The general rule of the common law is that a judgment in a
criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in a civil action to
establish any fact there determined. The parties are not the same
and different rules of evidence are applicable.
Identity of parties will not always operate to make a judgment
in a criminal action admissible in a civil action; there must be
identity of issue,
Stone v. United States, 167 U.
S. 178, although, as held in
Coffey v. United
States, 116 U. S. 436,
when the facts are ascertained in a criminal case as between the
United States and the defendant, they cannot be again litigated as
between him and the United States as the basis of any statutory
punishment denounced as a consequence of the existence of the
facts.
In a case coming from the Philippine Islands, however, this
Court will not apply the common law rule as to effect to be given
in a subsequent civil case to a judgment in a criminal case, but
will consider only whether the local law of the Philippine Islands
has been rightly applied.
The local law in the Philippine Islands, which is still in
force, not having been suspended by legislation, is that indemnity
for damages in penal cases is a consequence of the commission of
the crime and a verdict of acquittal carries with it exemption from
civil liability. This rule applies even against one who in the
criminal action attempted to reserve his rights to bring a civil
action.
The facts, which involve the right of recovery in the Philippine
Islands of damages caused by alleged criminal
Page 218 U. S. 477
acts of defendant in a civil action after the defendant's
acquittal in a criminal action, are stated in the opinion.
Page 218 U. S. 479
MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands to review a judgment affirming a judgment of the court of
the first instance in favor of the defendant.
The action was to recover indemnification of damages for the
destruction of a storehouse and a stock of merchandise therein,
valued at $58,473.49, Mexican, which the complaint alleged was
"burned maliciously or unlawfully by Eduardo Abaroa," the defendant
to the complaint, and defendant in error here.
The defense was, first, a general denial, and second, that the
defendant, in a criminal action for the same burning and damage
alleged, had been acquitted and held not guilty of the malicious
burning now alleged, and in consequence of such judgment was not
liable in a civil action for any damage to the plaintiff. The
judgment in the criminal proceeding referred to was in these
words:
"The evidence introduced by the prosecution indicates
Page 218 U. S. 480
that the defendant might have been the author of the crime, but
it is not conclusive. All persons charged with crime are presumed
to be innocent until they are proven otherwise. There being in my
mind some doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, I should and do
hereby acquit him, with the costs of these proceedings
de
officio, and the attachment heretofore levied on his property
is hereby vacated, reserving to the complaining witness whatever
right he may have to bring a civil action against the said Eduardo
Abaroa."
Upon a final hearing upon all of the proofs, the court of first
instance adjudged that the cause of action alleged and proved was
one arising from the criminal act which was the subject of the
former criminal proceeding, and that the defendant, having been
acquitted in the criminal action, was not civilly liable. This
judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands upon an elaborate opinion.
We have not had the benefit of either brief or argument for the
defendant in this writ of error, but have found much assistance in
the opinions of each of the Philippine courts, as well from very
helpful briefs filed by learned counsel for the plaintiffs in
error. The contention which has been very forcibly pressed is that
the judgment of acquittal in the criminal action does not operate
as a bar to a subsequent civil action for indemnification of
damages resulting from the same malicious or unlawful burning of
the house and goods of the plaintiff, which was charged in the
criminal action.
The proposition upon which the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands grounded its judgment affirming that of the lower court in
favor of the defendant Abaroa was
"that it has not been alleged or shown by the plaintiffs, as a
cause of action instituted civilly against the defendant, that the
aforesaid fire was caused through any fault or negligence on the
part of the defendant, nor is there
Page 218 U. S. 481
shown any motive or cause distinct from that, the subject of the
case already terminated in accordance with the provisions of
articles 1093, 1902, and 1903 of the Civil Code, and second, that
one who is not criminally responsible for a crime or misdemeanor
cannot be made civilly responsible for the crime of which he has
been acquitted."
The general rule of the common law is that a judgment in a
criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in a civil action to
establish any fact there determined. The reason for this rule is
primarily that the parties are not the same, and, secondarily, that
different rules of evidence are applicable. In the old case of
Jones v. White, 1 Strange, 67, 68, Eyre, J., said:
"If a verdict be given in evidence, it must be between the same
parties, and therefore an indictment, which is at the suit of the
King, cannot be read in an action which is at the suit of the
party."
