The mere assertion of a federal right and its denial do not
justify this Court in assuming jurisdiction where it indubitably
appears that the federal right is frivolous and without color of
merit, and this rule applies to cases brought to this Court under
the Act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. 85, from the District Court of
the United States for Porto Rico.
Under § 34 of the Act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. 85, regular
terms of the United States district court are to be held at Ponce
and San Juan at the time fixed by the act and the same character of
terms at Mayaguez at times specially designated by the court. The
terms held at Mayaguez are not special terms at which jury cases
cannot be tried, as distinguished from regular terms, and § 670,
Rev.Stat., does not apply to such terms of that court.
Julio P. Castro, defendant in error, was plaintiff in the court
below, and the plaintiff in error, the American Railroad Company, a
New York corporation doing business in Porto Rico, was defendant.
The action was commenced by the filing of a complaint in the office
of the clerk of the court at Mayaguez, Porto Rico. Damages in the
sum of $15,000 were prayed, because of the alleged negligent
killing of the daughter of the plaintiff by a train of the company,
whilst she, with other persons, was attempting to pass, in a
vehicle, over the railroad of the defendant at a point where it
intersected a public highway leading from the Town of San German to
the Town of Mayaguez.
A demurrer to the complaint was filed, and also the following
plea to the jurisdiction of the court
"Defendant in the above-entitled action comes now by its
attorney, F. H. Dexter, and objects to the jurisdiction
Page 204 U. S. 454
of this court to try this cause under the terms and provisions
of § 670 of the Revised Statutes of the United States for the
reason that all terms of this court held in the City of Mayaguez,
under and by virtue of the terms and provisions of the Act of April
12, 1900 , creating a civil government in Porto Rico, and
particularly the present term at which the above cause is set for
trial, is a special term of this Court, and therefore this court is
without jurisdiction to try the issues in this cause by a
jury."
"Wherefore defendant prays for an order either dismissing this
cause or transferring the same for trial at a regular term of this
court to be held at either San Juan or Ponce."
After the entry of an order overruling the demurrer and the plea
to jurisdiction, an answer was filed and the case was tried by a
jury. A verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
of $1,600. The objection to jurisdiction was renewed in a motion to
arrest the judgment, and, after the overruling thereof, a bill of
exceptions was settled by the trial judge containing exceptions
taken during the trial to the admission and rejection of evidence
and to instructions given and refused. The case was then brought to
this Court.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the Act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 85, c. 191), the general
rule governing the right of this Court to review by writs of error
or appeal final decisions of the District Court of the United
States for Porto Rico was made as to amount
Page 204 U. S. 455
to conform to that obtaining as to the territories of the United
States,
viz., $5,000. As this case does not involve the
requisite jurisdictional amount, it follows that the right of
review does not exist unless the case is within the provision of
the statute conferring jurisdiction to review in this Court "in all
cases where . . . an act of Congress is brought in question and the
right claimed thereunder is denied."
It has been settled that where, in the course of litigation
pending in the court just referred to, a party asserts a right
under an act of Congress, the act "is brought in question," and
when the right so claimed is denied, the case can be brought here.
Serralles v. Esbri, 200 U. S. 103;
Rodriguez v. United States, 198 U.
S. 156;
Crowley v. United States, 194
U. S. 466.
It is undoubted that the plea to the jurisdiction filed and
insisted upon below asserted on the record a right under an act of
Congress, which right was denied. But, in harmony with the rule
which governs where a right under the Constitution, etc., of the
United States is asserted in a case which is brought to this Court
from a state court, and in accord with the same rule which also
governs cases originally brought in a court of the United States
(
New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U.
S. 336, and cases cited;
Newburyport Water Co. v.
Newburyport, 193 U. S. 561), we
are of opinion that the mere assertion of a federal right and its
denial do not justify our assuming jurisdiction where it
indubitably appears that the federal right asserted is frivolous --
that is, without color or merit. We think the case at bar is of
this character.
