Such is the settled doctrine of this Court. In the leading case
of
Thompson v.
Whitman, 18 Wall. 457,
85 U. S. 468,
the whole question was fully examined in the light of the
authorities. Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court and
delivering its unanimous judgment, stated the conclusion to be
clear that the jurisdiction of a court rendering judgment in one
state may be questioned in a collateral proceeding in another
state,
Page 204 U. S. 16
notwithstanding the averments in the record of the judgment
itself. The Court, among other things, said that, if it be once
conceded that
"the validity of a judgment may be attacked collaterally by
evidence showing that the court had no jurisdiction, it is not
perceived how any allegation contained in the record itself,
however strongly made, can affect the right so to question it. The
very object of the evidence is to invalidate the paper as a record.
If that can be successfully done, no statements contained therein
have any force. If any such statements could be used to prevent
inquiry, a slight form of words might always be adopted so as
effectually to nullify the right of such inquiry. Recitals of this
kind must be regarded like asseverations of good faith in a deed,
which avail nothing if the instrument is shown to be
fraudulent."
This decision was in harmony with previous decisions. Chief
Justice Marshall had long before observed, in
Rose v.
Himely, 4 Cranch 241,
8 U. S. 269,
that, upon principle, the operation of every judgment must depend
on the power of the court to render that judgment. In
Williamson v.
Berry, 8 How. 495,
49 U. S. 540,
it was said to be well settled that the jurisdiction of any court
exercising authority over a subject
"may be inquired into in every other court when the proceedings
in the former are relied upon and brought before the latter by a
party claiming the benefit of such proceedings,"
and that the rule prevails whether
"the decree or judgment has been given in a court of admiralty,
chancery, ecclesiastical court, or court of common law, or whether
the point ruled has arisen under the laws of nations, the practice
in chancery, or the municipal laws of states."
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Story, § 1313,
referring to
Mills v.
Duryee, 7 Cranch 481,
11 U. S. 484,
and to the constitutional requirement as to the faith and credit to
be given to the records and judicial proceedings of a state,
said:
"But this does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the court in which the original judgment was given, to pronounce
it, or the right of the state itself to exercise authority over the
person or the subject matter. The Constitution
Page 204 U. S. 17
did not mean to confer [upon the states] a new power or
jurisdiction, but simply to regulate the effect of the acknowledged
jurisdiction over persons and things within the territory."
In the later case of
Galpin v.
Page, 18 Wall. 350,
85 U. S.
365-366,
85 U. S. 368 --
decided after, but at the same term as,
Thompson v.
Whitman -- the Court, after referring to the general rule as
to the presumption of jurisdiction in superior courts of general
jurisdiction, said that such presumptions
"only arise with respect to jurisdictional facts concerning
which the record is silent. Presumptions are only indulged to
supply the absence of evidence or averments respecting the facts
presumed. They have no place for consideration when the evidence is
disclosed or the averment is made. When, therefore, the record
states the evidence or makes an averment with reference to a
jurisdictional fact, it will be understood to speak the truth on
that point, and it will not be presumed that there was other or
different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was
otherwise than as averred."
In the same case:
"It is a rule as old as the law, and never more to be respected
than now, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had
his day in court, by which is meant until he has been duly cited to
appear,
and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard.
Judgment without such citation and opportunity wants all the
attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation
and oppression, and never can be upheld where justice is justly
administered."
The question of the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania court
being, then, open, on this record, let us see what presumptions
arise from the showing made by it.
The complaint in this case, as we have seen, alleged that, on
the third day of December, 1897, the date of the insurance
certificate, as well as prior and subsequent thereto, the defendant
association engaged in business in Pennsylvania, soliciting
applications for insurance and issuing policies to residents of
that commonwealth. The answer denied each and every material
allegation in the complaint, and such a
Page 204 U. S. 18
denial under the Indiana Code of Civil Procedure was sufficient
to put the plaintiffs upon proof of every fact that was essential
in establishing their cause of action. Thornton's Code Ind., Art.
10, § 47, Title "Pleadings;" Rev.Stat. § 914.
