While this Court cannot refuse to exercise its own judgment, it
naturally will lean toward the interpretation of a local statute
adopted by the local court.
The reenactment of a statute in the same words carries with it
the presumption that the legislature is satisfied with the
construction which it has notoriously received from those whose
duty it has been to carry it out,
Page 206 U. S. 475
and this presumption is as strong as one that the enactors of
the original statute which was adopted verbatim from one of another
state knew a single decision of the courts of that state giving a
different construction to the statute.
The construction by the Supreme Court of Arizona of § 2282,
Rev.Stat., of that state sustained by this Court as to the power of
the Territorial Board of Equalization to increase the total
valuation of the property in the Territory above the sum of the
return from the Board of Supervisors of the several counties, and
to change the valuations of particular classes of property within
the several counties.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 206 U. S. 478
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment on demurrer to a petition for
a writ of certiorari. The object of the petition was to vacate
proceedings of the Board of Equalization in 1905 by which the Board
added very largely to the assessed valuation of patented mines and,
in a less degree, of work horses and saddle horses, in Cochise
County and other counties in Arizona. It was alleged that, by these
proceedings, the Board increased the total valuation of property in
the territory and increased the valuation of the petitioner's
property of the above-mentioned kinds. The writ had been issued by
a single justice, returnable before the full bench, but the case
was heard on the demurrer by consent, and by the judgment the
demurrer was sustained and the writ was quashed.
The errors alleged are two: first that, while the Board, for
purposes of equalizing, might add to the total value of the
property in one county and diminish that of property in another, it
had no power to increase the total valuation of property in the
territory above the sum of the returns from the boards of
supervisors of the several counties, and second, that the Board was
bound to deal with the valuation of each county as a whole, and
could not increase or diminish the valuations of particular classes
of property within a county. The power of the Board depends, of
course, upon statute, and it is said that the statute of Arizona
was taken almost verbatim from one of Colorado, which had been
construed by the Supreme Court of that state in accordance with the
first of the petitioner's above contentions before it was adopted
by Arizona.
People v. Lothrop, 3 Colo. 428. The
construction, it is said, goes with the act.
Henrietta
Mining & Milling Co. v.
Page 206 U. S. 479
Gardner, 173 U. S. 123,
173 U. S. 130.
The second contention is based on an interpretation of the
statutes, the supposed absence of an express grant of power, and
later decisions in Colorado and other states.
On the other hand, while this Court cannot refuse to exercise
its own judgment, it naturally will lean toward the interpretation
of a local statute adopted by the local court.
Sweeney v.
Lomme, 22 Wall. 208;
Northern Pacific R. Co. v.
Hambly, 154 U. S. 349,
154 U. S. 361;
Fox v. Haarstick, 156 U. S. 674,
156 U. S. 679.
And again, when, for a considerable time, a statute notoriously has
received a construction in practice from those whose duty it is to
carry it out, and afterwards is reenacted in the same words, it may
be presumed that the construction is satisfactory to the
legislature, unless plainly erroneous, since otherwise naturally
the words would have been changed.
New York, New Haven &
Hartford R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
200 U. S. 361,
200 U. S.
401-402. The statute of Arizona was reenacted in 1901,
and was said by the supreme court to have been construed by the
Board against the petitioner's contention ever since the Board was
created, eighteen years before. Even apart from the reenactment a
certain weight attaches to this fact.
United States v.
Finnell, 185 U. S. 236,
185 U. S.
243-244;
United States v. Sweet, 189 U.
S. 471. The presumption that the codifiers of 1901 knew
and approved the practice of the Board certainly is as strong as
the presumption that the original enactors of the statute knew a
single decision in another state, and it is more important, since
it refers to a later time.
As an original question, the construction adopted by the supreme
court appears to us at least as reasonable as the opposite one
contended for, and the variations in the Arizona act from the
prototype, if Colorado furnished the prototype, and the different
background against which it was to be construed, seem to us to have
warranted the refusal to be bound by the Colorado case.
