In the absence of Congressional legislation, goods moving in
interstate commerce cease to be such commerce only after delivery
and sale in the original package.
The word "arrival," as used in the Wilson Law, means delivery of
the goods to the consignee, and not merely reaching their
destination and expressions to that effect in
Rhodes v.
Iowa, 170 U. S. 412 are
not
obiter.
The power of the state over intoxicating liquors from other
states in original packages after delivery and before sale given by
the Wilson Law does not attach before notice and expiration of a
reasonable time for the consignee to receive the goods from the
carrier, and this rule is not affected by the fact that, under the
state law, the carrier's liability as such may have ceased and
become that of a warehouseman.
118 Ga. 616 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 203 U. S. 271
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In March, 1902, P. B. Wise and H. D. Harkins, residents of
Charleston, South Carolina, each ordered a cask of whisky from Paul
Heymann, a wholesale liquor dealer in Augusta, Georgia. The price
of the whisky accompanied the orders, which were given upon the
understanding that if, for any cause, delivery was not made to the
consignees, the purchase price would be refunded.
The two casks of whisky, consigned to the respective purchasers
at Charleston, were delivered to the Southern Railway Company at
Augusta. In due course, the packages of liquor reached Charleston,
and were by the railroad company at once unloaded into its
warehouse, ready for delivery. The record does not show that the
consignees were notified of the arrival of the goods. Shortly after
the goods were so placed in the warehouse of the railroad company,
they were seized and taken from its possession. The seizures were
made without any warrant or other process, by constables asserting
their right to do so under the authority of what is known as the
Dispensary Law of South Carolina, which law was considered in
Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438. The
agent of the railroad company did not resist the seizure.
Thereafter, Heymann, the consignor, sued the railroad company
for failing to make the deliveries as contracted in the bills of
lading, and in the Superior Court of Richmond County, on appeal
from a justice's court, obtained a verdict and judgment. The cause
was appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and by that court the
judgment was reversed and the case remanded. 118 Ga. 616. On the
second trial, the defendant had a verdict and judgment, and on
appeal the
Page 203 U. S. 272
judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia upon the
authority of its previous opinion. The case was then brought
here.
The Act of Congress of August 8, 1890, commonly known as the
Wilson Act, provides that all intoxicating liquors
"transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein
for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall, upon arrival
in such state or territory, be subject to the operation and effect
of the laws of such state or territory, enacted in the exercise of
its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as
though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such state or
territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being
introduced therein in original packages or otherwise."
The Supreme Court of Georgia held -- although the goods had not
been delivered to the consignees, and although there was no showing
of notice to them from the carrier, or even if notice by the local
law was unnecessary, of the lapse of a reasonable time for the
consignees to call for and accept delivery -- that the interstate
transportation of the goods ended when they were placed in the
warehouse, and the carrier was thenceforward liable only as a
warehouseman, and that the goods ceased to be under the shelter of
the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. This was based
upon the conclusion that goods warehoused under the circumstances
stated must be considered as having arrived, within the meaning of
the Wilson Act, and therefore the packages of liquor in question
were lawfully seized because subject to the police authority of the
State of South Carolina. The meaning thus affixed to the word
"arrival," as employed in the Wilson Act, was adopted after
consideration of the opinion in
Rhodes v. Iowa,
170 U. S. 412.
While it was conceded by the learned court that language contained
in the opinion in that case indicated that this Court deemed
delivery essential to constitute "arrival" within the Wilson Act,
yet the expressions in the opinion to that effect were not binding,
as they were merely
obiter, since the
Page 203 U. S. 273
Rhodes case was only concerned with whether goods had
come under the state authority on reaching their place of
destination and before they had been warehoused by the carrier.
