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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 23–971
_________________
GARY WAETZIG, PETITIONER
v. HALLIBURTON
ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the tenth circuit
[February 26, 2025]
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a
court, “[o]n motion and just terms,” to “relieve a party
. . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” The
question in this case is whether Rule 60(b) permits a district
court to reopen a case that was voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice under Rule 41(a). We hold that such a dismissal counts as
a “final judgment, order, or proceeding,” and thus qualifies for
Rule 60(b) relief.
I
A
This case began as an employment dispute.
Petitioner Gary Waetzig is a former employee of respondent
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Following his termination,
Waetzig filed a lawsuit against Halliburton in the U. S.
District Court for the District of Colorado. He alleged that he was
illegally terminated on the basis of his age, in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81Stat. 602, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. §621
et seq. In response,
Halliburton asserted that Waetzig was required to arbitrate his
claim. Waetzig acquiesced and submitted his claims for
arbitration.
At that point, Waetzig could have asked the
District Court to stay his federal lawsuit pending the arbitration
proceedings. See 9 U. S. C. §3;
Smith v.
Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 476 (2024). Instead, he elected to
dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Under
that Rule, a plaintiff may dismiss his case “without a court order”
if he serves “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party
serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i). Since Halliburton had not yet served an answer or
moved for summary judgment, Waetzig’s dismissal was effective
without any court action. And given that this was the first time
Waetzig had dismissed these claims, his dismissal was presumptively
“without prejudice.” Rule 41(a)(1)(B). That means that Waetzig had
preserved his right to refile the same claims in the future.
Semtek Int’l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,
531 U.S.
497, 505 (2001).
Waetzig lost at arbitration. After a telephonic
hearing, the arbitrator issued an award granting summary judgment
in favor of Halliburton. In Waetzig’s view, however, the arbitrator
failed to follow various procedural rules required by the parties’
arbitration agreement. To remedy that alleged error, Waetzig turned
back to federal court.
B
Waetzig’s next move was procedurally creative.
Instead of filing a new lawsuit in federal court attacking the
validity of the arbitration award, he returned to the lawsuit that
he had previously dismissed. He filed a motion under the old docket
number and asked the court to reopen that case and vacate the
arbitration award. That move created an obvious problem: As we
already explained, Waetzig’s dismissal under Rule 41(a) terminated
his case. So, in theory, filing a new motion in the case was
impossible. The District Court was therefore skeptical of Waetzig’s
gambit. It issued an order asking him to show cause that would
justify the court’s taking jurisdiction over the motion. In
response, Waetzig asserted that the District Court could reopen the
case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Rule 60(b) permits a court, “[o]n motion and
just terms,” to “relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding.” A court may do so for six
enumerated “reasons,” including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.” See Rule 60(b)(1). The general “purpose” of
the Rule, we have said, is “to make an exception to finality.”
Gonzalez v.
Crosby,
545 U.S.
524, 529 (2005). The Rule “attempts to strike a proper balance
between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought
to an end and that justice should be done.” 11 C. Wright, A.
Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2851,
p. 286 (3d ed. 2012).
Here, the District Court agreed with Waetzig and
awarded Rule 60(b) relief. First, it held that a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice counts as a “final proceeding” and
therefore falls within the ambit of the Rule. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 55a–56a. Second, it found that Waetzig had committed a
“careless mistake” when he voluntarily dismissed his case instead
of moving for a stay pending arbitration or administratively
closing the case.
Id., at 59a. According to the District
Court, Waetzig did so under the false understanding that the court
would retain jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement.
Ibid. The court thus found that relief was proper under Rule
60(b)(1).
Ibid. And after reopening the case under that
provision,[
1] the court issued
a separate order granting Waetzig’s motion to vacate the
arbitration award.
Id., at 48a.
Halliburton appealed. Among other things, it
argued that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not count
as a “final judgment, order, or proceeding,” and therefore falls
outside the reach of Rule 60(b). Brief for Appellant in No. 22–1252
(CA10, Nov. 14, 2022), ECF Doc. 25, pp. 23–26. The Tenth Circuit
agreed. It reasoned that Waetzig’s voluntary dismissal was not a
final “judgment” or “order” because the act of dismissal required
neither the entry of a judgment nor the issuance of an order by the
court. 82 F. 4th 918, 921 (2023). The Tenth Circuit then
concluded that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice could not be
a “final proceeding” because, in its view, “a final proceeding must
involve, at a minimum, a judicial determination with
finality.”
