Where the vendors bring an action in their own name, but to
protect their vendees, such vendees, although having acquired title
prior to the institution of the action, are privies thereto, and
may plead the judgment in such action as
res judicata; in
such a case, the general rule that no one whose interest was
acquired prior to the institution of the action is privy to the
judgment rendered therein does not apply.
Under Spanish law, it was competent for vendors, after parting
with title, to conduct a litigation in their own names for the
benefit of their vendees, and therefore a judgment in such a case
inures to the benefit of the vendees as between them and the
defendants against whom it was rendered and their respective
privies.
One who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to
establish and protect his own right, or who assists in the
prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of his
own, and who does this openly to the knowledge of the opposing
party, is as much bound by the judgment and as fully entitled to
avail himself of it as an estoppel against an adverse party as he
would be if he had been a party to the record.
Lovejoy v.
Murray, 3 Wall. 1.
Assertions that parties are not privies to a judgment and cannot
plead it as
res judicata, and that a judgment can be
collaterally attacked as rendered against one insane at the time,
raise questions of law, and where, as in this case, such questions
are to be determined on the facts appearing in such judgments and
in the pleadings, the court does not usurp the functions of the
jury by determining that the contentions raised by such assertions
are without merit.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 217 U. S. 477
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In July, 1906, plaintiffs in error commenced this action in the
District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico
to recover, from the defendants in error the possession of certain
described real estate, and damages from April 12, 1904, for
unlawfully withholding possession thereof.
Page 217 U. S. 478
The right to the relief sought was based upon the averment that
one Clemente De Fleurian, at his death, on February 24, 1892, was
seised in fee and entitled to the possession of the premises, and
that he died intestate, leaving the plaintiffs -- his widow and two
children -- "as his legal succession." A demurrer to the complaint
was overruled except as to the necessity of furnishing certain
information in regard to rents and profits, which was afterwards
done through the medium of a bill of particulars. The defendants
filed a joint answer. In addition to a general denial, they pleaded
title by adverse possession of twenty years, and that plaintiffs'
right to recover was barred by reason of certain judgments obtained
by the predecessors in title of defendants in actions prosecuted by
them in the courts of France and in the courts of Porto Rico during
the Spanish regime, and by reason of a judgment of dismissal
entered in favor of predecessors in title of defendants, and
against the plaintiffs, in a suit in equity brought by the latter
in the trial court below in the year 1904 to quiet the title to the
premises in controversy. A motion was filed to strike out portions
of the answer as alleging mere evidentiary matter, and a demurrer
was also filed to the special defenses of
res judicata.
The motion and demurrer were overruled, the court filing an opinion
in which it detailed the substance of the matters set up in the
answer and, in effect, held that the decrees or judgments of the
French and Porto Rican courts prior to the cession from Spain were
res judicata as to the claims of the plaintiffs, unless
their rights had subsequently arisen. After setting forth its
reasons for such conclusion, the court called upon the
plaintiffs
"to file a replication within ten days or such longer period as
they may, if at all, be entitled to, setting up the fact whether or
not the answer is true insofar as it sets out the source of
plaintiffs' title, and describes or recites these proceedings in
other courts regarding this property."
This requirement was followed by the statement that,
"if it shall transpire that the answer has set up the real facts
in the case, then, on the application of
Page 217 U. S. 479
defendants, the action will be immediately dismissed at the cost
of the plaintiffs."
Thereafter a replication was filed on the part of the
plaintiffs, which, omitting the title and the signatures of the
attorneys, is as follows:
"
Replication"
"Now come the plaintiffs herein, in conformity with the order of
the court, entered herein, and make reply to the answer of the
defendants, as follows:"
"First. They deny that the defendants have ever had any just
title to the premises, or that those from whom they derived title
have possessed the premises in good faith or with just title."
"Second. The plaintiffs impugn the alleged prescription either
of ten years or of twenty years."
"Third. The plaintiffs deny the allegations in the answer that
the ancestor, Clemente De Fleurian, has obtained the deed to the
properties described in the complaint through fraud, and they
allege that he purchased the said properties in good faith and for
valuable consideration, and always was ready, and the plaintiffs
are ready, to comply with all the conditions of the said deed of
sale, and that said deed was delivered to him by the vendors and
their agents."
"Fourth. The plaintiffs admit that the judgments mentioned in
the answer as a third defense to the complaint have been rendered,
but the suits in which said judgments were rendered have been
instituted against Clemente De Fleurian while he was insane and out
of his mind, and without any curator or guardian or committee of
his person being named by the court, and that the defendants herein
were neither parties nor privies to the said judgments and suits
and appeals, and therefore said judgments cannot bar this
action."
