To give this Court jurisdiction under § 709, Rev.Stat., not only
must a right under the Constitution of the United States be
specially set up, but it must appear that the right was denied in
fact or that the judgment could not have been rendered without
denying it.
Where the constitutional right was not set up in the original
plea, and the record does not disclose the reasons of the state
court for refusing to allow a new plea setting up the
constitutional right, and the record shows that the refusal might
have been sufficiently based on nonfederal grounds, this Court
cannot review the judgment under § 709, Rev.Stat.
In the absence of action on the part of Congress, a state may
regulate the conduct of local delivery of telegraph messages after
the interstate transit by wire is completed.
Where it does not appear in the record that a telegraph message
between two points in the same state had to be transmitted partly
through another state, except by a plea which the state court
refused, on nonfederal grounds, to allow to be filed, no federal
question is involved, and this Court cannot review the judgment
under § 709, Rev.Stat.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action against the telegraph company, in two counts.
The first alleges a failure to transmit a message from Graham,
Virginia, to East Radford, in the same state, as
Page 213 U. S. 53
promptly as practicable. The second alleges a failure to deliver
the message as promptly as practicable after its arrival at Fast
Radford. Both seek to recover $100, under statutes of the state
imposing a forfeiture of that sum in such cases to the sender of
the dispatch. The declaration was filed in April, 1906. In June,
the defendant filed a demurrer and general denial by leave of
court. On February 25 of the next year, when the case was about to
be tried, the telegraph company offered a special plea that its
only proper and regular route for transmitting the message was by
way of Bluefield, West Virginia, to Washington, in the District of
Columbia, and thence, by relaying, to East Radford; that it did
promptly dispatch the message from Graham to Washington, but, by
mistake, sent it from Washington to Cincinnati, causing a delay;
that the transmission of the message was interstate commerce, and
that therefore the statute of Virginia, Act of January 18, 1904, c.
8, § 5, as applied to the part of the transmission outside of the
state, was void. Constitution of United States, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The conclusion of the plea was that the plaintiff could not
"recover the penalty in his declaration demanded," and the
defendant prayed judgment. The court refused to allow the plea to
be filed, and the defendant excepted. A trial followed at which the
plaintiff got a judgment. The errors assigned are that the court
refused to allow the defendant to file the above plea, and that it
rendered judgment for the plaintiff instead of for the
defendant.
This case comes here from a state court, and, of course,
therefore it must appear that a federal question necessarily was
involved in the decision before this Court can take jurisdiction or
undertake to reverse the judgment of a tribunal over which it has
no general power. It is not enough that a right under the
Constitution of the United States was specially set up and claimed.
It must be made manifest either that the right was denied in fact
or that the judgment could not have been rendered without denying
it.
DeSaussure v. Gaillard, 127 U.
S. 216;
Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.
S. 300;
Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S.
93,
207 U. S. 99.
See also Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S.
36.
Page 213 U. S. 54
The reasons which led the court to refuse leave to file the plea
in this case do not appear. But it is apparent on the face of the
record that there are at least two grounds on which it is possible
that leave may have been denied before the federal question was
reached. The original demurrer and answer seem to have been late,
as they were filed by leave of court. This plea was not offered
until more than nine months after the declaration, when the case
was called for trial. The circumstances are not disclosed, and it
may be that the court, in its discretion, considered that it was
unjust for the plaintiff to be called upon to meet a new and
serious issue at the last moment. Again, the plea, although it only
referred to the section of the statute upon which the first count
was based, went, in terms, to the whole declaration, and prayed
judgment. It clearly was bad as to the second count. In the absence
of any action on the part of Congress at least, it would not be
denied that a state could regulate the conduct of local messengers
when the transit by wire was over.
Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. James, 162 U. S. 650. It
cannot be said that the second count was abandoned, for nothing of
the sort appears, and the plea was offered before trial, so that
the evidence was not in. If the plea was not good for all that it
attempted to cover, it was bad altogether. It may be that, if we
were dealing with the judgment of a lower court of the United
States, we should think that there were sufficient grounds for
looking through the form to the substance of what the pleader seems
to have had most in mind; but when we are considering the action of
a state court, we cannot say that the local tribunal did not yield
to an argument that Saunders would have deemed conclusive, and that
Gould or Stephen would have regarded as an end of the case.
Manchester v. Vale, 1 Wms.Saund. 28; Gould Pl., 4th ed. §
104.
The first assignment of error falls for the reasons that we have
stated, and the second falls with it. The second is that the court
erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff. But the delay was
proved, and, as the plea was not admitted, there was nothing to
show that the message went outside the state.
Page 213 U. S. 55
Moreover, the judgment was upon both counts. It is impossible to
go further, and to pass upon the delicate question of
constitutional law that was argued here.
Writ of error dismissed.