No demand of payment or notice of nonpayment by a notary public,
is necessary in the case of promissory notes. A protest is,
strictly speaking, evidence in the case of foreign bills of
exchange only.
But it is a principle that memorandums made by a person in the
ordinary course of his business of acts which his duty in such
business requires him to do for others are, in case of his death,
admissible evidence of acts so done.
A fortiori the acts
of a public officer are so admissible, though they may not be
strictly official, if they are according to general usage and the
ordinary course of his office.
Therefore the books of a notary public, proved to have been
regularly kept, are admissible in evidence after his decease to
prove a demand of payment, and notice of nonpayment of a promissory
note.
This was a suit brought by petition according to the course of
proceedings in Louisiana by Webb, the defendant in error, against
Nicholls, the plaintiff in error, upon a promissory note dated 15
January, 1819, made by one Fletcher for the sum of $4,880, payable
to the order of Nicholls at the Nashville Bank and endorsed by
Nicholls, by his agent, to Webb. The answer of the defendant below
denied such a demand and notice of nonpayment as were necessary to
render
Page 21 U. S. 327
him liable as endorser. At the trial, it appeared in evidence
that the note became due on 18 July, which was Sunday. The demand
of payment of the maker was made, and notice of nonpayment to the
endorser was given at the request of the plaintiff below by one
Washington Perkins, a notary public, who died before the trial. The
original protest was annexed to the plaintiff's petition and was
drawn up according to the usual formula of that instrument, stating
a demand and refusal of payment at the Nashville Bank on Saturday,
17 July, the 18th being Sunday, and that he, the notary, "duly
notified the endorsers of the nonpayment." The plaintiff offered
this protest, among other evidence, to support his cause, together
with the deposition of Sophia Perkins, the daughter of the notary.
This witness stated in her deposition that her father kept a
regular record of his notarial acts, and uniformly entered, in a
book kept by himself or caused the deponent to enter, exact copies
of the notes, bills, &c., which he protested, and in the margin
opposite to the copy of the protest made memorandums after
notification to endorsers, if any, of the fact of such notification
and the manner, and that his notarial records had been, ever since
his death, in the house where she lived. And to her deposition she
annexed, and verified as true, a copy of the protest in this case.
The copy of the protest stated the demand (as supposed by mistake)
to have been made on 19 instead of 17 July, 1819, and contained the
following memorandum on the margin:
Page 21 U. S. 328
"Endorser duly notified in writing 19 July, 1819, the last day
of grace being Sunday, the 18th. Washington Perkins." In other
respects the protest was in the same form with that annexed as the
original to the plaintiff's petition. The defendant below objected
to the admission of this protest and deposition in evidence, but
his objection was overruled by the court. Whereupon the defendant
excepted and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, upon
which the court, according to the usual practice in Louisiana,
ascertained the sum due and rendered judgment. The cause was then
brought by writ of error to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the District
Page 21 U. S. 329
Court of Louisiana. The suit was brought by Mr. Webb, as
endorsee, against Mr. Nicholls, as endorser of a promissory note,
dated 15 January, 1819, and made by Thomas H. Fletcher, for the sum
of $4,880, payable to Nicholls or order at the Nashville Bank and
endorsed by Nicholls by his agent to the plaintiff. The note became
due on 18 July, which being Sunday, the note, of course, was
payable on the preceding Saturday. The cause came on for trial upon
petition and answer according to the usual course of proceedings in
Louisiana, the answer setting up, among other things, a denial of
due demand and notice of nonpayment, and upon the trial the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The court thereupon
ascertained the sum due and entered judgment for the plaintiff
according to what is understood to be the usual practice of that
state.
Several questions have been argued at the bar which may be at
once laid out of the case since they do not arise upon the record,
and we may therefore, proceed to examine that alone upon which any
judgment was pronounced in the court below.
