A state law will not be held unconstitutional in a suit coming
from a state court at the instance of one whose constitutional
rights are not invaded because, as against a class making no
complaint, it might be held unconstitutional.
Whether a state lien statute, otherwise constitutional, applies
to vessels not to be used in the waters of the state on whose
credit the supplies were furnished, whether the lien was properly
filed as to time and place, and what the effect thereof is as to
bona fide purchasers without notice, are not federal
questions, but the judgment of the state court is final and
conclusive on this Court.
Whether a state lien statute is unconstitutional as permitting
the seizure and sale of a vessel and the distribution of the
proceeds in conflict with
Page 205 U. S. 355
the exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty of the federal courts
will not be determined in a suit from the state courts where no
holder of a maritime lien is present contesting the
unconstitutionality of the statute. A contract to build a vessel is
not a maritime contract enforceable only in admiralty, but the
remedy is within the jurisdiction of the state court, and this rule
applies to items furnished the vessel after she has been launched,
but which are really part of her original construction.
142 Mich. 84 affirmed.
These cases may be considered together. They are writs of error
to the judgments of the Supreme Court of Michigan affirming the
decrees of the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, enforcing
liens for the De Laney Forge & Iron Company, defendant in
error, in 218, and George W. Edwards and others, defendants in
error in 219, and interveners in the original case.
The
Winnebago, a steel steamer of 1,091 tons burden,
was built by the Columbia Iron Works at St. Clair, Michigan. The
contract price was $95,000; date of contract, March 8, 1902,
between the Columbia Iron Works and John J. Boland and Thomas J.
Prindeville. It was understood that these persons should organize a
corporation to be known as the Iroquois Transportation Company. The
contract price was to be paid $31,000 in cash, from time to time;
for the balance, the transportation company was to execute its
notes to the amount of $16,000, to issue bonds for $48,000, to be
secured by mortgage upon its property. On April 5, 1902, Boland and
Prindeville assigned the contract to the Iroquois Transportation
Company. Payments were made on the contract as follows: $7,500 at
date of signing contract; 7,500, April 3, 1902; 4,000, April 14,
1902; 4,000, June 15, 1902; 4,000, July 15, 1902.
An additional $4,000 was paid on October 3, 1902, and two
negotiable notes of $4,000 given, maturing respectively November 1,
1903, and November 1, 1904.
The steamer was launched March 21, 1903. After she was in the
water, the work on the contract continued. On July 18, 1903, she
was inspected, measured, enrolled, and licensed to
Page 205 U. S. 356
be employed in domestic and foreign trade. This license was
issued in the name of the Columbia Iron Works as owner.
On July 19, 1903, the Iroquois Transportation Company received a
bill of sale of the steamer and delivered to the Columbia Iron
Works ninety-six negotiable bonds of $500 each, secured by mortgage
on the steamer, and paid the balance of the purchase money, which
was to be paid in cash, then amounting between $400 and $500.
The agreement recited that possession was given to the Iroquois
Transportation Company for the purpose of completing and finishing
up those things still remaining undone on the steamer and required
to be done by the iron works by the terms of the contract for the
construction of the steamer,
"it being the sole intent and purpose of this agreement to
enable the Iroquois Transportation Company to obtain immediate
possession of the steamer, and without intending either to limit
the extent of the obligation of said Columbia Iron Works under the
original specifications."
The steamer left St. Clair for Lorain, Ohio, July 19, 1903. At
that time, she was not completed, and workmen remained on her and
went with her to St. Clair, where additional work was done upon
her. She was afterwards engaged in carrying cargoes between points
on Lake Erie and Lake Superior.
On July 30, 1903, the Columbia Iron Works made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. On August 25, 1903, the De Laney Forge
& Iron Company served notice on the Iroquois Transportation
Company that it made a claim of lien against the steamer for
forging and material furnished, and on October 6, 1903, complaint
was filed in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, and
shortly thereafter Edwards and others intervened in the case,
claiming a lien. The Iroquois Company gave a bond under the statute
for the release of the vessel. Decrees were rendered in favor of
the claimants and interveners in the Circuit Court of Wayne County,
and upon appeal they were affirmed in the Supreme Court of
Michigan, 142 Mich. 84.