"Fifth. The plaintiffs admit that the judgment mentioned in the
answer as a fourth defense to the complaint has been rendered, but
the plaintiffs state that the court which rendered said judgment
had no jurisdiction in the subject matter,
Page 217 U. S. 480
and said judgment, being of a foreign court without
jurisdiction, is not binding, and the plaintiffs further allege
that the defendants herein were neither parties nor privies to the
said judgment and suit, and therefore said judgment is not a bar to
this action."
"Sixth. The plaintiffs, further replying, say that the judgment
or decree mentioned in the answer as a fifth defense to the
complaint was rendered not upon the merits of the case, and without
any proof being taken, but only upon a demurrer to the complaint
for want of equity and for laches -- both purely equitable
defenses, available only in suits in equity, and the plaintiffs
state that this decree is not a bar to this action."
"Wherefore the plaintiffs pray judgment thereon."
Thereupon the following entry of dismissal was made:
"Now come the plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Boerman &
Llorens, and file a replication to the answer in this cause, and
upon consideration thereof it appears to come within the rule laid
down in the court's opinion on the demurrer to the answer of the
defendants, filed June 1st. Now, upon application by Hartzell &
Rodriguez, the attorneys of said defendants, the cause is dismissed
at the cost of the plaintiffs, to be taxed by the clerk, for which
execution may issue."
"Plaintiffs except to the dismissal hereof."
From this judgment of dismissal the appeal now before us was
taken. In addition to assigning as error the overruling of the
demurrers to the respective defenses of
res judicata, it
is set up that
"the court erred in rendering judgment against the plaintiffs in
said cause, upon the pleadings in said cause, and that said
judgment is contrary to the law and facts as stated in the
pleadings in said court."
As upon the overruling of the demurrer, the court in substance
made it a condition for granting leave to reply to the answer, that
such reply should disclose that the answer had not set up the real
facts in the case, which condition was manifestly not complied with
in the replication, we shall review the
Page 217 U. S. 481
action of the court upon the hypothesis that the order
overruling the demurrer had also absolutely decreed a dismissal of
the complaint. On this assumption, we proceed to examine the
defense setting up as
res judicata the judgments of the
Porto Rican courts, rendered during the Spanish regime, to
determine whether the court properly held that they barred
recovery.
The defense in question covers twenty-six pages of the printed
record, the judgment of the court of first instance embracing
seventeen and that of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico seven pages.
The judgments establish the following, among other, facts: the real
estate, the subject of controversy, was a sugar plantation known by
the name of Serrano. The plantation was owned in 1879 and prior
thereto by David Laporte and others, and Clemente De Fleurian,
through whom plaintiffs claim title, was the manager of the
plantation. On October 9, 1879, what is termed a "private contract
of sale" of the plantation to De Fleurian was executed in France.
In November following, the owners of the property brought suit in
the civil court of Nimes, France, to annul the contract. On
February 18, 1880, the day after the return of De Fleurian to Porto
Rico, although the contract of sale was not of record in Porto
Rico, De Fleurian mortgaged the plantation to one Labastide, to
secure the payment of 36,811 pesos. The civil court of Nimes, on
May 10, 1880, entered a decree of nullity in the suit brought by
the Laportes, and this decree, upon the appeal of De Fleurian, was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Nimes on March 24, 1885, and by
the Court of Cassation on May 17, 1886.
Pending the litigation just referred to, the Laportes, in the
proper district in Porto Rico, "instituted possessory proceedings
for the said property," in which Labastide and his wife were
summoned "as abutting owners," and, they not making opposition, the
title of the Laportes was duly registered. Thereafter, the
Laportes, by public instrument of October 16, 1883,
"sold the property to Don Juan Forgas and
Page 217 U. S. 482
to Don Jose Gallart, free of all encumbrances, the vendors
binding themselves to guarantee the title to the same, as well as
to answer for all obligations for which the said property might be
liable."
In the defense we are considering, it was averred that title to
the premises came to the defendants through Forgas and Gallart. It
is also averred as follows:
"That these defendants are the successors and privies in the
ownership of said property to said original owners and to the said
Gallart and Forgas, and the succession of Gallart, by virtue of the
said sale to the said Forgas and Gallart. That, in the deed selling
and conveying said premises by the said owner to the said Forgas
and Gallart, it was expressly contracted and agreed that the said
owners should conduct the litigation necessary to free the title of
said premises from any lien, cloud, or encumbrance whatsoever, and
the same was made the express condition of the payment of a large
portion of the purchase price of said premises. And that, in
pursuance of said obligation resting upon the said owners of said
property, in addition to the proceedings in the courts of France,
hereinbefore referred to, the said owners of the said property
commenced their action in the court of first instance in the
judicial district of Ponce, Porto Rico, the district where the said
lands were located, the said court having full jurisdiction over
the said property and over the said defendants. The object of said
suit being to cancel and have declared null and void, or for the
rescission, as the case might be, of the private contract of sale
of the said plantation described in plaintiffs' complaint and known
as 'Serrano,' and also to have declared null and void, and for the
rescission and cancellation of, the said mortgage executed by the
said Fleurian in favor of the said Labastide."
