In a contest over a homestead entry, whether there was a sale
and whether the thing sold was or was not the tract in question are
matters of fact to be determined by the testimony, and the findings
of the Land Department in those respects are conclusive in the
courts.
While a homesteader cannot make a valid and enforceable contract
to sell the land he is seeking to enter, he is not bound to perfect
his application, but may abandon or relinquish his rights in the
land, and if he in fact makes a sale, he is no longer interested in
the land, and the government can treat the sale as a
relinquishment, and patent the land to other applicants.
83 P. 882 affirmed.
Page 205 U. S. 196
On December 3, 1900, Edward H. Love commenced this suit in the
District Court of Missoula County, Montana, to have Annie Flahive,
the holder of the legal title to a specified tract in that county,
adjudged to hold it in trust for him. A demurrer to the complaint
was sustained by the district court and, no amendment being asked,
judgment was entered for the defendants. This judgment was affirmed
by the supreme court of the state (33 Mont. 348), from which court
the case was brought here on writ of error.
The facts, as stated in the complaint and attached exhibits, are
that plaintiff, with the purpose of entering the land as a
homestead, and being qualified therefor, in May, 1882, settled
upon, occupied, and fenced the entire tract, with the exception of
the north twenty acres thereof. I n addition to a controversy in
the Land Department with the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
which claimed the land under its grant, but whose claim was finally
rejected, he had a contest in the Land Department with Michael
Flahive, who was also seeking to enter the land, which, after
several hearings before the local land officers, with appeals to
and decisions by the Commissioner of the General Land Office and
the Secretary of the Interior, resulted in a final decision against
him and an award of the land to the defendant Annie Flahive, the
widow of Michael Flahive, who had died pending the proceedings. In
pursuance of that award, a patent was issued to her in December,
1899.
Page 205 U. S. 198
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff rests his case on the contention that in the
conclusions of the Secretary of the Interior there was error in
matter of law inasmuch as it is well settled that, in the absence
of fraud or imposition, the findings of the Land Department on
matters of fact are conclusive upon the courts.
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72;
Lee v. Johnson,
116 U. S. 48;
Lake Superior &c. Co. v. Cunningham, 155 U.
S. 354,
155 U. S. 375;
Burfenning v. Chicago, St. Paul &c. Railway,
163 U. S. 321,
163 U. S. 323;
Gonzales v. French, 164 U. S. 338;
Johnson v. Drew, 171 U. S. 93,
171 U. S.
99.
He also invokes the authority of
Noble v. Union River
Logging Railroad, 147 U. S. 176,
to the effect that when, by the action of the Department, a right
of property has become vested in an applicant, it can be taken away
only by a
Page 205 U. S. 199
proceeding directly for that purpose, and contends that his
right to the land was determined by certain findings of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office on July 26, 1892, affirmed
by the Secretary of the Interior on January 12, 1894. It is
doubtless true that, when once a patent has issued, the
jurisdiction of the Land Department over the land ceases, and any
right of the government or third parties must be asserted by
proceedings in the courts.
United States v.
Stone, 2 Wall. 525,
69 U. S. 535;
Michigan Land & Lumber Company v. Rust, 168 U.
S. 589,
168 U. S. 593,
and cases cited. It may also be conceded that a right of property
may become vested by a decision of the Land Department, of which
the applicant cannot be deprived except upon proceedings directly
therefor, and of which he has notice.
Cornelius v. Kessel,
128 U. S. 456;
Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372,
157 U. S. 383;
Parsons v. Venzke, 164 U. S. 89;
Michigan Land & Lumber Company v. Rust, supra. Without
undertaking to indicate the limits to which this can be carried, it
is enough to say that the proceedings in this case, both in the
local land offices and by appeals and reviews in the General Land
Office, were within the settled rules of procedure established by
the Department in respect to such matters. Generally speaking, the
Land Department has jurisdiction until the legal title has passed,
and the several steps in this controversy were before the issue of
the patent, while the jurisdiction of the Land Department
continued, and with both parties present and participating. The
question of title was in process of administration, and until the
patent issued, nothing was settled so as to stop further inquiry.
