Objections to a bill for multifariousness and improper joinder
of parties must be promptly made, and properly by special demurrer
specifically directed to the objection, and so
held that,
in the absence of specific objection properly raised at the outset,
the court can determine in the same action, as against the
prosecuting attorney of a state, whether a statute is enforceable
under the Constitution of the United States, and, as against the
secretary of state, whether the bringing of the action in the
federal court will, under another statute, forfeit complainant's
right to do business in the state.
Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 1, and
West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.
S. 165, followed, to effect that an action brought to
enjoin state officers charged with the execution of a state statute
from enforcing the same on the ground that such statute violates
the federal Constitution is not an action against the state within
the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment.
Where a railroad company has already provided adequate
accommodation at any point, a state regulation requiring interstate
trains to stop at such point is an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce and void under the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution, and this rule equally applies to junction as
to other points, and so
held as to the Act of March 19,
1907, amending § 1075, Rev.Stat. of Missouri.
A statute requiring interstate trains to stop at junction points
for the convenience of passengers should be construed as a
regulation of commerce, and not as a police statute for the
protection of life and limb.
While the right to do local business within a state may not be
derived from the federal Constitution, the right to resort to
federal courts is one created by that Constitution and, as against
a foreign corporation
Page 218 U. S. 136
already established within it border, a state cannot forfeit the
right to do business because of the bringing of an action in the
federal court, and so
held that the Act of March 1, 1907,
of Missouri imposing such a penalty is unconstitutional and void as
to a foreign corporation already in the state at that time.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of certain
statutes of the State of Missouri, are stated in the opinion.
Page 218 U. S. 146
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway Company in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Western District of Missouri, to enjoin the execution of certain
provisions of the acts of the Legislature of the State of Missouri
as violative of complainant's rights under the federal
Constitution. The bill was filed against Harry T. Herndon,
prosecuting attorney of Clinton County, Missouri, and John E.
Swanger, secretary of State of the State of Missouri.
The bill is very lengthy, and as the decision of the court was
made upon demurrer to it, it will be necessary to call attention to
some of its pertinent allegations. Complainant avers that it is a
duly organized corporation of the
Page 218 U. S. 147
State of Illinois, operating a railroad in certain states --
among others, in the State of Missouri -- and is engaged in both
state and interstate commerce. It sets forth in detail the acts of
the State of Missouri authorizing the consolidation, extension, and
operations of the railroads under which it claims to have acquired
its system of railroads in that state. It avers that it duly filed
with the Secretary of State of the State of Missouri a copy of its
charter, in compliance with the laws of the state, and received a
certificate, November 22, 1902, in all respects in compliance with
the laws of the state, authorizing the complainant to carry on
business in said state for the term ending April 3, 1930, which
certificate is in full force, never having been cancelled or
withdrawn.
The bill sets forth the Act of March 19, 1907, amending § 1075
of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, requiring railroad companies
to perform certain duties -- among others, to stop passenger trains
at the junction or intersecting points of other railroads. As that
amended section is one of the acts complained of, it is set forth
in the margin. [
Footnote 1]
Page 218 U. S. 148
Concerning this section and the requirement to stop trains at
junction points, the bill sets out that the complainant has traffic
rights over the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway track
between Cameron Junction and Kansas City; that the town of Lathrop
is a town of about 1,000 inhabitants, situated in Clinton County,
Missouri, between Cameron Junction and Kansas City, on said line of
railway; that complainant, for the purpose of carrying on its
business as a common carrier at the said station of Lathrop, stops
a morning and evening passenger train each way, two west bound, and
two east bound, and, in addition thereto, stops two passenger
trains, one east bound and one west bound, which are local freight
trains regularly carrying passengers. Complainant further sets
forth that it runs a fast through passenger train between Chicago,
Fort Worth, and Dallas, Texas, by means of connecting carriers in
the State of
Page 218 U. S. 149
Texas, and a fast through passenger train between Chicago and
the Pacific coast by means of connecting carriers beyond the
territory of Oklahoma, neither of which stop at the station of
Lathrop to take on or let off passengers; that said trains which do
not stop at Lathrop are immediately preceded by trains that do stop
there, and which are maintained for the purpose of collecting
passengers from local stations and conveying them to nearby
stations on the line of the road of the complainant, where both of
said fast through trains do stop for the purpose of taking on and
letting off passengers.
