Where the prayer of a bill by a trustee is simply for permission
to resign the trust and turn over the subject matter thereof to
another trustee in accordance with the terms of the agreement
itself, the action cannot be treated as one of or in the nature of
interpleader.
Where the filing of a cross-bill would tie up property pending
determination of title, the court does not err in requiring the
party filing it to apply for an injunction and give a bond as
required by the rules of the court; nor will this Court assume that
the amount of the bond was too large when such party did not invoke
further action, but took an appeal before the expiration of the
time allowed for complying with the provisions of the decree.
31 App.D.C. 452, affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity, brought by the National Savings
Page 218 U. S. 423
& Trust Company against the appellants and certain others to
obtain a decree to permit it to resign a trust created by the
deposit with it of 35,005 shares of the stock of the American
Planograph Company. The stock was deposited under an agreement
signed by George R. Cornwall, Marion Bryan, Charles T. Moore, and
others, all of whom were made parties to the bill. The agreement
contained the following provision:
"And it is hereby mutually agreed by and between all the parties
hereto that, on the receipt of the respective certificates of the
said 35,005 shares of stock by the said trustee from the parties of
the first part, the said trustee shall cause to be delivered to
each of the parties of the first part who contribute toward said
35,005 shares an assignable trust certificate, which shall recite
the number of shares so deposited by him, and state that the holder
thereof is entitled to an equitable interest in the said 35,005
deposited shares equivalent to the number of shares so conveyed to
and deposited with said trustee by each of said depositors
respectively, and that the holder of said trust certificate or
certificates has no right to vote on any such shares, but shall be
entitled to receive his
pro rata share of any dividends
paid on the deposited stock, and that, on and after March 31, 1911,
each holder of such trust certificate will, on surrender thereof to
the said trustee, be entitled to a certificate of an equal number
of shares of stock of the American Planograph Company, and the
trustee shall forthwith cause to be transferred on the books of the
American Planograph Company the stock so held in trust, and deliver
the certificates thereof to each of the holders of the said trust
certificates."
The agreement transferred the legal title to the trust company,
and authorized it to vote the stock in the meeting of the
planograph company, "for such measures and such persons as the
owners of a majority in amount of said trust certificates shall
direct." Also to collect
Page 218 U. S. 424
dividends and pay them to the stockholders of the trust
certificates. The agreement also contained the following
provision:
"It is further agreed that, in case the said trustee shall
decline to accept or serve, or upon the resignation of said trustee
during the term for which it is or may be appointed or elected,
then the holders of a majority in amount of the trust certificates
shall elect a trustee to fill the vacancy or vacancies."
It was further provided that the agreement should continue in
force until April 26, 1911, but that the trust might be dissolved
before that time by a vote of three-fourths of the depositors.
It is alleged in the bill that the National Savings & Trust
Company notified the depositors of its desire to resign its
position as trustee, and that the depositors, by an instrument in
writing, duly nominated and appointed the New York Trust Company of
the City of New York and State of New York to be trustee in its
place instead. And further, that on May 22, 1906, it received a
written notice from the appellants, purporting to be issued by
themselves and others, that the shares have been transferred to it
"by breach of trust on the part of the holders of certain of the
shares," who were trustees of the appellants, and that suit had
been commenced by the beneficiaries of the trust in the State of
West Virginia against the planograph company to determine, among
other things, the ownership of such shares.
It is also alleged that two suits had been brought and were
pending against the Savings & Trust Company and others in the
Supreme Court of the District, respectively numbered 26,731, and
26,847, in which restraining orders were issued and were enforced,
restraining it and the other defendants, until the court's further
order, from removing or attempt to remove from the District of
Columbia, and from selling, encumbering, or in any manner disposing
of any of the shares of the stock of the planograph company in its
possession or custody. And that, by
Page 218 U. S. 425
reason thereof, and of the written notice served upon it by the
Moore company, it is
"advised that it may not transfer the said shares of stock in
its possession to the said New York Trust Company as its successor
in the said trust without the risk of liability and loss, except
through the aid of this Court, and that it is entitled in its said
capacity as a trustee to apply to this court for its instructions
and its protection in the premises."
The prayer of the bill was that the Savings & Trust
Company
"may be permitted to resign and retire from its said trust and
to surrender the shares of stock now held by it to a new trustee,
and that the complainant may be instructed by the courts as to the
manner and form of transfer by it to its successor in the said
trust."
Costs were also prayed and general relief. Copies of the various
instruments referred to were attached to the bill.