From the issue in the cause, the burden of proof of due demand
of payment and due notice of the nonpayment to Nicholls rested on
the plaintiff. It appears that the demand was made and notice given
at the request of the plaintiff by one Washington Perkins, a notary
public who died before the trial. The original protest was annexed
to the plaintiff's petition, and contained the usual
Page 21 U. S. 330
language in this instrument, stating a demand and refusal of
payment at the Nashville Bank on 17 July, the 18th being Sunday,
and that he, the notary, "duly notified the endorsers of the
nonpayment." Among other evidence to support the plaintiff's case,
he offered this protest, together with the deposition of Sophia
Perkins, the daughter of the notary. She stated in her deposition
that her father kept a regular record of his notarial acts, and
uniformly entered, in a book kept by himself, or caused the
deponent to do it, exact copies of the notes, bills, &c., and
in the margin opposite to the copy of the protest made memorandums
after notification to endorsers, if any, of the fact of such
notification, and the manner, and that his notarial records had
been, ever since his death, in the house where she lived. And to
her deposition she annexed and verified as true a copy of the
protest in this case. The copy of the protest states the demand
(most probably by mistake) to have been made on 19 instead of 17
July, 1819, and contains a memorandum on the margin: "Endorser duly
notified in writing 19 July, 1819, the last day of grace being
Sunday, the 18th. Washington Perkins." In other respects the
protest is the same in form as that annexed to the petition. To the
introduction of this deposition as well as of the protest as
evidence the defendant, Nicholls objected, and his objection was
overruled by the court and the papers were laid before the jury. A
bill of exceptions was taken to the decision of the court in so
admitting this evidence, and the sole
Page 21 U. S. 331
question now before us is whether that decision was right. What
that evidence might legally conduce to prove or what its effect
might be if properly admitted is not now a question before us. It
was left to the jury to draw such inferences of fact as it might
justly draw from it, and whether it was right or wrong in their
inferences we cannot now inquire.
It does not appear that by the laws of Tennessee a demand of the
payment of promissory notes is required to be made by a notary
public, or a protest made for nonpayment, or notice given by a
notary to the endorsers. And by the general commercial law it is
perfectly clear that the intervention of a notary is unnecessary in
these cases. The notarial protest is not, therefore, evidence of
itself, in chief, of the fact of demand, as it would be in cases of
foreign bills of exchange, and in strictness of law it is not an
official act. But, we all know that in point of fact notaries are
very commonly employed in this business, and in some of the states
it is a general usage so to protest all dishonored notes which are
lodged in or have been discounted by the bank. The practice has
doubtless grown up from a sense of its convenience and the just
confidence placed in men who, from their habits and character, are
likely to perform these important duties with punctuality and
accuracy. We may therefore safely take it to be true in this case
that the protesting of notes, if not strictly the duty of the
notary, was in conformity to general practice and was an employment
in which he was usually engaged. If
Page 21 U. S. 332
he had been alive at the trial, there is no question that the
protest could not have been given in evidence except with his
deposition or personal examination to support it. His death gives
rise to the question whether it is not, connected with other
evidence and particularly with that of his daughter, admissible
secondary evidence for the purpose of conducing to prove due demand
and notice.
*
The rules of evidence are of great importance, and cannot be
departed from without endangering private as well as public rights.
Courts of law are therefore extremely cautious in the introduction
of any new doctrines of evidence which trench upon old and
established principles. Still, however, it is obvious that as the
rules of evidence are founded upon general interest and
convenience, they must from time to time admit of modifications to
adapt them to the actual condition and business of men, or they
would work manifest injustice, and Lord Ellenborough has very
justly observed that they must expand according to the exigencies
of society.
Pritt v. Fairclough, 3 Camp. 305. The present
case affords a striking proof of the correctness of this remark.
Much of the business of the commercial world is done through the
medium of bills of exchange and promissory notes. The rules of law
require that
Page 21 U. S. 333
due notice and demand should be proved to charge the endorser.
What would be the consequence if in no instance secondary evidence
could be admitted of a nature like the present? It would materially
impair the negotiability and circulation of these important
facilities to commerce, since few persons would be disposed to risk
so much property upon the chance of a single life and the attempt
to multiply witnesses would be attended with serious inconveniences
and expenses. There is no doubt that upon the principles of law,
protests of foreign bills of exchange are admissible evidence of a
demand upon the drawee, and upon what foundation does this doctrine
rest but upon the usage of merchants and the universal convenience
of mankind? There is not even the plea of absolute necessity to
justify its introduction, since it is equally evidence whether the
notary be living or dead. The law indeed places a confidence in
public officers, but it is here extended to foreign officers acting
as the agents and instruments of private parties.
The general objection to evidence of the character of that now
before the Court is that it is in the nature of hearsay, and that
the party is deprived of the benefit of cross-examination. That
principle also applies to the case of foreign protests. But the
answer is that it is the best evidence the nature of the case
admits of. If the party is dead, we cannot have his personal
examination on oath, and the question then arises whether there
shall be a total failure of justice or secondary evidence shall be
admitted to prove
Page 21 U. S. 334
facts where ordinary prudence cannot guard us against the
effects of human mortality? Vast sums of money depend upon the
evidence of notaries and messengers of banks, and if their
memorandums in the ordinary discharge of their duty and employment
are not admissible in evidence after their death, the mischiefs
must be very extensive.