The requisite of mutual estoppel is essential to make a judgment
in one action obligatory in another, although the point in issue is
the same in each case. Unless the parties are the same, the matter
is
res inter alios. Buller's Nisi Prius 233; 1 Wharton's
Law of Evidence, vol. 1, 776;
Dyer v. Railroad, 87 Tenn.
712.
Neither will identity of parties always operate to make a
judgment in a criminal action admissible in evidence in a civil
action. There must be identity of issue. Thus, in
Stone v.
United States, 167 U. S. 178,
167 U. S. 187,
Stone was sued by the United States to recover the value of timber
alleged to have been cut by him from public lands. He had been
theretofore indicted, tried, and acquitted for unlawfully cutting
the same timber from the public lands, and pleaded this judgment as
a bar to a suit for civil liability. This was held to be no
defense, and
Coffey's Case, 116 U.
S. 436, distinguished as having been placed upon the
ground
"that the facts ascertained in the criminal case, as between the
United States and the claimant, could
Page 218 U. S. 482
not be again litigated between them, as the basis of any
statutory punishment denounced as a consequence of the
existence of the facts."
With respect to the application of
Coffey's Case, MR.
JUSTICE HARLAN, for the Court, said:
"In the present case, the action against Stone is purely civil.
It depends entirely upon the ownership of certain personal
property. The rule established in
Coffey's Case can have
no application in a civil case not involving any question of
criminal intent or of forfeiture for prohibited acts, but turning
wholly upon an issue as to the ownership of property. In the
criminal case, the government sought to punish a criminal offense,
while in the civil case, it only seeks, in its capacity as owner of
property illegally converted, to recover its value. In the criminal
case his acquittal may have been due to the fact that the
government failed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence
of some fact essential to establish the offense charged, while the
same evidence in a civil action brought to recover the value of the
property illegally converted might have been sufficient to entitle
the government to a verdict. Not only was a greater degree of proof
requisite to support the indictment than is sufficient to sustain a
civil action, but an essential fact had to be proved in the
criminal case, which was not necessary to be proved in the present
suit. In order to convict the defendant upon the indictment for
unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously cutting and removing timber
from lands of the United States, it was necessary to prove a
criminal intent on his part, or at least that he knew the timber to
be the property of the United States.
Regina v. Cohen, 8
Cox C.C. 41;
Regina v. James, 8 Car. & P. 131;
United States v. Pearce, 2 McLean, 14;
Cutter v.
State, 36 N.J.L. 125, 126. But the present action for the
conversion of the timber would be supported by proof that it was in
fact the property of the United States, whether the defendant
Page 218 U. S. 483
knew that fact or not.
Woodenware Co. v. United States,
106 U. S.
432. An honest mistake of the defendant as to his title
in the property would be a defense to the indictment, but not to
the civil action. Broom's Leg.Max., 5th ed. 366-367. It cannot be
said that any fact was conclusively established in the criminal
case, except that the defendant was not guilty of the public
offense with which he was charged. We cannot agree that the failure
or inability of the United States to prove in the criminal case
that the defendant had been guilty of a crime either forfeited its
right of property in the timber or its right in this civil action,
upon a preponderance of proof, to recover the value of such
property."
There are peculiarities about the character of the action now
under consideration which, as will appear later, may bring it under
the principles of
Coffey v. United States, supra, rather
than
Stone v. United States, the indemnification here
sought being a part of the punishment attached to the offense of
which the defendant has been acquitted.
The case is, however, one which we conceive must be governed by
the local law of the Philippine Islands, and the single question to
which we need address ourselves is as to whether that law was
rightly applied by the local tribunals.
Article 1902 of the Civil Code in force in the Philippine
Islands reads thus:
"A person who, by an act or omission, causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done."
By §§ 1092 and 1093 of the same Code, provision is made for the
enforcement of civil liability, varying in character according to
the origin of the liability. Thus, § 1092 provides that civil
obligations arising from crimes and misdemeanors shall be governed
by the provisions of the Penal Code. On the other hand, § 1093
provides that
"those arising from acts or omissions, in which fault or
negligence, not punished by law, occurs, shall
Page 218 U. S. 484
be subject to the provisions of chapter second of title sixteen
of this book."
