A libel of information, under the 9th section of the Slave Trade
Act of March 2, 1807, c. 77, alleging that the vessel sailed from
the ports of New York and Perth Amboy without the captain's having
delivered the manifests required by law to the collector or
surveyor of New York and Perth Amboy, is defective, the act
requiring the manifest to be delivered to the collector or a
surveyor of a single port.
Under the same section, the libel must charge the vessel to be
of the burden of forty tons or more. In general, it insufficient to
charge the offense in the words directing the forfeiture; but if
the words are general, embracing a whole class of individual
subjects, but must necessarily be so construed as to embrace only a
subdivision of that class, the allegation must conform to the
legislative sense and meaning.
Where the libel is so informal and defective that the court
cannot enter up a decree upon it, and the evidence discloses a case
of forfeiture, this Court will not amend the libel itself, but will
remand the cause to the court below with directions to permit it to
be amended.
This was an allegation of forfeiture in the court below against
the brig
Mary Ann for a violation of the Act of March 2,
1807, c. 77, prohibiting the importation of slaves into any port or
place within the jurisdiction of the United States from and after 1
January, 1808. The libel contained two counts. The first alleged
that the brig
Mary Ann, on 10 March, 1818, sailing
coastwise from a port in the United States, to-wit, the ports of
New York and Perth Amboy,
Page 21 U. S. 381
to a port or place within the jurisdiction of the same, to-wit,
the port of New Orleans, and having on board certain negroes,
mulattoes, or persons of color for the purpose of transporting them
to be sold or disposed of as slaves or to be held to service or
labor, to-wit, No. 1, Lydia, &c., did, laden and destined as
aforesaid, depart from the ports of New York and Perth Amboy, where
she then was, without the captain or commander having first made
out and subscribed duplicate manifests of every negro, mulatto, and
person of color, on board said brig
Mary Ann, and without
having previously delivered the same to the collectors or surveyors
of the ports of New York and Perth Amboy, and obtained a permit, in
manner as required by the act of Congress, in such case made and
provided, contrary to the form of said act. The second count was
for taking on board thirty-six negroes, mulattoes, or persons of
color previous to her arrival at her said port of destination,
contrary to the act, &c.
Page 21 U. S. 382
The court below condemned the vessel, as liable to forfeiture,
under the act referred to, and the claimant appealed to this
Court.
Page 21 U. S. 385
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court,
and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows:
Several objections have been made to the libel in this case. The
first is that it alleges the brig
Mary Ann to have sailed
from the ports of New York and Perth Amboy, without the captain's
having first made out and subscribed the duplicate manifests
required by law, and without his having previously delivered the
same to the collectors or surveyors of the ports of New York and
Perth Amboy, whereas the act of Congress directs the manifest to be
delivered to the collector or surveyor of a single port.
This objection is thought fatal. The libel either requires more
than the law requires, and charges, as the cause of forfeiture,
that the manifest was not delivered to the collectors or surveyors
of two ports, while the law directs that it should be delivered to
the collector or surveyor only of one, or it is too vague and
uncertain in not alleging with precision the port where the offense
was committed.
It is probable that the district attorney might be uncertain
whether the brig sailed from the port of Perth Amboy or of New
York; but this circumstance ought to produce no difficulty, since
the offense might have been laid singly in each port and charged
expressly in separate counts.
The second objection is this:
The libel charges that the manifest required by law was not made
out and delivered before the vessel sailed.
Page 21 U. S. 386
The counsel contends that a manifest was delivered, that this
charge is therefore disproved by the fact, and that if the
libellant would avail himself of any defects in the manifest, they
ought to be specified in the libel.
Whether a libel, charging generally that manifests have not been
made out and delivered as required by the act of Congress, would be
considered as sufficiently disproved by producing a manifest, not
strictly conformable to law, is a question which belongs certainly
to the merits of the cause and which would deserve consideration on
the inquiry, how far the defectiveness of the manifest was put in
issue by such a libel. But certainly no particular defect can be
alleged when there is no manifest, and of consequence the
allegation that the manifests required by law were not made out
would be sufficient on a demurrer. They are, of course, sufficient
for the present inquiry.
Another objection on which the Court has felt great difficulty
is that the libel does not state that the brig
Mary Ann
was "of the burden of forty tons or more."
The 9th section of the act of Congress on which this prosecution
was founded enacts that "the captain . . . of any ship or vessel,
of the burden of forty tons or more," and "sailing coastwise,"
&c.,
"having on board any negro . . . shall, previous to the
departure of such ship or vessel, make out and deliver duplicate
manifests. . . . And if any ship or vessel, being laden and
destined as aforesaid, shall depart from
Page 21 U. S. 387
the port where she may then be, without the captain, master, or
commander, having first made out and subscribed duplicate manifests
of every negro, mulatto, and person of color on board such ship or
vessel as aforesaid and without having previously delivered the
same to the said collector or surveyor, and obtained a permit, in
manner as herein required, . . . every such ship or vessel . . .
shall be forfeited to the use of the United States."
