Although the brief alleges that certain federal questions were
duly raised in the state court and so disposed of as to sustain the
jurisdiction of this Court, if those questions are wholly without
merit, or foreclosed by previous decisions of this Court, the writ
of error will be dismissed, and
held that rulings of the
state court in a criminal case in regard to change of venue,
admission of evidence, and form of indictment were not subject to
review in this Court and afforded no basis for holding that
plaintiff in error was not awarded due process of law.
Article V of Amendments to the Constitution does not operate as
a restriction on the powers of the state, but solely upon the
federal government.
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.
S. 172.
Under the laws of Missouri, the right of accused to the
endorsement of names of witnesses on the indictment does not rest
on the common law, but on state statute, and whether the provisions
have been complied with is not a federal question, and the decision
of the state court is not open to revision here.
The question of citizenship is immaterial as affecting the
jurisdiction of this Court under § 709, Rev.Stat. As a general
rule, aliens are subject to the law of the territory where the
crime is committed.
No treaty gives to subjects of Great Britain any different
measure of justice than that secured to citizens of this
country.
Writ of error to review, 95 S.W. Rep. 235, dismissed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error was found guilty of murder in the first
degree in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, and,
after
Page 205 U. S. 484
motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were made and
overruled, judgment was rendered on the verdict, and sentence
passed accordingly. The case was carried to the supreme court of
the state, and the judgment was affirmed by Division No. 2 of that
court, having appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases. No federal
question was referred to in the opinion of the court. A motion for
rehearing was filed wherein federal questions were sought to be
raised. The court denied the motion without opinion.
Plaintiff in error then moved for the transfer of the cause to
the court in banc, setting forth certain federal questions, and the
cause was transferred. The court in banc adopted the opinion of
Division No. 2 as its opinion, and the judgment was again affirmed.
198 Mo. 23. A motion for rehearing, assuming to raise federal
questions, was filed and denied without opinion. This writ of error
was thereupon brought, and comes before us on motions to dismiss or
affirm.
No assignment of errors was returned with the writ, as required
by § 997 of the Revised Statutes, nor is there in the brief of
counsel for plaintiff in error on these motions any specification
of errors under Rule 21, but the brief does allege that certain
federal questions were duly raised and so disposed of as to sustain
the jurisdiction of this Court.
But, if these questions are wholly without merit or are no
longer open by reason of our previous decisions, it has long been
settled that the writ of error should be dismissed.
1. Before the trial of the cause was commenced, plaintiff in
error applied for a change of venue on the ground of local
prejudice.
The application was heard at length, and forty-one witnesses
testified in its support and thirty-seven witnesses in opposition
thereto, and the trial court decided that prejudice justifying a
change of venue had not been made out, and denied the application.
It is now contended that the refusal to grant the change of venue
deprived plaintiff in error of a fair and impartial trial, to
which, under the federal Constitution, he
Page 205 U. S. 485
was entitled. The state supreme court held it to be a well
settled rule of law in Missouri that the granting of a change of
venue in a criminal case rested largely in the discretion of the
trial court, and that,
"where the trial court has heard the evidence in favor of and
against the application, and a conclusion reached adversely to
granting the change, such ruling will not be disturbed by this
Court, and should not be unless there are circumstances of such a
nature as indicates an abuse of the discretion lodged in such
court."
And the supreme court, after a full review of all the testimony,
decided that the trial court had acted properly in overruling the
application for a change of venue. In our judgment, no federal
question was involved. Were this otherwise, it would follow that we
could decide in any case that the trial court had abused its
discretion under the laws of the State of Missouri although the
Supreme Court of that state had held to the contrary.
2. It is also contended that plaintiff in error
"set up and claimed that, under the federal Constitution as well
as under the Constitution of Missouri, he could not be compelled to
give testimony against himself, and that this exemption and
protection were denied to him by the court in permitting to be
given in evidence against him alleged extrajudicial admissions
extorted from him while under arrest by the police officers of the
state."
Certain statements made by plaintiff in error, defendant below,
were admitted in evidence on the trial, but it does not appear that
counsel objected to the introduction of this testimony on the
ground that any rights, privileges, or immunities of defendant
under the Constitution of the United States were thereby violated.
Counsel for the state offered in evidence certain articles taken
from defendant's trunk, and this was objected to on the ground that
they were taken in violation of the state constitution and without
defendant's consent. The objection was not passed upon, and the
articles were withdrawn. The trunk and its contents were again
offered in evidence and objected to, but the objection was based
entirely upon the ground of irrelevancy and immateriality,
Page 205 U. S. 486
and the fact that a proper foundation had not been laid in the
identification of the trunk.