The action here involved comes directly under § 1092, above set
out, and is not an action arising from "fault or negligence, not
punished by law." The complaint alleges that the Act of burning was
"malicious and unlawful," and not that it was the result of any
"fault or negligence." This was the construction placed upon the
complaint by both the courts below, and is a construction not
challenged here. It follows that we must turn to the Penal Code to
discover when a civil action arises out of a crime or misdemeanor,
and the procedure of the enforcement of such civil liability.
Article 17 of the Penal Code reads as follows: "Every person
criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly
liable." May this civil liability be enforced without a prior legal
determination of the fact of the defendant's guilt of crime? Does
civil liability exist at all if the defendant has been found not
guilty of the acts out of which the civil liability arises? The
opinion of the court below was that a judgment of conviction was
essential to an action for indemnification under the applicable
local law. To this conclusion we assent, upon the following
considerations:
First, by the positive legislation of the Philippine Codes,
civil and criminal, a distinction is drawn between a civil
liability which results from the mere negligence of the defendant
and a liability for the civil consequences of a crime by which
another has sustained loss or injury.
Second, the plain inference from Article 17, above set out, is
that civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
which, if true, would constitute a crime or misdemeanor.
Third, the Philippine Code of Procedure plainly contemplates
that the civil liability of the defendant shall be ascertained and
declared in the criminal proceedings.
Thus, § 742 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, after
Page 218 U. S. 485
requiring that, in a criminal proceeding, all of the minor or
incidental offenses included in the principal crime shall be
decided, adds: "All questions relating to the civil liability which
may have been the subject matter of the charge shall be decided in
the sentence."
By § 108 of the same Code, the prosecuting official is required
to prosecute the right of the injured person to restitution or
indemnity, unless such person renounces the right.
By § 112 of the same Code, the civil action is held to be part
of the criminal action, "unless the person prejudiced or injured
renounces the same, or expressly reserves the right to institute it
after the conclusion of the criminal action."
In
United States v. Catequista, 1 Phil. 537, 538, the
court below failed to determine the liability of the defendant to
indemnify the person injured by the misdemeanor of which he had
been convicted. Concerning this, Ladd J., for the court, said:
"The court also erred in not determining in the judgment the
civil liability of the defendant for the
danos and
perjuicios, which resulted from the criminal act. Such
civil liability is a necessary consequence of criminal
responsibility (Penal Code, Art. 17), and is to be declared and
enforced in the criminal proceeding, except where the injured party
reserves his right to avail himself of it in a distinct civil
action.Code of Criminal Procedure of Spain, Article 112,
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code in the
Philippines, Article 51, No. 4. No such waiver or reservation is
disclosed by the record here."
It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case
reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action.
This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as there resulted a
judgment for the defendant, and the plain inference from the
foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal
Page 218 U. S. 486
must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility.
The effect of the application of the substantive law of the
Philippine Islands, given by the court below, not only in the
present case, but in the prior cases cited above, accords with the
interpretation of identical provisions in the law of Spain by the
Supreme Court of that kingdom, as shown by citations from the
Spanish Supreme Court Reports. Some of these we have not been able
to verify. We have, however, examined the decision of that court
cited as of January 3, 1877. In that case, the defendant had been
tried and acquitted upon a criminal complaint. Notwithstanding this
result, the trial court gave a judgment indemnifying the injured
person for a loss supposed to have been suffered by him as a
consequence of the crime of which the defendant had been acquitted.
This judgment was annulled. Upon this point the court, in
substance, said that indemnity for damages in penal cases was a
consequence of the commission of a crime. The defendant was
therefore not liable civilly, inasmuch as he had been found not
liable criminally.
The foregoing considerations eliminate any question of the
effect of such a judgment of acquittal under the principles of the
common law and require an affirmance of the judgment of the court
below as properly based upon the applicable substantive law of the
Philippine Islands, which has not been superseded by legislation
since the establishment of the present Philippine government.
Judgment affirmed.