While a broker who carries stocks for a customer on margin may
not be strictly a pledgee at common law, he is essentially a
pledgee and not the owner of the stock.
Markham v. Jaudon,
41 N.Y. 235, approved. Neither the right of the broker to repledge
stock carried on margin for a customer nor his right to sell such
stock for his protection when the margin is exhausted alters the
relation of the parties, is inconsistent with the customer's
ownership, or converts the broker into the owner of the stock.
Page 209 U. S. 366
A certificate of stock is not the property itself, but the
evidence of the property in the shares, and, as one share of stock
is not different in kind or quality from every other share of the
same issue and company, the return of a different certificate, or
the right to substitute one certificate for another of the same
number of shares, is not a material change in the property right
held by the broker for his customer.
A broker who turns over to a customer, upon demand and payment
of advances, stock which he is carrying on margin for that
customer, or certificates for an equal number of shares, does not
make the customer a preferred creditor within the meaning of §
60
a of the Bankrupt Law; in the absence of fraud or
preferential transfer the broker has the right to continue to use
his estate for the redemption of pledged stocks in order to comply
with the valid demand of a customer for stocks carried for him on
margin.
A payment by the broker to a customer on account of excess
margins to which the customer is entitled and which is taken into
consideration when the account is finally closed
held,
under the circumstances of this case, not to be a preferential
payment within the meaning of 60
a of the Bankrupt Law.
147 F. 659 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 209 U. S. 371
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes here upon a writ of certiorari to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
petitioner, Richardson, brought suit in the District Court of the
United States for the Southern District of New York as trustee in
bankruptcy of J. Francis Brown, against John M. Shaw and Alexander
Davidson, respondents, to recover certain alleged preferences.
Brown, the bankrupt, was a stockbroker transacting business in
Boston. The respondents, John M. Shaw and Alexander Davidson, were
partners and stockbrokers, transacting business in New York as John
M. Shaw & Company, and, as customers of Brown, they transacted
business with him on speculative account for the purchase and sale
of stocks on margin. The account was carried on in Brown's books in
the name of "Royal B. Young, Attorney," as agent of Shaw &
Company.
The transactions between Brown and Shaw & Company were
carried on for several months, from February to June, 1903. A debit
and credit account was opened February 10, when Shaw & Company
deposited with Brown $500 as margin, which was credited to them on
the account, and Brown purchased for them certain securities at a
cost of $3,987.50, which was charged to them on the account.
By agreement between the parties it was understood and agreed
that all securities carried in the account or deposited to secure
the same might be carried in Brown's general loans and might be
sold or bought at public or private sale, without notice, if Brown
deemed such sale or purchase necessary for his protection. On the
accounts rendered by Brown, the following memorandum was
printed:
"It is understood and agreed that all securities carried in this
account or deposited to secure the same may be carried in our
general loans and may be sold or bought at public or private sale,
without notice, when such sale or purchase is deemed necessary by
us for our protection. "
Page 209 U. S. 372
Until the account was closed, on June 26, 1903, Shaw &
Company from time to time paid to Brown various other sums of money
as margins, which were credited to them. They also transferred to
him various securities as margins in place of cash. They were
charged with interest upon the gross amount of the purchase price,
and credited with interest upon the margins they had deposited with
Brown. If at any time the total amount of margins in securities or
money exceeded ten percent, they had the right to withdraw the
excess. Brown was at no time left with a margin less than ten
percent. Shaw & Company kept a "liberal margin," at times
rising to twenty-three and a half percent
According to the agreement, the securities carried in this
account or deposited to secure the same might be carried in Brown's
general loans, and such securities were so pledged by him, and
Young, as agent of Shaw & Company, was informed of the fact.
The stocks were figured at the market price every day and
statements rendered to Young.
The bankrupt, Brown, transacted much of his general business
with Brown, Riley & Company, of Boston. He pledged his general
securities with that company.
On June 24, 1903, Young, the agent of Shaw & Company, as
above stated, learned of Brown's precarious financial condition,
and demanded payment of $5,000 cash from Brown's agent, Fletcher.
At that time the margins already paid by Shaw & Company
exceeded the agreed ten percent, and Fletcher returned to them
$5,000 of such margin.
