Although a description may not be technically correct, if it
identifies the land, it will sustain a conveyance, or, as in this
case, an assessment for taxes, and notice of sale therefor when
delinquent, and, if the owner knows that the property so described
is his, he is not, by reason of the deficient description, deprived
of his property without due process of law.
Where, as in the State of Washington, tax proceedings are
in
rem, owners are bound to take notice thereof and to pay taxes
on their property, even if assessed to unknown or other persons,
and if an owner stands by and sees the property sold for delinquent
taxes, he is not thereby deprived of his property without due
process of law.
44 Wash. 239 affirmed.
Page 212 U. S. 153
On May 16, 1889, plaintiff's grantors, Chester A. Congdon and
Clara B. Congdon, his wife, then the owners of the West Half (W.
1/2) of the Southeast Quarter (S.E. 1/4) and the East Half (E. 1/2)
of the Southwest Quarter (S.W. 1/4) of Section Twenty-four (24), in
Township Thirteen (13) North, Range Eighteen (18) East, Willamette
Meridian, excepting ten acres which belonged to Charles M. Holton,
platted their land as "Capital Addition to North Yakima." According
to the plat, in the central portion was a body of land marked
"reserved" and not divided into lots and blocks. If it had been so
divided, the ground would have made four blocks, and, to be in
harmony with the other numbering, would have been Blocks 352, 353,
372, and 373. Nothing was shown on the plat to indicate the meaning
of the term "reserved," nor the use to which the tract was to be
applied. For the years 1892, 1893, 1894, and 1895, the proper
assessor listed and assessed for taxation with other real estate
that which he described as Blocks 352 and 372 in "Capital Addition
to North Yakima." All taxes on the property so listed for these
years became delinquent. The county foreclosed the same in
proceedings conforming to the statutes of Washington, and, under
the decree, the property was sold and a tax deed executed to the
defendant Jay Yordy, who paid all subsequent taxes levied thereon.
After the platting by Congdon and wife, and in 1890, they deeded
all the land to the plaintiff, describing it not by lots and
blocks, but by the government descriptions, and with no allusion to
the Capital Addition to North Yakima. In September, 1904, after the
tax deed had been executed, delivered, and recorded, the plaintiff
platted that portion of Capital Addition marked "reserved" as
"Heerman's Addition to North Yakima," and subdivided said reserved
tract into four blocks, numbered from 1 to 4, inclusive, each block
being subdivided into 16 lots. The defendant Jay Yordy had already
taken possession of the tract purchased by him, claiming it under
his tax deed. On March 17, 1905, the plaintiff brought this action
against the defendants to recover the property, describing it as
lots in Blocks 1 and 2 of Heerman's Addition.
Page 212 U. S. 154
The plaintiff had actual knowledge of the fact that an attempt
was being made to levy and collect taxes upon that portion of its
property marked "reserved;" it denied the validity of such taxes in
interviews with two county treasurers, and stood quietly by during
the foreclosure proceedings and tax sale. With full knowledge, it
permitted the purchaser to make his purchase without any protest,
and only thereafter platted the reserved tract as Heerman's
Addition to North Yakima. The trial court entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, but that judgment was reversed by the supreme
court of the state, which ordered a judgment in favor of the
defendants. 44 Wash. 239. Thereupon, the case was brought here on
error.
Page 212 U. S. 156
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The contention of plaintiff in error in the state courts, as
shown by the record, and also stated in the certificate of the
chief justice of the supreme court of the state, is that sustaining
the tax proceedings divests it of its property without due process
of law in contravention to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. At the time of those
proceedings, while the land in controversy was within the limits of
the Capital Addition to North Yakima, it had not been divided into
lots and blocks, but was simply marked on the official plat
"reserved." In other words, according to the record, there was no
such property as that described, and nothing to identify any
property. There being no legal description, no official
identification, no one could, by an examination of the records,
know what property was the subject of the proceedings. Hence, they
were void, and no one was bound to take notice of them. But land
may be identified, although not technically
Page 212 U. S. 157
or officially described, and the identification may be
sufficient to sustain a contract or conveyance. The owner of
property is bound to take notice of the time and place provided for
tax proceedings. He knows that his property is subject to taxation.
The plaintiff was the owner of the entire Capital Addition to North
Yakima. It was charged with notice of the fact of the platting and
the condition shown by the plat. Examining the tax proceedings, it
would find that four blocks not named on the plat, but within that
addition, were listed and assessed for taxation. It would also know
that, if the tract reserved had been divided into blocks and lots
and numbered in harmony with that of the balance of the addition,
Blocks 352, 353, 372, and 373 would occupy the place of the tract
marked "reserved." It therefore had notice by the record that the
authorities were listing and assessing for taxation certain blocks
and lots which occupied the place marked upon the official plat as
"reserved." It also had notice that that tract marked "reserved"
was not otherwise listed or assessed for taxation, and that, if its
entire property was listed and assessed, the words "Blocks numbered
352," etc., were used by the authorities for describing the
"reserved" tract. Could it ignore these facts because the
description in the tax proceedings was not officially or
technically correct or sufficient? But the case does not rest on
this presumption. It appears from the testimony of the county
treasurers that the plaintiff knew that the authorities were
attempting to assess and tax this "reserved" tract under the
description of Blocks 352, etc., so that it had not merely notice
from the record, but notice in fact that the tract marked
"reserved" was being assessed for taxation under the description of
Blocks 352, etc., and in no other way. The general rule in
reference to description in conveyances is thus stated by Jones on
Real Property, § 323:
"The first requisite of an adequate description is that the land
shall be identified with reasonable certainty; but the degree of
certainty required is always qualified by the application of the
rule that that is certain which can be made certain. A
Page 212 U. S. 158
deed will not be declared void for uncertainty if it is
possible, by any reasonable rules of construction, to ascertain
from the description, aided by extrinsic evidence, what property it
was intended to convey. The office of a description is not to
identify the land, but to furnish the means of identification. The
description will be liberally construed to afford the basis of a
valid grant. It is only when it remains a matter of conjecture what
property was intended to be conveyed, after resorting to such
extrinsic evidence as is admissible, that the deed will be held
void for uncertainty in the description of parcels."
The statutes of Washington provide that:
"Any judgment for the deed to real estate sold for delinquent
taxes, rendered after the passage of this act, except as otherwise
provided in this section, shall estop all parties from raising any
objections thereto, or to a tax title based thereon, which existed
at or before the rendition of such judgment, and could have been
presented as a defense to the application for such judgment in the
court wherein the same was rendered, and as to all such questions
the judgment itself shall be conclusive evidence of its regularity
and validity in all collateral proceedings, except in cases where
the tax or assessments have been paid, or the real estate was not
liable to the tax or assessment."
1 Ballinger's Code, Statutes of Washington, § 1767.
In Washington, proceedings for the collection of taxes upon real
property are
in rem. Spokane Falls & Northern
Railway v. Abitz, 38 Wash. 8;
Allen v. Peterson, 38
Wash. 599;
Rowland v. Eskeland, 40 Wash. 253;
Shipley
v. Gaffner, 48 Wash. 169, 171.
In this last case it was said by the court:
"We have repeatedly held that these tax foreclosure proceedings
are
in rem, and not against the person of the owner, and
that owners are bound to take notice of the property they own, and
pay the taxes thereon, and defend against foreclosure for
delinquent taxes, even though the property is assessed to unknown
persons or to other persons."
See also Carson v. Titlow, 38 Wash. 196, 198.
Page 212 U. S. 159
We are of opinion that the federal question in this case was
rightly decided, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Washington is
Affirmed.
