Velazquez v. Bondi, 604 U.S. ___ (2025)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 23–929

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HUGO ABISAÍ MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ, PETITIONER v. PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit

[April 22, 2025]

Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case poses a question about how to calculate a deadline. Often, the government may detain and deport an individual after properly determining he is unlawfully present in this country. But, under 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b)(2), the government will sometimes delay detention and deportation for up to “60 days” to allow those of “good moral character” to leave the country on their own terms. When it comes to many other deadlines in immigration law, if the final day permitted for taking an action falls on a weekend or legal holiday, the deadline rolls over to the next business day. The question for us is whether §1229c(b)(2)’s 60-day voluntary-departure deadline works that same way.

I

A

Born in Mexico, Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez entered the United States unlawfully as a teenager about 20 years ago. Since then, he has made his life in Colorado. Pet. for Cert. 15. There, he attended high school, some college, and met and married his wife. Ibid. The couple has an 11-year-old son and a 10-year-old daughter, both U. S. citizens. Ibid. Mr. Monsalvo and his wife have raised their family in a home they own outside Denver, where he also owns and operates a small business. Ibid.

In 2011, the federal government initiated proceedings to remove Mr. Monsalvo from the country. Velazquez v. Garland, 88 F. 4th 1301, 1303 (CA10 2023). In response, Mr. Monsalvo did not dispute that he had entered the country unlawfully, but he asked the government to suspend its removal efforts because he would face persecution if returned to Mexico. App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a–50a. Alternatively, he sought permission to leave the country voluntarily. Id., at 50a.

That second request was important to him. As a rule, individuals lawfully determined to be deportable from this country are not entitled to leave on their own terms but instead face detention and forcible removal. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 11 (2008). In certain circumstances, however, the government can afford the option of a “voluntary departure” to those “of good moral character.” §1229c(b)(1)(B). When the government extends this option, it effectively makes detention and removal contingent: Officials may detain and remove the individual only if he remains in the country after his voluntary-departure period has expired. Suspending removal in this way can benefit both the government and the individual. For the government, an individual’s voluntary departure saves the cost and effort associated with detention and removal. Id., at 11. For the individual, it not only allows him to choose how and when he leaves the country. It also allows him to avoid substantial penalties associated with a forcible removal. Id., at 11–12 (citing §1182(a)(9)(A)).

In 2019, an immigration judge issued a decision in Mr. Monsalvo’s case. The judge rejected his claim that he would face persecution if returned to Mexico. But the judge also found Mr. Monsalvo eligible for voluntary departure and gave him 60 days to leave the country, the maximum allowed by law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. As it happened, the end of that 60-day period fell on a Saturday. So, the judge specified, Mr. Monsalvo’s deadline for departing voluntarily would extend to the following Monday. Id., at 70a. Should he fail to leave within that period, the immigration judge further ordered, Mr. Monsalvo would face removal and the penalties associated with it. Id., at 51a.

Mr. Monsalvo responded by appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals. By regulation, that appeal stayed the immigration judge’s order. See 8 CFR §1003.6 (2019); Dada, 554 U. S., at 10. On October 12, 2021, the Board issued its own decision. In it, the Board rejected Mr. Monsalvo’s argument that he would face persecution in Mexico and gave him a (new) period of “60 days to voluntarily depart” the United States, “the maximum period allowed by” §1229c(b)(2). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. If he “fail[ed] to voluntarily depart” within that period, the Board added, he “shall be removed.” Id., at 42a. Summing up, the Board explained its disposition this way:

“ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.

“FURTHER ORDER: . . . the respondent(s) is (are) permitted to voluntarily depart . . . within 60 days . . . . In the event a respondent fails to voluntarily depart . . . the respondent shall be removed as provided by the Immigration Judge.” Ibid.

The Board’s decision also included two other salient provisions. In one, the Board warned Mr. Monsalvo that he would face serious penalties if he overstayed his voluntary-departure deadline. Those penalties could include not just removal and monetary fines, but also ineligibility for most forms of immigration relief for a period of 10 years. Id., at 42a–43a; 8 U. S. C. §1229c(d)(1). In the other provision, the Board advised Mr. Monsalvo of his right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings if he thought he had new and previously unavailable evidence that could alter the Board’s assessment of his case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a. If he filed such a motion before the expiration of his 60-day voluntary-departure period, the Board continued, the penalties associated with failing to depart would “not apply.” Ibid.; 8 CFR §1240.26(b)(3)(iii) (2021).

B

Consistent with the Board’s direction, Mr. Monsalvo filed a motion to reopen. On Friday, December 10, 2021, his attorney served the government with a copy and sent the original to the Board using an overnight delivery service. Brief for Petitioner 12. On the following Monday, December 13, 2021, the Board accepted the motion for filing. Ibid. The motion drew the Board’s attention to this Court’s then-recent decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), and argued that, under its terms, Mr. Monsalvo was entitled to have his order of removal canceled. Brief for Petitioner 12.

