The creation of a board of Railroad Commissioners and the extent
of its powers, what the route of railroad companies created by the
state may be, and whether parallel and competing lines may
consolidate, are all matters which a state may regulate by its
statutes, and the state courts are the absolute interpreters of
such statutes.
Where the contention of plaintiff in error that a charter right
has been impaired by subsequent state action was disposed of by the
state court on the nonfederal ground that, if any such right ever
existed, plaintiff in error was estopped by its own conduct from
asserting it, this Court cannot review the judgment on the alleged
federal ground of impairment of the contract.
A decree of a state court requiring a railroad company which
does an interstate business to construct its lines within the state
in accordance with the provisions of its charter and the directions
of the state Railroad Commission is not an interference with
interstate commerce because compliance therewith entails expense or
requires the exercise of eminent domain.
How a state statute should be construed, whether a contract is
created thereby, and whether the statute is constitutional under
the state constitution are not, in the absence of any claim that
the contract, if any, has been impaired by subsequent state action,
federal questions
89 Miss. 724 affirmed.
This is a bill in equity, brought by the State of Mississippi
and the Railroad Commission of that state to require the railroad
companies to construct their railroad through the county seat of
Pontotoc County, State of Mississippi, and to restrain them from
abandoning a portion of the narrow gauge railroad formerly operated
by the Gulf & Chicago Railroad Company, which ran to the town
of Pontotoc.
The following is a summary of the bill: the Railroad Commission
exists under the laws of the State of Mississippi, and is, under
the laws, charged with the duty of supervising railroads and other
common carriers, and also with the duty of
Page 210 U. S. 188
enforcing the observance of the laws by such companies and other
carriers. The Gulf & Chicago Railway Company was organized in
1903, under the laws of Mississippi, with authority to construct a
railroad from the Town of Decatur, Mississippi, in a general
northerly direction, through the County of Pontotoc, and through
the State of Mississippi to the Tennessee line. At the time of the
organization of such railway company, there was in existence from
the Town of Pontotoc, Mississippi, to the Town of Middleton,
Tennessee, a narrow gauge road, which was operated by the Gulf
& Chicago Railroad Company, a corporation under the laws of
Mississippi. The railroad company was bound to continue and
preserve intact throughout its entire length the narrow gauge road,
and the Gulf & Chicago Railway Company and its lessee, the
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company, hereafter
called the Mobile Company, were in turn bound to so continue and
preserve intact the said line, "broadened and standardized as was
stipulated in the articles of consolidation hereinafter set forth."
Prior to the sixth of July, 1903, the Gulf & Chicago
Rail
way Company and the Gulf & Chicago
Rail
road Company, with other railroad companies, were
consolidated under the name of the Gulf & Chicago Railway
Company, and on that day a petition was presented to the Railroad
Commission, praying the approval of the consolidation. It was
stipulated in the petition, and by the granting of it by the
Commission, it was agreed that the consolidated corporation should
broaden and standardize the narrow gauge road running from the Town
of Pontotoc, "as it then existed and was being operated," and that,
when broadened and standardized, it should be a part of the main
line of the Gulf & Chicago Railway Company, extending from
Decatur, Mississippi, to Jackson, Tennessee. The petition and order
were made part of the bill. On or about the time of the
consolidation, approved as aforesaid, the Gulf & Chicago
Railway Company leased to the Mobile Company all of its railroad
property then constructed and operated, and that thereafter to be
constructed, including the narrow gauge road from Pontotoc
Page 210 U. S. 189
to Middleton, and including its entire proposed line from
Decatur to Jackson, and since the execution of the lease, the
Mobile Company has been in control and operation of the narrow
gauge road. The Gulf & Chicago Railway Company, in violation of
the terms and in disregard of the representations contained in its
petition to the Commission, has broadened and standardized the
narrow gauge road to a point one mile and a half from the end of
the line in Pontotoc County, and is operating the same. The
remaining part, which is the most important part of the road,
extending through a thickly populated district in the principal
portion of Pontotoc, has been abandoned. It was a material
consideration, in passing on the petition for consolidation, and
the consolidation would not have been approved but for the
representation that the company would standardize and broaden the
line extending into the town.