The complainant further avers that the tracks of the complainant
cross and intersect with the tracks of the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Company at the said station of Lathrop; that the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway runs two trains each way
every day, all of which stop at the station of Lathrop, and which
make close and direct connection with the trains which the
Page 218 U. S. 150
complainant stops at the station of Lathrop; that, except under
unusual circumstances, passengers seldom find it convenient to
change from the complainant's railway to that of the Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe line at the station of Lathrop. Complainant
avers that to stop the through interstate trains running between
Chicago, Fort Worth, and Dallas, Texas, and between Chicago and the
Pacific coast would be a direct, unreasonable, and unwarrantable
interference with its interstate business, and that said through
trains are maintained for, and are essential to the purpose of,
transporting interstate passenger traffic, and for the carriage of
the United States mails. The complainant avers that the facilities
for the interchange of passengers at the station of Lathrop are
amply sufficient to accommodate the public, and that the service is
both convenient and satisfactory to the public. The bill further
avers that, if the said through trains are required to stop at all
junctions with other railways and there interchange passengers with
such road, their usefulness as through trains will be destroyed,
and the interstate business of the complainant interfered with to
an unwarranted extent without any corresponding benefit to the
traveling public; that the law of March 19, 1907, as applied to
said trains which do not stop at the station of Lathrop, is a
serious burden upon interstate commerce so conducted by said
trains, and an unlawful and unreasonable interference therewith,
and in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the
Acts of Congress regulating commerce. Complainant avers that the
Act of March 19, 1907, requiring trains carrying passengers to stop
at the junction or intersections of other roads for the purpose of
interchanging passengers and baggage at such junction points, was
not passed in the exercise of the police power of the State of
Missouri to protect the traveling public, but solely for the
purpose of increasing traveling facilities, and to provide a more
convenient and satisfactory
Page 218 U. S. 151
train service at such junction points. Complainant avers that it
installed an interlocking plant and an automatic signal device at
the intersection with the tracks of the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway at the station of Lathrop, and thereby provided an
absolutely safe method for its through trains to pass over the
tracks of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe road without
stopping. The bill avers that Harry T. Herndon, as prosecuting
attorney for the County of Clinton, Missouri threatens to and will,
unless enjoined, put in motion the special provisions of the Act of
March 19, 1907, for the enforcement of penalties of $25 per day
since July 21, 1907, which penalties in a short time would amount
to many thousands of dollars.
Complainant further avers that defendant John E. Swanger,
Secretary of the State of Missouri, under and by authority of said
Act of the State of Missouri approved March 13, 1907, concerning
the bringing of cases by foreign corporations in the federal
courts, which act is set forth in the margin, [
Footnote 2] threatens to, and will, unless
Page 218 U. S. 152
enjoined, cancel the complainant's certificate of the right to
do business in the State of Missouri, and will take other steps
necessary to revoke the license and permit, as provided in the Act
of March 13, 1907, should the complainant file this, its bill of
complaint, in the United States circuit court, and because of any
attempt complainant
Page 218 U. S. 153
may make to remove any case to a federal court from any state
court of the State of Missouri, and to bring any case in any
federal court against a citizen of the State of Missouri. The bill
then sets out the coming of the complainant into the State of
Missouri in accordance with the laws of the state, that it acquired
property therein, which included many miles of railroad, depots,
station grounds, shops, and warehouses, terminals, rolling stock,
and other equipment necessary to the maintenance and operation of
its line, located in the State of Missouri, and at an assessed
value of $3,252,775. The bill sets out the various particulars
wherein it is contended that the Act of March 13, 1907, is void
under the Constitution of the United States, and the bill avers
that, if the complainant should attempt to remove into the federal
courts any case commenced in the state courts of Missouri, or
should commence proceedings in any federal court against a citizen
of the State of Missouri, the defendant, as Secretary of State of
the State of Missouri, would deny the right of complainant to do
business in the State of Missouri, and if the complainant attempted
to carry on the same it would be subject to forfeit and to pay to
the State of Missouri a penalty of not less than $2,000 nor more
than $10,000, to be recovered in any court in the state having
jurisdiction. An injunction was prayed against the defendant Harry
T. Herndon as prosecuting attorney of the County of Clinton,
Missouri, requiring him to refrain from enforcing, or attempting to
enforce, the provisions of the Act of March 19, 1907, so far as it
relates to the stopping of the trains aforesaid at the crossing of
the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway at the station of
Lathrop, Clinton County, Missouri, and from enforcing, or
attempting to enforce, the penalties of the statute, and that the
defendant John E. Swanger, secretary of State of the State of
Missouri, be restrained from enforcing, or attempting to enforce,
the provisions of the Act of March 13, 1907,
Page 218 U. S. 154
providing for the revocation and cancelling of the complainant's
charter because of the removal of cases from a state to a federal
court, or bringing suit in a federal court against any citizen of
the State of Missouri.
