The right to regulate interstate commerce is exclusively vested
in Congress, and the states cannot pass any law directly regulating
such commerce; but the states may, in the exercise of the police
power, pass laws in the interest of public safety which do not
interfere directly with the operations of interstate commerce.
The constitutionality of a state statute regulating operation of
railroad trains depends upon its effect on interstate commerce,
and, in the absence of congressional regulation on the subject,
states may make reasonable regulations as to the manner in which
trains shall approach, and give notice of their approach to,
dangerous crossings, so long as they are not a direct burden upon
interstate commerce.
One who would strike down a statute as unconstitutional must
show that it affects him injuriously and actually deprives him of a
constitutional right.
Proof must conform to the allegations, and, without proper
allegations, testimony cannot be admitted.
A pleading must state facts, and not mere conclusions, and the
want of
Page 217 U. S. 525
essential definite allegations renders a pleading subject to
demurrer. This general rule is also the practice in Georgia.
General statements that a statute is in violation of the
commerce clause of the federal Constitution, is a direct burden on
interstate commerce, and impairs the usefulness of the pleader's
facilities for that purpose are mere conclusions, and not
statements of the facts which make the operation of the statute
unconstitutional, and do not raise any defense to a cause of action
based on a violation of such statute.
160 F. 332 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of
Georgia regulating the crossing of highways by railroad trains, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 217 U. S. 530
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases were tried together in the circuit court, and were
so considered in the circuit court of appeals, and will be so
disposed of here. In No. 140, Josephine King brought her suit in
the Superior Court of Habersham County, Georgia, to recover $10,000
against the Southern Railway Company for the wrongful death of her
husband, killed while riding in a buggy at a crossing of the
defendant's railway. The alleged negligence was the violation of a
certain statute of the State of Georgia in that the company failed
to check and to keep checking
Page 217 U. S. 531
the speed of its train while approaching the crossing at which
her husband was killed.
In case No. 141, the action was brought by Inez King, by her
next friend, Josephine King, in the same court, because of injuries
received at the same time and place and in alleged violation of the
same statute. Both cases were removed to the United States Circuit
Court for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Georgia.
Upon trial, verdicts and judgments was rendered against the
railroad company. These judgments were affirmed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 8 160 F. 332. The cases
were then brought here by writs of certiorari.
The federal question presented concerns the validity of the
statute of the State of Georgia for violation of which a recovery
was had, it being the contention of the petitioner that the statute
is in violation of the interstate commerce clause of the federal
Constitution in that it is an illegal burden upon and a regulation
of interstate commerce. This statute is found in § 2222 of the
Civil Code of Georgia, and reads as follows:
"There must be fixed on the line of said roads at the distance
of 400 yards from the center of each of said crossings, and on each
side thereof, a post, and the engineer shall be required, whenever
he shall arrive at either of said posts, to blow the whistle of the
locomotive until it arrives at the public road, and to
simultaneously check and keep checking the speed thereof, so as to
stop in time should any person or thing be crossing said track on
said road."
It has been frequently decided in this Court that the right to
regulate interstate commerce is, by virtue of the federal
Constitution, exclusively vested in the Congress of the United
States. The states cannot pass any law directly regulating such
commerce. Attempts to do so have been declared unconstitutional in
many instances,
Page 217 U. S. 532
and the exclusive power in Congress to regulate such commerce
uniformly maintained. While this is true, the rights of the states
to pass laws not having the effect to regulate or directly
interfere with the operations of interstate commerce, passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state, in the interest of the
public health and safety, have been maintained by the decisions of
this Court. We may instance some of the cases of this nature in
which statutes have been held not to be a regulation of interstate
commerce, although they may affect the transaction of such commerce
among the states. In
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.
S. 465, it was held to be within the police power of the
state to require locomotive engineers to be examined and licensed.
In
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. New York,
165 U. S. 628, a
law regulating the heating of passenger cars and requiring guard
posts on bridges was sustained. In
Lake Shore R. Co. v.
Ohio, 173 U. S. 286,
it was held to be a valid enactment to require railway companies
operating within the State of Ohio to cause three of its regular
passenger trains to stop each way daily at every village containing
over 3,000 inhabitants. In
Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.
S. 584, it was held that a municipal ordinance of Kansas
City, Kansas, although applicable to interstate trains, which
restricted the speed of all trains within the city limits to six
mile an hour, was a valid exertion of the police power of the
state. In the case of
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S.
47, this Court said:
"It is also within the undoubted province of the state
legislature to make regulations with regard to the speed of
railroad trains in the neighborhood of cities and towns; with
regard to the precautions to be taken in the approach of such
trains to bridges, tunnels, deep cuts and sharp curves, and,
generally, with regard to all operations in which the lives and
health of people may be endangered, even though such regulations
affect, to some extent, the
Page 217 U. S. 533
operations of interstate commerce. Such regulations are
eminently local in their character, and, in the absence of
congressional regulations over the same subject, are free from all
constitutional objections, and unquestionably valid."
