Each state may, subject to restriction of the federal
Constitution, determine the limit of the jurisdiction of its
courts, and the decision of the highest court sustaining
jurisdiction although the cause of action arose outside the border
of the state is final, and does not present a federal question.
The provision in § 5 of the Safety Appliance Act of March 2,
1893, 27 Stat. 531, referring it to the American Railway
Association and the Interstate Commerce Commission to designate and
promulgate the standard height and maximum variation of drawbars
for freight cars is not unconstitutional as a delegation of
legislative power.
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.
S. 470.
Under the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531, the center
of the drawbars of freight cars used on standard gauges shall be,
when the cars are empty, thirty-four and a half inches above the
rails, and the statute permits, when a car is loaded or partly
loaded, a maximum variation in the height downwards of three
inches. The statute does not require that the variation shall be
proportioned to the load, or that a fully loaded car shall exhaust
the entire variation.
An instruction that, under the statute, the drawbars of fully
loaded freight cars must be of a uniform height of thirty-one and a
half inches and that a variation between two loaded cars'
constitutes negligence under the statute is prejudicial error.
Although the constitutional grant of power to this Court to
review judgements of the state courts may be wider than the
statutory grant in 709, Rev.Stat., the jurisdiction of the court
extends only to the cases enumerated in that section.
The denial by the state court to give to a federal statute the
construction insisted upon by a party which would lead to a
judgment in his favor is a denial of a right or immunity under the
laws of the United States and presents a federal question
reviewable by this Court under § 709, Rev.Stat.
It is only by reviewing in this Court the construction given by
the state courts to federal statutes that a uniform construction of
such statutes throughout all the states can be secured.
The Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531,
supplants the common law rule of reasonable care on the part of the
employer as to providing the appliances defined and specified
therein, and imposes upon
Page 210 U. S. 282
interstate carriers an absolute duty, and the common law rule of
reasonable care is not a defense where, in point of fact, the cars
used were not equipped with appliances complying with the standards
established by the act.
The courts have no responsibility for the justice or wisdom of
legislation. They must enforce the statute, unless clearly
unconstitutional, as it is written, and when Congress has
prescribed by statute a duty upon a carrier, the courts cannot
avoid a true construction thereof simply because such construction
is a harsh one.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 210 U. S. 284
MR. JUSTICE Moody delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant in error, as administratrix of George W. Taylor,
brought, in the circuit court of the State of Arkansas, this action
at law against the plaintiff in error, a corporation owning and
operating a railroad. Damages were sought for the benefit of
Taylor's widow and next of kin on account of his injury and death
in the course of his employment as brakeman in the service of the
railroad. It was alleged in the complaint that Taylor, while
attempting, in the discharge of his duty, to couple two cars, was
caught between them and killed. The right to recover for the death
was based solely on the failure of the defendant to equip the two
cars which were to be coupled with such drawbars as were required
by the act of Congress known as the Safety Appliance Law. 27 Stat.
531, c. 196. The defendant's answer denied that the cars were
improperly equipped with drawbars, and alleged that Taylor's death
was the result of his own negligence. At a trial before a jury upon
the issues made by the
Page 210 U. S. 285
pleadings, there was a verdict for the plaintiff, which was
affirmed in a majority opinion by the supreme court of the state.
The judgment of that court is brought here for reexamination by
writ of error. The writ sets forth many assignments of error, but,
of them, four only were relied upon in argument here, and they
alone need be stated and considered. It is not and cannot be
disputed that the questions raised by the errors assigned were
seasonably and properly made in the court below, so as to give this
Court jurisdiction to consider them; so no time need be spent on
that. But the defendant in error insists that the questions
themselves, though properly here in form, are not federal questions
-- that is to say, not questions which we, by law, are authorized
to consider on a writ of error to a state court. For that reason,
it is contended that the writ should be dismissed. That contention
we will consider with each question as it is discussed.
The accident by which the plaintiff's intestate lost his life
occurred in the Indian territory, where, contrary to the doctrine
of the common law, a right of action for death exists. The cause of
action arose under the laws of the territory, and was enforced in
the courts of Arkansas. The plaintiff in error contends that, of
such a cause, triable as it was in the courts of the territory
created by Congress, the courts of Arkansas have no jurisdiction.
