In California, pueblo land, which were simply ancillary to the
execution of the public trust and in which the pueblo never had an
indefeasible proprietary interest, and which were subject to the
supreme political dominion of the former Mexican government,
became, on the change of government, equally subject to the
sovereignty of the State of California through it legislature, and
the title to such lands did not pass to the United States. The
title of one holding under a deed to pueblo lands from a city in
California, ratified by the legislature, sustained as against the
city claiming to hold under a subsequent patent from the United
States.
139 Cal. 542 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Action to quiet title, brought by plaintiff in error (and, being
plaintiff in the court below, we will so designate it) in the
Superior Court of the County of Monterey to 1,635.03 acres of land,
situate in Monterey County, State of California. Plaintiff alleged
title in fee simple, and contends that such title has come to it as
successor of the Pueblo of Monterey of Upper California. There is
no dispute that the land was part of the Pueblo of Monterey, and
that, after proper proceedings had in pursuance of acts of
Congress, the title of the City of Monterey was confirmed by a
decree of the Board of Land Commissioners, and a patent issued to
the city November 19, 1891.
Page 203 U. S. 361
The defendant gets his title through one D. R. Ashley, who was
the attorney for the city, to present and prosecute its claim to
the land before the Board of Land Commissioners. To pay the
indebtedness incurred for his services, the land was sold under the
authority of certain acts of the legislature of the state, and
purchased by him. The validity of the title so derived, as against
the title of the city as successor of the Pueblo of Monterey, free
from the control of the legislature, makes the question in the
case. Judgment passed for the defendant in the trial court, and was
affirmed by the supreme court. 139 Cal. 542. This writ of error was
then allowed.
The City of Monterey was incorporated by an act of the
Legislature of the State of California March 30, 1850, and became
thereby successor of the former pueblo to its pueblo lands. In
1857, the charter of the city was amended, and by section 7
thereof, the trustees were empowered to pay off the expenses of
prosecuting the title of the city before the United States land
commissioners and before the United States courts, and, for that
purpose, sell and transfer any property, right, or franchise upon
such terms and for such price as might by them be deemed
reasonable. It was found by the lower courts (and we quote from the
opinion of the supreme court) that --
"On January 24, 1859, said Ashley presented to the trustees of
the City of Monterey a claim amounting to $991.50 for services as
its attorney in presenting such pueblo claim to the commissioners.
The claim was approved and allowed, and, there being no funds in
the treasury to pay it, the board of trustees passed a resolution
directing that a sale of all the pueblo lands of the city, or so
much of them as might be necessary to pay the claim of said Ashley,
be made at public auction on the ninth day of February, 1859. Due
notice of the time for holding said sale was given, and the same
was held at the time and in accordance with the notice at which
sale the entire pueblo tract was bid in by the said D. R. Ashley
and the defendant, David Jacks, for the sum of $1,002.50, being
Page 203 U. S. 361
the amount of the indebtedness and the necessary expenses of
sale, no one offering to purchase less than the whole or bid a
higher amount. Thereafter, said trustees made, executed, and
delivered a conveyance of said lands, dated February 9, 1859, but
acknowledged February 12, 1859, in favor of said D. R. Ashley and
the defendant, David Jacks, and in the conveyance, the proceedings
taken by the trustees in the matter of such sale were recited. This
conveyance was recorded in the County Recorder's Office of the
County of Monterey on June 11, 1859. On April 2, 1866, the act to
incorporate the City of Monterey was amended to read as
follows:"
"SEC. 2. All sales and conveyances made by the corporate
authorities of said city since the eighth day of February, 1859,
and which conveyances purport to have been recorded in the County
Recorder's Office of Monterey County, purporting to convey public
lands or lands confirmed to said City of Monterey in pursuance of
the Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, and entitled 'An Act to
Ascertain and Settle the Private Land Claims in the California,'
are hereby ratified and confirmed. . . ."
"On September 4, 1869, Ashley conveyed all his interest in the
land in controversy to the defendant."
The contentions of the parties are in part made to turn upon the
kind of right the City of Monterey derived as the successor of the
Pueblo of Monterey, whether proprietary or in trust, and, because
in trust, subject to the disposition of the legislature of the
state. This distinction was expressed by the supreme court and the
case determined by it, and the court supported its action by a
citation of prior decisions. It was said:
"There is a marked difference, however, between lands which are
held by a municipality in trust for public, municipal purposes,
such as pueblo lands, and lands acquired by a municipality through
purchase or special grant, and held in proprietary right."
Of the latter class, it was said: "That it is beyond the power
of the state to control its disposition without the consent of the
municipality." In the other case,
"the lands, being simply ancillary to the execution of the
public trust -- lands in which
Page 203 U. S. 363
the pueblo never had an indefeasible proprietary interest, and
which were subject to the supreme political dominion of the former
Mexican government -- became equally subject to the sovereignty of
the State of California through its legislature upon the change of
government."
Plaintiff attacks this conclusion, and contends that the title
to the lands vested not in the State of California as succeeding
sovereign, but in the United States, and the United States, having
the title, passed it by the patent of November 19, 1891, to the
plaintiff. And this contention, plaintiff asserts, presents the
federal question to be decided. At one time, this might have been
regarded as a serious question, but it is no longer so. Whatever of
legal power the State of California may exercise over its
municipalities has received decisive definition in many decisions.
The cases are quoted by the supreme court in the case at bar.
Whatever power the United States may exercise, or, by refraining
from exercising, yield to the State of California to exercise has
long been decisively settled. We need not review the cases. An
exposition of them can be found in
United States v. Santa
Fe, 165 U. S. 675.
If the United States was, as contended, a paramount sovereign,
and, as such, possessed the power to direct the trust to which
pueblo lands were subject, it did not do so, but conveyed land to
the "City of Monterey, its successors and assigns." In other words,
the conveyance was made to a municipality of the State of
California -- a creature of the laws of the state and subject to
the state.
Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220;
San
Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541.
See also Kies v.
Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233. And
we may observe that the United States, by an act passed June 15,
1906, has designated the City of Monterey as trustee of the
original grant, and confirmed the land to the city as patented. 34
Stat. 267.
We do not think, however, that the federal question presented is
so far unsubstantial as to justify a dismissal of the writ of
error, and the motion to dismiss is denied.
Judgment affirmed.