The narrow gauge road was constructed in 1887 by the Gulf &
Ship Island Railroad Company. When it was extended into Pontotoc, a
right of way was obtained by purchase, by the exercise of the right
of eminent domain, and by donations by the community, and when the
right of way was selected, it was with the view of extending the
road south through the town. The town was built and established,
and the town has been building for the last twenty years, with
reference to the line of railroad then so located. The interests of
the public are involved in the change of road; the convenience and
comfort of more than 1,000 people are involved; the change of road
would disturb established conditions, and practically break up a
prosperous community for the benefit of the defendants and a few
property owners in another part of the town, recently added
thereto, and through which it is proposed to run the new line of
railroad. The original Town of Pontotoc is the county seat of
Pontotoc County, as fixed by the legislature of the state, and §
187 of the Constitution of the state provides that no railroad
thereafter constructed in the state
"shall pass within three miles of any county seat without
passing through the same and establishing
Page 210 U. S. 190
and maintaining a depot therein unless prevented by natural
obstacles, provided such town or city shall grant the right of way
through its limits and sufficient ground for ordinary depot
purposes."
The Gulf & Chicago Railway Company is constructing its new
line within three miles of Pontotoc without passing through the
same. There are no natural obstacles in the way. The citizens stand
ready to grant the right of way through the limits of the town and
sufficient grounds for depot purposes. In fact, the company owns a
right of way through a large part of the town and sufficient
grounds for depot purposes. The conduct of the company is in
violation of the constitution and in willful disregard of the law
and of the order of the Commission and the rights of the
public.
The inadequacy of the remedy at law is alleged.
The injunction prayed was against the construction of the line
of road proposed, and to command the defendant to broaden and
standardize the line of road extending through the Town of
Pontotoc, and to compel its operation into the said county seat as
a part of the line built and to be built from Decatur, Mississippi,
to Jackson, Tennessee, and to extend the said line on through to
the said county seat, as required by said § 187 of the Constitution
of the State of Mississippi, and as required by law and by the
order of the complainant, the Mississippi Railroad Commission.
General relief was also prayed.
The answer of the defendant companies, in addition to traversing
the allegations of fact of the bill, alleges the following: prior
to the filing of the petition seeking the approval of the Railroad
Commission of the state to the consolidation of the railroads, the
officers of the companies had caused surveys to be made through the
Town of Pontotoc with the view to best serve the interest of the
people of that community in the location of the line of railroad
and the establishing of its depot in the town, and it became
apparent that it would be impossible to utilize that portion of the
narrow gauge line extending north about one mile from the depot.
This was submitted to the
Page 210 U. S. 191
people of the town, prior to the application for consolidation,
in a meeting called for that purpose, and, by an overwhelming
majority, the position taken by the officers of the companies was
acquiesced in and approved. Before the filing of the bill, the
companies had located and constructed their line as proposed at
such public meeting, had purchased a depot site and erected a
handsome and commodious depot on the site, into which it is now
operating a standard gauge road. And all of this done before the
filing of the bill.
The Railroad Commission made an order in the month of June,
1904, requiring the companies to build a depot on that part of the
line of the narrow gauge road since abandoned, and upon the old
site of the depot used by that road, and outside of the original
Town of Pontotoc, the enforcement of which was enjoined by the
United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi, which suit is now pending. The Commission is still
insisting upon the order and resisting the efforts of the companies
to enjoin its enforcement. Such order, it is alleged, is
inconsistent with the bill in this case.
The line of road now being constructed by the Gulf & Chicago
Railway Company from Decatur to Jackson is being constructed upon a
different scheme of grades from that upon which the narrow gauge
line was constructed, and necessarily adopted to enable the company
to transact its business with the least expense, and with the view
of enabling it to successfully meet the competition of other lines.
If the grades of the narrow gauge road had been adopted, it would
have been practically impossible for the railway company to operate
successfully, because of the heavy grades, and would have caused an
additional cost of construction of $90,000; would have lengthened
the road, increased the fixed charges of maintaining the property,
increased the cost of operation, and the cost to the company of
transacting all interstate commerce business from Mobile, Alabama,
to Tennessee.
