Admiralty courts, being free to work out their own system and to
finish the adjustment of maritime rights, have jurisdiction of an
action for contribution for damages paid to third parties as the
result of a collision for which both vessels were in fault. The
claim is of admiralty origin. The division of damages in admiralty
extends to what one of the vessels pays to the owners of cargo on
the other vessel jointly in fault.
The right of division of damages to vessels when both are in
fault and the contingent claim to partial indemnity for payment of
damage to cargo are separable, and the decree of division in the
original suit, the pleadings in which do not set up such claim for
indemnity, is not a bar to a subsequent suit brought to enforce
it.
142 F. 9 reversed.
Page 204 U. S. 221
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 204 U. S. 223
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a libel in admiralty, brought by the petitioner as
successor in corporate identity to the Union Steamboat Company, to
recover a part of a sum paid by it to the respondent
Page 204 U. S. 224
as the result of previous admiralty proceedings which came
before this Court several times. The former proceedings were begun
by the respondent, as owner of the propeller
Conemaugh and
bailee of her cargo, to recover for damages to both by a collision
between her and the propeller
New York. After hearings
below, 53 F. 553, 82 F. 819, it was decided by this Court on
certiorari that both vessels were in fault, and that the
representatives of the cargo could recover their whole damages from
the
New York. The
New York, 175 U.
S. 187. Thereupon the district court entered a decree
dividing the damages sustained by the steamers, requiring the
New York to pay to the
Conemaugh on that account
$13,083.33 and interest, and further required it to pay all the
damages to the cargo of the latter -- the insurers on cargo who had
intervened receiving their share, and the
Conemaugh
receiving the residue as trustee. The owners of the
New
York then applied to this Court for a mandamus directing the
district court to divide the damages to cargo. This was denied on
the ground that, if the court below erred, the remedy was by
appeal.
Ex Parte Union Steamboat Company, 178 U.
S. 317. Upon that intimation, an appeal was taken to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and after a motion
to dismiss had been denied, 104 F. 561, the decree was affirmed,
108 F. 102. On a second certiorari, that decree was affirmed by
this Court.
189 U. S. 189 U.S.
363. The
New York paid the damages and brought this
suit.
The ground of the last-mentioned decree was that the claim of
the
New York was not open, and the circuit court of
appeals denied leave to amend the pleadings for the reason that the
petitioner would be left free to assert its claim in an independent
proceeding. 108 F. 107. In the present case, the district court
followed this expression of the circuit court of appeals, and made
a decree giving the petitioner one-half of the damages paid by it
on account of cargo. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, however,
Page 204 U. S. 225
before which the present case came on appeal, held that the
whole matter was
res judicata by the final decree in the
former cause, and ordered the libel dismissed. 142 F. 9. Thereupon
a third certiorari was granted by this Court, and the record is now
before us.
The respondent set up three defenses, below and here. It argued
that there was no jurisdiction in admiralty over the claim in its
present form, that the petitioner had no case upon the merits, and
that it was concluded by the former decree. The circuit court of
appeals decided against the first two points before sustaining the
third. We shall take them up in their order. The jurisdiction
appears to us tolerably plain. If it be assumed that the right to
contribution is an incident of the joint liability in admiralty,
and is not
res judicata, it would be a mere historical
anomaly if the admiralty courts were not free to work out their own
system, and to finish the adjustment of maritime rights and
liabilities. Indeed, we imagine that this would not have been
denied very strenuously had the question been raised by proper
pleadings in connection with the original suit. But if the right is
not barred by the former decree, it would be still more anomalous
to send the parties to a different tribunal to secure that right at
this stage. For the decree was correct as far as it went, and, by
the hypothesis, might stop where it did without impairing the claim
to contribution. That claim is of admiralty origin, and must be
satisfied before complete justice is done. It cannot be that,
because the admiralty has carried out a part of its theory of
justice, it is prevented by that fact alone from carrying out the
rest.
See The Mariska, 107 F. 989.
On the merits also we have no great difficulty. The rule of the
common law, even, that there is no contribution between wrongdoers,
is subject to exception. Pollock, Torts, 7th ed.195, 196. Whatever
its origin, the admiralty rule in this country is well known to be
the other way.
