Where the decree of the lower court is founded on denial of
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, this Court has jurisdiction of
the appeal. The right to contribution is not a mere incident of a
form of procedure, but it belongs to the substantive law of the
admiralty.
The right to contribution in the admiralty cannot be taken away
because the claim is asserted against one of those causing the
damage at common law and put into judgment.
Where two vessels cause an injury to a third, the fact that the
injured party obtains judgment against the owners of one of the
vessels in fault does not deprive the admiralty of jurisdiction of
a suit brought by those against whom the judgment is entered
against the other vessel to compel contribution.
Quaere as to what, if anything, such judgment
conclusively establishes.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Court, are stated in the opinion.
Page 218 U. S. 269
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a libel for contribution. The libel was excepted to by
the claimant and was dismissed on the ground that the district
court, sitting as a court of admiralty, had no jurisdiction to
enforce contribution between the parties on the facts.
The facts alleged are as follows. The appellant was in
possession of the tug
Slatington under a demise, and the
tug was crossing the North River with car float No. 22 alongside on
the port side. The tug
Ira M. Hedges was coming up the
river on the port side with two stone scows in tow, one on each
side. There was a collision between one of those scows, the
Helen, and car float
No. 22, which was caused or
contributed to by the
Ira M. Hedges. The owner of the
Helen, not being the owner of the
Ira M. Hedges,
brought an action at common law and recovered a judgment against
the appellant, the owner of the
Ira M. Hedges not being
made a party defendant in that suit. The appellant paid the
judgment and brought this libel against the
Ira M. Hedges,
in terms to recover the amount of the claim set forth in the libel,
but, it fairly may be held, in substance to recover, if not the
whole,
Page 218 U. S. 270
then contribution for what the libellant has had to expend.
The first question is whether this Court has jurisdiction of the
appeal. It is said that the dismissal of the libel, although
expressed to be for want of jurisdiction, really is on the merits,
because payment of a judgment at common law is not a ground for
contribution from a joint wrongdoer, not a party to the suit. There
sometimes is difficulty in distinguishing between matters going to
the jurisdiction and those determining the merits,
Fauntleroy
v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230,
210 U. S. 235,
and, no doubt, this case presents that difficulty. But perhaps it
may be said that the two considerations coalesce here. The
admiralty has a limited jurisdiction. If there are no merits in the
claim, it is of a kind that the admiralty not only ought not to
enforce, but has no power to enforce. At all events, the form of
the decree must be taken to express the meaning of the judge. If
the decree was founded, as it purports to be, on a denial of
jurisdiction in the court, this Court has jurisdiction of the
appeal. For all admiralty jurisdiction belongs to courts of the
United States as such, and therefore the denial of jurisdiction
brings the appeal within the established rule.
See The
Jefferson, 215 U. S. 130,
215 U. S.
138.
Coming to the substance, we are of opinion that the decision was
wrong. The right to contribution belongs to the substantive law of
the admiralty.
Erie R. Co. v. Erie & Western Transportation
Co., 204 U. S. 220. It
is not a mere incident of a form of procedure. Therefore the fact,
over which the libellant had no control, that the injured party saw
fit to sue at common law cannot take that right away. The passing
of the claim against the libellant into the form of a judgment
before the claim was satisfied has no bearing upon the question
whether the right to contribution remains. It does not matter to
this question, even if it be true, as thought by the court
below,
Page 218 U. S. 271
that the libellant might have required the owner of the
Ira
M. Hedges to be made a party. For it still would have rested
with the plaintiff in the former suit to collect from the appellant
alone if it saw fit, and, if it had done so, it is, at best, but a
speculation to suggest that the libellant could have recovered from
its codefendant at common law.
The question as to what is conclusively established by the
common law judgment is not before us, but only the jurisdiction of
the court. But we may add that the appellant seeks to recover
contribution for the amount paid not as
res judicata, but
as one of the consequences of a joint tort from which it could not
escape, and which its fellow wrongdoer was bound to contemplate.
The claimant, of course, does not desire to dispute the appellant's
negligence. It is free to deny its own. Whether, if it were so
minded, it could controvert the amount of the damage as determined
by the judgment need not be discussed. No doubt it would have been
a prudent course for the appellant to give notice to the owner of
the
Ira M. Hedges to take part in the defense, with a view
to its possible ultimate liability. Whether a failure to do so
would affect its rights is not before us to decide. We do not mean
to intimate that the failure is material where there has been a
bona fide defense.
Decree reversed.