On the following day, June 25, Young demanded a final settlement
from Brown. At that time, Brown was insolvent within the meaning of
the Bankrupt Law, and had been for the two preceding months. On
June 26, the liquidation of this account was effected as follows:
Brown, the bankrupt, indorsed to Brown, Riley & Company a note
of $5,000, made by one of his debtors, and gave them a check for
$1,200, thereby increasing his margin on the general loan, and
agreed that $10,664.13 should be charged against his margin and
credited
Page 209 U. S. 373
to Shaw & Company, and a check was given by them, through
the Beacon Trust Company, to the order of Brown, Riley &
Company, for $34,919.62, and the securities to the value of
$45,583.75 were turned over to them. None of the certificates of
stock which Brown delivered to Shaw & Company were the
identical certificates which they had delivered to Brown as margin.
Two certain bonds, known as the "Shannon bonds," had been deposited
with Brown.
Among the creditors (customers) of Brown on the final day of
settlement there were a number of general customers upon
transactions in purchase and sale of stocks by Brown as broker,
similar to the transactions in the purchase and sale of stocks by
Brown as broker for Shaw & Company.
On July 27, 1903, Brown made an assignment, and was adjudicated
a bankrupt within four months, and petitioner in this case, Henry
Arnold Richardson, was elected trustee.
It was conceded by plaintiff's counsel that it was the custom of
the market to deliver shares from broker to customer of the same
amount without regard to whether they were the identical shares
received.
This suit was brought to recover the $5,000 paid to Shaw &
Company June 24, 1903, which sum, it is alleged, was paid to them
as excessive margins, and, it is alleged, enabled them to obtain a
preference as one of the creditors of Brown. The second cause of
action in the suit states that Shaw & Company are indebted to
Brown's estate in the sum of $10,664.13, being the amount he
transferred for their benefit, as above set forth.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, he requested to go to the
jury upon the issue of defendants' knowledge of Brown's insolvency.
The court held that no preference was shown, and directed a verdict
for defendants. The judgment was affirmed. 147 F. 659, 665.
The ground on which the counsel for the petitioner predicates
the alleged preferences in this case is that, when the stockbroker
Brown was approached for the settlement of the transactions
Page 209 U. S. 374
with Shaw & Company, being insolvent and dealing with
several customers, as to each of whom he had pledged the stocks
carried for them, and, under the understanding of the parties,
being under obligation to each of them to redeem the stocks from
the loan for which they were pledged, this obligation created a
right of demanding the pledged stocks and securities on the part of
each of the customers, which put the broker in the debtor class and
the customers into the creditor class, so that, if the broker used
his assets to carry out such obligation to a particular customer,
whereby the latter was able to redeem his stock from such pledge
upon payment only of the amount of his indebtedness to the broker,
with the result that the broker could not carry out similar
obligations to other customers in like situation, a preference is
created under § 60 of the Bankrupt Act, and this, says the learned
counsel in his brief, under any theory concerning the relation of
broker and customer, is "the main proposition upon which we hang
our appeal."
This case therefore requires an examination of the relations of
customer and broker under the circumstances disclosed in this
record; at least, so far as it is necessary to determine the
question of preference in bankruptcy upon which the case turns.
There has been much discussion upon this subject in the courts of
the Union. The leading case, and one most frequently cited and
followed, is
Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235 -- a case
which was argued by eminent counsel and held over a term for
consideration. The opinion in the case is by Chief Judge Hunt,
afterwards Mr. Justice Hunt of this Court. He summarized the
conclusions of the court as follows:
"The broker undertakes and agrees:"
"1. At once to buy for the customer the stocks indicated."
"2. To advance all the money required for the purchase beyond
the ten percent furnished by the customer."
"3. To carry or hold such stocks for the benefit of the customer
so long as the margin of ten percent is kept good, or
Page 209 U. S. 375
until notice is given by either party that the transaction must
be closed. An appreciation in the value of the stocks is the gain
of the customer, and not of the broker."
"4. At all times to have, in his name and under his control,
ready for delivery, the shares purchased, or an equal amount of
other shares of the same stock."
"5. To deliver such shares to the customer when required by him,
upon the receipt of the advances and commissions accruing to the
broker; or,"
"6. To sell such shares, upon the order of the customer, upon
payment of the like sums to him, and account to the customer for
the proceeds of such sale."
