Quaere where a petition to the highest court of the
state for rehearing asserts that a federal question had been set up
in the brief and arguments is simply denied with the statement that
no federal question had been raised in that court, whether this
Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment on writ of error.
This Court cannot decline jurisdiction when it is plain that the
fair result of a decision of the state court is to deny a
constitutional right.
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.
S. 226.
It is as obligatory upon the courts of a state to give the same
full force and effect to the constitution of another state as it
must give to its judicial proceedings.
Chicago & Alton
Railroad v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.
S. 615.
The mere construction, even if erroneous, by a state court of
the statute or, as in this case, of a provision of the constitution
of another state does not deny to it the full faith and credit
demanded by the federal Constitution.
Page 214 U. S. 20
The decision of the Court of Appeals of New York that a statute
of Ohio authorizing the formation of corporations general in terms,
but applicable to a special situation, did not contravene the
prohibition of the Constitution of Ohio against the general
assembly's passing any special act conferring corporate powers, and
that a corporation organized under such a statute could take as
legatee,
held not to question the validity of the
constitutional provision and, even if erroneous, such decision did
not repudiate the obligations of the full faith and credit clause
of the federal Constitution, and is not reviewable by this Court
under § 709, Rev.Stat.
*
Writ of error to review 191 N.Y. 254, 192 N.Y. 382, 583,
dismissed.
This is in effect a controversy between the Smithsonian
Institution of Washington, District of Columbia, and the Andrews
Institute for Girls, a corporation of the State of Ohio, concerning
a will made by Wallace C. Andrews, a resident of the City, County,
and State of New York, who died in that city on April 7, 1899. Both
Mr. Andrews and his wife perished on that day in a fire in their
dwelling house in New York City. Whether husband or wife died first
is not known. She was twelve years younger than he. They had no
children. The will was executed on November 12, 1891. After some
special gifts, which need not be noticed, the will provides:
"Fourth: Upon the death of my said wife, I devise and bequeath
to the corporation hereinafter directed to be formed, all the
excess and residue of my estate over the sum of $500,000 specified
in the third paragraph hereof."
"Fifth: I direct my executor and executrix as soon as
practicable after my decease and during the lives of my said wife
and her said brother or the life of the longest liver of them,
to
Page 214 U. S. 21
procure under the laws of the State of Ohio an incorporation, to
be formed with proper powers, for the purpose of establishing an
institution on the farm known as the Williams Farm, formerly owned
by me and now owned by my wife, fronting on Erie Street, in the
town of Willoughby, Lake County, Ohio, or if said farm be for any
cause not available, then on other suitable premises in the said
Town of Willoughby, for the free education of girls and for their
support in proper cases during education, with a special view
toward rendering them self-supporting."
"Said institution shall contain, among others, a sewing
department, cooking department, designing department and
departments of phonography and typewriting and other useful work
that would afford the pupils employment in life, including such new
discoveries and inventions as may be made from time to time tending
to enlarge the opportunities for useful and honorable employment
for women, and such as will aid them in obtaining honorable and
independent positions in life. Such school to be open only to girls
between the ages of ten and sixteen, both inclusive."
"Not exceeding one-tenth of the sum devoted to the said
institution by the fourth paragraph hereof may be used for the
erection of suitable buildings therefor on the said farm, or in the
contingency above specified, for the purchase of suitable premises
in said town and the erection of such buildings thereon, and the
income of the remaining nine tenths shall be devoted to the support
and maintenance of said institution."
"If, when the said sum shall be received by said corporation,
the one tenth thereof shall not, in the judgment of the directors,
be sufficient for such erection or such purchase and erection as
the case may be, the whole sum may, in their discretion, be allowed
to accumulate until the one tenth thereof with its accumulation
shall be so sufficient, when such one tenth may be used therefor,
while the income of the remaining nine tenths of said sum and
accumulations shall be devoted to the support and maintenance of
said institution. "
Page 214 U. S. 22
"The charter of the said corporation shall also provide, if and
so far as may be consistent with law and practicable, for the
management of the said corporation by a board of five directors, to
consist of the Governor for the time being of the State of Ohio,
the member of congress for the time being for the congressional
district embracing said Town of Willoughby, the Treasurer for the
time being of said County of Lake, the Mayor for the time being of
Willoughby, and the said Gamaliel C. St. John, and for the choice
of a resident of Willoughby by the said Governor as successor to
the said St. John as often as the fifth place shall become or be
vacant."
