This Court has jurisdiction of this case, for, even if the
requisite amount is not involved, the meaning and effect of a
provision of the Philippine Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369,
32 Stats. 691, is involved.
The provision of § 45 of the Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands relating to title to mines by prescription refers to
conditions as they were before the United States came into power
and had in view the natives of the islands and intention to do them
liberal justice.
Courts are justified in dealing liberally with natives of the
Philippines in dealing with evidence of possession.
Carino v.
Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449.
The limitation of size of mining claims in § 22 of the
Philippine Organic Act applies only to claims located after the
passage of that act.
Under § 28 of the Philippine Organic Act, a valid location could
not be made if the land was occupied by one who was already in
possession before the United States came into power, and the claim
of one locating under those conditions does not constitute an
adverse claim under § 45 of that act.
A right to an instrument that will confer a title in a thing is
a right to the thing itself, and a statutory right to apply for a
patent to mining lands is a right that equity will specifically
enforce.
Although, if seasonably taken, an objection to the form of
remedy might be sustained, after trial on the merits, it comes too
late.
7 Phil. 610 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 215 U. S. 21
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity, brought by the appellees to restrain
the appellant from setting up title to certain gold mines in the
Province of Benguet, or interfering with the same, and to obtain an
account of the gold heretofore taken from the mines. The trial
court rendered a judgment or decree granting an injunction as
prayed. Exceptions were taken on the grounds that the findings of
fact were against the weight of evidence, and that the judgment was
against the law. The Supreme Court reexamined the evidence, and
affirmed the decree below. Then the case was brought here by
appeal.
The appellees make a preliminary argument against the
jurisdiction of this Court, while the appellant asks us to
reexamine the evidence, and to reverse the decree on the facts as
well as the law. We cannot accede to either of these contentions.
We are of opinion that this Court has jurisdiction. For, if the
affidavits of value should be held to apply to the whole of Reavis'
claims, and not to only that part of them that are in controversy
here, still, a statute of the United States,
Page 215 U. S. 22
namely, a section of the organic act (§ 45, concerning mining
titles in the Philippines), is "involved," within the meaning of §
10 of the same act, which determines the jurisdiction of this
Court. Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369. 32 Stat. 691, 695. The meaning
and effect of that section are in question, and our construction
even has some bearing upon our opinion that the findings of the two
courts below should not be reopened. For, apart from the general
rule prevailing in such cases,
De la Rama v. De la Rama,
201 U. S. 303,
201 U. S. 309,
we shall refer to the law for special reasons why those findings
should not be disturbed in a case like this.
The appellees are Igorrots, and it is found that, for fifty
years, and probably for many more, Fianza and his ancestors have
held possession of these mines. He now claims title under the
Philippine Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 45, 32 Stat. 691. This
section reads as follows:
"That where such person or association, they and their grantors,
have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time
prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands,
evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such
period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto
under this act, in the absence of any adverse claim; but nothing in
this act shall be deemed to impair any lien which may have attached
in any way whatever prior to the issuance of a patent."
It is not disputed that this section applies to possession
maintained for a sufficient time before and until the statute went
into effect.
See Soper v. Lawrence Brothers Co.,
201 U. S. 359. The
period of prescription at that time was ten years. Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions, August 7, 1901, No.190, § 40; 1
Pub.Laws of Phil.Comm. 378, 384. Therefore, as the United States
had not had the sovereignty of the Philippines for ten years, the
section, notwithstanding its similarity to Rev.Stat. § 2332, must
be taken to refer to the conditions as they were before the United
States had come into power. Especially must it be supposed to have
had in view the natives of
Page 215 U. S. 23
the islands, and to have intended to do liberal justice to them.
By § 16, their occupancy of public lands is respected and made to
confer rights. In dealing with an Igorrot of the Province of
Benguet, it would be absurd to expect technical niceties, and the
courts below were quite justified in their liberal mode of dealing
with the evidence of possession and the possibly rather gradual
settling of the precise boundaries of the appellees' claim.
See
Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.
S. 449. At all events, they found that the appellees and
their ancestors had held the claim and worked it to the exclusion
of all others down to the bringing of this suit, and that the
boundaries were as shown in a plan that was filed and seems to have
been put in evidence before the trial came to an end.