A demurrer was filed to the bill by both of the defendants, the
same was overruled, and a final decree was entered enjoining the
enforcement of the Act of March 13, 1907, because of the beginning
of the suits, or the removal of cases to federal courts, and
enjoining the enforcement of the Act of March 19, 1907, so far as
it relates to the complainant's said trains passing through
Lathrop, or the stopping of such trains at the station of Lathrop,
and enjoined the defendant prosecuting attorney of Clinton County,
Missouri, from enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the provisions
of said act as to stopping said trains, or enforcing the penalties
provided for in that act for the failure to comply with the
provisions thereof.
It is evident from the foregoing statement that the
constitutional questions involved in this case are first, whether,
under the Act of March 19, 1907, the complainant can be compelled
to stop its through trains, described in the bill at the station of
Lathrop, and whether such a statute, so far as it relates to
interstate commerce trains, is void as an attempt to regulate
interstate commerce, and imposes a burden thereon by state
legislation. And, secondly, under the Act of March 13, 1907, can
the license and right of the complainant to do business in the
State of Missouri be lawfully revoked because it has begun a suit,
or may remove a suit, from a state court to a federal court,
complainant being a corporation organized in another state.
Before considering these questions, we will notice some of the
objections to the decree below made by the learned counsel for the
state. It is asserted that the bill is multifarious, and that there
is no right to join the defendants, the prosecuting attorney and
Secretary of State, in the
Page 218 U. S. 155
same bill. But no objection to such joinder of the parties was
specially taken, and it is well settled that an objection of this
character must be promptly made. The proper way to raise such
question is by special demurrer, specifically directed to the
objection. Street, Fed.Equity Practice, vol. 1, § 936. It is true
that a court may itself take the objection in extreme cases, when
that course is essential to the necessary and proper administration
of justice. But, as laid down in
Oliver v.
Piatt, 3 How. 333,
44 U. S. 412,
Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the Court, if the court can get to
a final decree without serious embarrassment, it will do so, and
says the learned Justice: "
A fortiori, an appellate court
would scarcely entertain the objection, if it was not forced upon
it by a moral necessity." No such case exists here. Certainly, in
the absence of a specific objection, there is no difficulty in
hearing at the same time the case against the Secretary of State
and the prosecuting attorney. The bringing of the suit against the
prosecuting attorney in the federal court, if the statute of March
13, 1907, is to be carried out, will forfeit the complainant's
right to do business within the state, and we see no reason why the
right to declare such forfeiture may not be considered with the
case against the prosecuting attorney. We find no merit in the
objection of multifariousness.
As to the objection that the suit is one against the state, we
think no discussion is necessary, and content ourselves with a
reference to the late cases in this Court to that point.
Ex
Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.
S. 165.
The act of March 19, 1907, requiring the stopping of certain
trains, upon its face seems to require the stoppage of all
passenger trains at the junction or intersection of other roads.
But it is contended by counsel for the state that this statute is
but an amendment of former statutes, and that the requirement to
stop trains carrying passengers,
Page 218 U. S. 156
as qualified by the subsequent language of the act, means to
stop such trains for a sufficient length of time to allow the
transfer of passengers, personal baggage, mails and express from
the trains of the roads connecting or intersecting to the trains of
the other road, and that therefore the act applies only to the
operation of trains actually carrying such passengers, personal
baggage, mails and express as are destined for points on the
connecting road, and does not require the stoppage of all trains
carrying passengers, as is set out in the bill. And this
conclusion, it is said, must necessarily follow because of the
construction given to the statute prior to its amendment on March
19, 1907.
State ex Rel. The W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 83
Mo. 148;
Logan v. H. & St. J. R. Co., 77 Mo. 666;
State ex Rel. Railroad, 105 Mo.App. 212.
The contention is that the amendment of 1907 has only the effect
to bring into the statute certain provisions as to branch
railroads. Assuming this to be a correct interpretation of this
statute, and that it only requires the stoppage of trains at
Lathrop carrying passengers destined for points on the intersecting
railroad, or to take up passengers there destined for points on
complainant's road, the question remains, would the requirement of
the Act of March 19, 1907, to stop the through trains described in
the bill for such purpose and under the circumstances set forth be
an unlawful attempt to regulate interstate commerce, and impose an
unlawful burden thereon?
The extent of the right to control through interstate
transportation of passengers by state legislation, or under orders
of a commission authorized by the state, has been recently before
this Court.
Miss. R. Comm'n v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
203 U. S. 335;
Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.