On the other hand, it has been held to be an illegal attempt to
regulate interstate commerce to require interstate passenger trains
to stop at county seats when adequate train service had already
been provided for local traffic.
C. C.C. & St.L. R. Co. v.
Illinois, 177 U. S. 514. In
Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad
Company, 203 U. S. 335, it
was held that orders of a state railroad commission which directed
the stopping of interstate trains at certain local stations, where
adequate transportation facilities had already been provided, was
an unlawful attempt to regulate interstate commerce, and repugnant
to the federal Constitution.
Applying the general rule to be deduced from these cases to such
regulations as are under consideration here, it is evident that the
constitutionality of such statute will depend upon their effect
upon interstate commerce. It is consistent with the former
decisions of this Court, and with a proper interpretation of
constitutional rights, at least in the absence of congressional
action upon the same subject matter, for the state to regulate the
manner in which interstate trains shall approach dangerous
crossings, the signals which shall be given, and the control of the
train which shall be required under such circumstances. Crossings
may be so situated in reference to cuts or curves as to render them
highly dangerous to those using the public highways. They may be in
or near towns or cities, so that to approach them at a high rate of
speed would be attended with great danger to life or limb. On the
other hand, highway crossings may be so numerous and so near
together that to require interstate trains to slacken speed
indiscriminately at all such
Page 217 U. S. 534
crossings would be practically destructive of the successful
operation of such passenger trains. Statutes which require the
speed of such trains to be checked at all crossings so situated
might not only be a regulation, but also a direct burden upon
interstate commerce, and therefor beyond the power of the state to
enact.
It is the settled law of this Court that one who would strike
down a state statute as violative of the federal Constitution must
bring himself, by proper averments and showing, within the class as
to whom the act thus attacked is unconstitutional. He must show
that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the law injures him,
and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the
federal Constitution.
Tyler v. The Judges, 179 U.
S. 405;
Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S.
51,
187 U. S. 60;
Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415;
Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152,
204 U. S.
160.
In the case at bar, the federal question was sought to be raised
by an amendment to the answer. The answer originally filed was
general in its nature, and did not set up the defense of violation
of the federal Constitution. The amendment filed set up that the
railroad company was engaged in interstate commerce, and, at the
time of the injury complained of, was operating an interstate
train, and after setting up the statute of the State of Georgia for
a violation of which the company was sued, averred that it was
inoperative as to the defendant's train, because in violation of §
8, Article I, of the federal Constitution, giving Congress the
power to regulate commerce, and further stated:
"Your defendant further shows that the statute of Georgia is not
a reasonable regulation of the police power of the state to secure
the safety of passengers, but that the statute is a direct burden
on and impedes the interstate traffic being done by this defendant,
and impairs the usefulness of its facilities for such traffic."
"Defendant further shows that it is impossible to observe
Page 217 U. S. 535
said statute and carry the mails as defendant is required to
carry them under the contract it has with the government, and it is
likewise impossible to do an interstate business and at the same
time comply with the terms of said statute."
"Wherefore it says that said statute is inoperative as to it,
and it should not be required to comply with the same on its
interstate line of railroad."
"All which it stands ready to verify, and prays that it be hence
discharged with its reasonable cost."
On oral demurrer to this amendment to the answer, the same was
held insufficient, and it was dismissed. Petitioner's counsel
further sought to raise the federal question by an offer of proof
at the trial by an engineer of the company, as follows:
"I expect to prove that, between the South Carolina line and
Atlanta, there are practically one hundred road crossings, or
between eighty-five and one hundred public road crossings; that the
distance is 101 miles; that the crossings in some localities are
very close together, and within a few hundred yards of each other,
and at others farther apart, but, on the average, making a crossing
to the mile, almost. We expect to show further that, to observe the
statute, and check and keep checking, so as to have a train under
control, and to stop should any person or thing be on the crossing,
would consume from five to ten minutes for each crossing,
dependent, of course, upon the weight and length of the train and
the grade; but it would make an average of seven or eight minutes.
We wish to show that this train was made up and known as No. 39,
the vestibule train which runs from the City of Washington, through
the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia; that it was carrying passengers from one state to another,
also carrying an express car with freight on it from one state to
another. We wish and expect to show that obedience
Page 217 U. S. 536
to that crossing act would hinder, and practically prevent,
interstate business being done by the defendant railroad. We wish
to show the condition I have just stated all existed at the time
this accident occurred, on the 11th of October, 1903."
