It is too late to raise the federal question on motion for
rehearing in the state court unless that court entertains the
motion and expressly passes on the federal question.
While aliens are ordinarily permitted to resort to our courts
for redress of wrongs and protection of rights, the removal of
property to another jurisdiction for adjustment of claims against
it is a matter of comity, and not of absolute right, and, in the
absence of treaty stipulations, it is within the power of a state
to determine its policy in regard thereto.
The refusal by a state to exercise comity in such manner as
would impair the rights of local creditors by removing a fund to a
foreign jurisdiction for administration does not deprive a foreign
creditor of his property without due process of law or deny to him
the equal protection of the law, and so held as to a judgment of
the highest court of Wisconsin holding the attachment of a citizen
of that state superior to an earlier attachment of a foreign
creditor.
While the treaty of 1828 with Prussia has been recognized as
being still in force by both the United States and the German
Empire, there is nothing therein undertaking to change the rule of
national comity that permits a country to first protect the rights
of its own citizens in local property before permitting it to be
taken out of its jurisdiction for administration in favor of
creditors beyond its borders.
127 Wis. 676 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 208 U. S. 574
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Disconto Gesellschaft, a banking corporation of Berlin,
Germany, began an action in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin, on August 17, 1901, against Gerhard Terlinden and at the
same time garnisheed the First National Bank of Milwaukee. The bank
appeared and admitted an indebtedness to Terlinden of $6,420. The
defendant in error Umbreit intervened and filed an answer, and
later an amended answer.
A reply was filed taking issue upon certain allegations of the
answer, and a trial was had in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee
County in which the court found the following facts:
"That on the seventeenth day of August, 1901, the above-named
plaintiff, the Disconto Gesellschaft, commenced an action in
Page 208 U. S. 575
this court against the above-named defendant, Gerhard Terlinden,
for the recovery of damages sustained by the tort of the said
defendant, committed in the month of May, 1901; that said defendant
appeared in said action by A.C. Umbreit, his attorney, on August
19, 1901, and answered the plaintiff's complaint; that thereafter
such proceedings were had in said action that judgment was duly
given on February 19, 1904, in favor of said plaintiff, Disconto
Gesellschaft, and against said defendant, Terlinden, for $94,
145.11 damages and costs; that $85,371.49, with interest from March
26, 1904, is now due and unpaid thereon; that, at the time of the
commencement of said action, to-wit, on August 17, 1901, process in
garnishment was served on the above-named garnishee, First National
Bank of Milwaukee, as garnishee of the defendant Terlinden."
"That, on August 9, 1901, and on August 14, 1901, a person
giving his name as Theodore Grafe deposited in said First National
Bank of Milwaukee the equivalent of German money aggregating
$6,420.00 to his credit upon account; that said sum has remained in
said bank ever since, and, at the date hereof, with interest
accrued thereon, amounted to $6,969.47."
"That the defendant Gerhard Terlinden and said Theodore Grafe,
mentioned in the finding, are identical and the same person."
"That the interpleaded defendant, Augustus C. Umbreit, on March
21, 1904, commenced an action in this Court against the defendant
Terlinden for recovery for services rendered between August 16,
1901, and February 1, 1903; that no personal service of the summons
therein was had on the said defendant; that said summons was served
by publication only, and without the mailing of a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to said defendant; that said defendant
did not appear therein; that, on June 11, 1904, judgment was given
in said action by default in favor of said Augustus C. Umbreit and
against said defendant Terlinden for $7,500 damages, no part
whereof has been paid; that, at the time of the commencement of
said action, process of garnishment was served, to-wit, on March
22,
Page 208 U. S. 576
1904, on the garnishee, First National Bank of Milwaukee, as
garnishee of said defendant Terlinden."
"That the defendant Terlinden at all the times set forth in
finding No. 1 was and still is a resident of Germany; that, about
July 11, 1901, he absconded from Germany and came to the State of
Wisconsin and assumed the name of Theodore Grafe; that, on August
16, 1901, he was apprehended as a fugitive from justice upon
extradition proceedings duly instituted against him, and was
thereupon extradited to Germany."
"That the above-named plaintiff, the Disconto Gesellschaft at
all the times set forth in the findings was, ever since has been,
and still is, a foreign corporation, to-wit, of Germany, and during
all said time had its principal place of business in Berlin,
Germany; that the above-named defendant, Augustus C. Umbreit,
during all said times, was and still is a resident of the State of
Wisconsin."
