The right to legislate in the territories being conferred under
constitutional authority, by Congress, the passage of a territorial
law is the exertion of an authority exercised under the United
States, and the validity of such authority is involved where the
right of the legislature to pass an act is challenged, and, in such
a case, if any sum or value is in dispute, an appeal lies to this
Court from the Supreme Court of a territory under § 2 of the Act of
March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 443, even though the sum or value be less
than $6,000.
Page 203 U. S. 39
The right of a shipper to have his goods transported by a common
carrier is a valuable right measurable in money, and an appeal
involving such a right of which this Court otherwise has
jurisdiction under § 2 of the Act of March 3, 1885, will not be
dismissed because no sum or value is involved.
The provision in § 10, Article I, of the Constitution of the
United States that states shall not lay imposts and duties on
imports and exports is not contravened by a state inspection law
applicable only to goods shipped to other states, and not to goods
directly shipped to foreign countries.
A state or territory has the right to legislate for the safety
and welfare of its people, which is not taken from it because of
the exclusive right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
and an inspection law affecting interstate commerce is not for that
reason invalid unless it is in conflict with an act of Congress or
an attempt to regulate interstate commerce.
Patapsco Guano Co.
v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U.
S. 345, followed.
The law of March 19, 1901, of the Territory of New Mexico making
it an offense for any railroad company to receive, for shipment
beyond the limits of the territory hides which had not been
inspected as required by the law is not unconstitutional as an
unwarranted regulation of, or burden on, interstate commerce.
This Court will take judicial notice of the fact that cattle run
at large in the great stretches of country in the West, identified
only as to ownership by brands, and of the necessity for, and use
of, branding of such cattle, and will not strike down state or
territorial legislation, essential for prevention of crime,
requiring the inspection of hides tax be shipped without the state,
although the act does not require such inspection of hides not to
be so shipped.
The exercise of the police power may and should have reference
to the peculiar situation and needs of the community, and is not
necessarily invalid because it may have the effect of levying a tax
upon the property affected if its main purpose is to protect the
people against fraud and wrong.
The law being otherwise valid, the amount of the inspection fee
is not a judicial question; it rests with the legislature to fix
the amount, and will only present a valid objection if so
unreasonable and disproportionate to the services rendered as to
attack the good faith of the law.
78 P. 74 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 203 U. S. 46
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico affirming the judgment of the District Court of Santa Fe
County sustaining a motion to quash an alternative writ of mandamus
issued on the relation of E. J. McLean & Company against the
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company.
Page 203 U. S. 47
From the allegations of the writ, it appears that the relators,
the appellants here, had delivered to the railroad company at Santa
Fe, New Mexico, a bale of hides consigned to Denver, Colorado, a
point on the line of the defendant's railroad. The railroad company
refused to receive and ship the hides for the reason that they did
not bear the evidence of inspection required by the act of the
Legislature of New Mexico approved March 19, 1901, which act, to be
more fully noticed hereafter, made it an offense for any railroad
company to receive hides for shipment beyond the limits of the
territory which had not been inspected within the requirements of
the law.
An objection is made to the jurisdiction of this Court upon the
ground that the case is not appealable under the Act of Congress of
March 3, 1885. 23 Stat. 443.
Section 1 of the act provides, in substance, that no appeal or
writ of error shall be allowed from any judgment or decree of the
supreme court of a territory unless the matter in dispute,
exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of $5,000. Section 2 of the act
makes exception to the application of section 1 as to the sum in
dispute, in cases wherein is involved the validity of a treaty or
statute of or authority exercised under the United States, and in
all such cases an appeal or writ of error will lie without regard
to the sum or value in dispute.
Confessedly, $5,000 is not involved, and in order to be
appealable to this Court, the case must involve the validity of an
authority exercised under the United States, and also be a
controversy in which some sum or value is involved. This Court, in
the case of
United States v. Lynch, 137 U.
S. 280,
137 U. S. 285,
laid down the test of the right to appeal under the statute in the
following terms:
"The validity of a statute, or the validity of an authority, is
drawn in question when the existence or constitutionality or
legality of such statute or authority is denied and the denial
forms the subject of direct inquiry."