This contention does not present a federal question. Each state
may, subject to the restrictions of the federal Constitution,
determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, the
character of the controversies which shall be heard in them, and,
specifically, how far it will, having jurisdiction of the parties,
entertain in its courts transitory actions where the cause of
action has arisen outside its borders.
Chambers v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co., 207 U. S. 142. We
have therefore no authority to review the decision of the state
court so far as it holds that there was jurisdiction to hear and
determine this case. On that question, the decision of that court
is final.
The next question presented requires an examination of the
Page 210 U. S. 286
act of Congress upon which the plaintiff below rested her right
to recover. Section 5 of the Safety Appliance Law is as follows. 27
Stat. 531:
"Within ninety days from the passage of this act, the American
Railway Association is authorized hereby to designate to the
Interstate Commerce Commission the standard height of drawbars for
freight cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of
the rails to the centers of the drawbars, for each of the several
gauges of railroads in use in the United States, and shall fix a
maximum variation from such standard height to be allowed between
the drawbars of empty and loaded cars. Upon their determination's
being certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission, said
Commission shall at once give notice of the standard fixed upon to
all common carriers, owners, or lessees engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States by such means as the Commission may
deem proper. But, should such association fail to determine a
standard as above provided, it shall be the duty of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to do so before July first, eighteen hundred
and ninety-four, and immediately to give notice thereof as
aforesaid. And after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five,
no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used in interstate
traffic which do not comply with the standard above provided
for."
The action taken in compliance with this law by the American
Railway Association, which was duly certified to and promulgated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission, was contained in the following
resolution:
"Resolved, that the standard height of drawbars for freight
cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of the
rails to the centers of the drawbars, for standard-gauge railroads
in the United States, shall be thirty-four and one-half inches, and
the maximum variation from such standard heights to be allowed
between the drawbars of empty and loaded cars shall be three
inches. "
Page 210 U. S. 287
"Resolved, that the standard height of drawbars for freight
cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of the
rails to the centers of the drawbars, for the narrow-gauge
railroads in the United States, shall be twenty-six inches, and the
maximum variation from such standard height to be allowed between
the drawbars of empty and loaded cars shall be three inches."
It is contended that there is here an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the railway association and to
the Interstate Commerce Commission. This is clearly a federal
question. Briefly stated, the statute enacted that, after a date
named, only cars with drawbars of uniform height should be used in
interstate commerce, and that the standard should be fixed by the
association and declared by the Commission . Nothing need be said
upon this question except that it was settled adversely to the
contention of the plaintiff in error in
Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 -- a
case which, in principle, is completely in point.
And see Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364,
where the cases were reviewed.
Before proceeding with the consideration of the third assignment
of error, which arises out of the charge, it will be necessary to
set forth the course of the trial and the state of the evidence
when the cause came to be submitted to the jury. This is done not
for the purpose of retrying questions of fact, which we may not do,
but first to see whether the question raised was of a federal
nature, and second to see whether error was committed in the
decision of it. Taylor was a brakeman on a freight train which had
stopped at a station for the purpose of leaving there two cars
which were in the middle of the train. When this was done, the
train was left in two parts, the engine and several cars attached
making one section and the caboose with several cars attached
making the other. The caboose and its cars remained stationary, and
the cars attached to the engine were "kicked" back to make the
coupling. One of the cars to be coupled had an automatic coupler,
and the other an old-fashioned link and pin coupler. That
Page 210 U. S. 288
part of the law which requires automatic couplers on all cars
was not then in force. In attempting to make the coupling Taylor
went between the cars, and was killed. The cars were "kicked" with
such force that the impact considerably injured those immediately
in contact. and derailed one of them. One of the cars to be coupled
(that with the automatic coupler) was fully, and the other lightly,
loaded. The testimony on both sides tended to show that there was
some difference in the height of the drawbars of these two cars as
they rested on the tracks in their loaded condition, but there was
no testimony as to the height of the drawbars if the cars were
unloaded except that, as originally made some years before, they
were both of standard height. But, as to the extent of the
difference in the height of the drawbars, as the cars were being
used at the time of the accident, there was a conflict in the
testimony. One witness called by the plaintiff testified that the
automatic coupler appeared to be about four inches lower than the
link and pin coupler, although another, called also by the