"That on or about the 27th day of July, 1901, proceedings in
bankruptcy were instituted in Germany against said defendant
Terlinden, and Paul Hecking, appointed trustee of his estate in
such proceedings on said date; that thereafter, and on or after
August 21, 1901, the above-named plaintiff, the Disconto
Gesellschaft, was appointed a member of the committee of creditors
of the defendant Terlinden's personal estate, and accepted such
appointment, and that the above-named plaintiff, the Disconto
Gesellschaft, presented its claim to said trustee in said
bankruptcy proceedings; that said claim had not been allowed by
said trustee in January, 1902, and there is no evidence that it has
since been allowed; that nothing has been paid upon said claim;
that said claim so presented and submitted is the same claim upon
which action was brought by the plaintiff in this Court and
judgment given, as set forth in finding No. 1; that said action was
instituted by said plaintiff, the Disconto Gesellschaft, through
the German consul in Chicago, and that the steps so taken by the
plaintiff, the Disconto Gesellschaft, had the consent and approval
of Dr. Paul Hecking as trustee in bankruptcy, so appointed in the
bankruptcy
Page 208 U. S. 577
proceedings in Germany, and that, after the commencement of the
same the plaintiff, the Disconto Gesellschaft, agreed with said
trustee that the moneys it should recover in said action should
form part of the said estate in bankruptcy and be handed over to
said trusted; that, among other provisions, the German Bankrupt Act
contained the following:"
" Sec. 14. Pending the bankruptcy proceedings, neither the
assets nor any other property of the bankrupt are subject to
attachment or execution in favor of individual creditors."
Upon the facts thus found, the circuit court rendered a judgment
giving priority to the levy of the Disconto Gesellschaft for the
satisfaction of its judgment out of the fund attached in the hands
of the bank. Umbreit then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. That court reversed the judgment of the circuit court
and directed judgment in favor of Umbreit that he recover the sum
garnisheed in the bank. 127 Wis. 651. Thereafter, a remittitur was
filed in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County and a final judgment
rendered in pursuance of the direction of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse that
judgment. At the same time, a decree in an equity suit, involving a
fund in another bank, was reversed and remanded to the circuit
court. This case had been heard, by consent, with the attachment
suit. With it we are not concerned in this proceeding.
No allegation of federal rights appeared in the case until the
application for rehearing. In this application, it was alleged that
the effect of the proceedings in the state court was to deprive the
plaintiff in error of its property without due process of law,
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, and to deprive it of certain
rights and privileges guaranteed to it by treaty between the
Kingdom of Prussia and the United States. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, in passing upon the petition for rehearing and denying
the same, dealt only with the alleged invasion of treaty rights,
overruling the contention of the plaintiff in error. 127 Wis. 676.
It is well settled in this Court that it is too late to raise
federal questions reviewable
Page 208 U. S. 578
here by motions for rehearing in the state court.
Pim v. St.
Louis, 165 U. S. 273;
Fullerton v. Texas, 196 U. S. 192;
McMillen v. Ferrum Mining Company, 197 U.
S. 343,
197 U. S. 347;
French v. Taylor, 199 U. S. 274,
199 U. S. 278.
An exception to this rule is found in cases where the supreme court
of the state entertains the motion and expressly passes upon the
federal question.
Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.
S. 589;
Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S.
79.
Conceding that this record sufficiently shows that the supreme
court heard and passed upon the federal questions made upon the
motion for rehearing, we will proceed briefly to consider them.
The suit brought by the Disconto Gesellschaft in attachment had
for its object to subject the fund in the bank in Milwaukee to the
payment of its claim against Terlinden. The plaintiff was a German
corporation and Terlinden was a German subject. Umbreit, the
intervener, was a citizen and resident of Wisconsin. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin adjudged that the fund attached could not be
subjected to the payment of the indebtedness due the foreign
corporation as against the claim asserted to the fund by one of its
own citizens, although that claim arose after the attachment by the
foreign creditor; and, further, that the fact that the effect of
judgment in favor of the foreign corporation would be, under the
facts found, to remove the fund to a foreign country, there to be
administered in favor of foreign creditors, was against the public
policy of Wisconsin, which forbade such discrimination as against a
citizen of that state.
Alien citizens, by the policy and practice of the courts of this
country, are ordinarily permitted to resort to the courts for the
redress of wrongs and the protection of their rights. 4 Moore,
International Law Digest, § 536, p. 7; Wharton, Conflict of Laws, §
17.
But what property may be removed from a state and subjected to
the claims of creditors of other states is a matter of comity
between nations and states, and not a matter of absolute
Page 208 U. S. 579
right in favor of creditors of another sovereignty when citizens
of the local state or country are asserting rights against property
within the local jurisdiction.
"
Comity,' in the legal sense," says Mr. Justice, speaking
for this Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.
S. 113, 159 U. S.
163,
"is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws."
In the elaborate examination of the subject in that case, many
cases are cited and the writings of leading authors on the subject
extensively quoted as to the nature, obligation, and extent of
comity between nations and states. The result of the discussion
shows that how far foreign creditors will be protected and their
rights enforced depends upon the circumstances of each case, and
that all civilized nations have recognized and enforced the
doctrine that international comity does not require the enforcement
of judgments in such wise as to prejudice the rights of local
creditors and the superior claims of such creditors to assert and
enforce demands against property within the local jurisdiction.