"Sixth: If my said wife shall die before me, then the
dispositions provided for in the third and fourth paragraphs hereof
shall take effect upon my death."
"Seventh: I direct my said executor and executrix as soon as
they may deem advisable, but within two years after my decease, to
sell all my real estate and invest the proceeds in interest-paying
securities, and as to all my estate I give them and my trustees
power to invest and reinvest the same or any part thereof, having
regard both to income and safety."
"Eighth: In case my intention with respect to the said
institution for girls shall because of illegality fail, or become
impossible of realization, I then devise and bequeath the sum
intended for it to the Smithsonian Institution at Washington,
District of Columbia, to be devoted to the purposes for which it
was established."
"Ninth: I appoint my said wife executrix and my said
brother-in-law executor of this my will, and neither as such nor as
trustees shall they be required to give security. All the powers
herein granted to them may be exercised by the survivor of them and
unless limited to their lives, by their successor or successors in
the administration of my estate."
Mrs. Andrews dying at the same time her husband did, his
brother-in-law, Mr. St. John, duly qualified as executor and
trustee under the will. Thereafter he commenced this suit in the
Supreme Court of New York County, seeking a construction
Page 214 U. S. 23
of the will and a determination of the rights of the Andrews
Institute for Girls, the Smithsonian Institution, and the heirs at
law and next of kin of the deceased. The Andrews Institute for
Girls, the Smithsonian Institution, Chief Justice Melville W.
Fuller, as Chancellor thereof, the Attorney General of the State of
New York, and the heirs and next of kin of the deceased, were made
parties defendant. At a hearing in a special term of the Supreme
Court of the County of New York, it was held that
"the defendant the Andrews Institute for Girls is entitled to
the residuary estate of the said Wallace C. Andrews, deceased,
together with the income thereof which has accrued since the death
of said deceased, after paying the expenses of administration,"
and also that the defendant the Smithsonian Institution has no
interest in the estate of the said Wallace C. Andrews, deceased.
This decision was sustained by the Appellate Division of the First
Department, and thereafter, with a slight modification, by the
Court of Appeals of the state, which remitted the record of the
Supreme Court of New York City, where the final judgment was
entered. Thereupon that judgment was brought here on a writ of
error by the Smithsonian Institution and its chancellor.
The defendants in error filed a motion to dismiss, which was
postponed until the final hearing, and the case is now before us on
such final hearing and motion to dismiss.
Page 214 U. S. 27
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is difficult to spell out from the record in this case the
decision of any question arising under the Constitution and laws of
the United States. Neither in the pleadings nor in the opinions is
there a direct reference to any special provision of the federal
Constitution. It is true that, after the decision by the Court of
Appeals, an affidavit was filed by one of the counsel for
plaintiffs in error in support of a petition for a rehearing
stating that, in the brief as well as upon the oral argument in
that court, a federal question (describing it) had been presented
and discussed, which petition was denied by the Court of Appeals in
these words: "Ordered, that the said motion be and the same hereby
is denied, with ten dollars costs, no federal question having been
raised in this Court."
It is unnecessary to determine whether this, of itself, is
sufficient to give jurisdiction to this Court. The language of the
Court of Appeals may be construed as denying that any such matter
was brought to its attention as stated in the affidavit, or as
holding that it presented no federal question.
Mallett v. North
Carolina, 181 U. S. 589;
M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U.
S. 530;
Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S.
79;
McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.
S. 458.
Counsel further contend that there was necessarily involved in
the decision of the case the determination of a question arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that
hence this Court has jurisdiction of this writ of error even if the
question was not formally referred to by counsel
Page 214 U. S. 28
or the state courts.
Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U.
S. 540,
123 U. S. 548;
Navigation Company v. Homestead Company, 123 U.
S. 552;
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.
S. 102,
172 U. S. 117;
M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U.
S. 530,
184 U. S. 534;
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226,
192 U. S. 230,
in which last case it is said:
"It is a necessary and well settled rule that the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court to protect constitutional rights cannot
be declined when it is plain that the fair result of a decision is
to deny the rights. . . . There can be no doubt that, if full faith
and credit were denied to a judgment rendered in another state upon
a suggestion of want of jurisdiction, without evidence to warrant
the finding, this Court would enforce the constitutional
requirement.
See German Savings Society v. Dormitzer,
ante, p.