Id., at 923. In so holding, the Tenth
Circuit split from other Circuits that have considered the issue.
See
Yesh Music v.
Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356,
362–363 (CA5 2013) (“[W]e are satisfied that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)
voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies as a ‘final
proceeding’ ”); accord,
Nelson v.
Napolitano,
657 F.3d 586, 589 (CA7 2011).
We granted certiorari to decide whether a Rule
41(a) dismissal without prejudice is a “final judgment, order, or
proceeding” under Rule 60(b). 603 U. S. ___ (2024).
II
Before reaching that question, however, we
first address a preliminary issue related to jurisdiction.
Halliburton claims that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over
Waetzig’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. In support of its
argument, Halliburton points to this Court’s decisions in
Badgerow v.
Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022), and
Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
511 U.S.
375 (1994). We need not address the merits of this argument,
however, because it presents no barrier to our deciding the
question presented. We granted certiorari to decide whether Rule
60(b) permits a court to reopen a case that was voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice. That question is separate from, and
antecedent to, the question whether the District Court could
exercise jurisdiction over Waetzig’s motion to vacate.
The cases Halliburton cites prove the point. In
Badgerow, we addressed the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to consider motions to vacate arbitration awards filed under
a provision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C.
§10(a). We held that a plaintiff seeking to vacate an arbitration
award must point to an “ ‘independent jurisdictional
basis’ ” that would authorize a federal court to decide the
matter.
Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 8 (quoting
Hall
Street Associates, L. L. C. v.
Mattel, Inc.,
552 U. S 576, 582 (2008)). In the other case,
Kokkonen,
we suggested that Rule 60(b) cannot confer jurisdiction upon a
federal court where jurisdiction would not otherwise exist. 511
U. S., at 378. We reasoned that reopening a case under Rule
60(b) would not automatically confer jurisdiction over a subsequent
motion to enforce a settlement agreement.
Ibid. The upshot
of our analysis in
Kokkonen was that, even though Rule 60(b)
might give a court the power to reopen a case, the Rule cannot
itself serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction.
Although these cases might bear on the District
Court’s jurisdiction over Waetzig’s motion to vacate, they say
nothing at all about whether the District Court had the power,
under Rule 60(b), to reopen Waetzig’s case in the first place. That
power is the focus of our decision today, and it must be addressed
before any subsequent jurisdictional questions is considered. The
procedural history of this case confirms as much. Before the
District Court could rule on Waetzig’s motion to vacate, it first
needed to reopen his case. Consistent with that understanding, the
court issued two separate orders: first, an order reopening the
case pursuant to Rule 60(b), see App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a, and
second, an order vacating the arbitration award, see
id., at
48a. We granted certiorari to address the District Court’s power to
issue the first order, not its jurisdiction to issue the second. We
leave it to the lower courts to address any subsequent
jurisdictional questions on remand.
III
That brings us to the question presented. Rule
60(b) permits a court to “relieve a party . . . from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding.” We hold that a Rule 41(a)
voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies as a “final
. . . proceeding” under Rule 60(b). Text, context, and
history support that interpretation.
A
1
To start, we hold that a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice is “final” under Rule 60(b). In 1946, when the
term “final” first appeared in the Rule, legal dictionaries defined
“final” to mean “[d]efinitive; terminating; completed; conclusive;
last.” Black’s Law Dictionary 779 (3d ed. 1933) (Black’s); see
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 503 (1930) (“the end, ultimate, or
last”). By way of illustration, Black’s Law Dictionary defined
“final order” as an order that “terminates the action itself.”
Black’s 1298. A voluntary dismissal without prejudice falls
comfortably within this definition. The dismissal is the
“conclusive” and “last” filing on the docket, and it “complete[s]”
the particular lawsuit at issue.
Id., at 779. And, like a
“final order,” the dismissal “terminates the action itself.”
Id., at 1298.