plaintiff, testified that the automatic coupler was one to three
inches higher than the other. That the automatic coupler was the
lower is shown by the marks left upon it by the contact, which
indicated that it had been overriden by the link and pin coupler,
and was testified to by a witness who made up the train at its
starting point. Two witnesses called by the defendant testified to
actual measurements made soon after the accident which showed that
the center of the drawbar of the automatic coupler was thirty-two
and one-half inches from the top of the rail and that of the link
and pin coupler thirty-three and one-half inches from the top of
the rail. The evidence, therefore, in its aspect most favorable to
the plaintiff, tended to show that the fully loaded car was
equipped with an automatic coupler which, at the time, was four
inches lower than the link and pin coupler of the lightly loaded
car. On the other hand, the evidence in its aspect most favorable
to the defendant tended to show that the automatic drawbar of the
loaded car was exactly one inch lower than the link and
Page 210 U. S. 289
pin drawbar. It was the duty of the jury to pass upon this
conflicting evidence, and it was the duty of the presiding judge to
instruct the jury clearly as to the duty imposed upon the defendant
by the act of Congress. Before passing to the consideration of the
charge to the jury, we will for ourselves determine the meaning of
that act. We think that it requires that the center of the drawbars
of freight cars used on standard gauge railroads shall be, when the
cars are empty, thirty-four and one-half inches above the level of
the tops of the rails; that it permits, when a car is partly or
fully loaded, a variation in the height downward, in no case to
exceed three inches; that it does not require that the variation
shall be in proportion to the load, nor that a fully loaded car
shall exhaust the full three inches of the maximum permissible
variation and bring its drawbars down to the height of thirty-one
and one-half inches above the rails. If a car, when unloaded, has
its drawbars thirty-four and one-half inches above the rails, and,
in any stage of loading, does not lower its drawbars more than
three inches, it complies with the requirements of the law. If,
when unloaded, its drawbars are of greater or less height than the
standard prescribed by the law, or if, when wholly or partially
loaded, its drawbars are lowered more than the maximum variation
permitted, the car does not comply with the requirements of the
law. On this aspect of the case, the presiding judge gave certain
instructions and refused certain instructions, both under the
exception of the defendant. The jury were instructed, the italics
being ours:
"1. The act of Congress fixes the standard height of loaded cars
engaged in interstate commerce on standard-gauge railroads at
thirty-one and one-half inches, and unloaded cars at thirty-four
and one-half inches, measured perpendicularly from the level of the
face of the rails to the centers of the drawbars, and this
variation of three inches in height is intended to allow for the
difference in height caused by loading the car to the full
capacity, or by loading it partially, or by its being carried in
the train when it is empty. Now the law required
Page 210 U. S. 290
that the two cars between which Taylor lost his life should be,
when unloaded, of the equal and uniform height, from the level of
the face of the rails to the center of the drawbars, of thirty-four
and one-half inches,
and when loaded to the full capacity,
should be of the uniform height of thirty-one and one-half inches.
Now if the plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence, shows a
violation of this duty on part of defendant, then this is
negligence and if the proof by a preponderance also shows that
this caused or contributed to the death of Taylor, then you should
find for the plaintiff, unless it appears by a preponderance of the
evidence that Taylor was wanting in ordinary care for his own
safety, and that this want of care on Taylor's part for his own
safety caused or contributed to the injury and death sued for, in
which latter case you should find for the defendant."
"2.
If there was the difference between the height of the
center of the drawbars in the two cars in question, as indicated in
the first instruction, then the question arises whether this
difference caused or contributed to the injury and death of Taylor
sued for. On that point, if such difference existed, and, but for
its existence, the injury and death of Taylor would not have
happened, then such difference is said in law to be an efficient
proximate cause of Taylor's injury and death, although it may be
true that other causes may have cooperated with this one in
producing the injury and death of Taylor, and but for these other
cooperating causes the injury and death of Taylor would not have
ensued. But if such difference in height of the center of the
drawbars as aforesaid actually existed, yet if the injury and death
of Taylor would have ensued just the same as it did without the
existence of such difference in height of the center of the
drawbars, then such difference in the height of the center of the
drawbars is not in law an efficient proximate cause of the injury
and death of Taylor."
The clear intendment of these instructions was that the law
required that the drawbars of a fully loaded car should be of the
height of thirty-one and one-half inches, and that, if either of
the cars varied from this requirement, the defendant had
Page 210 U. S. 291
failed in the performance of its duty. We find nothing in the
remainder of the charge which qualifies this instruction, and we
think it was erroneous. We should be reluctant to insist upon mere
academic accuracy of instructions to a jury. But how vitally this
error affected the defendant is demonstrated by the fact that its
own evidence showed that the drawbar of the fully loaded car was
thirty-two and one-half inches in height. Under these instructions,
the plaintiff was permitted to recover on proof of this fact alone.
