The authority for cutting timber from the public domain under
the Act of June 3, 1878, c. 150, 20 Stat. 88, extends only to land
valuable for minerals, and not to lands adjacent thereto and not
actually valuable for minerals.
Although the purpose of a statute may be defeated by it
qualifications, courts, in construing it, are bound by word that
are explicit and unmistakable in meaning.
151 F. 1022 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action to recover the value of timber cut from the
public domain in Idaho. The defendant justifies under the Act of
June 3, 1878, c. 150, 20 Stat. 88. That act authorizes citizens of
the United States and other persons,
bona fide residents
of certain states and territories, including Idaho, "and all other
mineral districts of the United States," to cut
"for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes,
any timber or other trees growing or being on the public lands,
said lands being mineral, and not subject to entry under existing
laws of the United States, except for mineral entry"
in the state, territory, or district of their residence. This
authority is given subject to regulation by the Secretary of the
Interior for the protection of the timber
Page 216 U. S. 373
and undergrowth, and is not given to railroads. The only
question before us is how far the authority extends with reference
to the specific land upon which the wood is cut.
There was a trial by jury, and the issue is exhibited
sufficiently by a passage or two from the charge, and the
instructions asked on behalf of the government, but refused. The
passages from the charge are as follows:
"The law cannot be construed to limit the cutting of timber
simply to ground that is known to contain mineral, or ground which
is or which might be legally located as a mining claim. . . . The
law includes as mineral lands not only those tracts in which
mineral has actually been discovered, and which have been or could
be legally located as mining locations, but also all other lands
lying in reasonably close proximity to or in the general
neighborhood of such known mineral tracts. . . . Take, for
instance, a large section of country. . . . There in the lower part
of the map, as you will see, is a section of country about six
miles square; the upper part indicates another section six miles
square. We will suppose now there are found here and there in that
section of country mineral locations. They may not be contiguous;
they may even be some distance apart; but you will be justified,
under the law as I have given it to you, in holding all that
particular section of country to be mineral ground. . . . The
question for you to decide is not whether those little tracts on
that map there -- the ground cut over by the defendant -- contain
mineral, but whether that whole section of country surrounding that
for miles around is what may be denominated a mineral country. If
you find it is a mineral country within the meaning of the law as I
have defined it to you, then your verdict must be for the
defendant."
The government asked for instructions that it was not sufficient
to show that the land in question was adjacent to lands valuable
for mineral purposes, but that the authority given by the act
extended only to lands valuable for minerals. It is needless to set
them forth at length. There was a verdict and judgment
Page 216 U. S. 374
for the defendant. The ruling and refusals were excepted to, but
the exceptions were overruled, and the judgment affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals, 151 F. 1022, on the authority of
United States v. Basic Co., 121 F. 504, and
United
States v. Rossi, 133 F. 380. The case then was brought to this
Court.
The instructions appear to us to have paid too little regard to
the words of the act, defining the land on which it permits timber
to be cut as "mineral, and not subject to entry under existing laws
of the United States, except for mineral entry." As was said in
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Lewis, 162 U.
S. 366,
162 U. S. 376,
"the right to cut is exceptional and quite narrow," and the party
claiming the right must prove it. The only lands excluded in 1878
or now from any but mineral entry are lands "valuable for minerals"
or containing "valuable mineral deposits." Rev.Stat. §§ 2302, 2318,
2319.
See § 2320. The matter was much discussed in
Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507, and
there it was said that the exceptions of mineral land from
preemption and settlement, etc.,
"are not held to exclude all lands in which minerals may be
found, but only those where the mineral is in sufficient quantity
to add to their richness and to justify expenditure for its
extraction, and known to be so at the date of the grant."
P.
139 U. S. 519.
A Land Department rule is quoted, with seeming approval, that "if
the land is worth more for agriculture than mining, it is not
mineral land, although it may contain some measure of gold or
silver," pp.
139 U. S.
521-522, citing
United States v. Reed, 28 F.
482. Again, it was said:
"The exception of mineral lands from grant in the Acts of
Congress should be considered to apply only to such lands as were
at the time of the grant, known to be so valuable for their
minerals as to justify expenditure for their extraction."
P.
139 U. S. 524.
These are the tests to which the Act of 1878 must be taken to
refer, since it refers to and rests upon the statutes construed to
adopt these tests.
It is said that such a construction empties the statute of all
its use, because if the land is known to be valuable for
Page 216 U. S. 375
minerals, a mining claim to it will be located, only the owners
of which can cut the timber, whereas the statute gives the right to
all residents. If that were true, courts still would be bound by
the explicit and unmistakable words. It is not unknown, when
opinion is divided, that qualifications sometimes are inserted into
an act that are hoped to make it ineffective. But the objection is
stated too strongly. As pointed out at the argument, in 1878,
probably there was a great deal of mineral land still unexplored on
which claims had not been located, not to speak of mere exceptional
cases in which the act would apply. The regulations of the
Secretary of the Interior for a long time, and it would seem
always, have been in accord with our opinion and the language of
the act.
Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA dissents.