Under § 1986, Rev.Stat., a commissioner of the United States is
not entitled to any fees for drawing complaints or jurats thereto
charging offenses under ch. 7, Title 70, Rev.Stat., unless the
complaints are served; there is no case within the meaning of §
1986 unless there be an arrest and examination. The fee provided by
§ 1986 covers all services, and unless earned, the commissioner
gets no other and is not entitled to compensation under § 847,
Rev.Stat., which as well as § 823 and 828 are supplanted in this
class of cases by § 1986.
Where the United States commissioner is also supervisor of
election, he is not entitled to compensation for certifying the
complaints from himself in one capacity to himself in another
capacity under § 2027, Rev.Stat.
When a commissioner applies on an account for an additional sum
for services in which he has already been improperly allowed
certain amounts, the United States may counterclaim for the amount
already so allowed as an offset against the amount actually due the
commissioner notwithstanding the approval of his account by the
United States Circuit Court, "subject to revision by the accounting
officers of the United States Treasury," and, under § 1059,
Rev.Stat., and § 1, cl. 2 of the Act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, the
counterclaim may include payments made after the filing of the
commissioner's claim.
26 Ct.Cl. 445 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a claim made by a commissioner of the United States
circuit court for services rendered between January 29, 1886,
Page 204 U. S. 582
and January 20, 1892, charges for which were disallowed by the
officers of the Treasury Department. It is necessary to state only
the items and matters now in controversy. Item 1, so far as
disallowed by the Court of Claims, is for drawing complaints which
charged offenses under the Revised Statutes, title "Crimes" (70) c.
7 (Crimes against the Elective Franchise and Civil Rights of
Citizens) and upon which warrants never were served "because
inquiry developed no offense had been committed." The disallowed
portion of item 2 is for drawing jurats to similar complaints of
which the same facts were true. Item 11 is for certifying
complaints for offenses under said c. 7, the claimant being the
chief supervisor of elections, to whom, he, as commissioner,
certified the complaints. Item 20 is for filing and entering
similar complaints, in civil rights proceedings, where the warrants
were returned unexecuted by the marshal. Item 23 is for drawing
depositions for complaints in similar proceedings, where "no
warrant issued as the result of scrutiny of lists of voters by
commissioner and inquiries at residences." These are the disallowed
claims brought here by this appeal.
By Rev.Stat. § 1986, district attorneys and others mentioned are
to be paid for their services under the provisions for enforcing
said c. 7 "the same fees as are allowed to them for like services
in other cases." The sentence then goes on:
"and where the proceedings are before a commissioner, he shall
be entitled to a fee of ten dollars for his services in each case,
inclusive of all services incident to the arrest and
examination."
It is established and admitted that this fee is not earned
(because there is not a "case" within the meaning of the section)
unless there be an arrest and an examination.
Southworth v.
United States, 151 U. S. 179,
151 U. S. 185,
161 U. S. 161 U.S.
639. And again, it is plain that the fee, when it is earned, covers
all services, as sufficiently appears from the contrast to the
allowance of the usual fees to others in the earlier part of the
same sentence and from the final words of the entitling clause.
These two propositions granted, it seems to us not
Page 204 U. S. 583
to need argument to conclude that, unless the fee is earned, the
commissioner gets no other. This section having supplanted the
usual provisions of §§ 823, 828, § 847 for the cases to which it
refers, cannot be held to leave open a resort to § 847 when the
conditions attached to the substituted compensation are not
fulfilled. This disposes of all items except 11, which stands on a
different ground. As to that, a few words are enough. By Rev.Stat.
§ 2027, it was the claimant's duty as commissioner to forward the
original complaint, etc. to the chief supervisor for the judicial
district. As he was supervisor as well as commissioner, this
section merely required a change in the character of his custody.
No certificate was necessary, and if the complaints were certified,
it can have been only for the purpose of charging fees. But
further, if that duty had been added to the others in connection
with cases covered by § 1986, the mere fact that the addition was
by a later statute would not break in upon the rule established by
§ 1986 that the compensation for all the services was entire.
The first item is not for the whole service of drawing the
complaints. It admits the receipt of fifteen cents per folio and
demands five cents more on the strength of cases decided after the
claimant had been paid upon his former account.
United States
v. Ewing, 140 U. S. 142;
United States v. Barber, 140 U. S. 164.
These cases being decisions under Rev.Stat. § 847, are not in
point. But, if that be in any way material, they had the effect of
inducing the applicant to open his account. The present is called a
new account in argument, to be sure. But it is hard to conceive a
more distinct opening than the demand of money in addition to sums
received at the time as full payment for indivisible items. On the
claimant's own view of his rights, there were not two charges for
each folio, one for fifteen cents and another for five. He asserted
one indivisible right on which he had been paid fifteen cents in
full, and he now said that that was not enough. The United States,
by way of counterclaim to this attempt
Page 204 U. S. 584
to get additional pay, demanded the sums already paid to the
claimant contrary to the principle that we have laid down, and the
Court of Claims allowed an offset of $3,120, found to have been
paid by mistake, against the larger sum that it found due to the
claimant. We see no reason to doubt the right of the United States,
or the legality of its asserting that right by counterclaim.
Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. United States, 164 U.
S. 190;
United States v. Burchard, 125 U.
S. 176;
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.
S. 426. It is urged that the account was approved by the
United States circuit court. The account was approved, "subject to
revision by the accounting officers of the United States Treasury"
only. On the findings on which the case comes before us, this
qualified approval has no weight. One portion of the counterclaim
is for dates later than the filing of the claim. But, in view of
the broad language of the statutes ("all set-offs, counterclaims,
claims for damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, or other
demands whatsoever," Rev.Stat. § 1059, clause "second;" Act of
March 3, 1887, c. 359, § 1, clause "second"), we are of opinion
that it properly was allowed with the rest.
The case was elaborately argued at the bar, and is discussed at
length in printed briefs. We have examined all the details of the
latter, but do not deem it necessary to add more to the careful
consideration that the case received in the Court of Claims.
Judgment affirmed.