Page 205 U. S. 359
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Michigan statute under which the liens are claimed in this
case is as follows:
"Third Compiled Laws of Michigan, p. 3254:"
"(10789) Sec. 2. Every water craft of above five tons burden
used or intended to be used in navigating the waters of this state
shall be subject to a lien thereon:"
"First, for all debts contracted by the owner or part owner,
master, clerk, agent, or steward of such craft, on account of
supplies and provisions furnished for the use of said water craft,
on account of work done or services rendered, on board of such
craft by seamen or any employee other than the master thereof; on
account of work done or service rendered by any person in or about
the loading or unloading of said water craft; on account of work
done or materials furnished by mechanics, tradesmen, or others, in
or about the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or equipping
such craft:
Provided, That when labor shall be performed
or materials furnished, as aforesaid, by a subcontractor or workman
other than an original contractor, and the same is not paid for,
said person or persons may give the owner or his agent, or the
master or clerk of said craft, timely notice of his or their said
claim, and from thenceforth said person or persons shall have a
lien upon said craft
pro rata for his or their said
claims, to the amount that may be due by said owner to said
original contractor for work or labor then done on said water
craft. "
Page 205 U. S. 360
Several objections are urged by the plaintiff in error which, if
sustained, will result in the reversal of the judgments of the
Supreme Court of Michigan. Some of them are of a nonfederal
character. It is insisted that the statute does not apply in this
case because the steamer
Winnebago was not to be used in
navigating the waters of Michigan within the terms of the statute.
But this only presents a question of state law, upon which the
judgment of the state court is final and conclusive. The same may
be said as to the objection because the transportation company was
a
bona fide purchaser without notice of complainant's
lien, and because complainant did not within a year file its claim
for a lien with the proper court in the county in which it resided.
These are state questions likewise concluded by the decision of the
state court.
It is further contended that to seize the vessel and subject her
to sale and the proceeds thereof to distribution in the state court
would be in direct conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction in
admiralty in the courts of the United States in favor of liens of a
maritime character, and therefore the Michigan act is
unconstitutional. No maritime lien is asserted in this case, and it
is merely a matter of speculation as to whether any such claim
existed or might be thereafter asserted. No holder of any such
maritime lien is here contesting the constitutionality of the state
law.
In a case from a state court, this Court does not listen to
objections of those who do not come within the class whose
constitutional rights are alleged to be invaded, or hold a law
unconstitutional because, as against the class making no complaint,
the law might be so held. This was distinctly ruled in a case
decided at this term.
New York ex Rel. Hatch v. Reardon,
204 U. S. 152.
See also Supervisor v. Stanley, 105 U.
S. 305,
105 U. S. 311;
Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 276,
180 U. S.
283-284;
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.
S. 114,
176 U. S. 118;
Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108,
192 U. S.
114.
There is no one in position in this case to make this objection,
and, for aught that this record discloses, no such maritime
Page 205 U. S. 361
lien existed. If this statute is broad enough to include
strictly maritime liens, it can only be held unconstitutional, in a
case coming from a state court, where the complaint on that ground
is made by the holder of such a demand. We agree with Judge
Severns, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in a case directly involving this question, where other
claimants upon the
Winnebago had removed a case to the
United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
whence it was taken to the circuit court of appeals:
"And the fact that she [the
Winnebago] might become
subject to maritime liens would not destroy liens already lawfully
acquired. It is true she might become subject to maritime liens
which would be superior to the existing lien, and that such liens
would have to be enforced in the admiralty. But that possibility
does not defeat the enforcement by a state court of the nonmaritime
lien to which she is subject. How else is the owner of the latter
to obtain his remedy? It may be the vessel will never become
subject to maritime liens at all, and if so, the holder of the
existing lien may never have even the privilege of proving his
claim in some cause instituted for another purpose. But no such
supposed embarrassment has yet occurred. And they are as yet
imaginary. But suppose such other liens should attach. That should
not prevent the enforcement of the earlier lien in the proper
court. If the holder of the earlier lien delays his action, he
subjects himself to the danger of superior liens becoming fastened,
and the enforcement of his own lien in the state court must leave
the vessel subject to the superior liens of which the state court
cannot take cognizance. If occasion requires, and the admiralty
court enforces the superior liens, it is in no wise obstructed by
the action of the state court, and a title under a decree of the
former court would defeat the title gained under the decree of the
state court. The case of
Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S.
