Under the Treaty of Paris of 1898, between the United States and
Spain, a Spanish resident of the Philippine Islands, who left there
in May, 1899, without making any declaration of intention to
preserve his allegiance to Spain and remained away until after the
expiration of eighteen months after the ratification of the treaty,
continued to be a Spaniard, and did not, even though he intended to
return, become a citizen of the islands under the new sovereignty,
and therefore is not eligible to admission to practice at the bar
under the rules established by the military and civil authorities
of the Philippine Islands.
The laws applicable to other foreigners referred to in Article
XIX of the treaty referred not to Spanish laws, but to the laws to
be enacted by the new sovereignty. Spaniards only became foreigners
after the cession.
The right to practice law is not property within the protection
of Article VII of the treaty.
1 Phil. 88 affirmed.
Plaintiff in error applied to the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands in February, 1901, to be admitted to practice
law in the Philippine courts. His petition was supported by various
certificates as to professional qualifications and good character,
and set forth that petitioner was a graduate of the University of
Manila, and practiced law in the Philippine Islands from 1892 until
the cessation of the Spanish courts;
"that he is of good character, and has not been inscribed in the
record of Spanish nationality, in consequence whereof I have lost
this, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, and
therefore I am neither a subject nor citizen of any foreign
government, and consequently, in my opinion, have the condition
required by General Order No. 29, July 19, 1899, of the United
States military government in these islands, for continuing the
practice of my profession."
July 27, 1901, the petition was denied by the Supreme Court,
without opinion, on the ground that the applicant "does not
Page 209 U. S. 92
possess the political qualifications required by law for the
practice of his profession in the Philippine Archipelago."
Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for rehearing,
accompanied by additional certificates and affidavits as to his
professional and personal reputation. In this petition he claimed
to be entitled to practice his profession under Article IX of the
Treaty of Paris and under § 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which had been enacted since the date of his first petition.
The petition for rehearing was denied by the court in an opinion
rendered by the Chief Justice, 1 Phil. 88, which held that
petitioner had not lost his Spanish nationality, but was a Spanish
subject upon an equal footing with other foreign residents who were
not entitled to practice the legal profession under the law, either
prior or subsequent to the Treaty of Paris.
In January, 1906, plaintiff in error presented to the court the
following motion:
"Appears Juan Garcia Bosque and asks that the honorable Supreme
Court be pleased to declare that the petitioner has a right to
practice as an attorney at law in the Philippines before all
courts. This motion is founded upon the accompanying
affidavit."
The affidavit referred to stated that the affiant, on April 10,
1899, and for eight years immediately prior thereto, had practiced
law continuously before the courts of the islands. The Supreme
Court overruled the motion, and thereupon plaintiff sued out this
writ of error.
Page 209 U. S. 95
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error contends: (1) that his right to practice law
in the Philippine Islands was expressly guaranteed by Article IX of
the Treaty of Paris and recognized by § 13
Page 209 U. S. 96
of the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure; (2) that the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands had no power, jurisdiction, or
authority to deny or deprive a lawyer of his right to practice his
profession, except for the reasons and in the manner provided in
the Civil Code; (3) that plaintiff in error's right so to practice
was a vested right, of which he could be deprived only by due
process of law.
Article IX of the Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1754, provided:
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain, by the present treaty, relinquishes or
cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove
therefrom, retaining, in either event, all their rights of
property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property
or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case
they remain in the territory, they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a
year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty,
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance, in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced
it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they may reside."
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by the Congress."
The record shows that plaintiff in error left the Philippines
for Europe on May 30, 1899, and remained away until January 11,
1901. In the affidavit accompanying his petition for rehearing, he
states that the reasons for his departure from the islands were the
unsettled conditions prevailing there and the state of his health;
that while abroad, he lived in France and Spain, residing for the
most part in Barcelona; that he did not return sooner to the
Philippines because of newspaper reports as to personal unsafety in
Manila. In his first petition, he
Page 209 U. S. 97
claims to have lost his Spanish nationality because he had not
made the necessary declaration of intention to preserve his
allegiance to Spain, but that requirement was meant only for those
who remained in the territory, and was not necessary in his case,
since he removed from the islands.
In the opinion of the Philippine Supreme Court, he carried his
Spanish nationality with him on his departure, and it could only be
lost by continuous residence in the islands and failure to declare
his intention of retaining it within the time specified. But
plaintiff was absent from the Philippines during the whole of the
period allowed for making such declaration, and remained away
several months after its expiration. It follows that he did not
become a citizen of the islands under the new sovereignty, but that
he continued to remain a Spaniard. The fact that he intended to
return does not affect this conclusion. It was not necessary, in
order to retain his Spanish nationality, that he should remain away
permanently, and he was absent for more than a year and a half.
The question whether aliens were permitted to practice law in
Spain and her colonies is elaborately argued, but it is quite
unnecessary to pass upon it, since it is manifest that the words in
Article IX of the treaty, "such laws as are applicable to other
foreigners," referred not to the Spanish law, but to the laws
enacted by the new sovereignty. Spaniards only became "foreigners"
after the cession of the islands, and it is obvious that the words
meant such laws as shall be applicable to other foreigners.