The burden of proof was therefore upon the plaintiffs to show by
what authority the Pennsylvania court could legally enter a
personal judgment against a corporation which, according to the
complaint itself, was a corporation of another state, and was not
alleged to have appeared in person or by an attorney of its own
selection, or to have been personally served with process. This
burden the plaintiffs met by introducing in evidence a complete
transcript of the record of the action in the Pennsylvania court,
from which it appeared: 1. that the defendant association was sued
in the Pennsylvania court as a life insurance association of
Indiana, was alleged to have been engaged in business in
Pennsylvania, and was so engaged before and after the certificate
of insurance in question was issued; 2. that the summons in that
action was served on the Commissioner of Insurance for
Pennsylvania, the defendant association not having appointed an
agent in that commonwealth upon whom process could be served nor
having appeared by an attorney or representative; 3. that, the
Insurance Commissioner not having appeared in the action, judgment
was taken against the defendant, and that is the judgment here in
suit.
It was further made to appear in the present action that, when
the contract of insurance was executed, as well as before and
since, it was provided by a statute of Pennsylvania, approved June
20th, 1883, amendatory of a previous statute of that commonwealth
establishing an insurance department, as follows:
"No insurance company not of this state, nor its agents, shall
do business in this state until it has filed with the Insurance
Commissioner of this state a written stipulation, duly
authenticated by the company, agreeing that any legal process
affecting the company, served on the Insurance Commissioner, or the
party designated by
Page 204 U. S. 19
him, or the agent specified by the company to receive service of
process for said company, shall have the same effect as if served
personally on the company within this state, and, if such company
should cease to maintain such agent in this state so designated,
such process may thereafter be served on the Insurance
Commissioner; but, so long, as any liability of the stipulating
company to any resident of this state continues, such stipulation
cannot be revoked or modified, except that a new one may be
substituted, so as to require or dispense with the service at the
office of the said company within this state, and that such service
of process according to this stipulation shall be sufficient
personal service on the company. The term 'process' shall be
construed to mean and include any and every writ, rule, order,
notice, or decree, including any process of execution that may
issue in or upon any action, suit, or legal proceeding to which
said company may be a party by themselves, or jointly with others,
whether the same shall arise upon a policy of insurance or
otherwise, by or in any other court of this commonwealth having
jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, . . . and, in
default of an agent appointed by the company, as aforesaid, then
the officer so charged with the service of said process shall, in
like manner, deputize the sheriff, constable, or other officer
aforesaid of the county where the agent, if any there be, named by
the Insurance Commissioner, may reside, to serve the same on him,
and, in default of such agent named by such commissioner, as
aforesaid, then in like manner to deputize the sheriff, constable,
or other officer, as aforesaid, of the county where the office of
the Insurance Commissioner may be located, to serve the same on
him, and each and every service so made shall have the same force
and effect, to all intents and purposes, as personal service on
said company in the county where said process issued; . . ."
The defendant association introduced no evidence. If, looking
alone at the pleadings in the Pennsylvania suit, it be taken that
at the time of the contract in question, the
Page 204 U. S. 20
Indiana corporation was engaged in transacting at least
some business in Pennsylvania, without having complied
with the provisions of the above statute of that commonwealth --
that is, without having filed with the Insurance Commissioner the
written stipulation required by that statute -- still plaintiffs
cannot claim, on the present record, the full benefit of the
general rule that the judgment of a court of superior authority,
when proceeding within the general scope of its powers, is presumed
to act rightly within its jurisdiction; that nothing shall be
"intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court but
that which specially appears to be so."
Peacock v. Bell, 1
Saunder 74. When a judgment of a court of superior authority is
attacked collaterally for the want of jurisdiction, such a
presumption cannot be indulged when it affirmatively appears from
the pleadings or evidence that jurisdiction was wanting. We make
this observation in view of the fact, distinctly shown by the
plaintiffs themselves, that the policy of insurance and contract in
question was in fact executed in Indiana, and not in Pennsylvania.
The policy sued on provided as one of its conditions that,
"for all purposes and in all cases, this contract shall be
deemed to have been made at the special office of this association
in the State of Indiana, U.S.A. and all benefits and claims
thereunder shall be payable at such office."
Besides, to the complaint or petition in the Pennsylvania court
was appended the following memorandum signed by the attorney for
the plaintiffs: "The above contract of insurance is governed by the
laws of the State of Indiana, the contract having been entered into
at Indianapolis." And when the suit was brought in Pennsylvania,
the plaintiffs were confronted with the condition in the policy
that
"it is expressly understood and agreed that no action shall be
maintained nor recovery had for any claims under or in virtue of
this policy after the lapse of six months from the death of said
member,"
McNally. More than six months had elapsed after McNally's death
before the suit was instituted in Pennsylvania. In order to obviate
this difficulty, the plaintiffs, in
Page 204 U. S. 21
their declaration or statement in assumpsit in the Pennsylvania
court, alleged that the contract of insurance was governed by the
laws of Indiana, "the contract having been entered into at
Indianapolis, Indiana;" also, that
"said policy of insurance and the contract touching the issuing
the same were executed in the State of Indiana, in which state all
provisions limiting liability on policies where suit is not brought
within a certain time are held void and of no account."