The answer of the Moore company neither admitted nor denied the
averments of the bill, except that it admitted giving notice to the
Savings & Trust Company as alleged by it and the pendency of
the suit in West Virginia, as alleged. Also, that the shares of
stock stand in the name of the Savings & Trust Company on the
books of the planograph company.
The answer alleges new matter to the following effect: in
January, 1900, Moore, Bryan, and Cornwall, three of the appellants,
entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of wrecking the Moore
company and a company called in the answer the Liomatrix, the stock
of which is owned by the Moore company, and acquiring for
themselves the assets of the Moore company, including certain
inventions of Moore. To this end, they procured the organization of
the planograph company, the purposes of which were of the same
general character with those of the Moore company.
Page 218 U. S. 426
Afterwards, by the use of the new incorporation and by a course
of fraudulent representations and conduct, which included the
piracy of the most valuable machine of the Moore company, the
officers of the latter company were induced to believe that the
planograph company possessed some inventions of great value, and
that the Moore company would be benefited by a consolidation of the
two companies. Such consolidation was effected in 1901 upon terms
and in a manner which gave complete control of the consolidated
companies to the confederates, and that they have used such control
for their own profit, and have by various fraudulent means
possessed themselves of a very large part of the 35,005 shares of
that company's stock, deposited with the Savings & Trust
Company. A detail of the transactions by which this was effected is
not necessary to recite.
The answer concludes as follows:
"This defendant admits, on the allegations set forth in the bill
of complaint, that the plaintiff is entitled to resign and be
relieved of its trust, but it alleges, on information and belief,
that the New York Trust Company has not consented to accept said
trust, and further that no other responsible trust company will be
likely to accept the same if it has full knowledge of the facts,
and in view of all the facts and circumstances hereinabove set
forth, including the restraining orders granted by this Court in
equity suits Nos. 26,731 and 26,847, referred to in the bill of
complaint, which orders still remain in force, and prohibit the
removal or transfer of the said 35,005 shares of planograph stock,
defendant submits that the plaintiff can be granted relief and the
rights of all parties protected only by the appointment of a
receiver for the said 35,005 shares of planograph stock affected by
said trust, who shall hold said stock subject to the orders of this
Court until the rights of the various claimants thereto have been
settled and determined. "
Page 218 U. S. 427
Certain exhibits were attached to the answer, by which it is
alleged its allegations are sustained.
The individual appellants, by a joint answer, adopted that of
the Moore company.
All of the other defendants in the suit and appellees here
answered, and gave consent to an order permitting the Savings &
Trust Company to resign its trust and surrender the shares of stock
held by it to the New York Trust Company. Two of those so
consenting are the complainants in the suits Nos. 26,731 and
26,847, referred to above.
The cause was set down for hearing on bill and answers, and on
the December 13, 1907, it coming on to be heard, a decree was
entered, authorizing and directing the Savings & Trust Company
to deliver to the New York Trust Company all of the certificates of
stock in the American Planograph Company which it held by virtue of
the agreement alleged in its bill, "and to make such indorsement
upon such certificates as may be required to enable its said
successor to take complete title to such certificates." And it was
ordered that, upon compliance with the decree, it should be
discharged from all liability to the defendants in the suit in
respect of such certificates and its action as trustee under such
agreement.
The decree concluded as follows:
"Provided, however, that this decree and order shall be void if,
on or before the 23d of December, 1907, the defendants the Moore
Printing Typewriter Company, Russell W. Montague, and George P.
Montague, or one or more of said last-named defendants, by way of a
cross-bill in this case or by original bill in this Court, as they
may be advised, shall apply for and obtain a restraining order or
injunction with undertaking and security as required by Equity Rule
42 of this Court, prohibiting such transfer of said
certificates."
The decree was made by consent of all parties except
Page 218 U. S. 428
by the Moore company and the individual appellants.
On December 13, the Moore company offered a cross-bill, which
repeated the charges of fraud contained in its answer and made
other charges of misconduct. It prayed that the Savings & Trust
Company be required to hold the stock subject to such order or
orders as should thereafter be made, and that it be a trustee of
such stock for the purpose of the cause, and that, in the event
that it be permitted to resign, the person substituted for it be
deemed a trustee of the stock, and hold it subject to the orders of
the court. The other relief prayed is not necessary to mention.
Leave to file the cross-bill was granted. Nothing else was done
under it, but the appellants took an appeal from the decree to the
Court of Appeals, by which court the decree was affirmed.
