The duty of this Court is limited to actual pending
controversies. It should not pronounce judgment on abstract
questions, even if its opinion might influence future action under
like circumstances.
This Court judicially knows that the members of Congress elected
at the regular congressional election of November, 1908, have taken
their seats, served their terms, and that their successors have
been elected.
This Court also judicially knows when the term of a secretary of
state of a state expires and whether his successor has been
inducted into his office.
An action against the secretary of a state to compel him in
certifying nominees for Congress, to proceed under a former
apportionment act on the ground that the present act is
unconstitutional, is not a suit against the state, nor is it in
this case one against a continuing board, but against the secretary
of state personally, and, on the termination of his official
authority, his successor cannot be substituted.
In this case, as the thing sought to be prevented has been done
and cannot be undone by judicial action, it is now only a moot
case.
Writ of error to review 12 Ky. 363 dismissed.
The facts, which involve the validity of the Kentucky act of
1900 apportioning the state into Congressional districts, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 218 U. S. 490
MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Shortly stated, this is an attack upon the validity of the
Kentucky Act of March 12, 1898, and certain amendments thereto,
apportioning the state into eleven congressional districts. The
bill alleges that the districts do not conform to the requirement
of the acts of Congress apportioning representatives among the
states, which acts require that such districts shall be of
contiguous territory, "containing as nearly as practicable an equal
number of inhabitants." The averments of the bill are that the
districts are grossly and unnecessarily unequal in population.
The bill was filed in an equity court of the state. A demurrer,
as not stating a case good in law, was sustained, and the bill
dismissed. This judgment was affirmed upon an appeal to the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky. The ground upon which the Kentucky court
rested its judgment was, in substance, that neither the
Constitution of the United States nor of the state contained any
provision which vested in the court any authority to annul an
apportionment of the state into districts for the election of
Congressmen, and that the matter pertained to the political
department of the government, and was subject only to the
supervising control of the Congress, if any such power of
supervision existed at all.
The bill in substance alleges that a congressional election in
each of the eleven congressional districts of the state will be
held in November, 1908. That, under the law of Kentucky, it is the
duty of the defendant H. V. McChesney, as Secretary of the
Commonwealth, or his successor in office at the time, to certify,
within sixty days prior to said election, the names of the nominees
of the Republican and Democratic parties for members of
Congress
Page 218 U. S. 491
in each district, to clerks of the various county courts of the
state, and the duty of such clerks to print the name so certified
upon the official ballots to be used in said congressional
election.
The complainant's interest in the matter is that he is a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Kentucky, and a qualified
voter and resident of Hart County, one of the counties of said
state, and as such entitled to vote for a Congressman in the
district to which that county is lawfully attached. The act of the
general assembly dividing the state in congressional districts
prior to the Act of March 12, 1898, was an act passed April 15,
1882. By this act of 1882 the Counties of Hart, Green, and Taylor
formed part of the fourth congressional district. By the Act of
March 12, 1898, and acts amendatory, the three counties named were
made part of the eleventh district, and certain counties were taken
from the eleventh and placed in other districts.
The contention is that, the act of 1898 and its amendments being
void because of gross inequality of inhabitants, the aforesaid Act
of April 15, 1882, is the apportionment act in force, and that the
approaching election should be held for the election of eleven
members of Congress in the eleven districts organized by the act of
1882, and not in the districts as shaped by the later illegal
arrangement.
The object and prayer of the bill is to require the defendant H.
V. McChesney, or his successor in office, to proceed in conformity
with the apportionment Act of April 15, 1882, by certifying the
names of party nominees for Congress made in districts organized in
conformity with that act, and to require the county court clerks,
who are made defendants, to print only the names of nominees so
certified upon the ballots for the election of Congressmen at the
election to be held in November, 1908, and that said McChesney, or
his successor, be restrained
Page 218 U. S. 492
from certifying, or the defendant clerks from printing,
otherwise.
Without considering the question of the authority for judicial
interference in respect to a congressional apportionment act, we
are of opinion that this writ of error must be dismissed.
The matter which the defendant McChesney, as Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, is to be prohibited from doing relates
solely to an election to be held in November, 1908, and the thing
which he is to be required to do relates only to the same election.
The election to be affected by a decree, according to the prayer of
the bill, has long since been held, and the members of Congress
were, in November, 1908, elected under the apportionment Act of
1900. They were, as we may judicially know, admitted to the
respective seats, and, as we may also take notice, their successors
have been elected according to the same scheme of apportionment.
The thing sought to be prevented has been done, and cannot be
undone by any judicial action. Under such circumstances, there is
nothing but a moot case.
Mills v. Green, 159 U.
S. 651;
Jones v. Montague, 194 U.
S. 147.
The duty of the court is limited to the decision of actual
pending controversies, and it should not pronounce judgment upon
abstract questions, however such opinion might influence future
action in like circumstances.
Aside from this, we may judicially take notice that the
defendant H. V. McChesney is no longer Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, his term having expired and a successor
having been inducted into office, who has not been substituted as a
defendant to this suit.
This is not a suit against the State of Kentucky. The state is
not the subject of suit. Nor is it a suit against the secretary of
state as one of a corporation or continuing board, "where the
obligations sought to be enforced devolve upon a corporation or
continuing body," as
Page 218 U. S. 493
pointed out in
United States v. Butterworth,
169 U. S. 600,
169 U. S. 603,
distinguishing
Leavenworth County v. Sellew, 99 U. S.
624, and
Thompson v. United States,
103 U. S. 480. The
only ground for making McChesney a defendant is to enjoin him
personally from doing something which he may not lawfully do, and
to require him personally to do another thing which it is claimed
is his legal duty to do as an administrative act requiring no
discretion. If he disobey the mandate or injunction of the court,
he personally would be in contempt. He only can be rightly made to
bear the costs of this proceeding if the complainant should
succeed, and he only could be compelled to obey the decree of the
court. As his official authority has terminated, the case, so far
as it seeks to accomplish the object of the bill, is at an end,
there being no statute providing for the substitution of
McChesney's successor in a suit of this character. The case is
governed by
United States v.
Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604;
United States v.
Butterworth, 169 U. S. 600, and
Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, 196 U.
S. 432,
196 U. S.
441.
Dismiss the writ of error.