We cannot concur in the view taken by the learned court of the
decision in the
Rhodes case. In that case, a railroad
employee at a town in Iowa was indicted under the law of that state
because, after an interstate shipment of liquors had reached the
depot of the final carrier at the point of destination, he moved
the package from the platform, where it had been placed on being
unloaded, to a freight warehouse belonging to the railroad company,
a few feet away. It was insisted on behalf of the State of Iowa
that the effect of the Wilson Act was to confer upon that state the
power to subject to state regulations merchandise shipped from
another state the moment it reached the boundary line of the State
of Iowa. On the other hand, it was contended that an interstate
shipment of liquor did not arrive within that state within the
meaning of the Wilson Act until the consummation of the shipment by
delivery at its destination to the consignee. The case therefore
necessarily involved deciding the meaning of the word "arrival" in
the Wilson Act, and this required an ascertainment of when goods
shipped from one state to another, generally speaking, ceased to be
controlled by the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution,
and how far the general rule resulting from the power of Congress
to regulate commerce had been limited, if at all, by the provisions
of the Wilson Act. Considering the first question, the elementary
and long settled doctrine was reiterated that delivery and sale in
the original package was necessary to terminate interstate commerce
so far as the police regulations of the states were concerned. In
passing upon the second question, the court, referring to a
previous case involving the Wilson Law,
In re Rahrer,
140 U. S. 545,
pointed out that the contention which was made in that case, that
the Wilson Act was repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States because it was an abdication by Congress of its power to
regulate commerce,
Page 203 U. S. 274
was held to be untenable because the Wilson Act was simply
legislation by Congress creating a uniform rule applicable to all
the states by which liquor, when the subject of interstate
commerce, could come under the power of a state at an earlier date
than it otherwise would have done. Contemplating the grounds of the
previous ruling upholding the constitutionality of the Wilson Act
and coming to precisely determine the meaning of the word "arrival"
as used in that act, it was said in the
Rhodes case (p.
170 U. S.
426):
"Interpreting the statute by the light of all its provisions, it
was not intended to and did not cause the power of the state to
attach to an interstate commerce shipment whilst the merchandise
was in transit under such shipment, and until its arrival at the
point of destination, and delivery there to the consignee."
And as a result of this ascertainment of the meaning of the
Wilson Act, it was held that, as the act of moving the goods
preceded the period affixed by the Wilson Act at which the state
power could attach, the conviction was erroneous.
The
Rhodes case involved, of necessity, a construction
of the import of the Wilson Act, and the mere fact that the
particular conduct which happened in that case to be the subject of
complaint occurred prior to the delivery did not operate to cause
the affirmative construction which was given to the Wilson Act, and
which it was necessary to give, to be
obiter, and
therefore subject to be disregarded. And a case decided by this
Court on the same day as the
Rhodes case leaves no room
for controversy concerning the affirmative construction given to
the Wilson Act in the Rhodes case. The case referred to is
Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438. The
Court said (p.
170 U. S.
451):
"The interstate commerce clause of the Constitution guarantees
the right to ship merchandise from one state into another, and
protects it until the termination of the shipment by delivery at
the place of consignment, and this right is wholly unaffected by
the act of Congress which allows state
Page 203 U. S. 275
authority to attach to the original package before sale, but
only after delivery.
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S.
58,
165 U. S. 107, and
Rhodes v.
Iowa, supra. It follows that, under the Constitution of the
United States, every resident of South Carolina is free to receive
for his own use liquor from other states, and that the inhibitions
of a state statute do not operate to prevent liquors from other
states from being shipped into such state, on the order of a
resident, for his use."
And in subsequent cases, the construction adopted in the
previous cases of the word "arrival" as employed in the Wilson Act
has been reaffirmed and applied. Thus, in
American Express Co.
v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, in
reviewing the
Rhodes case, the meaning of the Wilson Act
was again reiterated, the Court saying (p.
196 U. S.
142):
"The contention was that, as by the Wilson Act the power of the
state operated upon the property the moment it passed the state
boundary line, therefore the State of Iowa had the right to forbid
the transportation of the merchandise within the state, and to
punish those carrying it therein. This was not sustained. The Court
declined to express an opinion as to the authority of Congress,
under its power to regulate commerce, to delegate to the states the
right to forbid the transportation of merchandise from one state to
another. It was, however, decided that the Wilson Act manifested no
attempt on the part of Congress to exert such power, but was only a
regulation of commerce, since it merely provided, in the case of
intoxicating liquors, that such merchandise, when transported from
one state to another, should lose its character as interstate
commerce upon completion of delivery under the contract of
interstate shipment, and before sale in the original packages."
