While, in case of diverse citizenship, the suit may be brought
in the circuit court for the district of the residence of either
party, there must be service within the district, and if the
defendant is a nonresident corporation, service can only be made
upon it if it is doing business in that district in such a manner,
and to such an extent as to warrant the inference that it is
present there through its agent.
A railroad company which has no tracks within the district is
not doing business therein in the sense that liability for service
is incurred because it hires an office and employs an agent for the
merely incidental business of solicitation of freight and passenger
traffic.
147 F. 767 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 205 U. S. 531
MR. JUSTICE MOODY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought an
action in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to
have been incurred in Colorado through the negligence of the
defendant, against the defendant in error, a corporation
Page 205 U. S. 532
created by the laws of the State of Iowa, and therefore, for
jurisdictional purposes, a citizen of that state. The return upon
the writ shows a service
"on Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company, a
corporation which is doing business in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania . . . by giving a true and attested copy to Harry E.
Heller, agent of said corporation."
The defendant appeared specially for the purpose of disputing
jurisdiction. The circuit court held that the service was
insufficient because the defendant was not doing business within
the district, and that decision is brought here by writ of error
for review.
The jurisdiction of the circuit court in this case was founded
solely upon the fact that the parties were citizens of different
states. In such a case, the suit may be brought in the district of
the residence of either. Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 1, as
corrected by Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, § 1 (25 Stat. 434).
But to obtain jurisdiction, there must be service, and the service
was upon the corporation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Its validity depends upon whether the corporation was doing
business in that district in such a manner and to such an extent as
to warrant the inference that, through its agents, it was present
there.
The eastern point of the defendant's line of railroad was at
Chicago, whence its tracks extended westward. The business for
which it was incorporated was the carriage of freight and
passengers, and the construction, maintenance, and operation of a
railroad for that purpose. As incidental and collateral to that
business, it was proper, and, according to the business methods
generally pursued, probably essential, that freight and passenger
traffic should be solicited in other parts of the country than
those through which the defendant's tracks ran. For the purpose of
conducting this incidental business, the defendant employed Mr.
Heller, hired an office for him in Philadelphia, designated him as
district freight and passenger agent, and in many ways advertised
to the public these facts. The business of the agent was to solicit
and procure passengers and freight to be transported over the
defendant's line. For conducting this business, several clerks and
various traveling passenger
Page 205 U. S. 533
and freight agents were employed who reported to the agent and
acted under his direction. He sold no tickets and received no
payments for transportation of freight. When a prospective
passenger desired a ticket and supplied to the agent for one, the
agent took the applicant's money and procured from one of the
railroads running west from Philadelphia a ticket for Chicago and a
prepaid order, which gave to the applicant, upon his arrival at
Chicago, the right to receive from the Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad a ticket over that road. Occasionally he sold to
railroad employees, who already had tickets over intermediate
lines, orders for reduced rates over the defendant's lines. In some
cases, for the convenience of shippers who had received bills of
lading from the initial line for goods routed over the defendant's
lines, he gave in exchange therefor bills of lading over the
defendant's line. In these bills of lading it was recited that they
should not be in force until the freight had been actually received
by the defendant.
The question here is whether service upon the agent was
sufficient, and one element of its sufficiency is whether the facts
show that the defendant corporation was doing business within the
district. It is obvious that the defendant was doing there a
considerable business of a certain kind, although there was no
carriage of freight or passengers. In support of his contention
that the defendant was doing business within the district in such a
sense that it was liable to service there, the plaintiff cites
Denver &c. Railroad Co. v. Roller, 100 F. 738, and
Tuchband v. Chicago &c. Railroad, 115 N.Y. 437. The
facts in those cases were similar to those in the present case. But
in both cases the action was brought in the state courts, and the
question was of the interpretation of a state statute and the
jurisdiction of the state courts.
The business shown in this case was, in substance, nothing more
than that of solicitation. Without undertaking to
Page 205 U. S. 534
formulate any general rule defining what transactions will
constitute "doing business" in the sense that liability to service
is incurred, we think that this is not enough to bring the
defendant within the district so that process can be served upon
it. This view accords with several decisions in the lower federal
courts.
Maxwell v. Atchison &c. Railroad, 34 F. 286;
Fairbank & Co. v. Cincinnati &c. Railroad, 54 F.
420;
Union Associated Press v. Times Star Co., 84 F. 419;
Earle v. Chesapeake &c. Railroad, 127 F. 235.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.