As above mentioned, the litigation in France was commenced by
the Laportes before the sale to Forgas and Gallart, and continued
after such sale, terminating in May, 1886. The action against De
Fleurian and Labastide in the Porto
Page 217 U. S. 483
Rican courts, referred to in the excerpt just made, was
commenced on May 9, 1887, and the final judgment of the trial
court, relied upon as
res judicata, was entered therein on
October 26, 1889. In that judgment, after referring to the
proceedings had in the litigation in France, as shown by the
records of the judgments of the French courts which were in
evidence, the court of first instance, after making certain
statements as to the effect, as
res judicata, of the
French judgments, which statements are copied in the margin,
* proceeded
Page 217 U. S. 484
to reinvestigate the merits of the controversy, and determine
the questions arising as matters of first impression, concluding by
giving to the plaintiffs the full relief demanded, the judgment
reading as follows:
"I adjudge that Don Clemente De Fleurian is held to have
confessed to the questions propounded at folios 340 and 341 of the
second record of the roll of evidence of the plaintiffs. I should
declare and do declare also the nullity of the instrument of sale
and of the instrument of mortgage of the sugar cane plantation
called 'El Serrano,' the first of which was executed in the private
contract in Anduze, France, dated October ninth, eighteen hundred
and seventy-nine, between the plaintiffs and Don Clemente De
Fleurian, and the second named at Juana Diaz, before the notary Don
Ramon Rodriguez, on the eighteenth day of February, eighteen
hundred and eighty, by Don Clemente De Fleurian and Don Fernando
Labastide, in consequence of which it is ordered that, after this
decision shall have been final, the annotation of the said
instrument of mortgage in the registry of property be cancelled,
for which purpose the proper orders shall issue, with the necessary
excerpts, addressed to the registrar of property for the district,
taxing all costs against the defendants, Don Clemente Fleurian and
Don Fernando Labastide. Thus, finally adjudging, was pronounced,
ordered, and signed by the judge."
On an appeal, taken by Labastide, the Supreme Court of Porto
Rico, on January 28, 1891, affirmed the judgment of the court of
first instance. Thereafter an appeal, also taken by
Page 217 U. S. 485
Labastide, to the Supreme Court of Spain, was dismissed, and it
is averred in the answer that "the said decision of the Supreme
Court of Porto Rico became firm and fixed, and is still in full
force and effect;" and that, pursuant to the decisions of the Porto
Rican courts above referred to,
"the proper orders were issued and the registration of the said
mortgage from the said Clemente De Fleurian to the said Labastide
was duly cancelled and annulled in the registry of property of
Ponce, and the said decision of the court of first instance of
Ponce, and the said decision of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico,
confirming the same, have been carried out as to all matters and
things which were ordered and directed therein and thereby."
The question, then, is whether these judgments of the courts of
Porto Rico, entered in litigation prosecuted in the names of the
former owners, for the benefit of their vendees, through whom the
defendants in this action deraign title, are, as contended by the
defendants in error,
"a full, complete, and final determination of all the matters
and things relating to the alleged title of the said Clemente De
Fleurian in or to the said premises described in the plaintiff's
complaint herein,"
operative as
res judicata in favor of the defendants,
and constituting a bar to the further prosecution of the
proceedings under the complaint herein. We proceed to consider this
question.
It is recited in the judgment entered on October 26, 1889, by
the court of first instance of Porto Rico, that the then pending
action was commenced on May 9, 1887, by the Laporte heirs, and it
also expressly found that the property had been sold prior to the
institution of the action,
viz., on October 16, 1883, by
the Laportes, to Forgas and Gallart, from whom mediately or
immediately the present defendants acquired title, "the vendors
binding themselves to guarantee the title to the same, as well as
to answer for all obligations for which the said property might be
liable." It is also apparent from the findings of the court that
the action referred
Page 217 U. S. 486
to was intended to make effective the result of the proceedings
instituted in France, which had been commenced in order to remove
the cloud upon the title of the Laportes, resulting from the
contract of sale made to De Fleurian and the mortgage made by him
to Labastide. As the judgment of the court of first instance,
reciting the facts referred to, was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Porto Rico, we may properly assume that the Porto Rican courts
did not consider that they were passing upon a merely moot
question, but were of opinion that the adjudication made inured to
the benefit of the vendees of the nominal complainants, such
vendees being the real owners. It being, then, competent, under the
Spanish law, for the vendors of property, after parting with title,
to conduct in their own names, for the benefit of their vendees, a
litigation having for its object ultimate relief such as was sought
in the action so instituted by the Laporte heirs in 1887, we are of
opinion that there is no merit in the contention upon which
plaintiffs in error rely in assailing the sufficiency of the
defense set up in the third paragraph of the answer. In effect,
that contention simply was that, as the original owners had sold
the property before the institution of the action commenced in
1887, the defendants herein, as claimants under purchasers who had
bought from the Laportes before the commencement of that action,
are not in privity with the complainants in that suit, as they were
mere strangers to the litigation, and not entitled to enjoy the
benefit of the adjudication. Let it be conceded, for the sake of
argument, that ordinarily no one is privy to a judgment whose
succession to the rights of property thereby affected occurred
previously to the institution of the suit (
Dull v.