That straightforward reading of “final” is
confirmed by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s Notes, which
are “ ‘a reliable source of insight into the meaning of a
rule.’ ”
Hall v.
Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 75 (2018)
(quoting
United States v.
Vonn,
535 U.S.
55, 64, n. 6 (2002)). In the Notes accompanying the 1946
amendments to Rule 60(b), the Committee briefly explained its
reason for adding the term “final.” According to the Committee, the
addition of “final” clarified that “interlocutory judgments are not
brought within the restrictions of the Rule, but rather they are
left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to
afford such relief from them as justice requires.” Advisory
Committee’s 1946 Note on subd. (b) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60, 28
U. S. C. App., p. 289.
The term “final” was therefore intended to
exclude “interlocutory judgments” from the reach of the Rule. And,
as the Committee Notes explain, that exclusion makes sense. Rule
60(b) relief from interlocutory judgments is unnecessary because,
with respect to those judgments, “a rehearing may be sought at any
time before [the] final decree, provided due diligence be employed
and a revision be otherwise consonant with equity.”
John Simmons
Co. v.
Grier Brothers Co.,
258 U.S.
82, 90–91 (1922). In other words, a court presiding over a case
is
always capable of revising an interlocutory ruling, so
long as a revision is “consonant with equity.”
Id., at 91.
The word “final” underscores that Rule 60(b) does not infringe that
inherent and distinct power.
After a case is finally terminated, however, a
court no longer presides, and a party can no longer seek a
“rehearing” on an interlocutory judgment.
Ibid. It is at
that point that a court’s power under Rule 60(b) kicks in,
permitting the court to look back at the “final” act in a case and
provide relief from that act when appropriate. A voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is one such “final” act. It terminates
the case and strips a court of its equitable power to revise its
earlier rulings. At that point, Rule 60(b) is the appropriate
avenue for relief.
A contrary interpretation would place voluntary
dismissals without prejudice into a procedural no man’s land. Such
dismissals would not be “interlocutory” in the manner that the
Committee Notes discuss because they are outside of a court’s
“complete power” over an ongoing case. Nor would they be “final”
and thus subject to Rule 60(b). Halliburton provides no evidence
supporting the existence of any third category. If a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is not “interlocutory,” then it is hard
to imagine that it could be anything but “final.”
2
Halliburton nevertheless presses for a narrower
definition of “final.” Specifically, it asks the Court to construe
“final” in Rule 60(b) to mean essentially what it means in
jurisdictional statutes like 28 U. S. C. §1291, which
gives the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals from “final
decisions” of district courts. This grant of appellate jurisdiction
can be traced back to the first Judiciary Act. See Judiciary Act of
1789, §22, 1Stat. 84. And long before the adoption of Rule 60(b),
this Court had developed a rich jurisprudence explaining the
meaning of “final” as it relates to appellate jurisdiction. See
Bostwick v.
Brinkerhoff,
106 U.S.
3, 3–4 (1882) (citing cases). Halliburton asks us to look to
that “ ‘legal lineage’ ” when interpreting Rule 60(b).
Brief for Respondent 22 (quoting
Hall, 584 U. S., at
66). Based on that body of case law, Halliburton contends that a
determination is “final” principally when it “ ‘terminate[s]
the litigation between the parties
on the merits of the
case.’ ” Brief for Respondent 23 (quoting
Bostwick, 106
U. S., at 3; alterations in original; emphasis added).
Contrary to Halliburton’s suggestion, however,
we do not find this body of case law helpful in interpreting the
meaning of the term “final” in Rule 60(b). True, we sometimes look
to legal tradition when interpreting a statutory term, but we
typically do so only when the term is “ ‘obviously
transplanted from another legal source.’ ”
Taggart v.
Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554, 560 (2019) (quoting
Hall, 584
U. S., at 73). Here, there is little reason to think that the
term “final” in Rule 60(b) was transplanted from statutes governing
the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts. In that field, the
concept of finality plays a distinctive role: It prevents
interlocutory appeals from unduly impairing the resolution of civil
and criminal cases at the trial level. Under 28 U. S. C.
§1291 and predecessor provisions, a party that loses in the
district court has a “statutory right” to take an appeal from any
“final decision.”
Arizona v.