The first step in this inquiry respects the extent of the clause
of forfeiture. Does it comprehend vessels under forty tons
burden?
Although the language of the sentence is general, yet those
rules for construing statutes, which are dictated by good sense and
sanctioned by immemorial usage, which require that the intent of
the legislature shall have effect, which intent is to be collected
from the context, restrain, we think, the meaning of those terms to
vessels of the burden of forty tons and upwards.
The burden enters essentially into the description of those
vessels which can commit the offense prohibited by this section.
Only vessels of forty tons or more are directed to make out and
deliver the manifests prescribed by the act, and only such vessels
could obtain the permit. The whole provision must have been
intended for vessels of that burden only, or the words would have
been omitted. When, then, the act proceeds, after prescribing the
duty, to punish the violation of it, the words "any ship or vessel"
must be applied
Page 21 U. S. 388
to those ships or vessels only to which the duty had been
prescribed. We understand the clause in the same sense as if the
word "such" had been introduced.
The construction of this section may receive some illustration
from the 8th and the 10th.
The 8th section prohibits the commander of any ship or vessel of
less burden than forty tons to take on board any negro, mulatto, or
person of color for the purposes described in the 9th section on
penalty of forfeiting, for every such negro, &c., the sum of
$800. But no forfeiture of the vessel is inflicted in this section.
The words imposing forfeiture are "and if any ship or vessel, being
laden and destined as aforesaid." Now the preceding part of the
section, to which these words refer, is confined to vessels of
forty tons and more. The act proceeds, "shall depart . . . without
the commander having first made out, . . . duplicate manifests, as
aforesaid," showing that the general words, "any ship or vessel,"
meant those ships or vessels only which had been directed to make
out these manifests and without having obtained a permit "in manner
as herein prescribed." Now only a vessel of forty tons and more
could obtain the permit directed. The section proceeds to enact
that every such ship or vessel shall be forfeited, and the
commander thereof shall moreover forfeit, for every such negro,
&c., the sum of one thousand dollars.
It is perfectly clear that this pecuniary penalty is coextensive
with the forfeiture of the vessel. But it cannot extend to the
commanders of vessels
Page 21 U. S. 389
under forty tons, because the eighth section has inflicted on
the commanders of such vessels, for the same offense, the penalty
of $800.
The 10th section inflicts a penalty of $10,000 on the commander
who shall land negroes, &c., transported coastwise without
delivering to the collector the duplicate manifests prescribed by
the 9th section. This section was unquestionably intended to be
coextensive with the 9th, and is in terms confined to vessels of
the burden of forty tons or more.
We think that the legislature has inflicted forfeiture for the
failure to make out, subscribe, and deliver a manifest on those
vessels only which are directed to perform those acts -- that is,
only on vessels of the burden of forty tons or more.
The question then recurs is the omission to charge that the brig
Mary Ann was a vessel of the burden of forty tons or more
fatal to this libel?
It is in general true that it is sufficient for a libel to
charge the offense in the very words which direct the forfeiture,
but this proposition is not, we think, universally true. If the
words which describe the subject of the law are general, embracing
a whole class of individuals, but must necessarily be so construed
as to embrace only a subdivision of that class, we think the charge
in the libel ought to conform to the true sense and meaning of
those words as used by the legislature. In this case, if the brig
Mary Ann be a vessel under forty tons, her commander is
liable to a pecuniary penalty, but the court cannot pronounce
Page 21 U. S. 390
a sentence of forfeiture against her. If she be of the burden of
forty tons or more, the commander is liable to a heavier pecuniary
penalty, and the vessel is forfeited. The libel ought to inform the
court that the vessel is of that description which may incur
forfeiture.
We think, therefore, that the sentence of the District Court of
Louisiana must be reversed for these defects in the libel, but as
there is much reason to believe that the offense for which the
forfeiture is claimed has been committed, the cause is remanded to
the District Court of Louisiana, with directions to permit the
libel to be amended.
Decree reversed.
DECREE. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
record of the District Court of Louisiana, and was argued by
counsel. On consideration whereof this Court is of opinion, that
the libel filed in the said cause, is insufficient to sustain the
sentence pronounced by the district court, because it does not
state, with sufficient certainty, the port in which the offense
charged therein was committed, and because also it does not allege
that the brig
Mary Ann was of the burden of forty tons or
more. This Court is of opinion that the sentence of the District
Court of Louisiana, condemning the brig
Mary Ann, her
tackle, apparel, and furniture, as forfeited to the United States,
is erroneous, and doth reverse and annul the same, and this Court
doth further ADJUDGE, ORDER, and DECREE that the cause be
remanded
Page 21 U. S. 391
to the Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana,
with directions to allow the libel to be amended, and to take such
further proceedings in the said cause as law and justice may
require.