Writ of error and not appeal is the proper method to bring up to
this Court a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands in a case affecting title to land in Court of Land
Registration.
Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.
S. 449.
In this case, the grant involved was made without authority by
subordinate officials, was void
ab initio, and conveyed no
title to the original grantee or those holding under him.
A man cannot take advantage of his ignorance of the law, and
where all that is done to give him a title is insufficient on its
face, the grantee is chargeable with knowledge, does not hold in
good faith, and in such a case prescription does not run from the
date of the instrument under which he claims.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 215 U. S. 414
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes by writ of error and appeal from a judgment of
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, affirming a judgment
of the Court of Land Registration, which denied registration of a
tract of land. It is admitted that the facts as found by the two
courts may be assumed to be true,
Reavis v. Fianza,
215 U. S. 16, but,
apart from the concurrence of the courts below, the proper
proceeding in a case of this kind is by writ of error, and
therefore the appeal is dismissed.
Carifio v. Insular
Government, 212 U. S. 449. So
much being established, the grounds on which the plaintiff in error
can claim title may be stated in a few words. On July 13, 1873, the
Gobernadorcillo and Principales of the Town of Mabalacat, in the
Province of Pampanga, Luzon, executed an instrument, marked O.K. by
the parish priest, purporting to grant the land, with
qualifications not needing to be noticed, to one Rafael Lacson,
under whom the plaintiff in error claims. Possession was held until
1885, and since then has been abandoned. The land was public land.
The questions brought here were whether the original grant was
valid, or, if not, whether the possession that followed it without
interruption for ten years and more conferred title by prescription
under the royal decree of June 25, 1880. This decree states the
rule of prescription in the usual terms of the civil law. It
confers ownership on those who shall establish that they have
possessed the lands in question for the requisite time under just
title and in good faith.
See Civil Code, Arts.1957, 1952,
1953.
Page 215 U. S. 415
As we understand the later briefs filed in behalf of the
plaintiff in error, the vain attempt to justify the grant under the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, Book 4, Title 12, Law 1, is
given up, and therefore we shall spend no time upon that. There is,
however, an effort to support it under a decree of January 4, 1813.
Reynolds, Spanish & Mexican Land Laws 83. This was a scheme of
the Cortes to reduce public and Crown lands to private ownership,
after reserving one-half for the public debt. When certain
preliminaries had been accomplished, as to which we have no
information, the other half was to be allotted in the first place
to retired officers and soldiers who had served in the present war,
etc., as a patriotic reward. Of the remaining land, there was to be
given, gratuitously and by lot, to every resident of the respective
towns who applied, a tract, under certain limitations. The
proceedings on these grants were to be had by the constitutional
common councils, and the provincial deputations were to approve
them. Although this decree purported to apply to Crown lands "in
the provinces beyond the sea" as well as to those in the Peninsula,
it would seem, on the face of it, to have been intended for
Spaniards, and to have had but doubtful reference to the natives of
conquered territory.
But there are other answers to the suggestion that are free from
doubt. The decree has been said to have been repealed in the
following year.
United States v.
Clarke, 8 Pet. 436,
33 U. S. 455;
Hall, Mexican Law 48.
But compare 66 U.
S. Vallejo, 1 Black 541;
Hayes v. United
States, 170 U. S. 637,
170 U. S.
653-654. But even if it be assumed, as it is by the
argument for the plaintiff in error, that either that or later
legislation to similar effect instituted a working system in the
Philippines -- a large assumption -- it is admitted that the
conditions of the supposed gratuity were not fulfilled. Our
attention has not been called to any law giving authority to the
ill defined body that attempted to make the grant. The land was not
distributed by lot, and the essential requirement of approval
Page 215 U. S. 416
by a higher authority was wholly neglected. In view of the
admission to which we have referred, we find it unnecessary to
follow the learned and able argument of the Solicitor General.
There is a hint, to be sure, that the grant may be presumed to have
satisfied native custom, and may be sustained upon that ground. But
such a notion would be a mongrel offspring of Spanish law and
ignorance, and no reason is given for making the presumption other
than a guess. Unauthorized grants of public lands by subordinate
officials seem to have been a noticeable feature in other Spanish
colonies.
Whitney v. United States, 181 U.
S. 104,
181 U. S.
114-115. The real object of the reference to the decree
of 1813 is to found a claim of prescription by showing a just title
for the possession which is proved to have been maintained for ten
years.
Lacson, the original grantee, held the land until 1881, when he
conveyed it to Pedro Carrillo and his wife. Possession was
abandoned in 1885 without further change of title. Therefore the
only "just title" to which the possession can be referred is the
original grant. The phrase
justo titulo is explained to
mean a title such as to transfer the property -- Schmidt, Civil Law
of Spain and Mexico 289, 290;
see Partidas, 1. 18, T. 29,
p. 3; or, as it is defined in the Civil Code of a few years later
than the decree of 1880, "that which legally suffices to transfer
the ownership or property right, the prescription of which is in
question." ยง 1952. Of course, this does not mean that the
titulo must have been effective in the particular case,
for then prescription would be unnecessary. We assume, for
instance, that if a private person in possession of Crown lands,
seeming to be the owner, executed a formally valid conveyance under
which his grantee held, supposing his title good, possession for
ten years might create an indisputable right. But if the public
facts known by the grantees showed that the conveyance to him was
void, we understand that it would not constitute a starting point
for the running of time, and that the grantee's actual belief
Page 215 U. S. 417
would not help his case. Indeed, in such a case, he would not be
regarded as holding in good faith, within the requirement of the
decree, because a man is not allowed to take advantage of his
ignorance of law. The subject is fully expounded in
Hayes v.
United States, 170 U. S. 637,
170 U. S. 650
et seq.
All that was done to give Lacson a lawful title was insufficient
on its face. Therefore, on the facts known to him, he was
chargeable with knowledge that he had acquired no legal rights, and
it was impossible that the period of prescription should begin to
run from the date of the instrument under which he claimed. The
possession of Carrillo and his successors, after the conveyance to
him in 1881, was not maintained for ten years, and therefore the
claim of the plaintiff in error must fail.
Judgment affirmed.