By amendments subsequently made to the answer, it was alleged
that, when the consolidation of the companies was had,
Page 210 U. S. 192
it was the purpose (which was well known to the Railroad
Commission) of making the consolidated company a through trunk line
of railroad for interstate commerce and the transmission of the
mails, and that one of the vital objects to be attained was to
shorten the line in every way possible. It is further alleged that
a refusal to permit the execution of such purpose
"will impose unnecessary and unreasonable burdens upon the
interstate commerce, and will violate in letter and spirit § 8,
Article I, of the Constitution of the United States. And it is
alleged that the southern end of the old narrow gauge road line
runs into deep hollows and ends in a cluster of big hills which to
cut through would cause great expense and entail long delay; that
the line would thereby be lengthened, and it would he hampered and
prevented from doing an interstate business in successful
competition with other lines."
The case, on the petition of the railroads, was removed to the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the
Northern District of Mississippi, and was subsequently remanded to
the state court on motion of the defendants in error.
A temporary injunction was granted enjoining and commanding the
Mobile Company and the Gulf & Chicago Railway Company to
"absolutely refrain from constructing and operating a certain
line of railroad from Decatur, Mississippi, to Middleton,
Tennessee, or any other line of railroad from any point whatsoever
to any other point passing within three miles of the county seat of
Pontotoc County, Mississippi, as the said county seat was
originally laid out, marked, and established, without passing
through the said county seat."
Upon motion of the companies, and after proofs submitted, a
decree was entered dissolving the injunction, the decree reciting
that all of the relief prayed for by the bill could be obtained by
a mandatory injunction if the allegations of the bill should be
sustained upon the final hearing, and further reciting that
"the public interests of the county north and south of the Town
of Pontotoc, along the line of said railroad, as well as the
Page 210 U. S. 193
interests of the railroad, will suffer by reason of the
continuance of the temporary injunction."
All other questions were reserved until the final hearing.
The supreme court of the state reversed the decree, reinstated
the injunction, and remanded the case to the chancery court. 86
Miss. 172.
After a trial upon the merits, the chancery court entered a
decree making the injunction perpetual. The decree was affirmed by
the supreme court. 89 Miss. 724. Other facts will appear in the
opinion.
Page 210 U. S. 197
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant railroad companies, in their motion to dissolve
the temporary injunction, urged as grounds thereof, among others,
that the injunction imposed a direct and unnecessary burden upon,
and was an interference with, interstate commerce and an
interference with the carrying of United States mail. To those
grounds the court did not apparently respond, and the supreme court
did not refer to them in either of its opinions.
Counter-contentions are urged. Plaintiffs in error contend that
the federal questions set up by them were evaded. Defendants in
error contend that such questions were not involved, and are not
now presented for consideration.
The opinion of the supreme court on the first appeal was very
elaborate, and we can only give a brief summary of the propositions
decided. The court gives a summary of the facts of the bill, the
averments of the petition to the Commission, and the terms of its
order, and says that, "waiving minor considerations not
sufficiently developed by the proof," and "passing at once to the
very heart of the matter," the case divided into two main
branches:
"1. What is the true interpretation to be given § 187 of our
Constitution, and has it any application to the facts of this
litigation? 2. What are the legal rights of the citizens of the
Town of Pontotoc and the duties of the appellees as to the narrow
gauge road which was in use and active operation before and at the
consolidation hereinbefore referred to and at the date of the
leasing of its property by one appellee to the other? "
Page 210 U. S. 198
Under the first branch, the court decided that appellants
(defendants in error here) could, under the facts of the record, be
"afforded no relief by the language of intendment of § 187 of the
Constitution." This branch of the case therefore needs no further
consideration.
As elements in the discussion and decision of the second branch
of the case, the court said that had there been no consolidation
between the Gulf & Chicago Railroad Company and the Gulf &
Chicago Railway Company, and the latter company had constructed its
road over the route and in the direction specified in its
application for incorporation, it would inevitably have been a
parallel and competing line with the narrow gauge line then in
existence, and the consolidation of the roads would not have been
permitted. "More than this," it was said,
"an express grant of power by the legislature for the two
companies to consolidate . . . would have been void as being in
contravention of the general statutory inhibition against
consolidation or purchase of competing lines of railroads, which
cannot, without violating § 87 of the Constitution [of the state],
be suspended 'for the benefit of any individual or private
corporation or association.'"