192 U. S. 125."
The question upon which counsel rely arises upon Article IV, §
1, of the federal Constitution, which reads:
"Full faith and credit shall be given each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state, and
the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof."
It is not pretended that any judgment of the State of Ohio was
disregarded by the courts of New York, but it is contended that
full force and effect was not given to the Constitution of the
State of Ohio. This duty is as obligatory as the similar duty in
respect to the judicial proceedings of that state.
Town of
South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260,
94 U. S. 268;
Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. Wiggins Ferry
Company, 119 U. S. 615,
119 U. S. 622,
in which Mr. Chief Justice Waite said:
"Without doubt, the constitutional requirement, Art, IV, § 1,
that 'full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other
state,' implies that the public acts of every state shall be given
the same effect by the courts of another state that they have by
law and usage at home. This is clearly the logical result of the
principles announced as early as 1813 in
Mills
Page 214 U. S. 29
v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481, and steadily adhered to ever
since."
Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.
S. 640,
176 U. S.
642.
On the other hand, it is settled that the mere construction by a
state court of the statute of another state, without questioning
its validity, does not deny to it the full faith and credit
demanded by the constitutional provision.
Glenn v. Garth,
147 U. S. 360;
Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 222;
Bankolzer v. New York Life Insurance Company, 178 U.
S. 402;
Johnson v. New York Life Insurance
Company, 187 U. S. 491;
Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335;
Allen v. Alleghany Company, 196 U.
S. 458.
In the light of these decisions, we pass to consider the
particular question presented. Sections 1 and 2 of article 13 of
the Ohio Constitution read:
"SEC. 1. The general assembly shall pass no special act
conferring corporate powers."
"SEC. 2. Corporations may be formed under general laws, but all
such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed."
By § 3235, 2 Bates' Ann. Ohio Statutes (6th ed.), p. 1836, it is
provided:
"Corporations may be formed in the manner provided in this
chapter for any purpose for which individuals may lawfully
associate themselves, except for carrying on professional
business,"
and immediately following this section are those naming the
conditions and methods of incorporation. After the death of the
testator, and on March 19, 1902, the general assembly of the State
of Ohio passed an act (Laws 1902, p. 61), the first section of
which is as follows:
"SEC. 1. Whenever, by the last will and testament of any person
which has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, duly admitted
testament of any person which has heretofore been, or shall
hereafter be, duly admitted may devise or bequeath, his or her
property, or any portion thereof, for charitable uses within this
state, or for the establishment and maintenance of any industrial
or educational within this state, or for the establishment and
maintenance of any industrial or educational in any
Page 214 U. S. 30
such will and testament, it has been, or may be, provided that
the executor or executors thereof shall organize a corporation
under the laws of this state for the purpose of receiving the
property so devised or bequeathed, and carrying out the charitable
purposes in such will expressed, or establishing and maintaining
the institution or school therein provided for, and such will
further provides for the management of such corporation by a board
of trustees or directors, consisting, in part, of officials of this
state, of the county in which such charities are to be administered
or such institution or school located, the officials of any
municipal incorporation in said county, and the member of Congress
for the district of which said county forms a part, or any of such
officials, and names any other person or persons to be associated
with said officials or any of them, and provides for the
appointment of a successor or successors to the person or persons
so appointed, to act with such officials in any manner specified in
said will, such executor or executors, or his or their successors
in office, and the persons hereinafter named, may constitute
themselves a body corporate, with the general powers of benevolent
incorporations."
The second section requires that a copy of the will or
testament, for the carrying out of the provisions of which the
corporation is organized, shall be set forth in the articles of
incorporation. Thereafter the Andrews Institute for Girls was
incorporated, containing, as required by § 2, the will of the
testator. Now it is contended by counsel for the plaintiffs in
error that this act was a special act, conferring corporate powers,
and that therefore it and the incorporation made under it was in
conflict with the Constitution of Ohio. It is not suggested that
there has been any decision of the courts of Ohio in reference to
the validity of the act or subsequent incorporation of the Andrews
Institute, but it is insisted that it is so obvious that the act is
a special act, conferring corporate powers, inasmuch as the terms
of the will of an individual are the basis of the act and the
incorporation, that the courts of
Page 214 U. S. 31
New York could not have given force and effect to the
prohibitions of the Constitution of Ohio. Nevertheless, whether
rightly or wrongly, the New York courts held that there was no
violation of the Constitution of Ohio, the Court of Appeals saying
in its opinion:
"At the death of the testator, the general statutes of Ohio
provided that corporations might be formed for any purpose for
which individuals might lawfully associate themselves, except for
carrying on professional business. 2 Bates' Ann. Ohio Statutes (6th
ed.), p. 1836."