The right to legislate in the territories is conferred under
Page 203 U. S. 48
constitutional authority by the Congress of the United States,
and the passage of a territorial law is the exertion of an
authority exercised under the United States. While this act was
passed in pursuance of the authority given by the United States to
the territorial legislature, it is contended by the relators below,
appellants here, that it violates the Constitution of the United
States, and is therefore invalid, although it is an attempted
exercise of power conferred by Congress upon the territory. The
objection of the relator to the law raises a controversy as to the
right of the legislature to pass it under the broad power of
legislation conferred by Congress upon the territory. In other
words, the validity of an authority exercised under the United
States in the passage and enforcement of this law is directly
challenged, and the case does involve the validity of an authority
exercised under the power derived from the United States. It is not
a case merely involving the construction of a legislative act of
the territory, as was the fact in
Snow v. United States,
118 U. S. 346. The
power to pass the act at all, in view of the requirements of the
Constitution of the United States, is the subject matter of
controversy, and brings the case in this aspect within the second
section of the act.
Is there any sum or value in dispute in this case? While the act
does not prescribe the amount, some sum or value must be in
dispute.
Albright v. New Mexico, 200 U. S.
9. The matter in dispute is the right to have the goods
which were tendered for shipment transported to their destination.
As a common carrier, the railroad was bound to receive and
transport the goods. Its refusal so to do was based upon the
statute in question because of the noninspection of the goods
tendered. The relators claimed the right to have their goods
transported because the statute was null and void, being an
unconstitutional enactment. The controversy therefore relates to
the right of the appellants to have their goods transported by the
railroad company to the place of destination. We think this was a
valuable right, measurable
Page 203 U. S. 49
in money. At common law, a cause of action arose from the
refusal of a common carrier to transport goods duly tendered for
carriage. Ordinarily the measure of damages in such case is the
difference between the value of the goods at the point of tender
and their value at their proposed destination, less the cost of
carriage. We are of the opinion that this controversy involves a
money value within the meaning of the statute, and the motion to
dismiss the appeal will be overruled.
Passing to the merits of the controversy, Congress has conferred
legislative power upon the territory to an extent not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Rev.Stat. §
1851. It is contended that the act under consideration contravenes
that part of Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the
United States which reads:
"No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."
And also that part of the eighth section of Article I of the
Constitution of the United States which gives to Congress the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the states,
and with the Indian tribes.
As to the objection predicated on Section 10 of Article I, that
section can have no application to the present case, as that
provision directly applies only to articles imported or exported to
foreign countries.
Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board
of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345,
171 U. S. 350,
and cases cited. Moreover, that paragraph of the Constitution
expressly reserves the right of the states to pass inspection laws,
and if this law is of that character, it does not run counter to
this requirement of the Constitution.
The question principally argued is as to the effect of this law
upon interstate commerce, and it is urged that it is in violation
of the Constitution, because it undertakes to regulate interstate
commerce, and lays upon it a tax not within the power of the local
legislature to exact. It has been too frequently decided by this
Court to require the restatement
Page 203 U. S. 50
of the decisions that the exclusive power to regulate interstate
commerce is vested by the Constitution in Congress, and that other
laws which undertake to regulate such commerce or impose burdens
upon it are invalid. This doctrine has been reaffirmed and
announced in cases decided as recently as the last term of this
Court.
Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. Mayes,
201 U. S. 321;
McNeill v. Southern Railway Co., 202 U.
S. 543. While this is true, it is equally well settled
that a state or a territory, for the same reasons, in the exercise
of the police power, may make rules and regulations not conflicting
with the legislation of Congress upon the same subject, and not
amounting to regulations of interstate commerce. It will only be
necessary to refer to a few of the many cases decided in this Court
holding valid enactments of legislatures having for their object
the protection, welfare, and safety of the people, although such
laws may have an effect upon interstate commerce.
M., K. &
T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613,
169 U. S. 635;
Chicago, Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.
S. 133;
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes,
191 U. S. 477. The
principle decided in these cases is that a state or territory has
the right to legislate for the safety and welfare of its people,
and that this right is not taken from it because of the exclusive
right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, except in cases
where the attempted exercise of authority by the legislature is in
conflict with an act of Congress, or is an attempt to regulate
interstate commerce. In
Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina
Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345, it
was directly recognized that the state might pass inspection laws
for the protection of its people against fraudulent practices and
for the suppression of frauds, although such legislation had an
effect upon interstate commerce. The same principle was recognized
in
Neilson v. Garza, 2 Woods 287 -- a case decided by Mr.