256, is a good illustration of this subject. There is no
difficulty other than such as may happen in case one court should
take and have possession of the vessel at a time when the other
Page 205 U. S. 362
should require it; but that is an incident common along all the
lines of concurrent proceedings in the state and federal courts,
and gives no ground for the denial of jurisdiction to either."
The Winnebago, 141 F. 945.
It is next insisted that the materials and supplies were not
furnished on the credit of the vessel, but were contracted for,
furnished, and delivered on the credit of the Columbia Iron
Works.
The findings upon this proposition are again questions within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state court. The findings will
not be disturbed here.
It is next objected that the court erred because certain items
were allowed for material furnished the vessel after she was
launched, and therefore the subject of exclusive jurisdiction for
which a lien could only be enforced in the admiralty. But we agree
with the state court that these items were really furnished for the
completion of the vessel, and were fairly a part of her original
construction. In such a case, the remedy was within the
jurisdiction of the state court.
The Iosco, Fed.Cas. No.
7,060;
The Victorian, 24 Or. 121;
The Winnebago,
141 F. 945.
It is urged that the attempt to enforce the lien on the vessel
was while she was engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore
proceedings against her were unlawful and void in view of the
exclusive control of this subject by Congress under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. But it must be
remembered that, concerning contracts not maritime in their nature,
the state has authority to make laws and enforce liens, and it is
no valid objection that the enforcement of such laws may prevent or
obstruct the prosecution of a voyage of an interstate character.
The laws of the states enforcing attachment and execution in cases
cognizable in state courts have been sustained and upheld.
Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co.,
119 U. S. 388,
119 U. S. 398.
The state may pass laws enforcing the rights of its citizens which
affect interstate commerce, but fall short of regulating such
commerce in the sense
Page 205 U. S. 363
in which the Constitution gives exclusive jurisdiction to
Congress.
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S.
99,
93 U. S. 103;
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1,
128 U. S. 23;
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.
S. 477.
Upon the subject, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the Court in
Knapp v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638,
177 U. S. 642,
said:
"That wherever any lien is given by a state statute for a cause
of action cognizable in admiralty, either
in rem or
in
personam, proceedings
in rem to enforce such lien are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts."
"But the converse of this proposition is equally true -- that if
a lien upon a vessel be created for a claim over which a court of
admiralty has no jurisdiction in any form, such lien may be
enforced in the courts of the state. Thus, as the admiralty
jurisdiction does not extend to a contract for building a vessel,
or to work done or materials furnished in its construction
(
The
Jefferson, People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How.
393;
Roach v. Chapman, 22 How.
129), we held in
Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall.
532, that, in respect to such contracts, it was competent for the
states to enact such laws as their legislatures might deem just and
expedient, and to provide for their enforcement
in
rem."
The contract in this case being for the construction of a
vessel, and its enforcement within the power and jurisdiction of
the state courts, we do not think that execution of such a decree
can be avoided because the vessel engaged in interstate
commerce.
Finally, an elaborate and able argument is made in support of
the contention that a contract to build a ship is a maritime
contract, and therefore can be enforced only in admiralty; but, as
late as this term, in
Graham & Morton Transportation
Company v. Craig Shipbuilding Company, this contention was
overruled upon the authority of the previous decisions of this
Court. 203 U.S. 577.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Michigan are
Affirmed.
