The Constitution of the United States does not, as a general
rule, control the power of the states to select and classify
subjects for taxation, and vested rights which cannot be impaired
by subsequent legislation may still be classified for, and
subjected to, taxation.
A state may classify for taxation estates passing by will or
intestacy and include therein property held as community property
by husband and wife at the time of the death of the husband and
becoming completely vested in the wife, without violating either
the
Page 218 U. S. 401
contract, due process, or equal protection provision of the
Constitution; the mere fact that the wife had a preexisting right
of property creates no exemption from taxation if the selection of
that class of estates is legal.
In determining whether a tax imposed by a state is
constitutional, this Court is not concerned with the designation of
the tax or whether the thing taxed may or may not have been
mistakenly brought within the law; it is confined solely to
determining whether the state has power to levy a tax on the
subject taxed.
The nature and character of the right of a wife in community
property for the purpose of taxation is a peculiarly local
question, and the determination of the state court in regard
thereto is not reviewable by this Court.
The law of California of 1905, taxing all property passing by
will or intestacy, having been construed by the highest court of
that state as applying to the surviving wife's share of the
community property, this Court holds that such tax is not in
conflict with either the contract, due process or equal protection
clause of the Constitution of the United States.
153 Cal. 359 affirmed.
James Moffitt was married in California in the year 1863, and
there resided with his wife until his death on October 25, 1906. He
left a large amount of property, all of which formed part of the
community which existed between himself and his wife. By a will,
duly admitted to probate, Moffitt disposed of all his estate to his
wife and children in the same proportions as if he had died
intestate.
The probate court held that "the interest of the widow in the
community property of herself and her deceased husband" was subject
to be taxed under a law of California of 1905, which taxed all
property passing by will or in case of intestacy from any person
who may die seised or possessed of the same. A tax of $26,684.57
was thereupon assessed as against Mrs. Moffitt's one-half interest
in the estate, and an order was entered directing payment of the
tax by the executors. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
California. The single
Page 218 U. S. 402
question presented by the appeal, as stated in the opinion of
the supreme court, was "whether the surviving wife's share of the
community property is subject to this inheritance tax." The
question was answered in the affirmative. In an opinion denying an
application for a rehearing, the court also adversely disposed of
the contention that the enforcement of the tax would violate the
contract clause or the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution of the United States. 153 Cal. 359. The case was
then brought to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
While the plaintiffs in error rely on both the contract clause
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the latter
contention is in substance but an incident, and the former is the
fundamental proposition counted on to procure a reversal. We come,
however, separately to consider the two contentions.
1.
The alleged violation of the contract clause. --
Considered merely subjectively, the contention is that the rights
vested in the wife as a partner in the community existing by virtue
of the constitution and laws of the State of California governing
at the time of the marriage were contractual rights of such a
character that they could not be essentially changed or modified by
subsequent legislation without impairing the obligations of the
contract, and thereby violating the Constitution of the United
States.
Page 218 U. S. 403
But even although this theoretical proposition be fully
conceded, for the sake of the argument, it is apparent that it is
here a mere abstraction, and is therefore irrelevant to the case to
be decided. We say this because there is no assertion of the giving
effect to any law enacted subsequent to the contracting of the
marriage which purports to essentially modify the rights of the
wife in and to the community, as those rights existed at the time
the marriage was celebrated. This is so because the state law the
enforcement of which it is asserted will impair the obligation of
the contract is merely a law imposing a tax. It is evident,
therefore, when the contention is concretely considered, it
involves but a single proposition -- that is, that the State of
California could not, without violating the Constitution of the
United States, impose a tax on the share of the wife in the
community property on the occasion of the cessation by the death of
the husband of his dominion and control over the common property,
and the consequent complete vesting in enjoyment of such share in
the wife. But, in every conceivable aspect, this proposition must
rest upon one or both of two theories: either that the nature and
character of the right or interest were such that the state could
not tax it without violating the Constitution of the United States,
or that, if it could be generically taxed without violating that
instrument, for some particular reason the otherwise valid state
power of taxation could not be exerted without violating the
Constitution of the United States. The first conception is at once
disposed of by saying that it is elementary that the Constitution
of the United States does not, generally speaking, control the
power of the states to select and classify subjects of taxation,
and hence, even although the wife's right in the community property
was a vested right which could not be impaired by subsequent
legislation, it was nevertheless within the power of the state,
without violating the Constitution of the
Page 218 U. S. 404
United States, in selecting objects of taxation, to select the
vesting in complete possession and enjoyment by wives of their
shares in community property consequent upon the death of their
husbands, and the resulting cessation of their power to control the
same and enjoy the fruits thereof. And this also disposes of the
second conception, since, if the state had the power, so far as the
Constitution of the United States was concerned, to select the
vesting of such right to possession and enjoyment as a subject of
taxation, clearly the mere fact that the wife had a preexisting
right to the property created no exemption from taxation if the
selection for taxation would be otherwise legal. It follows
therefore that the mere statement of the contention demonstrates
the mistaken conception upon which, in the nature of things, it
rests.
