coming into the circuit court.
The case of
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, just decided,
ante, p.
219 U. S. 104,
cuts the root of the plaintiffs' case except so far as the Kansas
law shows certain minor differences from
Page 219 U. S. 127
that of Oklahoma. The most important of these is that
contribution to the fund is not absolutely required. On this
ground, it is said, and was thought by the circuit judge, that the
law could not be justified under the police power. We cannot agree
to such a limitation. If, as we have decided, the law might compel
the contribution on the grounds that we have stated, it may try to
bring about the same result by the creation of motives less
compulsory than command and of disadvantages in holding aloof less
peremptory than an immediate stop. We shall not go through the
details of minute criticism urged by the appellants, in most if not
all of which they are in no way concerned. Perhaps the most
striking of these subordinate matters is the preference of ordinary
depositors over other creditors -- a preference that seems to be
overstated by the appellants. This obviously is in aid of what we
have assumed to be the one of the chief objects and justifications
of such laws -- securing the currency of checks. The ordinary
deposits are those that are drawn against in that way. Another
discrimination complained of is that against unincorporated banks
and banks not having a surplus of ten percent. But if the state
might require incorporation, it may give advantages to incorporated
companies. It might provide that no banking business should be done
except by corporations, and that corporations should not be formed
or continue with less than a surplus of ten percent, both
provisions being for the purpose of assuring safety. If, instead of
that, it allows the plaintiffs to keep on without incorporation,
and with a smaller surplus, they cannot complain that the safer
banks will outstrip them as the result of the law. We think it
unnecessary to discuss the case more at length.
Decree affirmed.