Again, in
Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U.
S. 501, referring to the Wilson Act and its previous
construction, it was declared (p.
199 U. S.
517):
"This act was held to be constitutional in the case of
In re
Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, and that, by
virtue of said act, state
Page 203 U. S. 276
statutes might operate upon the original packages of
intoxicating liquors before sale in the state.
Rhodes v.
Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, and
Vance v.
W. A. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U. S. 438, held that the
state statute must permit the delivery of the liquors to the party
to whom they were consigned within the state, but that, after such
delivery, the state had power to prevent the sale of the liquors,
even in the original package."
As the general principle is that goods moving in interstate
commerce cease to be such commerce only after delivery and sale in
the original package, and as the settled rule is that the Wilson
Law was not an abdication of the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, since that law simply affects an incident of
such commerce by allowing the state power to attach after delivery
and before sale, we are not concerned with whether, under the law
of any particular state, the liability of a railroad company as
carrier ceases and becomes that of a warehouseman on the goods'
reaching their ultimate destination, before notice and before the
expiration of a reasonable time for the consignee to receive the
goods from the carrier. For, whatever may be the divergent legal
rules in the several states concerning the precise time when the
liability of a carrier as such in respect to the carriage of goods,
ends, they cannot affect the general principle as to when an
interstate shipment ceases to be under the protection of the
commerce clause of the Constitution, and thereby comes under the
control of the state authority.
Of course, we are not called upon in this case, and do not,
decide if goods of the character referred to in the Wilson Act,
moving in interstate commerce, arrive at the point of destination,
and, after notice and full opportunity to receive them, are
designedly left in the hands of the carrier for an unreasonable
time, that such conduct on the part of the consignee might not
justify, if affirmatively alleged and proven, the holding that
goods so dealt with have come under the operation of the Wilson
Act, because constructively delivered. We say we
Page 203 U. S. 277
are not called upon to consider this question, for the reason
that no facts are shown by the record justifying passing on such a
proposition. And as in this case we deal only with the power of the
state to enforce its police regulations against goods of the
character of those enumerated in the Wilson Act, the subject of
interstate commerce, before delivery, we must not be understood as
in any way limiting or restricting the ruling made in
Vance v.
W. A. Vandercook Co., No. 1, supra, upholding the right of a
citizen of one state to bring from another state into the state of
his residence, and keep therein, for his personal use, the
merchandise referred to in the Wilson Act. In other words, as in
the case at bar, delivery had not taken place when the seizures
were made, and the control of the state over the goods had not
attached, we are not called upon to consider whether, if the power
of the state had attached by delivery, the state might not have
levied upon the goods on the charge that they had not been
bona
fide brought into the state, and were not held by the
consignees for their personal use, and therefore were not within
the ruling in
Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., No. 1,
supra.
The conclusion that the court below erred in declining to follow
the prior rulings of this Court construing the Wilson Act disposes
of the entire controversy arising on the record before us, for the
following reasons: in its answer filed in the trial court, the
railroad company substantially defended alone upon the ground that
the seizure was rightful. And the Supreme Court of Georgia treated
the liability of the defendant as depending solely upon the
validity of the seizure. The court said:
"If [the goods] . . . were still in the course of interstate
transportation, the seizure by the constable was not even
prima
facie legal, for the very law under which the seizure was made
had, prior to such seizure, been declared by the Supreme Court of
the United States to be unconstitutional insofar as it interfered
with interstate commerce.
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S.
58. It therefore follows that, if the shipment had
not
Page 203 U. S. 278
been completed at the time the goods were seized, the railroad
company would have no right to defend on the ground that it
submitted to the superior authority, granting that such a defense,
if established, would relieve it from liability."
Moreover, in this Court, counsel, in their brief on behalf of
the defendant in error, rely exclusively upon the correctness of
the construction given to the Wilson Act by the court below, and do
not urge, in the event such construction be not sustained, that it
was exempt for any reason whatever from liability.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.