Manypenny,
451 U.S.
232, 245, n. 19 (1981). Our decisions defining what the
term “final” means in this context have imposed an important
practical limit on such appeals. We have described the finality
requirement as “the means for achieving a healthy legal system.”
Cobbledick v.
United States,
309
U.S. 323, 326 (1940). Without it, too many trial court rulings
could be appealed, and “ ‘the orderly progress of a
cause’ ” would be halted while the appellate court considered
all sorts of “ ‘question[s] which ha[ve] happened to cross the
path of such litigation.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting
Segurola v.
United States,
275
U.S. 106, 112 (1927)).
Finality under Rule 60(b) does not play a
similar role. Unlike an appeal filed under the appellate
jurisdiction statute, a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is
discretionary, not “a matter of statutory right.”
Manypenny,
451 U. S., at 245, n. 19. Further, Rule 60(b) relief is
unnecessary when a case is ongoing because during that time, a
court retains jurisdiction to review and modify its decrees. See
supra, at 7. Thus, there is no reason to fear that Rule
60(b) will be abused to bring about a “ ‘halt in the orderly
progress of a cause.’ ”
Cobbledick, 309 U. S., at
326 (quoting
Segurola, 275 U. S., at 112). And, even if
such abuse were possible, Rule 60(b) provides district courts with
ample discretion to prevent it. Given these stark contextual
differences, it is unlikely that “final” as it appears in Rule
60(b) was transplanted from the appellate jurisdiction statute.
We therefore see no reason to import the
understanding of finality that applies in the field of appellate
jurisdiction. In the context of Rule 60(b), a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice is “final” because it terminates the case.
B
Next, we hold that a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice counts as a “proceeding” under Rule
60(b).[
2] In 1938, when the
term “proceeding” first appeared in the Rule, Black’s Law
Dictionary defined “proceeding” as: “[T]he form and manner of
conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer;
regular and orderly progress in form of law; including all possible
steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of
judgment.” Black’s 1430. Other dictionaries defined the term
similarly. See Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, at 1023 (“the form in
which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of
intervening in suits [and] of conducting them
. . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (1927) (“[a]ny step or
act taken in conducting litigation”). These definitions suggest
that the term “proceeding” encompasses
all steps in an
action, including the filing of papers that are noted on the
docket. Even today, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “proceeding” as
“[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including
all acts and events between the time of commencement and the
entry of judgment.” Black’s 1459 (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis
added).
Other Federal Rules similarly treat “proceeding”
as including all formal steps taken in an action. Take, for
example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Under that Rule, a
court may stay “further proceedings” in a case until a discovery
order is obeyed. Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iv). In that context, a stay of
“proceedings” likely refers to a stay of
any further action
in the lawsuit, including further docket filings. If read
otherwise, the stay would be an ineffective sanction against a
party’s disobedience. Similarly, Rule 41 permits a court to “stay
the proceedings” until a plaintiff pays the costs of a previously
dismissed action. Rule 41(d)(2). As with Rule 37, that would be a
relatively toothless sanction if “proceedings” did not encompass
all further actions in the case.
Halliburton and the court below offer an
alternative definition. They argue that the term “proceeding” is
“ ‘given more precise content by the neighboring words with
which it is associated.’ ”
Fischer v.
United
States, 603 U.S. 480, 487 (2024) (quoting
United States
v.
Williams,
553 U.S.
285, 294 (2008)). Specifically, they assert that the term
“proceeding” should be read to include the characteristics of the
terms that come before it: “judgment” and “order.” See Rule 60(b)
(“judgment, order, or proceeding”). Since a “judgment” and “order”
both involve some judicial determination of rights, they say, a
“proceeding” should at least involve some judicial action or
conclusive determination of rights. See Brief for Respondent 34–37;
82 F. 4th, at 922–923.
Although it is true that statutory terms must be
read in the context of their neighbors, that rule cuts the other
way here. To read “proceeding” to require a judicial determination
would strip it of any independent meaning. Any formal judicial
determination of a party’s rights is bound to be an “order.” See
Black’s 1298 (defining “order” as “[e]very direction of a court or
judge made or entered in writing”). So, if the term “proceeding”
covers only judicial determinations, it is hard to imagine what the
term “proceeding” would encompass that is not already covered by
the term “order.”