Blackman, 169 U. S. 248;
Freeman on Judgments, 1st ed. ยง 162), nevertheless, the rule has no
application to a case like this, where the nominal plaintiffs or
complainants were, in legal intendment, conducting the litigation
under the direction and for the benefit of the real owners of the
property. The persons for whose benefit, to the knowledge of the
court and of all the parties
Page 217 U. S. 487
to the record, litigation is being conducted, cannot, in a legal
sense, be said to be strangers to the cause. The case is within the
principle that one who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of
another, to establish and protect his own right, or who assists in
the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of
his own, and who does this openly, to the knowledge of the opposing
party, is as much bound by the judgment, and as fully entitled to
avail himself of it, as an estoppel against an adversary party, as
he would be if he had been a party to the record.
Lovejoy v.
Murray, 3 Wall. 1.
There is no merit in the contention that, in rendering judgment
upon the pleadings, the court usurped the province of the jury. In
the view we have taken of the case, it becomes necessary, for the
purpose of testing that contention, to consider only the fourth
paragraph of the replication, heretofore quoted. In asserting, as
was done in that paragraph,
"that the defendants herein were neither parties nor privies to
the said judgments, suit, and appeals (referred to in the third
defense), and therefore said judgments cannot bar this action,"
there was presented merely a question of law as to whether, upon
the facts appearing in the judgments, or averred in the third
defense, the defendants in this action were, as a matter of law, in
privity with the complainants in the cause in which the judgments
pleaded as
res judicata were rendered. And this is true
also as to the charge made in the fourth paragraph of the
replication, that De Fleurian was insane when the judgments relied
upon as
res judicata were entered. We say this because
clearly whether the judgments, on such mere averment, were subject
to be collaterally attacked was a matter of law for the court, even
if the assumption be indulged in that the right to plead the
asserted insanity (which we do not intimate to be the case) was
within the condition as to replying imposed by the court when it
overruled the demurrer.
Affirmed.
*
"9. Whereas there is not any treaty between France and Spain
providing special rules as to the force and efficacy of the
contracts executed, and of judgments rendered in civil matters, in
any one of said nations as regards the other, and therefore the
general principles of international law are applicable to the case,
among which of said principles there is the principle of
reciprocity, specially expressed as to the execution of judgments
rendered by foreign courts, in articles 951 and 952 of the law of
Civil Procedure."
"10. Whereas, according to the French legislation, real
property, even if possessed by foreigners, is governed by the
French law (article 3d of the Civil Code); 'a judicial mortgage
does not ensue from a judgment rendered in a foreign country except
when such judgment has been declared executory by a French court'
(paragraph 4 of article 2123); 'contracts entered into a foreign
country, and acts executed before foreign officers, cannot produce
mortgage on property in France' (article 2128); 'the said acts and
judgments are not subject to execution in France except in the
manner and in the cases provided by articles 2123 and 2128 of the
Civil Code' (article 546 of the Code of Procedure)."
"11. Whereas, according to the general interpretation in France
as to the aforesaid provisions of its legislation, as well as to
article 14 of the Civil Code, the acts and judgments rendered by
foreign courts are subject to revision and new discussion before
the French courts, and that in that respect, and on the principle
of reciprocity, the final judgment rendered by the French courts,
to which reference has been made in this action by the plaintiff,
cannot produce the force and effect of
res judicata as to
a decision of the questions which are being ventilated in the same,
especially when the same have not had the exequatur of the Supreme
Court of Justice in the form provided by article 954 and subsequent
articles of the said law of Civil Procedure."
"12. Whereas, according to the principle of private
international law, sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Justice in
several opinions, the efficacy of the acts or contracts affecting
directly real property are governed by the royal statute, or
namely, by the laws of the country where the real property is
situated, and therefore, as the question in this suit is in regard
to a property situated in a Spanish territory, the questions
relating to the nullity or validity of the title to the said
property, and of the mortgage put on the same, should be ventilated
or decided in accordance with the Spanish laws.
Locus regit
actum."