The plaintiffs cannot therefore be heard now to say that the
contract was not, in fact made in Indiana. What they alleged in the
Pennsylvania suit precluded the idea that the contract of insurance
was made in that commonwealth. Indeed, if they had alleged that the
business was transacted in Pennsylvania, their action on the
contract would have been defeated by the condition in the policy
that no suit thereon could be brought on it after the expiration of
six months from the death of the person whose life was insured.
But even if it be assumed that the insurance company was engaged
in some business in Pennsylvania at the time the contract in
question was made, it cannot be held that the company agreed that
service of process upon the Insurance Commissioner of that
commonwealth would alone be sufficient to bring it into court in
respect of all business transacted by it, no matter where, with, or
for the benefit of, citizens of Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly, it was
competent for Pennsylvania to declare that no insurance corporation
should transact business within its limits without filing the
written stipulation specified in its statute.
Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404;
Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168;
Hooper v.
California, 155 U. S. 648,
155 U. S. 653,
and authorities cited;
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,
177 U. S. 28,
177 U. S. 45. It
is equally true that if an insurance corporation of another state
transacts business in Pennsylvania without complying with its
provisions, it will be deemed to have assented to any valid terms
prescribed by that commonwealth as a condition of its right to do
business there, and it will be estopped to say that it had not done
what it should
Page 204 U. S. 22
have done in order that it might lawfully enter that
commonwealth and there exert its corporate powers. In
Railroad Company v.
Harris, 12 Wall. 65, the question was as to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia of a
suit against a corporation in Maryland whose railroad entered the
District with the consent of Congress. This Court said:
"It [the corporation] cannot migrate, but may exercise its
authority in a foreign territory upon such conditions as may be
prescribed by the law of the place. One of these conditions may be
that it shall consent to be sued there. If it do business there, it
will be presumed to have assented, and will be bound
accordingly."
This language was cited and approved in
Chicago
& N.W. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270,
80 U. S. 285.
The same question was before the court in
Ex Parte
Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369,
96 U. S. 376,
and the principle announced in the
Harris and
Whitton cases was approved. In the
Schollenberger
case, the Pennsylvania statute here in question was involved. To
the same effect are the following cases:
Ehrman v. Teutonia
Ins. Co., 1 McCrary 123, 129;
Knapp, Stout & Co. v.
Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 F. 607; Berry v. Knights Templars'
& M. Life Indemnity Co. 46 F. 439, 441-442;
Diamond Plate
Glass Co. v. Minneapolis Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 55 F. 27;
Stewart v. Harmon, 98 F. 190, 192.
Conceding, then, that, by going into Pennsylvania without first
complying with its statute, the defendant association may be held
to have assented to the service upon the Insurance Commissioner of
process in a suit brought against it there in respect of business
transacted by it in that commonwealth, such assent cannot properly
be implied where it affirmatively appears, as it does here, that
the business was not transacted in Pennsylvania. Indeed, the
Pennsylvania statute, upon its face, is only directed against
insurance companies who do business in that commonwealth -- "in
this state." While the highest considerations of public policy
demand that an insurance corporation, entering a state in defiance
of a statute
Page 204 U. S. 23
which lawfully prescribes the terms upon which it may exert its
powers there, should be held to have assented to such terms as to
business there transacted by it, it would be going very far to
imply, and we do not imply, such assent as to business transacted
in another state, although citizens of the former state may be
interested in such business.
As the suit in the Pennsylvania court was upon a contract
executed in Indiana; as the personal judgment in that court against
the Indiana corporation was only upon notice to the Insurance
Commissioner, without any legal notice to the defendant
association, and without its having appeared in person or by
attorney or by agent in the suit, and as the act of the
Pennsylvania court in rendering the judgment must be deemed that of
the state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
* we hold that the
judgment in Pennsylvania was not entitled to the faith and credit
which, by the Constitution, is required to be given to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the several states, and
was void as wanting in due process of law.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana must therefore be
reversed, with directions for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
*
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
100 U. S.
346-347;
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.
S. 370;
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356;
Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565;
Chicago, B &c. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.
S. 226,
166 U. S.
233-234.