S. 328.
The principle to be deduced from these cases is that, where a
railroad company has already provided ample
Page 218 U. S. 157
facilities for the adequate accommodation of the traveling
public such as may be proper and reasonable at any given point, and
operates interstate commerce trains, carrying passengers, through
the same places at which such interstate trains do not stop, a
state regulation which requires the stopping of such interstate
trains, in addition to ample facilities already provided, to the
detriment and hindrance of interstate traffic is an unlawful
regulation and burden upon interstate commerce. Applying the
principles thus settled, and taking the allegations of the bill as
true, which we must do in view of the fact that the case was
decided upon demurrer, we think that construing the statute so as
to require the stoppage of the through trains whenever any persons
might seek to avail themselves thereof, in order to permit a
transfer of passengers from one road to the other upon such trains,
would be an unnecessary and unlawful burden upon interstate
traffic. The averment of the bill is that the business is already
amply provided for in the other trains of the company and the
connecting road, and the serious detriment to the interstate
carrying business from the requirement to stop the through trains
described for the purpose of permitting such transfers is fully set
forth in the bill, and admitted by the demurrer.
It is true that the bill avers that few persons require transfer
at such connecting point, but if passengers have the right, under
this statute, to require the stoppage of such through trains at
Lathrop whenever they may desire to avail themselves of such
privilege, serious inconvenience would result to the interstate
traffic in question. It is to be remembered that this statute is
not of that class passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the promotion of the public safety, and requiring the
stoppage of trains by one railroad before crossing the tracks of
another railroad; this statute, as its second section shows, was
passed for the purpose of providing
Page 218 U. S. 158
greater facilities of travel, and not for the protection of life
and limb. We therefore reach the conclusion that the circuit court
did not err in granting the injunction so far as it relates to the
enforcement of the Act of March 19, 1907, relating to the stoppage
of the interstate commerce trains at the station of Lathrop.
As to the validity of the Act of March 13, 1907, forfeiting the
right of the company to do business in the State of Missouri, and
subjecting it to penalties in case it should bring a suit in the
federal courts or remove one from the state courts to the federal
courts, but little need be said. This is so because of the cases
decided at this term, involving contentions kindred to the one made
in this case.
See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas,
216 U. S. 1;
Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56;
Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U. S.
146;
Southern Railway Co. v. Greene,
216 U. S. 400.
Applying the principles announced in those cases, it is evident
that the act in controversy cannot stand, in view of the provisions
of the Constitution of the United States. Moreover, this is not a
case where the state has undertaken to prevent the coming of the
corporation into its borders for the purpose of carrying on
business. The corporation was within the state, complying with its
laws, and had acquired, under the sanction of the state, a large
amount of property within its borders, and thus had become a person
within the state within the meaning of the Constitution, and
entitled to its protection. Under the statute in controversy, a
domestic railroad company might bring an action in the federal
court, or, in a proper case, remove one thereto, without being
subject to the forfeiture of its right to do business, or to the
imposition of penalties provided for in the act. In all the cases
in this Court discussing the right of the states to exclude foreign
corporations and to prevent them from removing cases to the federal
courts, it has been conceded that,
Page 218 U. S. 159
while the right to do local business within the state may not
have been derived from the federal Constitution, the right to
resort to the federal courts is a creation of the Constitution of
the United States and the statutes passed in pursuance thereof.
It is enough now to say that, within the principles decided at
this term in the cases cited above, the Act of March 13, 1907, as
applied to the complainant railroad company, in view of the
admitted facts set out in the bill in this case, is
unconstitutional and void. We find no error in the decree granted
in the Circuit Court, and the same is affirmed.