We give a section of the General Laws of Colorado, 1877, and of
the Revised Statutes of Arizona [one above the other].
Page 206 U. S. 480
"2282. Sec. 43. Said Board shall ascertain whether the valuation
of real estate in each county bears a fair relation or proportion
to the valuation in all other counties of the state, and on such
examination they may increase or diminish the aggregate valuation
of real estate in any county as much as, in their judgment, may be
necessary to produce a just relation between all the valuations of
real estate in the state; but in no instance shall they reduce the
aggregate valuation of all the counties below the aggregate
valuation as returned by the clerks of the several counties."
"3880. (Sec. 50.) The said Board shall ascertain whether the
valuation of property in each county bears a fair relation or
proportion to the valuation in all other counties in the territory,
and on such examination they may increase or diminish the valuation
of property in any county as much as, in their judgment, may be
necessary to produce a just relation between all the valuations of
property in the territory; but in no instance shall they reduce the
aggregate valuation of all the counties below the aggregate
valuation as returned by the Boards of supervisors of the several
counties. And said Board shall at the same time fix the rate of
taxes for territorial purposes which is to be levied and collected
in each county."
For convenience, we take up the second of the alleged errors
first. It will be seen that the word "property" takes the place of
"real estate" at the beginning, and that the power given, instead
of being only a power to increase or diminish the aggregate
valuation of real estate in any county, is to increase or diminish
the valuation of property (not the property) in (not of) any
county. The word "aggregate" is left out, and the fact that it was
left out favors the construction that, apart from that fact, would
be reasonable, that the power extends to the valuation of any
property, and is not confined to the valuation of all the property
as one whole. This construction
Page 206 U. S. 481
is further favored by the purpose of the changes in valuation,
which is to "produce a just relation between all the valuations of
property in the territory." This phrase is interstitial in its
working. It does not confine the equality to the valuations by
county, but extends it to all the valuations of property. Yet a
further argument may be drawn from the language of § 3874: "No
assessor, board of supervisors, or the territorial board of
equalization shall assess any real estate at a less valuation than
seventy-five cents per acre." This recognizes the power of the
Board to deal with a special class of property, and we may add, by
way of anticipation, by also recognizing a function of assessment,
does much to make inapplicable the reasoning of the Colorado
decision upon the other point.
It seems to have been argued below that at least the Board was
confined to dealing with property by the classes mentioned in other
sections of the statutes, especially §§ 3849, 3861, 3877. But the
classifications and specifications provided for in those sections
do not affect the power expressly given by § 3880, as we have
construed the latter, and further, by § 3877 the territorial Board
is given power in very broad terms to change the list. It is not
necessary to rely on this power to change the list for the power of
the Board to change valuations of a particular class of property.
It is mentioned simply to show that the powers given by § 3880 are
not diminished by other provisions.
The first contention of the petitioner needs but a few words in
addition to what we have said. The power to increase the valuation
of property in any county is as power to increase it in all, or at
least to increase the valuation of some kinds of property in all,
so as to produce a just relation between them and the other
valuations left undisturbed. We find nothing in the statute that
requires the increase to be so adjusted that the total valuation
shall be unchanged. On the contrary, the prohibition against
reducing it implies that the Board has the power of change, and,
but for the prohibition, might reduce
Page 206 U. S. 482
the total. Therefore it may add to the total, since the law does
not forbid that. The Colorado decision to the contrary turned
partly on the notion, which has been shown to be inapplicable to
Arizona, that the Board of Equalization had no function of
assessment. It also turned, in part at least, on the Constitution
of the state, to which, of course, the statute was subject. There
was no constitution to be conformed to in Arizona, and therefore
the construction of the statute depends on the meaning of the words
alone, and the supreme court of the territory, in construing them,
was left at large.
Judgment affirmed.