But how stand the authorities upon this subject? Do they as
inflexibly lay down the general rule as the objection seems to
imply? The written declarations of deceased persons and entries in
their books have been for a long time admitted as evidence upon the
general ground that they were made against the interest of the
parties. Of this nature are the entries made by receivers of money
charging themselves, rentals of parties, and bills of lading signed
by masters of vessels. More than a century ago it was decided that
the entries in the books of a tradesman made by a deceased shopman
were admissible as evidence of the delivery of the goods and of
other matters there stated within his own knowledge. So in an
action on a tailor's bill, a shop book was allowed as evidence, it
being proved that the servant who wrote the book was dead and that
this was his hand, and he was accustomed to make the entries. In
the case of
Higham v. Ridgeway, 10 East 109, it was held
that the entry of a midwife in his books, in the ordinary course of
his
Page 21 U. S. 335
business, of the birth of a child, accompanied by another entry
in his ledger of the charge for the service and a memorandum of
payment at a subsequent date, was admissible evidence of the time
of the birth. It is true that Lord Ellenborough, in giving his own
opinion, laid stress upon the circumstance that the entry admitting
payment was to the prejudice of the party, and therefore like the
case of a receiver. But this seems very artificial reasoning, and
could not apply to the original entry in the day book which was
made before payment, and even in the ledger the payment was alleged
to have been made six months after the service. So that in truth,
at the time of the entry, it was not against the party's interest.
And Mr. Justice Le Blanc, in the same case, after observing that he
did not mean to give any opinion as to the mere declarations or
entries of a midwife who is dead respecting the time of a person's
birth, being made in a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of
such a person, as it was not necessary then to determine that
question, significantly said, "I would not be bound at present to
say that they are not evidence."
In the recent case of
Hagedorn v. Reid, 3 Camp. 379, in
a suit on a policy of insurance where a license was necessary, the
original not being found, it was proved that it was the invariable
practice of the plaintiff's office, he being a policy broker, that
the clerk who copies any license sends it off by post and makes a
memorandum on the copy of his having done so, and a copy of the
license in question was produced from the plaintiff's letter book
in the handwriting
Page 21 U. S. 336
of a deceased clerk with a memorandum on it stating that the
original was sent to Doorman, and a witness, acquainted with the
plaintiff's mode of transacting business, swore that he had no
doubt the original was sent according to the statement in the
memorandum. Lord Ellenborough held this to be sufficient evidence
of the license. And in
Pritt v. Fairclough, 3 Camp. 305,
the same learned judge held that the entry of a copy of a letter in
the letter book of a party, made by a deceased clerk and sent to
the other party, was admissible in evidence, the letter book being
punctually kept, to prove the contents of the letter so sent. And
he observed on that occasion that if it were not so, there would be
no way in which the most careful merchant could prove the contents
of a letter after the death of his entering clerk. The case of
Welsh v. Barrett, which has been cited at the bar from the
Massachusetts Reports, is still more directly in point. It was
there held that the memorandums of a messenger of a bank, made in
the usual course of his employment, of demands on promisors and
notices to endorsers in respect to notes left for collection in the
bank, were, after his decease, admissible evidence to establish
such demands and notices. And the learned Chief Justice of the
court on that occasion went into an examination of the grounds of
the doctrine and put the very case of a notarial demand and protest
of notes, which had been suggested at the bar as a more correct
course, as not
Page 21 U. S. 337
distinguishable in principle, and liable to the same objections
as the evidence then before the court. We are entirely satisfied
with that decision, and think it is founded in good sense and
public convenience. We think it a safe principle that memorandums,
made by a person in the ordinary course of his business of acts or
matters which his duty in such business requires him to do for
others, in case of his death are admissible evidence of the acts
and matters so done. It is of course liable to be impugned by other
evidence and to be encountered by any presumptions or facts which
diminish its credibility or certainty.
A fortiori we think
the acts of a public officer, like a notary public, admissible,
although they may not be strictly official, if they are according
to the customary business of his office, since he acts as a sworn
officer and is clothed with public authority and confidence.
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that the evidence
excepted to in this case was rightly admitted. The variance between
the copy and the original protest as to the time of the demand
might have been explained to the satisfaction of the jury at the
trial, but it forms no ground upon which this Court is called upon
to express any opinion.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
* By the French law, inland bills of exchange and promissory
notes, as well as foreign bills, are required to be protested, and
the protest is the only evidence of demand and refusal of payment
and notice of nonpayment. Code de Commerce, liv. 1, tit. 8, art.
187, 175.