When the state offered in evidence the statements made by
defendant following his arrest, the trial court excluded the jury
and heard the testimony of the persons present at the time for the
purpose of determining the competency thereof. After the
examination of a number of witnesses, who detailed fully the
circumstances under which the statements were made, counsel
objected "because there is no foundation laid for it and because it
was [not] voluntary." This objection was overruled, and the
evidence admitted.
The state supreme court held that the trial court, in admitting
the testimony, did not commit error. This notwithstanding the
Constitution of Missouri provided "that no person shall be
compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case." Its
ruling upon that proposition is not subject to review in this
Court.
After the decision of the supreme court in banc affirming the
judgment, plaintiff in error filed a petition for rehearing which
was denied without opinion. The third ground of that motion was as
follows:
"Because counsel for appellant, through neglect and
inadvertence, failed to call the attention of the court to the
proposition that the cross-examination of appellant, complained of
as 'improper,' and the admission as evidence of statements or
'confessions' made by appellant while in the 'sweat box' of the St.
Louis Police Department, was in direct violation of the
Constitution of the United States, Article V, Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, in that it compelled the
appellant to become a witness against himself."
The suggestion came too late, and, moreover, Article V of the
Amendments, alone relied on, does not operate as a "restriction of
the powers of the state, but was intended to operate solely upon
the federal government."
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.
S. 172. And if, as decided, the admission of this
testimony did not violate the rights of the plaintiff in error
under the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri, the
record
Page 205 U. S. 487
affords no basis for holding that he was not awarded due process
of law.
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.
S. 126.
3. Plaintiff in error filed a demurrer to the indictment, one of
the grounds of which was:
"Because of the inconsistency, multiplicity, and repugnancy of
said counts, the defendant is being proceeded against in violation
of the state and federal guaranty of due process of law, and in
violation of his constitutional right to be specifically informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
The demurrer was overruled. And also a motion to quash assigning
similar grounds, which was likewise overruled.
These rulings in respect of the sufficiency of the indictment
present no federal question.
Howard v. Fleming,
191 U. S. 126,
191 U. S. 135,
and cases cited.
4. After the demurrer and motion to quash had been disposed of,
a plea in abatement was filed, averring that the prosecuting
attorney intentionally refrained from indorsing the names of
certain witnesses on the indictment; that defendant was a native of
Great Britain and a subject of the King, and that, by virtue of
treaties, the law of nations, the laws and Constitution of the
United States, and the laws of Missouri, defendant was entitled to
know who were the witnesses against him.
A similar point, with like allegations, was made in the motion
to quash. The court heard the evidence on the plea in abatement,
and found the issues against defendant, except that it found that
he was a native citizen and subject of Great Britain.
The question of citizenship is immaterial as affecting the
jurisdiction of this Court under § 709, Rev.Stat.
French v.
Hopkins, 124 U. S. 524. Nor
are we aware, as Chief Justice Waite said in
Spies v.
Illinois, 123 U. S. 131,
123 U. S. 182, of
any treaty giving to subjects of Great Britain any different
measure of justice than secured to citizens of this country. And
the general rule of law is that aliens are subject to the law of
the territory where the crime is committed.
Wildenhus'
Case, 120 U. S. 1;
Carlisle v. United
States, 16 Wall. 147;
People v. McLeod, 1
Hill, 377; Wharton, Conflict of Laws, § 819.
Page 205 U. S. 488
As to the allegation that the prosecuting attorney intentionally
refrained from indorsing the names of certain witnesses on the
indictment, in the motion to quash as well as in the plea in
abatement, the state courts held that the charge was not sustained
by the evidence.
The right of the accused to the indorsement of names of
witnesses does not rest on the common law, but is statutory, and
provided for in Missouri by § 2517 of the Revised Statutes of 1899,
whereby the right of the state to use other witnesses not so
indorsed is recognized. The state supreme court discussed the
matter at length, held there was no error, and added:
"Aside from all this, it is manifest that the defendant has no
right to complain of any prejudicial error upon the action of the
court upon this motion. This motion was filed October 6, 1903, and
the record discloses upon the showing made upon such motion and
plea in abatement that appellant had notice of these additional
witnesses which were introduced by the state at the trial. The
trial did not occur until the twenty-third of February, 1904, some
three or four months subsequent to the time of which the record
discloses that he had notice of these witnesses."
The decision of the supreme court that defendant had been tried
in accordance with the procedure provided by the statutes of
Missouri is not open to revision here in the circumstances.
We have not been astute to apply to these motions the rigor of
our rules, and have explored the record with care; but have not
found therein any denial of fundamental rights, of due process of
law, or of the equal protection of the laws. The federal questions
asserted in the brief or suggested by the record are wholly
inadequate to justify our interference.
Writ of error dismissed.