Justice Bradley on the circuit and quoted from at length with
approval by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER in the
Patapsco
case.
Applying the principles recognized in these cases to the
Page 203 U. S. 51
case at bar, does the act in question do violence to the
exclusive right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce? We
take judicial notice of the fact that, in the Territory of New
Mexico and in other similar parts of the West, cattle are required
to be branded in order to identify their ownership, and that they
run at large in great stretches of country with no other means of
determining their separate ownership than by the brands or marks
upon them. In view of these considerations, and for the purpose of
protecting the owners of cattle against fraud and criminal seizures
of their property, the Territory of New Mexico has made provision,
by means of a system of laws enacted for the purpose, for the
protection of the ownership of cattle and the prevention of
fraudulent appropriations of this kind of property. The legislation
upon the subject in the territory is thus summarized in the
opinion, in this case, of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, 78 P.
74:
"The first act relating to inspection of hides was passed in
1884, and provided that all butchers should keep a record of all
animals slaughtered, and keep the hides and horns of such animals
for thirty days after slaughter, free to the inspection of all
persons (Compiled Laws, section 84), and provided a penalty for
failure to keep the record and the hides and horns (sec. 86), and a
penalty for refusal of inspection of the record or hides (sec. 87).
In 1891, all persons were required to keep hides for thirty days
for the inspection of any sheriff, deputy sheriff, or any
constable, or any board or inspector, or any officer authorized to
inspect hides (sec. 89), and provided a penalty (sec. 90). In 1889,
amended in 1895 (p. 70, c. 29, § 4), a cattle sanitary board was
created (section 183), with power to adopt and enforce quarantine
regulations and regulations for the inspection of cattle for sale
and slaughter (sec. 184), and pay inspectors not to exceed $2.50
per day and their expenses (sec. 190). In 1891, the cattle sanitary
board was authorized and required to make regulations concerning
inspection of cattle for shipment, and hides and slaughterhouses
(sec. 208), and there was provided
Page 203 U. S. 52
the details of arrangement for inspection of cattle (sec. 212),
and the duties of cattle inspectors were enlarged by
providing:"
"Every slaughterhouse in this territory shall be carefully
inspected by some one of the inspectors aforesaid, and all hides
found in such slaughterhouses shall be carefully compared with the
records of such slaughterhouses, and a report in writing setting
forth the number of cattle killed at any such slaughterhouse since
the last inspection, . . . the names of the persons from whom each
of said cattle was bought, the brands and marks upon each hide, and
any information that may be obtained touching the violation by the
owner of any such slaughterhouse, or any other person, of the
provisions of an act entitled 'An Act for the Protection of Stock,
and for Other Purposes,' approved April 1, 1884. For the purpose of
making the inspection authorized by this act, any inspector
employed by the said sanitary board shall have the right to enter,
in the day or night time, any slaughterhouse or other place where
cattle are killed in this territory, and to carefully examine the
same, and all books and records required by law to be kept therein
and to compare the hides found therein with such records"
"(sec. 213). In 1893, it was provided that the cattle sanitary
board might fix fees for the inspection of cattle and hides (sec.
221) (repealed in 1899), and that such fees shall be paid to the
secretary of the board and placed to the credit of the cattle
sanitary board (sec. 222), and shall be used, together with funds
realized from taxes levied and assessed, or to be levied and
assessed, upon cattle only, to defray the expenses of the board
(sec. 220). Chapter 44, p. 94, of the Laws of 1899 makes no changes
in the law material to the consideration of this case. Chapter 53
of the Laws of 1899, provides a fee of three cents for inspection
of cattle."
In
pari materia with this legislation, the act of 1901,
now under consideration, was passed. Sections 3 and 4 of that act
are as follows:
"SEC. 3. Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any person,
firm,
Page 203 U. S. 53
or corporation to offer, or any railroad company or other common
carrier to receive, for the purpose of shipment or transportation
beyond the limits of this territory, any hides that have not been
inspected and tagged by a duly authorized inspector of the cattle
sanitary board of New Mexico for the district in which such hides
originate. For each hide thus inspected there shall be paid by the
owner or holder thereof a fee or charge of ten cents, and such fee
or charge shall be a lien upon the hides thus inspected, until the
same shall have been paid. Each inspector of hides shall keep a
complete record of all inspections made by him, and shall at once
forward to the secretary of the cattle sanitary board, on blanks
furnished him for that purpose, a complete report of each
inspection, giving the names of the purchaser and shipper of the
hides, as well as all the brands thereon, which said report shall
be preserved by the secretary as a part of the records of his
office."