From such proof, a verdict for the plaintiff would logically
follow. The error of the charge was emphasized by the refusal to
instruct the jury, as requested by the defendant,
"that, when one car is fully loaded and another car in the same
train is only partially loaded, the law allows a variation of full
three inches between the center of the drawbars of such cars,
without regard to the amount of weight in the partially loaded
car."
This request, taken in connection with the instruction that the
drawbars of unloaded cars should be of the height prescribed by the
act, expressed the true rule, and should have been given. On the
other hand, a request for instructions, which was as follows:
"The court charges you that the act of Congress allows a
variation in height of three inches between the centers of the
drawbars of all cars used in interstate commerce, regardless of
whether they are loaded or empty, the measurement of such height to
be made perpendicularly from the top of the rail to the center of
the drawbar shank or draft line,"
contained an erroneous expression of the law, and was correctly
refused. It is based upon the theory that the height of the
drawbars of unloaded cars may vary three inches, while the act, as
we have said, requires that the height of the drawbars of unloaded
cars shall be uniform.
But we have not the power to correct mere errors in the trials
in state courts, although affirmed by the highest state courts.
This Court is not a general court of appeals, with the general
right to review the decisions of state courts. We may only inquire
whether there has been error committed in the
Page 210 U. S. 292
decision of those federal questions which are set forth in § 709
of the Revised Statutes, and it is strenuously urged that the error
in this part of the case was not in the decision of any such
federal question. That position we proceed to examine.
The judicial power of the United States extends
"to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority."
Const. Article III, § 2. The case at bar, where the right of
action was based solely upon an act of Congress, assuredly was a
case "arising under . . . the laws of the United States." It was
settled, once for all time, in
Cohen v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, that the appellate
jurisdiction, authorized by the Constitution to be exercised by
this Court, warrants it in reviewing the judgments of state courts
so far as they pass upon a law of the United States. It was said in
that case (p.
19 U. S.
416):
"They [the words of the Constitution] give to the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States. The words are broad enough
to comprehend all cases of this description, in whatever court they
may be decided;"
and it was further said (p.
19 U. S.
379):
"A case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party,
as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the
Constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct
decision depends on the construction of either."
But the appellate jurisdiction of this Court must be exercised
"with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress
shall make." Const. Article III, § 2. Congress has regulated and
limited the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over the state
courts by § 709 of the Revised Statutes, and our jurisdiction in
this respect extends only to the cases there enumerated, even
though a wider jurisdiction might be permitted by the
constitutional grant of power.
Murdock v.
Memphis, 20 Wall. 590,
87 U. S. 620.
The words of that section material here are those authorizing this
Court to reexamine the judgments of the state courts
"where any title, right, privilege,
Page 210 U. S. 293
or immunity is claimed under . . . any . . . statute of . . .
the United States, and the decision is against the title, right,
privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed . . . under such
. . . statute."
There can be no doubt that the claim made here was specifically
set up, claimed, and denied in the state courts. The question
therefore, precisely stated, is whether it was a claim of a right
or immunity under a statute of the United States. Recent decisions
of this Court remove all doubt from the answer to this question.
McCormick v. Market Bank, 165 U.
S. 538;
California Bank v. Kennedy,
167 U. S. 362;
San Jose Land and Water Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co.,
189 U. S. 177;
Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12;
Rector v. City Deposit Bank, 200 U.
S. 405;
Illinois Central Railroad v. McKendree,
203 U. S. 514;
Eau Claire National Bank v. Jackman, 204 U.
S. 522;
Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U.
S. 538. The principles to be derived from the cases are
these: where a party to litigation in a state court insists, by way
of objection to or requests for instructions, upon a construction
of a statute of the United States which will lead, or, on possible
findings of fact from the evidence may lead, to a judgment in his
favor, and his claim in this respect, being duly set up, is denied
by the highest court of the state, then the question thus raised
may be reviewed in this Court. The plain reason is that, in all
such cases, he has claimed in the state court a right or immunity
under a law of the United States and it has been denied to him.
Jurisdiction so clearly warranted by the Constitution and so
explicitly conferred by the act of Congress needs no justification.