"Subsequent to the death of the testator, and in March, 1902, an
act was passed by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio
entitled, 'An Act to Provide for the Administration of Charitable
Trusts in Certain cases.' If we assume that such act was passed to
aid in the incorporation of the Andrews Institute for Girls, it is
not necessarily, unconstitutional for that reason. It is not an
uncommon thing in any state for questions to arise making it
desirable or perhaps necessary for further general legislation to
enable persons interested to carry out desired and desirable
measures. The fact that such further general statute is passed to
aid a particular person for the time being does not make the act a
special, as distinguished from a general, one. Whether an act,
general in form, is a mere device to evade a wholesome
constitutional provision is largely dependent upon the special
circumstances of each case. If the act relates to persons, places,
and things as a class, and is neither local nor temporary, the mere
fact that its practical effect is special and private does not
necessarily prove that it violates constitutional provisions
against special legislation.
Matter of N.Y.El. R. Co., 70
N.Y. 327-344;
In the Matter of Church, 92 N.Y. 1;
Matter of Henneberger, 155 N.Y. 420, 426;
People v.
Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528;
Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction
Co., 160 N.Y. 377;
People ex Rel. Clauson v. Newburgh
& S. Plank Road Co., 86 N.Y. 1;
Matter of N.Y. &
L. I. Bridge Co., 148 N.Y. 540;
Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co.
v. Shanahan, 128 N.Y. 345;
Ferguson v. Ross, 126
N.Y.
Page 214 U. S. 32
459;
Sun P. & Pub. Association v. New York, 152
N.Y. 257."
"The act so passed by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio
in 1902 would not seem to be a violation of the Constitution of
that state.
Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. 75;
State v.
Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77;
Gentsch v. State, 71 Ohio
St. 151;
Cinn. Street R. Co. v. Horstman, 72 Ohio St. 93;
State of Ohio v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 411."
"Subsequent to the death of the testator, and on the 8th day of
May, 1902, 'The Andrews Institute for Girls' was incorporated
pursuant to the laws of the State of Ohio"
"for the purpose of receiving the property devised and
bequeathed in and by the wills of Wallace C. Andrews, and Margaret
M. St. John Andrews, late of the city and State of New York, to the
corporation therein directed to be formed, and for the purpose of
carrying out the charitable purposes in such wills expressed, and
of establishing and maintaining the institution therein provided
for."
"The articles of incorporation include a complete copy of the
will of the testator, and also of the will and codicil of Margaret
M. St. John Andrews. They also provide that the corporation shall
be located in the Town of Willoughby, Ohio, and name as members of
the corporation the persons proposed in the will of said testator,
together with two other persons in the State of Ohio, which persons
so named constitute the board of directors for the administration
and management of the property and trust or other funds of the
corporation, and for the control and management of said
institution. Said act of the General Assembly of the State of Ohio,
among other things, provides:"
"The Attorney General of the State of Ohio shall, in his
official capacity, have power to bring proceedings in any court of
record, and enforce any such devise or bequest, whenever he deems
such action necessary for the protection and carrying out of the
purposes named in said last will and testament, without waiting for
the organization of such corporation. "
Page 214 U. S. 33
That there is some foundation for the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals is obvious from the opinions of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, cited in the foregoing quotation. It is unnecessary to
hold that there was no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
It is enough for the purposes of this case to hold that that court
did not question the validity of any provision of the Constitution
of the State of Ohio, and did not sustain any act or incorporation
which it held to be in conflict with such provision. At most, there
was simply a matter of error, and not a repudiation of the
obligations of the federal Constitution.
We do not see that any provision of the federal Constitution has
been violated, and the writ of error is
Dismissed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE did not hear the arguments and took no part in
the decision of this case.
* In this case, the New York court held: whether an act general
in form is a mere device to evade a wholesome constitutional
provision [against special acts conferring corporate powers] is
largely dependent upon the special circumstances. If the act
relates to persons and things as a class, and is neither local nor
temporary, the mere fact that its practical effect is special and
private does not necessarily prove that it violates constitutional
provisions against special legislation.