"SEC. 4. Any person, firm, or corporation, common carrier,
railroad company, or agent thereof, violating any provision of this
act, or refusing to permit the inspection of any hides as herein
provided, shall, upon conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000 for
each and every violation of the provisions of this act."
The purpose of these provisions is apparent, and is to prevent
the criminal or fraudulent appropriation of cattle by requiring the
inspection of hides and registration by a record which preserves
the name of the shipper and purchaser of the hides, as well as the
brands thereon, and by which is afforded some evidence, at least,
tending to identify the ownership of the cattle. It evident that
the provision as to the shipment of the hides beyond the limits of
the territory is essential to this purpose, for if the hides can be
surreptitiously or criminally obtained and shipped beyond such
limits, without inspection or registration, a very convenient door
is open to the perpetration of fraud and the prevention of
discovery.
Page 203 U. S. 54
It is argued that this act lays a special burden upon interstate
commerce because, under the law, hides not offered for
transportation are not required to be inspected after thirty days
in slaughterhouses, and not at all outside of slaughterhouses. But
legislation is not void because it meets the exigencies of a
particular situation. Other statutory provisions apply to property
remaining in the territory, where possibly it may be found and
identified. When shipped beyond the limits of the territory, the
means of reaching it are beyond local control, and it is the
purpose of sections 3 and 4 of the act of 1901 to preserve within
the territory a record of the brands identifying the property and
naming the purchaser or shipper. Certainly we cannot judicially say
that there can be no valid reason for making the inspection in
question apply only to hides offered for transportation beyond the
territory, and that for that reason the tax is an arbitrary
discrimination against interstate traffic.
It is urged further that this is a mere revenue law, and in no
just sense an inspection law, and therefore not within the police
power conferred upon the territory. It is true that inspection laws
ordinarily have for their object the improvement of quality, and to
protect the community against fraud and imposition in the character
of the article received for sale or to be exported, but in the
Patapsco case,
supra, it was directly recognized
that inspection laws such as the one under consideration might be
passed in the exercise of the police power, and such was the view
of Mr. Justice Bradley in
Neilson v. Garza, supra, decided
on the circuit. We see no reason why an inspection law which has
for its purpose the protection of the community against fraud and
the promotion of the welfare of the people cannot be passed in the
exercise of the police power, when the legislation tends to
subserve the purpose in view . In the Territory of New Mexico and
other parts of the country similarly situated, it is highly
essential to protect large numbers of people against criminal
aggression upon this class of property. The exercise of the police
power
Page 203 U. S. 55
may and should have reference to the peculiar situation and
needs of the community. The law under consideration, designed to
prevent the clandestine removal of property in which a large number
of the people of the territory are interested, seems to us an
obviously rightful exercise of this power. It is true it affects
interstate commerce, but we do not think such was its primary
purpose, and while it may have an effect to levy a tax upon this
class of property, the main purpose evidently was to protect the
people against fraud and wrong.
It is further urged that this law is invalid because it imposes
an unreasonable fee for the inspection, which goes into the
treasury of the sanitary board, and the allegations of the writ
tend to show that an inspector might make a considerable sum in
excess of day's wages in the work of inspecting hides under the
provisions of this act. The law being otherwise valid, the amount
of the inspection fee is not a judicial question; it rests with the
legislature to fix the amount, and it can only present a valid
objection when it is shown that it is so unreasonable and
disproportionate to the services rendered as to attack the good
faith of the law.
Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of
Agriculture, 171 U. S.
345-350.
We are of the opinion that the allegations of the relator as to
the cost of inspection, compared with the fees authorized to be
charged, and the profit which might accrue to the inspector, in
view of other and necessary incidental expense connected with the
inspection and registration, do not bring the case within that
class which holds that, under the guise of inspection, other and
different purposes are to be subserved, thus rendering the
legislation invalid.
Upon the whole case, we are of the opinion that, in the absence
of congressional legislation covering the subject and making a
different provision, the act in controversy is a valid exercise of
the police power of the territory, and not in violation of the
Constitution giving exclusive power to Congress in the regulation
of interstate commerce.
Affirmed.