Knight v. U.S. Land
Association, 142 U. S. 161;
Michigan Land & Lumber Company v. Rust, supra. So,
although it be conceded that the findings of the Secretary of the
Interior, in 1894, were to the effect that the plaintiff had a
right to enter the land, that decision was not final, and it was
within the jurisdiction of the Land Department to institute further
inquiry, and upon it to finally award the land to the party held to
have the better right.
Page 205 U. S. 200
This brings us to the pivotal fact. It appears from the
complaint and exhibits that, during the time that these proceedings
were pending in the Lond Department, Love made a sale to James
Rundall of the tract in controversy, or some other tract, or some
logs, and that Rundall thereafter made a sale of the same property
to Flahive. What was the thing sold is not positively shown by the
testimony. In the final decision of the case, the Secretary of the
Interior, after giving a synopsis of the testimony, which he says
is largely incomplete and irrelevant and not entirely satisfactory
upon the question, says:
"The witnesses Vanderpool and Lynch testify that Love had a
place for sale which included the tract in controversy; Rundall,
that he purchased the tract in controversy from Love. The latter
denies any sale of the land, but states that he sold some logs for
W. H. Finley. It is evident from Love's statement of the
transaction that, conceding the sale to be only of logs, he was
aware that the land upon which the logs were situated would be
claimed by the purchaser of the logs not by virtue of the sale of
the logs, but because it appears that he sold the logs for the
reason that the claim of W. H. Finley, upon which the logs were
situated, was about to be taken by Rundall."
"
* * * *"
"It appears that a clear preponderance of the testimony shows
that the logs were situated upon the land in controversy, and from
Love's evidence it is shown that he, at the time of this sale, laid
no claim to the land upon which this unfinished cabin was
erected."
"
* * * *"
"It thus appears that, from a preponderance of the testimony, it
is shown that this tract of land was not claimed by Love at the
date of the sale of this land or of these logs, for it is evident
that, in either case, Love asserted no title. It matters not, under
the peculiar circumstances of this case, whether Love sold his own
land or the land of W. H. Finley, or simply
Page 205 U. S. 201
logs, as, in the first instance, it would work an estoppel of
the assertion of claim now, in the second it would be conclusive
evidence that the land was not claimed by him, and in the third, it
would be equally evidence of the same fact, as, from his own
testimony, it appears that he laid no claim to the land upon which
the logs were situated."
"This decision is not to be understood as holding that Love, in
selling the Finley claim to Rundall, conveyed to the latter any
title, or that Rundall, in selling to Flahive, did so; but it
appearing that this sale was made, it is conclusive evidence that
Love asserted at that time no title in himself, or, if he had prior
to such time asserted title, that by such sale he relinquished all
claim in and to the tract in controversy, and that he is in equity
and good faith estopped from asserting title against the vendee of
the purchaser from him."
"The decision appealed from is therefore affirmed, and the
application of Love to enter the tract in controversy is held
subject to the rights of Annie Flahive, the widow of Michael
Flahive."
Of course, whether there was a sale and what was the thing sold
were matters of fact to be determined by the testimony, and the
findings of the Land Department in that respect are conclusive in
the courts. It is objected by the plaintiff that a sale of a
homestead prior to the issue of patent is void under the statutes
of the United States.
Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.
S. 483. This is undoubtedly the law, and the ruling of
the Secretary was not in conflict with it; but the fact that one
seeking to enter a tract of land as a homestead cannot make a valid
sale thereof is not at all inconsistent with his right to
relinquish his application for the land, and so the Secretary of
the Interior ruled. While public policy may prevent enforcing a
contract of sale, it does not destroy its significance as a
declaration that the vendor no longer claims any rights. He cannot
sell and at the same time deny that he has made a sale. The
government may fairly treat it as a relinquishment -- an
abandonment -- of his application
Page 205 U. S. 202
and entry. No man entering land as a homestead is bound to
perfect his title by occupation. He may abandon it at any time, or
he may in any other satisfactory way relinquish the rights acquired
by his entry. Having done that, he is no longer interested in the
title to the land. That is a matter to be settled between the
government and other applicants. In this case, Love having
relinquished his claim, it does not lie in his mouth to challenge
the action of the government in patenting the land to Mrs.
Flahive.
We see no error in the record, and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Montana is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the decision of this case.