As appears in the Revised Statutes, it has been the uniform
practice of Congress to fix both the time and place for holding
sessions of the district and circuit courts of the United States,
which, for convenience of expression, have been styled the regular
terms of court. Rev.Stat. §§ 572, 658. Upon the district judge has
also been conferred the power of designating the time and place of
holding special terms of the district
Page 204 U. S. 456
court, in which any business might be transacted which might be
disposed of at a regular term. Rev.Stat. sec. 581. The asserted
application to the district court of Porto Rico of the provision as
to special terms of the circuit courts is that upon which was
rested the claim of statutory right to exemption from a trial of
the cause by jury at Mayaguez, which was denied by the court below,
and forms the basis for the contention that this Court must
exercise jurisdiction to pass upon the assigned errors. The section
reads as follows:
"SEC. 670. At any special term of a circuit court in any
district in Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia,
and Wisconsin, any business may be transacted which might be
transacted at any regular term of such court. At any special term
of a circuit court in any other district, it shall be competent for
the court to entertain jurisdiction of, and to hear and decide, all
cases in equity, cases in error or on appeal, issues of law,
motions in arrest of judgment, motions for a new trial, and all
other motions, and to award executions and other final process, and
to do and transact all other business and direct all other
proceedings in all causes pending in the circuit court, except
trying any cause by a jury, in the same way and with the same
effect as the same might be done at any regular session of said
court."
The application of this section, it is contended, results from
the concluding words of the following portion of § 34 of the Act of
April 12, 1900:
"The District Court of the United States for Porto Rico . . .
shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district
courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in
the circuit courts of the United States, and shall proceed therein
in the same manner as a circuit court."
"Rev.Stat. sec. 670 is to be interpreted in the light of section
669, reading as follows:"
"SEC 669. In the districts not mentioned in the five preceding
sections [California, Oregon, Nevada, Kentucky, Indiana,
Page 204 U. S. 457
Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin being the
districts mentioned], the presiding judge of any circuit court may
appoint special sessions thereof, to be held at the places where
the regular sessions are held."
Keeping in mind that the substantially uniform rule stated in
Rev.Stat. §§ 664 to 669 requires the holding of special terms of a
circuit court at the place where the regular sessions are
authorized to be held, it follows that a special term of a circuit
court of the United States, as the expression is employed in
Rev.Stat. § 670, is a session ordered for the disposal of business,
supplementary to a regular term, and to be held at the place fixed
by Congress for holding such regular term. When the plain result of
the legislation just referred to is noted, it is apparent that
there is no color whatever for the pretension that Rev.Stat. sec.
670 had any possible application to the term at which this case was
tried. That term was held under authority conferred by that portion
of sec. 34 of the Act of April 12, 1900, where, referring to the
district court of Porto Rico, it was provided:
"Regular terms of said court shall be held in San Juan
commencing on the second Monday in April and October of each year,
and also at Ponce on the second Monday in January of each year, and
special terms may be held at Mayaguez at such other stated times as
said judge may deem expedient."
On the face of this provision it is apparent that it was the
intention of Congress to authorize the holding of sessions of the
court at Mayaguez at times to be specially designated by the
district judge. It cannot be said that the word "special" in the
act was intended to affix to the terms authorized by Congress to be
held at Mayaguez the character of special terms, as
contradistinguished from regular terms, within the purview of
Rev.Stat. sec. 670 without reducing the statute to an absurdity,
for unless the act authorized the holding of regular terms at
Mayaguez, it would be impossible to conceive of the holding of
special terms at that place in the sense of Rev.Stat. sec. 670.
What the provision in question plainly
Page 204 U. S. 458
meant was that regular terms should be held at Ponce and San
Juan at the times fixed by Congress in the statute and that the
same character of term might be held at Mayaguez at a time to be
specially designated by the district judge.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