It cannot be said that there was no evidence of the facts found,
for the plaintiff Fianza testified in terms that his grandfather
and father had owned the mines in question, and that he and the
other appellees owned them in their turn; that they had all worked
the mines, that no one else had claimed them, and that the
appellant had interfered with his possession, and, when he put up a
sign, had torn it down. No doubt his working of the mines was
slight and superficial according to our notions, and the possession
may not have been sharply asserted as it would have been with us,
whether from Igorrot habits or from the absence of legal title
under Spanish law. But it sufficiently appears that the appellee's
family had held the place in Igorrot fashion, and to deny them
possession in favor of Western intruders probably would be to say
that the natives had no rights under the section that an American
was bound to respect. Whatever vagueness there may have been in the
boundaries, it is plain that the appellant attempted to locate a
claim within them, and Fianza testified that the plan to which we
have referred followed the boundaries that his father showed to
him. It is said that the claim is larger than is allowed by § 22.
But the limitation of that section applies only to claims "located
after the passage of this act."
It is to be assumed, then, that the appellees and their
ancestors
Page 215 U. S. 24
had held possession and had worked their claims for much more
than the period required by § 45 before the moment when the statute
went into effect. It is to be assumed that the possession and
working continued down to within two months of that moment. But the
appellant says that he entered and staked his claims before that
time, and then was in possession of them. On this ground, as well
as others that are disposed of by the findings below, he contends
that there was an adverse claim within the meaning of the act. But
the ground in question was not unoccupied, and therefore he could
not make a valid claim under § 28.
See also Act of March
2, 1901, c. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 910. He refiled a location in
October, 1902, but he did not and could not make the required
affidavit because of the prior occupation, and at that date, Fianza
was within the act unless he already had been deprived of its
benefits. Moreover, it is found that Fianza's possession continued
down to the bringing of this suit. This is justified by the
evidence, and is not contradicted by the bill. The bill, to be
sure, alleges that Reavis, in 1900, illegally entered and deprived
the appellees of their mines, and that he still continues to
maintain his unjust claim. But further on it alleges that, in the
spring of 1902, Reavis was directed by the Governor of Benguet not
to molest the appellees; that he then waited in Manila, and, after
the promulgation of the law, "again entered," set stakes, and filed
a notice of location. So that the bill does not mean that he was
continuously in possession, or that he was in possession when the
law took effect. We are of opinion that there was no adverse claim
that would have prevented the appellees from getting a patent under
§ 45.
See Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.
S. 279,
104 U. S. 284;
Altoona Quicksilver Mining Co. v. Integral Quicksilver Mining
Co., 114 Cal. 100, 105.
See also McCowan v. Maclay,
16 Mont. 234, 239-240.
It is suggested that the possession of Fianza was not under a
claim of title, since he could have no title under Spanish law. But
whatever may be the construction of Rev.Stat. § 2332, the
corresponding § 45 of the Philippine Act cannot be taken
Page 215 U. S. 25
to adopt from the local law any other requirement as to the
possession than the length of time for which it must be maintained.
Otherwise, in view of the Spanish and American law before July 1,
1902, no rights could be acquired, and the section would be empty
words, whereas, as we have said before, another section of the act,
§ 16, still further shows the intention of Congress to respect
native occupation of public lands.
Again, it is urged that the section, of itself, confers no right
other than to apply for a patent. But a right to an instrument that
will confer a title in a thing is a right to have the thing. That
is to say, it is a right of the kind that equity specifically
enforces. It may or may not be true that, if the objection had been
taken at the outset, the plaintiffs would have been turned over to
another remedy, and left to apply for a patent; but, after a trial
on the merits, the objection comes too late.
See Perego v.
Dodge, 163 U. S. 160,
163 U. S. 164;
Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354,
130 U. S.
395.
Some objections were taken to the exclusion of evidence. But,
apart from the fact that they do not appear to have been saved in
the exceptions taken to the supreme court and irrespective of its
admissibility, the evidence offered could not have affected the
result. An inquiry of Fianza whether he claimed the mines mentioned
in the suit or those measured by the surveyor who made the plan to
which we have referred was met by the allowance of an amendment,
claiming according to the plan. A question to another of the
plaintiffs whether she saw any Igorrots working for Reavis would
have brought out nothing not admitted by the bill, that Reavis did,
for a time, intrude upon the mines in suit. Upon the whole case, we
are of opinion that no sufficient ground is shown for reversing the
decree, and it is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.