The petitioner was tried in the District Court for Comanche
County in the Territory of Oklahoma. The first ground now relied
upon is that the court was not duly organized under the act of
Congress requiring the supreme court to define the judicial
districts and to fix the times and places at each county seat where
the district court shall be held. The order of the supreme court
went no further in the way of fixing the place than to specify
Lawton for the County of Comanche. This order was made on January
15, 1902, about six months after the land, which had been Indian
territory, was opened for settlement and the county created. At
that time and at the time of the trial, there were no county or
court buildings in the county. The order of the supreme court was
as precise as the circumstances permitted it to be, and the failure
to specify a building did not go to the jurisdiction of the trial
court. There is no pretense that the petitioner lost any
opportunities by reason of no building's being named.
The next ground argued is that the laws of the territory were
not followed in the selection of the grand jury because the persons
selected were not electors of the territory, and some of them were
nonresidents, with other subordinate matters. The order for the
summons stated the reason, which was that there had been no
election held in the county, and there were no names of jurors in
the jury box; whereupon the presiding judge ordered the sheriff to
summon twenty persons from the body of the county. We have heard no
answer to the material portion of the reasoning of the circuit
court of appeals
Page 203 U. S. 104
upon this point. If the Legislature of Oklahoma had prescribed
the method of selection followed, that method would not have
violated the Constitution or any law or treaty of the United
States. If it did prescribe a different one, a departure from that
was a violation of the territorial enactment alone. The acts of the
Legislature of Oklahoma are not laws of the United States within
the meaning of Rev.Stat. § 753. If any laws have been violated, it
is the latter one. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to
release on this ground under Rev.Stat. § 753. The Fifth Amendment,
requiring the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, does not
take up unto itself the local law as to how the grand jury should
be made up, and raise the latter to a constitutional requirement.
See Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638. It
is unnecessary to consider whether the judge went beyond his powers
under the circumstances.
See Clawson v. United States,
114 U. S. 477. But
it is proper to add that, while the reason which we have given is
logically the first to be considered by this Court, we do not mean
to give any countenance to the notion that, if the law was
disobeyed, it affected the jurisdiction of the court.
Ex Parte
Harding, 120 U. S. 782;
In re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575.
The third ground on which the jurisdiction of the trial court is
denied is that, on August 4, 1901, the date of the commission of
the crime, the place was within territory not embraced in any
organized county, and was attached for judicial purposes to
Canadian County. By the Oklahoma Organic Act, May 2, 1890, c. 182,
§ 9, 26 Stat. 85, 86, this is provided for, and by § 10, such
offenses shall be tried in the county to which the territory "shall
be attached." It is argued that there had been no law passed
changing the place of trial or affecting the order of the supreme
court attaching the territory to Canadian County. But the very
words quoted from § 10 look to the state of things at the time of
trial. At that time, Comanche County had been organized, and a term
of court fixed for it by the order of the supreme court dated
January 15, 1902. The meaning of this order, so far as the
Page 203 U. S. 105
power of the supreme court went, is plain. The statute gave the
petitioner no vested right to be tried in Canadian County, and his
trial in Comanche County conformed to its intent.
See Post v.
United States, 161 U. S. 583.
The fourth ground is that, as the crime was committed on August
4, 1901, two days before the opening of the land for settlement,
the place was still under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, and therefore the crime was punishable under Rev.Stat. §
5339 alone. The order of the President with regard to the
conditions of settlement and entry are referred to as confirming
the argument. But those orders were intended merely to carry out
the acts of Congress governing the matter. There is no doubt that
congress was exercising control so far as settlement was concerned.
But there is equally little doubt that the title to the territory
had passed, that it had become part of the Territory of Oklahoma,
and, as such, no longer under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States within Rev.Stat. § 5339. Act of May 2, 1890, c. 182,
§§ 1, 4, 6, 26 Stat. 81; Act of June 6, 1900, c. 813, 31 Stat. 677;
Act of March 3, 1901, c. 846, 31 Stat. 1093.
See Bates v.
Clark, 95 U. S. 204;
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 952;
Ex Parte
Moran, 144 F. 594, 602. Therefore, the application of the
territorial statute was not excluded, and the murder was a
violation of the territorial law.
Finally, it is contended that the petitioner was compelled to be
a witness against himself, contrary to the Fifth Amendment, because
he was compelled to stand up and walk before the jury and because,
during a recess, the jury was stationed so as to observe his size
and walk. If this was an error, as to which we express no opinion,
it did not go to the jurisdiction of the court.
Felts v.
Murphy, 201 U. S. 123.
Rule discharged. Writs denied.