And, to sustain this proposition,
Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co.
v. Southern Ry. Co., 83 Miss. 746, was cited. It was deduced
from § 3587 of the code of the state of 1892 that the statement in
the petition that the roads were "in no way parallel or competing
lines" were statements of jurisdictional facts "upon the existence
of which depended the power of the corporations to consolidate."
And, following
Lusby v. Railroad, 73 Miss. 364, the court
held that the Gulf & Chicago Railroad Company was without power
to abandon or relocate any portion of its line, "except on the
score of
imperious necessity'" -- an exception, it was said,
not suggested by the facts of this record. These restraints and
duties, it was further said, came to the consolidated
corporation.
On the return of the case to the chancery court, and after a
hearing on the merits, that court entered a decree making the
Page 210 U. S. 199
injunction perpetual. The decree recited that the court found
"as a fact" that a valid contract existed between the Gulf &
Chicago Railroad Company and the citizens of Pontotoc which
provided that the line of the railway of the company should be
established and maintained where the same was established and
maintained before the consolidation of that company with the other
companies, and that the town had not given its assent to the
abandonment of that line. The court further found "that no natural
obstacles or imperious necessity prevents the said defendant
companies from broadening and standardizing" the narrow gauge
road
"and making it a part of the main line of the proposed railroad,
and no such obstacles or necessity exist to prevent the said
companies from extending their said line from the southern terminus
of the said original line . . . , and that the allegations of the
bill have been sustained by the proof, and that the complainants
are entitled to the relief prayed for."
The supreme court affirmed the decree of the chancery court,
repeating, with some modifications, the principles which it
expressed on the first appeal of the case. It said that, in a
former opinion, the court expressly held that
"the consolidation was conditioned upon the broadening and
standardizing the then-existing narrow gauge railroad, and make it
a part of the main line of railroad operated by the consolidated
corporation."
And it was alone, it was further said, upon the compliance with
those conditions, that the Railroad Commission consented to the
consolidation, and without which the Commission would have had no
power to authorize the consolidation, and without which the
consolidation would not have been effected. So insistent was the
condition, the court held, in view of the fact that the roads would
otherwise be parallel and competing roads, that the legislature
could not relieve from it without violating § 87 of the
Constitution of the state.
The court expressed the law of the state to be that parallel and
competing roads could not consolidate, and that other roads could
only consolidate with the consent of the Railroad Commission. And
it was also said that the roads, recognizing
Page 210 U. S. 200
the law stated in their petition to the Commission
"that the railroads were 'in no way parallel or competing
lines,' and expressly pledged themselves to broaden and standardize
the then-existing narrow gauge railroad, and to make it a part of
the main line operated by the consolidated corporation. . . . And
it is upon this ground, and this ground alone, that we now hold
that the decree of the chancellor should be affirmed."
The court took pains to repeat this limitation. And, excluding
other questions, the court said that it had nothing to do with the
location of the depot, and that it dealt alone with the "obligation
entered into" by the companies with the Commission; "that only," to
quote the words of the court,
"is the core of this contention, and that, and that precisely,
is what we deal with and decide in this case -- to-wit, that these
appellants [plaintiffs in error here] are bound by their solemn
obligation, deliberately entered into, as stated above, to broaden
and standardize the narrow gauge railroad and to make it a part of
the main line."
We have made these full quotations from the opinions and decrees
of the state courts to clearly show what facts were found and what
principles of law laid down, that we might estimate the federal
questions which it is contended are involved in the case. We have
seen that the federal grounds invoked in the motion to dissolve the
temporary injunction were that the injunction imposed a direct and
unnecessary burden upon, and was an interference with, interstate
commerce, and was an interference with the carrying of the United
States mails. In the amended answer the same grounds were repeated
with more circumstantiality, and § 8, article 1, of the
Constitution of the United States, was invoked.
The same grounds were practically repeated in the assignment of
errors on the appeal to the supreme court of the state, and, in
addition, the provision of § 10, Article I, which prohibits any
state from impairing the obligation of a contract, was invoked on
the ground that the decree of the chancery court impaired
"the obligation of the contract right
Page 210 U. S. 201
to change the location of the narrow gauge road, embodied in § 8
of the charter of the Ripley Railroad, and in the articles of
organization of the Gulf & Chicago Railroad Company."