"Under this contract the customer undertakes--"
"1. To pay a margin of ten percent on the current market value
of the shares."
"2. To keep good such margin according to the fluctuations of
the market."
"3. To take the shares so purchased on his order whenever
required by the broker, and to pay the difference between the
percentage advanced by him and the amount paid therefor by the
broker."
"The position of the broker is two-fold. Upon the order of the
customer, he purchases the shares of stocks desired by him. This is
a clear act of agency. To complete the purchase, he advances from
his own funds, for the benefit of the customer, ninety percent of
the purchase money. Quite as clearly he does not, in this, act as
an agent, but assumes a new position. He also holds or carries the
stock for the benefit of the purchaser until a sale is made by the
order of the purchaser or upon his own action. In thus holding or
carrying, he stands also upon a different ground from that of a
broker or agent whose office is simply to buy and sell. To advance
money for the purchase, and to hold and carry stocks, is not the
act of a broker as such. In so doing, he enters upon a new duty,
obtains other rights, and is subject to additional
responsibilities. . . . In my judgment, the contract between the
parties to this action
Page 209 U. S. 376
was, in spirit and in effect, if not technically and in form, a
contract of pledge."
The case had been approved in other cases in New York, some of
which are:
Stewart v. Drake, 16 N.Y. 449;
Stenton v.
Jerome, 54 N.Y. 480;
Baker v. Drake, 66 N.Y. 518;
Gruman v. Smith, 81 N.Y. 25;
Gillett v. Whiting,
120 N.Y. 402;
Content v. Banner, 184 N.Y. 121;
Douglas
v. Carpenter, 17 App.Div. 329. And approved in other states:
Cashman v. Root, 89 Cal. 373;
Brewster v. Van
Liew, 119 Ill. 554;
Gilpin v. Howell, 5 Pa. 41;
Wynkoop v. Seal, 64 Pa. 361;
Esser v. Linderman,
71 Pa. 76.
The subject was fully considered in a case which leaves nothing
to be added to the discussion,
Skiff v. Stoddard, 63
Conn.198, in which the conclusions in
Markham v. Jaudon
were adopted and approved. These views have been very generally
accepted as settled law by the text writers on the subject. 1 Dos
Passos on Stockbrokers (2d ed.) 179-200; Jones, Pledges, § 496;
Mechem, Agency, § 936.
Mr. Jones, in his Work on Pledges, § 496, summarizes the law as
follows:
"The broker acts in a threefold relation: first, in purchasing
the stock, he is an agent; then, in advancing money for the
purchase, he becomes a creditor, and finally, in holding the stock
to secure the advances made, he becomes a pledgee of it. It does
not matter that the actual possession of the stock was never in the
customer. The form of a delivery of the stock to the customer, and
a redelivery by him to the broker, would have constituted a strict,
formal pledge. But this delivery and redelivery would leave the
parties in precisely the same situation they are in when, waiving
this formality, the broker retains the certificates as security for
the advances."
In Dos Passos on Stockbrokers at page 114, the author says:
"Upon the whole, while it must be conceded that there are
apparently some incongruous features in the relation, there seems
to be neither difficulty nor hardship in holding that a stockbroker
is a pledgee, for, although it is true that he may advance all or
the greater part of the
Page 209 U. S. 377
money embraced in the speculation, if he acts honestly,
faithfully, and prudently, the entire risk is upon the client. . .
. To introduce a different rule would give opportunities for sharp
practices and frauds, which the law should not invite."
The rule thus established by the courts of the state where such
transactions are the most numerous, and which has long been adopted
and generally followed as a settled rule of law, should not be
lightly disturbed, and an examination of the cases and the
principles upon which they rest leads us to the conclusion that in
no just sense can the broker be held to be the owner of the shares
of stock which he purchases and carries for his customer. While we
recognize that the courts of Massachusetts have reached a different
conclusion, and hold that the broker is the owner, carrying the
shares upon a conditional contract of sale, and, while entertaining
the greatest respect for the Supreme Judicial Court of that state,
we cannot accept its conclusion as to the relation of broker and
customer under the circumstances developed in this case. We say
this, recognizing the difficulties which can be pointed out in the
application of either rule.