It is said, however, that the reasoning just stated, while it
may be abstractly sound, is here inapplicable because the thing
complained of in this case is that the State of California has
imposed an inheritance tax upon the share of the wife in the
community, and thereby taxed her as an heir of her husband when, if
the laws existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage be
properly construed and be held to be contractual, she took her
share of the property on her husband's death not as an heir to
property of which he was the owner, but by virtue of a right of
ownership vested in her prior to the death of the husband, although
the right to possess and enjoy such property was deferred, and
arose only on his death. But, for the purpose of enforcing the
Constitution of the United States, we are not concerned with the
mere designation affixed to the tax which the court below upheld,
or whether the thing or subject taxed may or may not have been
mistakenly brought within the state taxing law. We say so because,
in determining whether the imposition of the tax complained of
violated the Constitution of the
Page 218 U. S. 405
United States, we are solely confined to considering whether the
state had the lawful power, without violating the Constitution of
the United States, to levy a tax upon the subject or thing taxed.
This being true, as it clearly results from what we have said that
the vesting of the wife's right of possession and enjoyment,
arising upon the death of her husband, was subject to be taxed by
the state, so far as the Constitution of the United States was
concerned, it follows that whether the tax imposed was designated
or levied as an inheritance tax or any other is a matter with which
we have no concern. To make this, if possible, clearer by an
illustration, we say that our view just expressed as to the
operation and effect of the Constitution of the United States upon
the tax in question would not be in the slightest degree changed
although it were to be hypothetically conceded that, on an analysis
of the Constitution and laws of California concerning the community
between husband and wife in force at the time of the marriage of
the Moffitts, we should conclude that the nature and character of
the rights of the wife in the community property, if correctly
interpreted, were such that, on the death of the husband, the share
coming to the wife would not be liable to taxation under a taxing
law like the one under consideration. This would be the case
because, as there was state power to tax, so far as the
Constitution of the United States was concerned, the question
whether or not the wife's interest under the circumstances was
correctly subjected to the tax was a purely state question, not
involving any violation of the Constitution of the United States,
and which therefore we have no right to review. The controlling
effect of the reasoning which we have just stated was pointed out,
and the mistaken conception upon which the contentions of the
plaintiffs in error rest was indicated, in
Castillo v.
McConnico, 168 U. S. 674,
168 U. S.
683.
2. The contention pressed in argument as to the equal
Page 218 U. S. 406
protection of the law clause substantially denies the right of
the state to impose any tax on the share of the wife in the
community property, resulting from the termination of the community
by the death of the husband, or in substance assumes that we have
the right to review the action of the state court in deciding that
the tax law which it enforced was applicable. We say this because
the entire argument proceeds upon the contention that, as the share
of the wife in the community property was a vested interest during
the life of the husband, it could not, on the death of the husband,
be taxed differently from any other property --
viz.,
according to value -- without violating the Constitution of
California and creating an inequality repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States. But this merely rests upon the mistaken
conception previously disposed of, since the nature and character
of the right of the wife in the community for the purpose of
taxation was peculiarly a local question, which we have no power to
review.
Affirmed.