Such a limited reading of “proceeding” is
contrary to the general structure of Rule 60(b). When the Rule
authorizes relief from a “judgment, order, or proceeding,” it
speaks in an ascending order of generality. It starts with the
narrowest category, “judgments,” and then moves to a broader
category, “orders.” Any “judgment” will generally involve an
“order,” but not all “orders” are “judgments.” That suggests that
each term should be read as broader than what came before. Just as
“order” encompasses and
exceeds “judgment,” “proceeding”
should encompass and exceed “order.” It would be odd, therefore, to
read “proceeding” as covering only those acts that are already
covered by the term “order.”
Halliburton intuitively grasps this point. To
avoid a complete overlap between “order” and “proceeding,” it tries
to conjure up examples of what might count as a “proceeding” under
its definition while not being an “order.” But in doing so,
Halliburton only reinforces the commonsense conclusion that a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a proceeding. For
example, Halliburton suggests that a voluntary dismissal
with prejudice may qualify as a “proceeding.” Brief for
Respondent 37. But there is no reason why a voluntary dismissal
with prejudice would count as a “proceeding” while a
voluntary dismissal
without prejudice would not. Both
consist in the simple filing of a paper on the docket. See Rule
41(a)(1)(A). Halliburton contends that a dismissal
with
prejudice is different because it “imposes legal burdens.” Brief
for Respondent 37. But a voluntary dismissal
without
prejudice does so as well. For example, Waetzig’s dismissal
apparently precluded him from continuing to pursue his claims—not
because his dismissal was with prejudice, but because the relevant
statute of limitations had already expired. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
11, 19–20.
In sum, the text, context, and structure of Rule
60(b) show that the term “proceeding” encompasses all steps taken
in the action, including a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice.
C
Finally, our reading of Rule 60(b) is
buttressed by the historical context in which the Rule was enacted.
The original version of the Rule was based on a then-extant
provision in the California Code of Civil Procedure, §473. See
Advisory Committee’s 1946 Note on subd. (b) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
60. That provision permitted a court to “relieve a party
. . . from a judgment, order, or other proceeding.” Cal.
Code Civ. Proc. §473 (Deering 1937). And prior to the enactment of
Rule 60(b), the Supreme Court of California had read that provision
to apply to voluntary dismissals. According to the California
court, a plaintiff who “consented to [a] dismissal to his injury,
under a mistake of fact, excusable under the terms of the statute,
. . . is not barred of relief.”
Palace Hardware
Co. v.
Smith, 134 Cal. 381, 384, 66 P. 474, 476 (1901).
And the California court made clear that the existence of prejudice
was immaterial: “Whether . . . a voluntary dismissal
. . . bars a future action, need not be considered. If
the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the statute, it is not
material whether, in its absence, he could have relief either at
law or in equity.”
Id., at 385, 66 P., at 476.
When read in light of this history, it makes
sense that Rule 60(b) would likewise extend to voluntary dismissals
without prejudice. The provision was “expressly modeled” after a
statute that ostensibly permitted such relief. See
Hall, 584
U. S., at 72–73 (reading Rule 42(a) in light of “its statutory
predecessor”). And although the Rule has been amended substantially
since then, the amendments have always retained the original
candidates for relief: judgments, orders, or proceedings. To be
sure, the Rule now specifies that the judgments, orders, or
proceedings must be “final.” But, as we have already explained, the
term “final” does not exclude voluntary dismissals without
prejudice from the reach of the Rule. See
supra, at 6–9.
There is no reason to think, then, that such dismissals have since
escaped the Rule’s coverage.
IV
For the above reasons, a Rule 41(a) voluntary
dismissal without prejudice counts as a “final proceeding” under
Rule 60(b). When the requirements of Rule 60(b) are satisfied, a
district court may relieve a party from such a dismissal and reopen
the case. We express no view on whether that relief was proper in
Waetzig’s case. Nor do we reach the question whether the court
below could exercise jurisdiction over Waetzig’s motion to vacate
the arbitration award. Those questions are left to the court below
on remand, to the extent the relevant arguments have been
preserved.
The judgment of the Tenth Circuit is reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.