At the inception of the contract, it is the customer who wishes
to purchase stocks, and he procures the broker to buy on his
account. As was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court
in
Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193,
129 U. S. 198,
a broker is but an agent and is bound to follow the directions of
his principal, or give notice that he declines the agency.
The dividends on the securities belong to the customer. The
customer pays interest upon the purchase price, and is credited
with interest upon the margins deposited. He has the right at any
time to withdraw his excess over ten percent deposited as margin
with the broker. Upon settlement of the account, he receives the
securities. In this case, the broker assumed to pledge the stocks
not because he was the owner thereof, but because, by the terms of
the contract, printed upon every statement of account, he obtained
the right from the customer to pledge the securities upon general
loans, and in like
Page 209 U. S. 378
manner he secured the privilege of selling when necessary for
his protection.
The risk of the venture is entirely upon the customer. He
profits if it succeeds; he loses if it fails. The broker gets out
of the transaction, when closed in accordance with the
understanding of the parties, his commission and interest upon the
advances, and nothing else. That such was the arrangement between
the parties is shown in the testimony of the broker's agent, who
testified: "If these stocks carried for J.M. Shaw & Company
made a profit, that profit belongs to Shaw & Company over and
above what he owed us."
When Young, the agent of Shaw & Company, demanded the
stocks, their right of ownership in them was recognized, and, while
pledged, they were under the control of the broker, were promptly
redeemed, and turned over to the customer. Consistently with the
terms of the contract, as understood by both parties, the broker
could not have declined to thus redeem and turn over the stock,
and, when adjudicated a bankrupt, his trustee had no better rights,
in the absence of fraud or preferential transfer, than the bankrupt
himself.
Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.
S. 415,
206 U. S. 423;
Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516,
196 U. S. 526;
Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S. 91;
York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.
S. 344,
201 U. S.
352.
It is objected to this view of the relation of customer and
broker that the broker was not obliged to return the very stocks
pledged, but might substitute other certificates for those received
by him, and that this is inconsistent with ownership on the part of
the customer, and shows a proprietary interest of the broker in the
shares; but this contention loses sight of the fact that the
certificate of shares of stock is not the property itself, it is
but the evidence of property in the shares. The certificate, as the
term implies, but certifies the ownership of the property and
rights in the corporation represented by the number of shares
named.
A certificate of the same number of shares, although printed
upon different paper and bearing a different number, represents
Page 209 U. S. 379
precisely the same kind and value of property as does another
certificate for a like number of shares of stock in the same
corporation. It is a misconception of the nature of the certificate
to say that a return of a different certificate or the right to
substitute one certificate for another is a material change in the
property right held by the broker for the customer.
Horton v.
Morgan, 19 N.Y. 170;
Taussig v. Hart, 28 N.Y. 425;
Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 218. As was said by the
Court of Appeals of New York in
Caswell v. Putnam, 120
N.Y. 153, 157,
"one share of stock is not different in kind or value from every
other share of the same issue and company. They are unlike distinct
articles of personal property which differ in kind and value, such
as a horse, wagon, or harness. The stock has no earmark which
distinguishes one share from another, so as to give it any
additional value or importance; like grain of a uniform quality,
one bushel is of the same kind and value as another."
Nor is the right to repledge inconsistent with ownership of the
stock in the customer.
Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 216,
219;
Ogden v. Lathrop, 65 N.Y. 158. It was obtained in the
present case by a contract specifically made, and did not affect
the right of the customer, upon settlement of the accounts, to
require of the broker the redemption of the shares and their return
in kind.
It is true that the right to sell for the broker's protection,
which was not exercised in this case, presents more difficulty, and
is one of the incongruities in the recognition of ownership in the
customer; nevertheless it does not change the essential relations
of the parties, and certainly does not convert the broker into what
he never intended to be and for which he assumes no risk, and takes
no responsibility in the purchase and carrying of shares of
stock.
The broker cannot be converted into an owner without a
perversion of the understanding of the parties, as was pertinently
observed in the very able discussion already referred to in
Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 216:
"So long as the
Page 209 U. S. 380
interpretation of the contract preserves as its distinctive
feature the principal proposition that the customer purchases
merely the right to have delivery to him in the future at his
option, of stocks or securities at the price of the day of the
agreement, and its corollary that the customer derives no right,
title, or interest in the stocks or securities until final
performance, the difficulties in the way of harmonizing the
situation are bound to exist. The fundamental difficulty grows out
of the necessary attempt in some way to transform the customer, who
enjoys all the incidents and assumes all the risks of ownership,
into a person who in fact has no right, title, or interest, and to
create out of the broker, who enjoys none of the incidents of
ownership, and assumes not a particle of its responsibility, a
person clothed with a full title and an absolute ownership."
