Where a statute creates a new right and a commission is given
power to extend relief in regard thereto at the instance of a
specified.class, its power is limited thereto, and so held that the
Interstate Commerce Commission has power to compel switch
connections with lateral branch roads under § 1 of the Act of March
4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended by § 1 of the Act of June
29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, only at the instance, as stated
therein, of shippers; it has no power to do so on the application
of a branch railroad.
Quaere, and not decided, whether the railroad on whose
behalf the application in this case was made was a lateral branch
road within the meaning of the statute.
166 F. 498 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 216 U. S. 535
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity, brought by the plaintiff, appellee, to
prevent the enforcement of an order made by the appellant,
requiring the plaintiff to establish a switch connection with the
Rahway Valley Railroad Company's road. 14 I.C.C. 191. The order was
made on June 24, 1908, under the Act to Regulate Commerce, February
4, 1887, c. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, as amended by the Act of June
29, 1906, c. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584. Then this bill was brought;
the Attorney General filed a certificate that the case was of
general public importance; Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 5, 34
Stat. 590; Act of February 11, 1903, c. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823; the
Interstate Commerce Commission demurred; the case was brought up
before three circuit judges; a preliminary injunction was issued on
the ground that the appellant, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
had exceeded its power, and an appeal was taken at once and
directly to this Court, as allowed by the Act of 1906. 166 F.
498.
The Rahway Valley road is about ten miles long. It runs
southeasterly from Summit through Kenilworth to Roselle, its
terminus on the Lehigh Valley Railroad, and also southwesterly from
Kenilworth to Aldene, its terminus on the Central Railroad of New
Jersey, all the places named being
Page 216 U. S. 536
in New Jersey. The Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad
Company, the appellee, is a common carrier subject to the acts of
Congress regulating commerce. Between Denville, New Jersey, and
Hoboken, it has two branches or lines, the northerly, the Boonton
branch, being devoted specially to freight, the southerly, the
Morris & Essex line, devoted as exclusively as may be to
passenger traffic. This southerly branch passes through Summit, and
the Rahway Valley Railroad Company petitioned for and got an order
requiring the appellee to make a switch connection with its road at
that place. As the order interferes with the just-stated policy of
the appellee as to its southerly line, it resisted the petition and
brought this suit.
The material part of the Act of Congress upon which the
Commission relies is as follows:
"Any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act, upon
application of any lateral, branch line of railroad, or of any
shipper tendering interstate traffic for transportation, shall
construct, maintain, and operate, upon reasonable terms, a switch
connection with any such lateral, branch line of railroad, or
private side track which may be constructed to connect with its
railroad, where such connection is reasonably practicable, and can
be put in with safety, and will furnish sufficient business to
justify the construction and maintenance of the same, and shall
furnish cars for the movement of such traffic to the best of its
ability, without discrimination in favor of or against any such
shipper. If any common carrier shall fail to install and operate
any such switch or connection, as aforesaid, on application
therefor in writing by any shipper, such shipper may make complaint
to the Commission, as provided in section thirteen of this Act, and
the Commission shall hear and investigate the same, and shall
determine as to the safety and practicability thereof and
justification and reasonable compensation therefor, and the
Commission may make an order, as provided in section fifteen of
this Act, directing the common carrier to comply with the
provisions
Page 216 U. S. 537
of this section in accordance with such order, and such order
shall be enforced as hereinafter provided for the enforcement of
all other orders by the Commission, other than orders for the
payment of money."
The question is raised whether the Rahway road is a "lateral,
branch line of railroad" relatively to the appellee. There
certainly is force in the contention that the words of the statute
mean a railroad naturally tributary to the line of the common
carrier ordered to make the connection, and dependent upon it for
an outlet to the markets of the country, which, according to the
bill, the Rahway road is not. There is force in the argument that a
road already having connection with the roads of two carriers
subject to the act, and having joint routes and through rates with
them, cannot be regarded as a lateral, branch line of railroad of
another road situated like the appellee. On the other hand, it
would be going far to lay down the universal proposition that a
feeder might not be a lateral, branch road of one line at one end,
and of another at the other. We leave this doubtful question on one
side, because we agree with the circuit judges in the
considerations upon which they decided the case.
The statute creates a new right not existing outside of it.
Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287,
179 U. S. 296.
It is plain from the provisions of the act, the history of the
amendments, and justice, that the object was not to give a roving
commission to every road that might see fit to make a descent upon
a main line, but primarily at least, to provide for shippers
seeking an outlet either by a private road or a branch. The remedy
given by the section creating the right is given only on complaint
by the shipper. We are of opinion that the remedy is exclusive, on
familiar principles, and that the general powers given by other
sections cannot be taken to authorize a complaint to the Commission
by a branch railroad company under § 1. If they were applicable to
a branch road, they would have been equally applicable to shippers,
and there was no more reason to mention
Page 216 U. S. 538
complaints by shippers than by others. The argument that
shippers were mentioned to insure their rights in case of a refusal
to connect with a lateral line is excluded by the form of the
statute, which obviously is providing the only remedy that Congress
has in mind. It may or may not be true that the distinction is not
very effective, but it stands in the law, and must be accepted as
the limit of the Commission's power.
Decree affirmed.