Such recognition is not inconsistent with that moral duty to
respect the rights of foreign citizens which inheres in the law of
nations. Speaking of the doctrine of comity, Mr. Justice Story
says:
"Every nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of
the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which
its exercise may be justly demanded."
Story on Conflict of Laws, § 33.
The doctrine of comity has been the subject of frequent
discussion in the courts of this country when it has been sought to
assert rights accruing under assignments for the benefit of
creditors in other states as against the demands of local
creditors, by attachment or otherwise in the state where the
property is situated. The cases were reviewed by Mr. Justice
Brown,
Page 208 U. S. 580
delivering the opinion of the court in
Security Trust Co. v.
Dodd, 173 U. S. 624, and
the conclusion reached that voluntary assignments for the benefit
of creditors should be given force in other states as to property
therein situate, except so far as they come in conflict with the
rights of local creditors, or with the public policy of the state
in which it is sought to be enforced; and, as was said by Mr.
Justice McLean in
Oakey v.
Bennett, 11 How. 33,
52 U. S. 44,
"national comity does not require any government to give effect
to such assignment [for the benefit of creditors] when it shall
impair the remedies or lessen the securities of its own
citizens,"
There being, then, no provision of positive law requiring the
recognition of the right of the plaintiff in error to appropriate
property in the State of Wisconsin and subject it to distribution
for the benefit of foreign creditors as against the demands of
local creditors, how far the public policy of the state permitted
such recognition was a matter for the state to determine for
itself. In determining that the policy of Wisconsin would not
permit the property to be thus appropriated to the benefit of alien
creditors as against the demands of the citizens of the state, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has done no more than has been
frequently done by nations and states in refusing to exercise the
doctrine of comity in such wise as to impair the right of local
creditors to subject local property to their just claims. We fail
to perceive how this application of a well known rule can be said
to deprive the plaintiff in error of its property without due
process of law.
Upon the motion for rehearing, the plaintiff in error called
attention to two alleged treaty provisions between the United
States and the Kingdom of Prussia, the first from the Treaty of
1828 and the second from the treaty of 1799. As to the
last-mentioned treaty, the following provision was referred to:
"Each party shall endeavor by all the means in their power to
protect and defend all vessels and other effects belonging to the
citizens or subjects of the other, which shall be within the extent
of their jurisdiction by sea or by land. "
Page 208 U. S. 581
The Treaty of 1799 expired by its own terms on June 2, 1810, and
the provision relied upon is not set forth in so much of the treaty
as was revived by Article 12 of the Treaty of May 1, 1828.
See Compilation of Treaties in Force, 1904, prepared under
resolution of the Senate, pp. 638
et seq. If this
provision of the treaty of 1799 were in force, we are unable to see
that it has any bearing upon the present case.
Article one of the Treaty of 1828 between the Kingdom of Prussia
and the United States is as follows:
"There shall be between the territories of the high contracting
parties a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The
inhabitants of their respective states shall mutually have liberty
to enter the ports, places, and rivers of the territories of each
party wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They shall be at
liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of said
territories, in order to attend to their affairs, and they shall
enjoy, to that effect, the same security and protection as natives
of the country wherein they reside, on condition of their
submitting to the laws and ordinances there prevailing."
This treaty is printed as one of the treaties in force in the
compilation of 1904, p. 643, and has undoubtedly been recognized by
the two governments as still in force since the formation of the
German Empire.
See Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.
S. 270; Foreign Relations of 1883, p. 369; Foreign
Relations of 1885, pp. 404, 443, 444; Foreign Relations of 1887, p.
370; Foreign Relations of 1895, pt. 1, 538.
Assuming, then, that this treaty is still in force between the
United States and the German Empire, and conceding the rule that
treaties should be liberally interpreted with a view to protecting
the citizens of the respective countries in rights thereby secured,
is there anything in this article which required any different
decision in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin than that given? The
inhabitants of the respective countries are to be at liberty to
sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of said territories in
order to attend to their affairs, and they shall enjoy, to that
effect, the same security and protection as
Page 208 U. S. 582
the natives of the country wherein they reside, upon submission
to the laws and ordinances there prevailing. It requires very great
ingenuity to perceive anything in this treaty provision applicable
to the present case. It is said to be found in the right of
citizens of Prussia to attend to their affairs in this country. The
treaty provides that for that purpose they are to have the same
security and protection as natives in the country wherein they
reside. Even between states of the American Union, as shown in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Brown in
Security Trust Co. v. Dodd,
supra, it has been the constant practice not to recognize
assignments for the benefit of creditors outside the state where
the same came in conflict with the rights of domestic creditors
seeking to recover their debts against local property. This is the
doctrine in force as against natives of the country residing in
other states, and it is this doctrine which has been applied by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin to foreign creditors residing in
Germany. In short, there is nothing in this treaty undertaking to
change the well recognized rule between states and nations which
permits a country to first protect the rights of its own citizens
in local property before permitting it to be taken out of the
jurisdiction for administration in favor of those residing beyond
their borders.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, entered
upon the remittitur from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, is
Affirmed.