We reach the conclusion, therefore, that, although the broker
may not be strictly a pledgee, as understood at common law, he is
essentially a pledgee, and not the owner, of the stock, and turning
it over upon demand to the customer does not create the relation of
a preferred creditor within the meaning of the Bankrupt Law.
We cannot consent to the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the insolvency of the broker at once converts
every customer having the right to demand pledged stocks into a
creditor who becomes a preferred creditor when the contract with
him is kept and the stocks are redeemed and turned over to him.
In the absence of fraud or preferential transfer to a creditor,
the broker had a right to continue to use his estate for the
redemption of the pledged stocks. As this Court said in
Cook v.
Tullis, 18 Wall. 332,
85 U. S.
340:
"There is nothing in the Bankrupt Act, either in its language or
object, which prevents an insolvent from dealing with his property,
selling or exchanging it for other property at any time before
proceedings in bankruptcy are taken by or against him, provided
such dealings be conducted without any purpose
Page 209 U. S. 381
to defraud or delay his creditors or give preference to anyone,
and does not impair the value of his estate. An insolvent is not
bound, in the misfortune of his insolvency, to abandon all dealing
with his property; his creditors can only complain if he waste his
estate or give preference in its disposition to one over another.
His dealing will stand if it leave his estate in as good plight and
condition as previously."
The Bankrupt Act, in § 60
a, provides:
"A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being
insolvent, he has, within four months before the filing of the
petition, or after the filing of the petition and before the
adjudication, procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against
himself in favor of any person, or made a transfer of any of his
property, and the effect of the enforcement of such judgment or
transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of
the same class."
A creditor is defined to include anyone who owns a demand or
claim provable in bankruptcy. Sec. 1, sub. 9, Bankruptcy Act 1898,
3 U.S.Comp.St. 3419. It is essential, therefore, in order to set
aside the alleged preference, that Shaw & Company, at the time
of the transfer, should have stood in the relation of creditor to
the bankrupt. Of course, if the New York rule based upon
Markham v. Jaudon is correct, and the broker was the
pledgee of the customer's stock, there can be no question that, in
redeeming these stocks for the purpose of satisfying the pledge, no
preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy Act resulted.
In our view, we think no different result is reached, so far as
a preference in bankruptcy is concerned, if the Massachusetts cases
could be taken to lay down the correct rule of the relations
between broker and customer.
That rule is said to have its origin in
Wood v. Hayes,
15 Gray, 375, decided in 1860, in which the opinion, though by
Chief Justice Shaw, is very brief. It was therein held that the
broker was a holder of the shares upon conditional contract
Page 209 U. S. 382
to deliver them to the customer upon the payment of so much
money, and, until the money was paid, the right to have performance
did not accrue.
In
Covell v. Lound, 135 Mass. 41, the right of the
broker was considered after the customer had refused to pay the
necessary margin, and after the customer had requested the broker
to do the best he could for him and to sell the stock at the
broker's board without notice, and it was held that, under such
circumstances the broker was not liable for conversion.
In
Weston v. Jordan, 168 Mass. 401, the question was as
to the relation between customer and broker after the broker had
parted with the shares after repeated demands by the customer and
refusal by the broker to deliver the shares, and it was held that a
valid cause of action arose in favor of the customer, whether for
breach of contract or for conversion it matters not.
In
Chase v. Boston, 180 Mass. 459, the opinion is by
Chief Justice Holmes, and the question directly decided is whether
a broker who held shares of stock in his own name, and which he
carried for his customer on margin, was required to pay a city tax
upon the value. It was held that he was. In that case, the learned
justice said:
"No doubt, whichever view be taken, there will be anomalies, and
no doubt it is possible to read into either a sufficient number of
implied understandings to make it consistent with itself. Purchases
on margin certainly retain some of the characteristics of ordinary
single purchases by an gent, out of which they grew. The broker
buys and is expected to buy stock from third persons to the amount
of the order.