In the assignments of error in this Court, the plaintiffs in
error have, for the first time, invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. To sustain this assignment,
it is contended that the supreme court of the state, by directing
the consolidated company "to operate the spur track as soon as
completed, connecting the main line on the north with the Town of
Pontotoc," deprives plaintiffs in error of their property without
due process of law. And a like result is produced, it is also
contended, by the decision of the court holding the "Stegall bill,"
so called, to be invalid. The latter ground will be referred to
hereafter. Of the other, it is said, it arose for the first time
upon the decree and opinion of the supreme court, as it is further
said that the decree of the chancery court did not deny the rights
of the companies under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is difficult to
appreciate the contention. The decree of the chancery court
recited, among other things, that no natural obstacles existed to
prevent the companies from extending their line "from the southern
terminus" of the original line, and enjoined the companies from
building and operating any line that "did not include or comprise
the original line of the Gulf & Chicago Railroad Company, as
originally constructed and maintained," required them to broaden
and standardize the entire line of the original narrow gauge
railroad, and to construct their line of railway in such a way as
to include as part of the main line "all of the line of the narrow
gauge line." And it was commanded that the work commence within
thirty days and be finished within sixty days. The supreme court,
in its opinion, said:
"In view of the various interests here involved, we direct the
appellant to operate
the spur track as soon as completed,
connecting the main line on the north of the town of Pontotoc."
The court therefore accepted and approved what was already done,
and modified the decree of the chancery court in the interest
of
Page 210 U. S. 202
the companies. And it besides extended the time for compliance
with the decree from sixty days to six months. But, aside from
this, all of the contentions of the companies (except that based on
the "Stegall bill," which will be presently considered) depend upon
the power of the Commission, the petition of the companies, and the
order of the Commission upon the petition. And these, we think,
were all local questions, the decision of which we have no power to
review. There is nothing in the statutes or Constitution of the
United States which prevents a state from creating a board of
railroad commissioners, and what powers the board shall have will
depend upon the law creating them, of which the courts of the state
are the absolute interpreters. Whether corporations shall remain
separate or be permitted to consolidate is a matter of state
regulation and provision. It is competent also for a state to
prescribe the route of the railroad it creates, and to provide that
parallel and competing lines shall remain so. And this power was
exercised by the State of Mississippi. It is not exactly clear
whether this is disputed by the companies. It is, however,
contended that the Commission is a mere administrative agency, and
that its only real power or duty in the matter of consenting to
consolidations is to determine that such consolidations are not of
parallel or competing roads, and that the Commission has nothing
whatever to do with the terms of the consolidation. And it is
further contended that there was no agreement or contract of any
kind between the companies and the Commission, that the order of
the Commission was "merely an official finding that the two roads
came within the necessary statutory requirements," and that the
attempt of the supreme court to base its decision and decree upon
the ground that the petition and order constituted a contract
binding upon the plaintiffs in error was a "mere pretext, intended
to avoid the determination of the federal questions arising in the
case, and to place its decision on a nonfederal ground." We cannot
assent to this view. The power of the Commission and the effect of
its order were necessarily presented by the case.
Page 210 U. S. 203
They were grounds of suit. They became, therefore, the immediate
and primary questions to be decided. The power of the Commission
and the effect of its order, depended upon the statutes of the
state, and of them, as we have said, the supreme court is the
absolute interpreter. The matter is exceedingly simple, and is best
explained by the reference to the opinion of the supreme court of
the state. The court declared that the roads, but for their
consolidation, would have been parallel and competing roads, and,
in order to make their consolidation -- in order to give the
Commission power to consent to their consolidation -- the companies
represented that the roads were not parallel and competing. Of
course, they would not be if they were made parts of one line. And
it was represented that they would be made parts of one line -- to
be made so by the broadening of the narrow gauge road, not by its
abandonment in whole or in part. Upon this representation -- upon
this condition -- the consent of the Commission was invoked and
secured.
Much more discussion is unnecessary. It is enough to add to that
which we have said that the decree of the supreme court does not
work an interference with, or cast a direct burden upon, interstate
commerce. The case of the
Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Illinois, 163 U. S. 142;
Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U.