But it may not be out of place to say that in no other manner can a
uniform construction of the statute laws of the United States be
secured, so that they shall have the same meaning and effect in all
the states of the Union.
It is clear that these principles govern the case at bar. The
defendant, now plaintiff in error, objected to an erroneous
construction of the Safety Appliance Act which warranted on the
evidence a judgment against it, and insisted upon a correct
Page 210 U. S. 294
construction of the act which warranted on the evidence a
judgment in its favor. The denials of its claims were decisions of
federal questions reviewable here.
The plaintiff in error raises another question which, for the
reasons already given, we think is of a federal nature. The
evidence showed that drawbars, which, as originally constructed,
are of standard height, are lowered by the natural effect of proper
use; that, in addition to the correction of this tendency by
general repair, devices called "shims," which are metallic wedges
of different thickness, are employed to raise the lowered drawbar
to the legal standard, and that, in the caboose of this train, the
railroad furnished a sufficient supply of these shims, which it was
the duty of the conductor or brakeman to use as occasion demanded.
On this state of the evidence, the defendant was refused
instructions, in substance, that, if the defendant furnished cars
which were constructed with drawbars of a standard height, and
furnished shims to competent inspectors and trainmen, and used
reasonable care to keep the drawbars at a reasonable height, it had
complied with its statutory duty, and, if the lowering of the
drawbar resulted from the failure to use the shims, that was the
negligence of a fellow servant, for which the defendant was not
responsible. In deciding the questions thus raised, upon which the
courts have differed (
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Delk, 158 F. 931), we need not enter into the wilderness of
cases upon the common law duty of the employer to use reasonable
care to furnish his employee reasonably safe tools, machinery, and
appliances, or consider when and how far that duty may be performed
by delegating it to suitable persons for whose default the employer
is not responsible. In the case before us, the liability of the
defendant does not grow out of the common law duty of master to
servant. The Congress, not satisfied with the common law duty and
its resulting liability, has prescribed and defined the duty by
statute. We have nothing to do but to ascertain and declare the
meaning of a few simple words in which the duty is described. It is
enacted that "no
Page 210 U. S. 295
cars, either loader or unloaded, shall be used in interstate
traffic which do not comply with the standard." There is no escape
from the meaning of these words. Explanation cannot clarify them,
and ought not to be employed to confuse them or lessen their
significance. The obvious purpose of the legislature was to
supplant the qualified duty of the common law with an absolute
duty, deemed by it more just. If the railroad does, in point of
fact, use cars which do not comply with the standard, it violates
the plain prohibitions of the law, and there arises from that
violation the liability to make compensation to one who is injured
by it. It is urged that this is a harsh construction. To this we
reply that, if it be the true construction, its harshness is no
concern of the courts. They have no responsibility for the justice
or wisdom of legislation, and no duty except to enforce the law as
it is written, unless it is clearly beyond the constitutional power
of the lawmaking body. It is said that the liability under the
statute, as thus construed, imposes so great a hardship upon the
railroads that it ought not to be supposed that Congress intended
it. Certainly the statute ought not to be given an absurd or
utterly unreasonable interpretation, leading to hardship and
injustice, if any other interpretation is reasonably possible. But
this argument is a dangerous one, and never should be heeded where
the hardship would be occasional and exceptional. It would be
better, it was once said by Lord Eldon, to look hardship in the
face, rather than break down the rules of law. But, when applied to
the case at bar, the argument of hardship is plausible only when
the attention is directed to the material interest of the employer
to the exclusion of the interests of the employee and of the
public. Where an injury happens through the absence of a safe
drawbar, there must be hardship. Such an injury must be an
irreparable misfortune to someone. If it must be borne entirely by
him who suffers it, that is a hardship to him. If its burden is
transferred, as far as it is capable of transfer, to the employer,
it is a hardship to him. It is quite conceivable that Congress,
contemplating the inevitable
Page 210 U. S. 296
hardship of such injuries and hoping to diminish the economic
loss to the community resulting from them, should deem it wise to
impose their burdens upon those who could measurably control their
causes, instead of upon those who are, in the main, helpless in
that regard. Such a policy would be intelligible, and, to say the
least, not so unreasonable as to require us to doubt that it was
intended, and to seek some unnatural interpretation of common
words. We see no error in this part of the case. But, for the
reasons before given, the judgment must be
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER concurs in the judgment.