Affirmed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 1075. Every railroad corporation in this state which now
is, or may hereafter be, engaged in the transportation of persons
or property from one point in this state to another point in this
state, shall give public notice of the regular time of starting and
running its cars, and shall furnish sufficient accommodations for
the transportation of all such passengers, baggage, mails, and
express freight as shall, within a reasonable time previous
thereto, be offered for transportation at the place of starting at
the junctions of other railroads, and at the junction of branch
railroads of the same system, as herein defined, carrying
passengers, and at the several stopping places, and shall at all
crossings and intersections of other railroads, where such other
railroad and the railroad crossing the same are now or may
hereafter be made, upon the same grade, and the character of the
land at such crossing or intersection will admit of the same,
erect, build, and maintain, either jointly with the railroad
company whose road is crossed, or separately by each railroad
company, a depot or passenger house and waiting room or rooms
sufficient to comfortably accommodate all passengers awaiting the
arrival and departure of tains at such junction or railroad
crossing, and shall keep such depot or passenger house or rooms
warm, lighted, and open to the ingress and egress of all passengers
for a reasonable time before the arrival and until after the
departure of all trains carrying passengers on said railroad or
railroads, and they are hereby required to stop all trains carrying
passengers at the junction or intersection of other railroads, and
they are further required to receive all passengers and baggage
for, and to stop, on a flag or signal, all trains carrying
passengers at the junction of all branch railroads of the same
system, which said branch railroads are eighteen miles or more in
length, and at the terminus of which is located any county seat
town of any county in this state, a sufficient length of time to
allow the transfer of passengers, personal baggage, mails, and
express freight from the trains of railroads so connecting or
intersecting; or they may mutually arrange for the transportation
of such persons and property over both roads without change of
cars, and they shall be compelled to receive all passengers and
freight from such connecting, intersecting, or branch roads
whenever the same shall be delivered to them. And every railroad
company or corporation owning, operating, or leasing any railroad
in this state shall keep all its depots, stations, or passenger
stations, whether located at the crossing or intersection of other
roads or elsewhere, warm, lighted, and open to the ingress and
egress of all passengers a reasonable time before the arrival and
until after the departure of all passenger trains on said railroad
which stop or receive or discharge passengers at such depots,
stations, or passenger houses. Every railroad corporation or
company which shall fail, neglect, or refuse to comply with any or
either one of the provisions of this section from and after the
time the same shall become a law, shall, for each day said railroad
corporation or company refuses, neglects, or fails to comply
therewith, shall forfeit and pay the sum of twenty-five dollars,
which may be recovered in the name of the State of Missouri, to the
use of the school fund of the county wherein said crossing, depot,
station, passenger house or branch railroad is located, and it
shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute for a
recovery of the same. The term 'railroad corporations,' as used in
this act, shall include the term 'railway company and railway
corporation.'"
"SEC. 2. Inasmuch as the train service is very inconvenient and
unsatisfactory in some places constitutes an emergency within the
meaning of the Constitution, therefore this act shall take effect
and be in force from and after its passage."
[
Footnote 2]
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri
as follows:
"SEC. 1. If any foreign or nonresident railway corporation of
whatever kind, incorporated, created, and existing under the laws
of any other state, territory, or country, and doing business as a
carrier of freight or passengers from one point in this state, to
another point in this state, under the laws of this state
regulating or authorizing the licensing of, or the issuing of a
permit or a certificate of authority to, or suffering or allowing,
any such corporation to enter or to do business in this state
shall, without the consent of the other party, in writing, to any
suit or proceeding brought by or against it in any court of this
state, remove said suit or proceeding to any federal court, or
shall institute any suit or proceeding against any citizen of this
state in any federal court, the license, permit, certificate of
authority, and all right of such corporation and its agents to
carry passengers or freight from one point in this state to another
point in this state shall forthwith be revoked by the secretary of
state, and its right to do such business shall cease, and the
secretary of state shall publish such revocation in some newspaper
of large and general circulation in the state, and such corporation
shall not again be authorized or permitted to carry passengers or
freight from one point in this state to another point in this
state, or to do business as a carrier of passengers or freight of
any kind from one point in this state to another point in this
state at any time within five years from the date of such
revocation or the cessation of such right. But the revocation of
such license, permit, right, certificate of authority, or the
cessation of such right, shall not be deemed to prohibit or prevent
such corporation from carrying passengers or freight from a point
within this state to a point without this state, or from a point
without this state to a point within this state, or from making
what are portation."
"SEC. 2. If any corporation included in the provisions of this
act shall carry, or attempt to carry, or hold itself out to carry,
passengers or freight of any kind from one point in the state to
another, without a license, permit, or certificate of authority
therefor, first had and obtained from the State of Missouri, to be
issued by the secretary of state, or after its license, permit.
right, or certificate of authority to carry passengers or freight
of any kind from one point in this state to another point in this
state, shall have been revoked or ceased, as provided for by the
preceding section of this act, it shall forfeit and pay to the
State of Missouri for each offense a penalty of not less than
$2,000 nor more than $10,000, suit to be brought therefor in any
court of competent jurisdiction by the attorney general or the
prosecuting attorney of any county in the state in which such
offense shall have been committed, and such offense shall be deemed
to have been committed either in the county where such
transportation originated or in the county where it terminated. And
the governor may, whenever he shall deem it necessary, appoint
special counsel to assist the attorney general or any prosecuting
attorney to enforce or carry out the provisions of this act."
"SEC. 3. All acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith are,
insofar as they are in conflict, hereby repealed."
"Approved March 13, 1907."
Laws of Missouri of 1907, p. 174.