The North Star, 106 U. S.
17;
The Sterling, 106 U.
S. 647; Admiralty Rule, 59.
Compare The
Frankland L.R. Probate [1901] 161.
Page 204 U. S. 226
And it is established, as it logically follows, that the
division of damages extends to what one of the parties pays to the
owners of cargo on board the other.
The Chattahoochee,
173 U. S. 540. The
right to the division of the latter element does not stand on
subrogation, but arises directly from the tort. The liability of
the
New York, under our practice, for all the damage to
cargo was one of the consequences plainly to be foreseen, and,
since the
Conemaugh was answerable to the
New
York as a partial cause of the tort, its responsibility
extended to all the manifest consequences for which, on the general
ground that they were manifest, the
New York could be
held. Therefore the contract relations between the
Conemaugh and her cargo have nothing to do with the case.
See The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540.
More specifically, the last-named vessel's liability to the
New
York is not affected by provisions in the
Conemaugh's
bills of lading, giving her the benefit of insurance, and requiring
notice of any claim for damage to be made in writing within thirty
days, and suit to be brought within three months.
It only remains, then, to consider whether the petitioner is
concluded by the former decree. If the liability of the
Conemaugh arises, as we have said, out of the tort, then
it is said to follow that the
New York either is
attempting to split up its cause of action or to recover in excess
of a decree covering the case. It is true that the
New
York was the defendant in the former suit, but the damage to
the
New York was allowed for in the division. If the
allowance was by way of recoupment, then it may be said that the
New York, by asserting a counterclaim for its damages,
bound itself to present its whole claim to the same extent as if it
had brought the suit -- at least, until it had neutralized the
claim made against it in the
Conemaugh's own right. If the
allowance was because division is the very form and condition of
any claim for damage to vessels in case of mutual fault,
The
North Star, 106 U. S. 17;
Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular & Oriental
Steam Navigation Co., 7 App.Cas. 795, 801, 806, and the mutual
rights
Page 204 U. S. 227
cancel each other
pro tanto as they arise, just as in
an account current, as distinguished from set-off, then it might be
contended that the claim in respect of the payment of damage to
cargo is an item in the same account with the one for damage to the
ship, and that a decree as to one involves a disposition of the
other, and makes the whole matter
res judicata. See
The Manitoba, 122 U. S. 97,
122 U. S.
111.
But, whatever be the technical theory, the right of a defendant
to a division of the damage to the vessels when both are in fault,
and its contingent claim to partial indemnity for payment of damage
to cargo, must be separable, from the necessity of to case. To
illustrate. Suppose, in a case of collision, one vessel to be sued
for damage to the other vessel alone. It could not set up the
possibility that the cargo owners might sue sometime within six
years and suspend the decree on the ground that otherwise the
defendant might be barred from demanding indemnity in case the
cargo owners should sue and succeed. If cargo owners should sue one
or the other vessels after a division of the damages to the vessels
themselves, it must be that the libellee would be free to require
the other to exonerate or indemnify it to the same extent as if no
such division had taken place. It would be impossible to do justice
otherwise. As to the English law,
see Stoomvaart Maatschappy
Nederland v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 7
App.Cas. 795, 806.
If we are right, then this is a strong case for holding that the
petitioner is not barred. It stands adjudicated that its pleadings
did not open its present claim. They could not have done so,
because, at that stage, the petitioner not having paid, it had no
claim for indemnity, but only for exoneration. It was not bound to
adopt the procedure permitted to it by Rule 59. It did ask leave to
amend so as to protect its rights, but was met by the argument of
the respondent and the opinion of the circuit court of appeals that
it could bring a new suit. This Court said the same thing in
affirming the decree against the
New York. "If, as between
her and the
Conemaugh,
Page 204 U. S. 228
she have a claim for recoupment, the way is open to recover it."
189 U. S. 189
U.S. 368. The same proposition was implied in
The Juniata,
93 U. S. 337,
93 U. S. 340.
Every consideration leads us to adhere to this statement in the
circumstances of the case at bar.
Decree of circuit court of appeals reversed.
Decree of district court affirmed.