S. 514, and
Mississippi Railroad Commission v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 203 U. S. 335,
cited by the companies to sustain their contentions, are not
apposite. In those cases, there was an interference with interstate
trains for local purposes, though local needs had been adequately
supplied. In the case at bar, there is the insistence of the
operation of a particular road, which the companies themselves
selected or represented that they had selected. That compliance
will entail expense or require the exercise of eminent domain will
not make it a burden upon interstate commerce.
Wisconsin
&c. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287.
Besides, the comparative expense of roads we must assume was
considered when the petition to the Commission was made.
Page 210 U. S. 204
It is further contended by the companies that they had the
right, under § 8 of the charter of the Ripley Railroad Company, to
change the location of its line through the Town of Pontotoc, and
that the charter constitutes a contract which is impaired, it is
further urged, by the laws creating the Railroad Commission, as
interpreted by the supreme court of the state. Section 8 of the
charter provides that, for the purpose of making the railroad
provided for in § 2, "or repairing or changing it afterwards," the
railroad shall have rights of entering upon adjoining land, etc.,
upon making compensation to the owners. What power this section
confers may be open to dispute. It may be said that the right of
"repairing or changing" the railroad does not give the power to
abandon it. However, the supreme court did not pass upon the
meaning of § 8. The court said if that section gave the companies
the power to change the line of the narrow gauge road as they
desired, they waived it, and are estopped to revoke it by their
obtaining the consent of the state through its Railroad Commission
to broaden and standardize that line through its entire length.
This was a question for the supreme court to decide. It was fairly
presented to the court. We cannot question the motives of its
judgment; indeed we cannot say that we dissent from it. At any
rate, it is not reviewable.
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.
S. 361;
Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 176 U.
S. 550;
Hale v. Lewis, 181 U.
S. 473;
Schaefer v. Werling, 188 U.
S. 516.
The final contention of plaintiffs in error is based on the act
of the legislature of the state, called the "Stegall bill." This
act was passed after the decree of the chancery court, and it is
contended that it is an express legislative enactment which
approved the location by the Gulf & Chicago Railway Company, as
consolidated, of its railway through the Town of Pontotoc, and
authorized a continuance of the same on condition that it should
broaden and standardize the track into the old town and to the site
of the old station. These conditions, it is asserted, were
performed, and a contract was hence entered into between the state
and the railroad company, and that the
Page 210 U. S. 205
decision of the supreme court,
"denying the obligation of this contract, is either (a) a law
impairing the obligation of a contract; or (b) a denial to the
plaintiffs in error of the equal protection of the laws; or (c) the
taking of their property without due process of law, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."
The supreme court decided that the bill was unconstitutional,
saying:
"So far as the Stegall bill is concerned, it is perfectly
obvious, as already held in the former opinion, that this special
act, which was in substance for the benefit of this particular
corporation, was, under the general statute laws which we have just
referred to with respect to consolidation, palpably and manifestly
violative of § 87 of the Constitution, and plainly null and
void."
This conclusion is attacked, and our construction is invoked of
the constitutional provision against that made by the supreme court
of the state.
We are unable to yield to the appeal. It is only when the
judgment of a state court gives effect to a law subsequent to that
(or it may be a constitution) which it is alleged constitutes a
contract that we may review the judgment and decide the question of
contract. And this would involve the construction of the law. But
the record presents no such case. The "Stegall bill," it is true,
is claimed to be a contract, but its validity is not asserted
against a subsequent law. It is asserted against prior laws and the
Constitution. The decision of the court therefore was of that kind
that a court is often called to make under the laws and
Constitution of its state. To assert error in the decision, or even
to be able to demonstrate it, does not invest us with power of
review. Nor do the other supposed consequences of the decision of
the supreme court give us jurisdiction to review it. That it denies
the companies the equal protection of the law, we may say, is
without any foundation. No discrimination against them is pointed
out, and to say that the decision takes their property without due
process of law is only another way of saying that they had a
contract, the obligation of which is impaired. Of course,
Page 210 U. S. 206
they assert rights under the "Stegall bill," but in that they
present a very common case, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the state court.
Judgment affirmed.