This testimony was excluded, and an exception was taken. It is
apparent from this outline of the state of the record that, when
this testimony was offered, there was no answer on file in the case
under which it would be competent. A demurrer had been sustained to
the amendment to the answer, and the case stood upon the complaint
and the general issue filed by the defendant. It is elementary that
the proof must conform to the allegations, and that, without proper
allegations, testimony cannot be admitted. We are then remitted to
the question, did the court err in sustaining the demurrer to the
amended answer? The circuit court of appeals held, and we think
correctly, that an inspection of that document shows that it did
not contain a proper averment of the facts, which would show that
the operation of the statute in controversy was such as to
unlawfully regulate interstate commerce, and therefore deprive the
railway company of its constitutional right to carry on such
commerce unhampered by such illegal restrictions. The amended
answer contains the general statement that the statute is in
violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution, and a direct
burden upon, and impedes, interstate traffic, and impairs the
usefulness of defendant's facilities for that purpose; that it is
impossible to observe the statute in carrying mails and in
interstate commerce business. But these averments are mere
conclusions. They set forth no facts which would make the operation
of the statute unconstitutional. They do not show the number or
location of the crossings at which the railway company would be
required to check the speed of its trains, so as to interfere with
their successful operation. For aught that appears
Page 217 U. S. 537
as allegations of fact in this answer, the crossing at which
this injury happened may have been so located and of such dangerous
character as to make the slackening of trains at that point
necessary to the safety of those using the public highway, and a
statute making such requirement only a reasonable police
regulation, and not an unlawful attempt to regulate or hinder
interstate commerce. In the absence of facts setting up a situation
showing the unreasonable character of the statute as applied to the
defendant under the circumstances, we think the amended answer set
up no legal defense, and that the demurrer thereto was properly
sustained.
The learned counsel for the petitioner insists that, under the
decisions in Georgia, in the absence of a special demurrer
requiring a more particular statement, the answer was sufficient.
It is enough to say that we have examined those decisions, and
think that they do not indicate a departure from the general rule
that a pleading must state facts, and not mere conclusions, and
that the want of definite allegations essential to a cause of
action or defense renders a pleading subject to demurrer.
We find no error in the judgment of the circuit court of
appeals, and the same is affirmed in both cases.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, dissenting:
The petitioner set up as a defense to these actions that the
statute under which it was sued was such a burden on commerce among
the states as to violate Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution of the
United States -- a pure issue of law. If, in order to try this
issue intelligently, it was necessary to take evidence of facts, I
think the court was bound to hear such evidence, even without any
specific allegation of the facts that would maintain it, as it is
the court's duty to know and to declare the law. But I
Page 217 U. S. 538
leave that question on one side because the petitioners did not
stop with the naked proposition, but alleged further that
"it is impossible to observe said statute and carry the mails as
the defendant is required to carry them under the contract it has
with the government, and it is likewise impossible to do an
interstate business and at the same time comply with the terms of
said statute."
These are pure allegations of fact. They mean, on their face,
that the requirement that the engineer at every grade crossing
should have his train under such control as to be able to stop, if
necessary, to avoid running down a man or wagon crossing the track,
requires such delays as to prevent, or seriously to interfere with,
commerce among the states. They refer to physical conditions and to
physical facts; they can refer to nothing else. I think it obvious
that they mean that the crossings are so numerous as to make the
requirement impracticable, since I can think of nothing but the
number of them that would have that effect.
The statement may be called a conclusion, but it is a conclusion
of fact, just as the statement that a certain liquid was beer is a
conclusion of fact from certain impressions of taste, smell, and
sight. If the objection to the pleading had been that more
particulars were wanted, although, for my part, I think it would
have been unnecessarily detailed and prolix pleading to set forth
what and where the crossings were, the pleading should not have
been rejected, but the details should have been required. The
petitioner showed that it was ready to give them, by its offer of
proof. But evidently the answer was not held bad on that ground.
Presumably, at least as stated by the counsel for the petitioner,
it was held bad on the ground taken by the supreme court of that
state, that, although the requirement was impracticable, it was the
law.
Central of Georgia Ry. v. Hall, 109 Ga. 367, 369.
Page 217 U. S. 539
For it is to be observed further that the facts involved were
public facts, and that, although the court might not take notice of
the precise situation of particular crossings, it well might take
notice, as the Supreme Court of Georgia seems to have taken notice
in the case just mentioned, that they were numerous.
See United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.
S. 690,
174 U. S. 698,
and for many cases, Wigmore, Ev. §§ 2575, 2580. 16 Cyc.Law &
Proc. p. 862. 17 Am. & Eng. Ency.Law, 2d. ed. p. 904. Again, if
any merely technical objection had been thought fatal to the
defense, the petitioner undoubtedly would have met it by a further
amendment to its plea.
It seems to me a miscarriage of justice to sustain liability
under a statute which possibly, and I think probably, is
unconstitutional until the facts have been heard which the
petitioner alleged and offered to prove. I think that the judgment
should be reversed.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in this
dissent.