We think it evident that plaintiff, under the laws and
regulations on the subject put in force in the Philippines, first
by the military and then by the civil authorities, was not entitled
to the privilege which he sought.
On July 19, 1899, the military governor promulgated, in respect
to the admission of lawyers, certain regulations, known as "General
Orders No. 29, Series of 1899," § 2 of which provides as
follows:
"Any resident of the Philippine Islands,
not a subject
or
Page 209 U. S. 98
citizen of any foreign government, of the age of
twenty-three years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to
admission as attorney and counselor in all of the courts of these
islands."
By § 3, every applicant is required to produce satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character and to undergo a strict
examination in open court by the justices of the Supreme Court. If,
upon examination, he is found qualified, he shall be admitted to
practice in all the courts of the Philippine Islands, and a
certificate of the record of the court's order to that effect shall
be given him, which certificate shall be his license. (Sec. 4.)
Section 5 is as follows:
"Every resident of these islands,
not a citizen or subject
of any foreign government, who has been admitted to practice
law in the Supreme Court of the United States, or in any circuit
court of appeals, circuit court, or district court thereof, or in
the highest court of any state or territory of the United States,
may be admitted to practice in the courts of these islands upon the
production of his license. Likewise all persons duly accredited as
lawyers in the Philippine Islands on the 31st day of January, 1899,
who are residents of said islands,
and not subjects or citizens
of another government, may be admitted as attorneys and
counselors in all the courts of the islands:
Provided,
That all applicants under this section shall furnish satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and professional standing and take
the prescribed oath:
And provided further, That the court
may, if it deems advisable, examine the applicant as to his
qualifications."
Every person, upon admission, must take an oath of allegiance to
the United States. (Sec. 6.)
It is conceded that plaintiff did not become a member of the bar
under the provisions of this law.
General Orders No. 29 was followed by act No. 190 of the
Philippine Commission, being the Code of Civil Procedure for the
Philippine Islands (1 Pub. Laws, p. 378), § 13 of which is as
follows:
Page 209 U. S. 99
"The following persons,
if not specially declared
ineligible, are entitled to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands: "
"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders
of the islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United
States, and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar
of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Code."
"2. Those who are hereafter licensed in the manner herein
prescribed."
It will be perceived that the applicants must be "in good and
regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this Code." This
description does not apply to plaintiff in error. The Civil Code
was enacted August 7, 1901, to take effect September 1, 1901. He
had been denied permission to practice law by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on July 27, 1901, upon the ground that he did not
possess the political qualifications required by law. He was not,
therefore, at the date of the adoption of the Code, in good and
regular standing as a member of the bar.
It is true § 13 declares "those who have been duly licensed
under the laws and orders of the islands, under the sovereignty of
Spain," etc., are entitled to practice law, but that applies only
to persons "not specially declared ineligible;" and plaintiff in
error was declared ineligible because a citizen or subject of a
foreign government.
Reference may well be made in this connection to § 14 of the
act, which reads:
"Any resident of the Philippine Islands,
not a subject or
citizen of any foreign government, of the age of twenty-three
years, of good moral character, and who possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to admission as
a member of the bar of the islands, and to practice as such in all
their courts."
Section 19 provides for the admission without examination of any
resident,
not a citizen or subject of any foreign
government,
Page 209 U. S. 100
who has been admitted to practice in any of the courts of the
United States.
It seems clear from the provisions of General Orders No. 29, and
of the Code, that the intention was, and has been from the first,
to require all members of the bar to be either citizens of the
United States or those enjoying the status of natives of the
Philippines, and to exclude all foreigners from the legal
profession in the islands.
If it be conceded that plaintiff in error possessed the
privilege of practicing his profession in the islands at the time
Spain surrendered her sovereignty over them, the enjoyment of that
privilege ceased by virtue of the stipulations of the Treaty of
Paris and the subsequent laws and regulations of the new
sovereignty inconsistent therewith; and the effect of the decision
in the present instance was not to deprive plaintiff in error of
that privilege. Counsel for plaintiff in error cite various
sections of the Code which prescribe the grounds upon which a
lawyer may be deprived of the right to practice, but they relate to
the removal or suspension from the bar of attorneys already
practicing, and have no application to the case of one who has been
denied admission to practice at all.
The eighth article of the Treaty of Paris declares that the
cession of sovereignty "cannot in any respect impair the property
or rights which, by law, belong to the peaceful possession of
property of all kinds," etc., but that stipulation does not relate
to the rights connected with trades and professions. The word
"
propiedad" used in the Spanish text is defined by
Escriche as the right to enjoy and dispose freely of one's things
in so far as the laws do not prohibit it. 4 Escriche 736. The same
word appears in Article IX, providing that Spanish subjects may
retain, whether they remain or remove from the territory, "all
their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds." Clearly, the right to practice
law was not referred to as "property" there, and they are followed
by the words
"and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and professions,
Page 209 U. S. 101
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable
to other foreigners."
We concur with the conclusions of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and its judgment is
Affirmed.