Rothschild v. Brookman, 5 Bligh (N.R.) 165;
Taussig v. Hart, 58 N.Y. 425. He charges his customer a
commission. He credits him with dividends and charges him with
assessments on stock. However the transaction is closed, the profit
or loss is the customer's. But none of these features is
decisive."
And while the rule dating back to the decision of Chief Justice
Shaw in 15 Gray was recognized as the law of Massachusetts,
Page 209 U. S. 383
there is nothing in the case decisive of the question now before
us.
The case most relied upon as showing the preference is
Weston v. Jordan, supra. It was held in that case that
Wheatland, the broker (Weston was his assignee in insolvency) had
become a debtor to the customer Jordan, having parted with the
control of the shares and substituting none others for them after
repeated demands for them by the customer. And it was held that,
when the insolvent broker went into the street and bought that kind
of stocks with his own money, and the customer took the stocks,
knowing of such purchase, the transaction amounted to a preference,
and in course of the discussion, Mr. Justice Allen, referring to
the contention of counsel that the Massachusetts rule should be
reconsidered in view of the rules adopted in New York and other
states, said:
"The defendant seeks to have these decisions reconsidered; but
the facts of the present case do not call for such reconsideration
of the general doctrine. Even if, at the outset, Jordan were to be
deemed a pledgor and Wheatland a pledgee of the shares, that
relation was changed by what happened afterwards. . . . After
Wheatland had parted with the control of the shares, and
after
repeated demands for them by Jordan and refusals by Wheatland to
deliver them, Jordan had a valid ground of action against
Wheatland, either for breach of contract or for a conversion, it
matters not which."
The facts in the present case are entirely different from those
disclosed in the case just cited. In the present case, there was no
demand for the return of the stocks which was refused by the
broker; but, recognizing the obligation of the contract, when the
stocks were demanded the broker proceeded to redeem them from the
pledge which he had made of them under the right given by the
contract between the parties, and turned them over to the customer.
In such case, the relation of debtor and creditor did not arise as
it might upon the refusal, as in
Weston v. Jordan, to turn
over the stocks upon demand.
Page 209 U. S. 384
After an examination of the Massachusetts cases, Judge Lowell
held in
In re Swift, 105 F. 493, while following the
Massachusetts rule as between broker and customer, that no cause of
action arose until after demand by the customer. And the same view
was taken in the same case upon review in the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in an opinion by Judge Putnam, 112 F. 315. While
both courts held that, under the law as defined in the
Massachusetts cases, bankruptcy excused demand, they held that the
customer did not become a creditor upon insolvency, but only after
demand and refusal or its equivalent.
How then stood the parties at the time of the demand for the
return of these shares of stock? They were held upon a contract
which required the broker, upon demand, to turn over the shares
purchased, or similar shares, to the customer upon payment of
advancements, interest, and commissions. These stocks were redeemed
and turned over to him; as a consequence, the relation of debtor
and creditor as between the broker and customer did not arise.
Upon the principles heretofore discussed, we think the payment
of the $5,000 on June 24 was not a preferential payment to a
creditor. The customer had demanded settlement, the broker had paid
the $5,000, and on the following day this sum was taken into
account in settling the account before turning over to the customer
the stock belonging to him, according to the understanding of the
parties.
We find no error in the judgment of the court of appeals, and
the same is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES:
If I had been left to decide this case alone, I should have
adhered to the opinion which, upon authority and conviction, I
helped to enforce in another place. I have submitted a memorandum
of the reasons that prevailed in my mind to my brethren, and, as it
has not convinced them, I presume that
Page 209 U. S. 385
I am wrong. I suppose that it is possible to say that, after a
purchase of stock is announced to a customer, he becomes an
equitable tenant in common of all the stock of that kind in the
broker's hands; that the broker's powers of disposition, extensive
as they are, are subject to the duty to keep stock enough on hand
to satisfy his customers' claims, and that the nature of the stock
identifies the fund as fully as a grain elevator identifies the
grain for which receipts are out. It would seem to follow that the
customer would have a right to demand his stock of the trustee
himself, as well as to receive it from the bankrupt, on paying
whatever remained to be paid. A just deference to the views of my
brethren prevents my dissenting from the conclusion reached,
although I cannot but feel a lingering doubt.