The contentions of the parties turn upon the question whether or
not the bill is one of interpleader. Appellants contend that it is
one in the nature of interpleader, being in some respects identical
with it, but involving
"another principle of equity, namely, a trust, and it has
therefore a greater scope, and is free from many of the technical
restrictions of strict interpleader, particularly as applied to
bailors and bailees, principal and agent,"
etc.
The Court of Appeals considered the bill as one of strict
interpleader, and rejected the contention of appellants (they were
appellants, also in the Court of Appeals) because the claim
"asserted was not derived from the contractual relation existing
between plaintiff [Savings & Trust Company] and the depositors
of the stock." In other words, that the claim of appellants and the
claim of the depositors were not derived from a common source.
The Court of Appeals quoted from
Richardson v. Belt, 13
App.D.C. 200, as follows:
Page 218 U. S. 429
"An essential foundation of the equity of interpleader is that
the party seeking the relief must not be under an independent or
special liability to one of the claimants. Adams, Eq. 204; 3
Pom.Eq. Jur. ยง 1327. Where there is an independent liability of the
party seeking the relief to one of the several defendants, arising
out of the relations subsisting between them, or upon a special
contract creating, for example, the relation of bailor and bailee,
landlord and tenant, or creditor and debtor, there can be no
interpleader unless it be made to appear that others have acquired
a claim of title or interest derived under the said liability."
But it is not necessary to consider the essentials of a bill of
interpleader or one in the nature of interpleader. It is very
certain that the bill in the pending case was not intended to be
either. The prayer of the bill is for permission to resign the
trust created by the agreement between the Savings & Trust
Company and the depositors of the stock -- a right which the
agreement expressly gives it. But appellants say:
"In the present case, either the complainant, the trust company,
had a right to compel the adverse claimants to come into court and
litigate their claims, or it had not. If it had not, the bill
should have been dismissed. If, on the other hand, it had such
right, as it clearly had, then the stock in controversy should have
been awarded to the parties who established their ownership to it
-- that is, to the appellants, who, it is submitted, fully
established their claims, while the defendant appellees practically
made default, which, in a case of this nature, amounts to a
confession that they had no right or title as against appellants to
the thing in controversy."
The assumptions of these statements are not justified. The
complainant did not bring the appellants into court to interplead
their claim to the stock with the depositors of it. The complainant
sought only by its bill to terminate
Page 218 U. S. 430
its relation to the depositors of the stock, and transfer the
trust it had undertaken to someone else. There were good reasons
for doing so. It had taken the custody of and assumed duties in
regard to property the title to which had come into dispute. Every
act that was done in discharge of those duties would be under the
shadow of illegality and the possibility of litigation. And,
besides, something had been done under the trust, the propriety of
which might be questioned by the new claimants to the property.
Whether justifiably, was submitted to the court, and likewise the
responsibility of the new trustee. It must be remembered that,
after the Savings & Trust Company received notice of the new
claimants of the stock, it had to proceed, if it proceeded at all,
in the possibility of such claim being declared the legal one. It
sought therefore to relieve itself of the trust and receive a
complete discharge from past and future responsibility. The
appellants sought to make it a trustee for them during, it may be,
a protracted litigation. It was something more, as we have seen,
than a mere holder of the stock. It had active duties to perform.
We see no error, therefore, in the action of the court on the bill
and answers.
But it is said that the trial court erred in refusing to receive
the cross-bill except upon the terms prescribed in the decree,
which were, as we have seen, that they apply for an injunction and
give a bond, as provided by Equity Rule 42 of the court. In the
motion for permission to file the cross-bill, orders were asked
that would have suspended the operation of the decree and the
transfer of the stock certificates. And it will further be observed
that the stock was not to be transferred by the decree to those
whose title appellants were seeking to divest, but to a responsible
trust company, and that there were shares of stock held by the
trust company in which others had an interest which, it is not
contended, is subject to a trust in favor of appellants. The
purpose of the cross-bill
Page 218 U. S. 431
was therefore to prevent the use of property under a claim of
title to it which would take time to determine, and it was not
inequitable in the court to require security of the appellants --
the security which was required of other litigants who sought the
same kind of relief.
Appellants, however, contend that the requirement was
inequitable, because the amount of the bond would have been large
and beyond their ability to give. But we may not assume that the
court's action would have been in excess of what the circumstance
would have justified. The appellants did not invoke further action,
but took an appeal, even before the expiration of the time which
they had been given to comply with the provision of the decree.
Decree affirmed.