The Board denied the motion to reopen for two reasons. First, it held that Niz-Chavez did not justify reopening Mr. Monsalvo’s removal proceedings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a. Second, and without prompting from the government, the Board held that his motion to reopen had arrived too late. Id., at 38a.

The Board’s second holding rested on an interpretation of §1229c(b)(2)’s voluntary-departure deadline. The Board began by observing that it had given Mr. Monsalvo “60 days” to depart voluntarily, the maximum allowed by §1229c(b)(2). Interpreting that statute, the Board read its use of the term “days” to refer to calendar days. Here, that meant Mr. Monsalvo’s voluntary-departure period began on October 12, 2021, when the Board issued its removal order, and expired on Saturday, December 11, 2021. The Board did not question that Mr. Monsalvo served his motion to reopen the day before, on Friday, December 10, 2021. But, the Board stressed, the motion was not filed until the following business day, Monday, December 13, 2021. And, as the Board saw it, that created a problem. Because Mr. Monsalvo had neither left the country nor filed a motion to reopen before the expiration of his voluntary-departure period, the Board said, the penalties it had previously warned Mr. Monsalvo about now applied. See supra, at 2. Accordingly, the Board held, it was powerless to entertain his motion—or nearly any request for immigration relief he might wish to pursue for the next decade. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a (citing §1229c(d)); see also id., at 43a.

Mr. Monsalvo filed a motion asking the Board to reconsider this second holding. Pet. for Cert. 19. His reason for focusing on it was obvious. Not only did that holding prevent him from seeking to reopen his case; the Board’s reasoning had the potential to foreclose for years almost any avenue of lawful immigration relief he might hope to pursue. Addressing the Board’s holding, Mr. Monsalvo argued that it misconstrued §1229c(b)(2). As a matter of law, he submitted, that statute operates to extend any deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. The immigration judge handling his case had understood §1229c(b)(2) to work just this way. See supra, at 3; App. to Pet. for Cert. 70a. And under that view of the law, Mr. Monsalvo contended, his voluntary-departure deadline did not expire until Monday, December 13, 2021. As a result, his motion to reopen was timely filed that same day, and the penalties associated with failing to file a motion to reopen or to depart voluntarily did not apply. See 88 F. 4th, at 1305. Ultimately, however, the Board disagreed, stood by its earlier decision, and denied Mr. Monsalvo’s motion for reconsideration. Ibid.

C

Having failed before the agency, Mr. Monsalvo turned to court, petitioning the Tenth Circuit to review the Board’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. §1252(a)(1). But that effort failed too. Like the Board, the Tenth Circuit thought that the provision in his final order of removal granting him “60 days” to depart voluntarily was “[c]onclusively . . . governed by” §1229c(b)(2). Id., at 1308. And, like the Board, the court read the statute as speaking in terms of “calendar days.” Id., at 1303. From this, the court reasoned, it followed that Mr. Monsalvo’s voluntary-departure deadline expired on Saturday, December 11, 2021, and his failure to file a motion to reopen or to depart voluntarily by that date made it impossible for the Board to entertain either his motion or perhaps any other application from him for years. Id., at 1309–1310.

We agreed to take up the case because the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of §1229c(b)(2) opened a circuit split. 603 U. S. ___ (2024). While the Tenth Circuit has construed the statute to afford an individual no more than 60 calendar days to leave the country voluntarily, the Ninth Circuit has read it to extend a deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. See Meza-Vallejos v. Holder, 669 F.3d 920 (2012). Who is right on this question of statutory interpretation matters greatly to people like Mr. Monsalvo. Not only does it affect the time one may have to reopen immigration proceedings. As we have seen, it also affects an individual’s exposure to detention, removal, and fines, and carries with it serious ramifications for his ability to seek lawful status for years into the future. §§1229c(d)(1), 1182(a)(9); 8 CFR §1240.26(a).

II

Before we can address that question, however, we must attend to an antecedent one. In the Tenth Circuit, the government argued that court lacked statutory jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Monsalvo’s petition. Here, the government renews its claim. On its view, we cannot pass on who has the better reading of §1229c(b)(2), but must instead vacate the Tenth Circuit’s judgment and remand Mr. Monsalvo’s petition to that court with instructions to dismiss it. See Brief for Respondent 15–20.

A

The Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction hinged on §1252(a)(1). That provision allows an individual to petition for “[j]udicial review of a final order of removal” in the appropriate court of appeals. Ibid. Such a petition supplies the exclusive means for obtaining “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States.” §1252(b)(9).

The Tenth Circuit held that it had statutory jurisdiction to consider Mr. Monsalvo’s petition, and we agree. On October 12, 2021, the Board issued an order which petitioner contends, and the government does not dispute, constituted a final order of removal. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a–43a; Reply Brief 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–38, 64–65. That order conditionally authorized Mr. Monsalvo’s detention and removal, providing that “[i]n the event” he failed to leave voluntarily “within 60 days,” the “maximum permitted period allowed by” §1229c(b)(2), authorities could detain and “remov[e]” him. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a, 42a; supra, at 3. In later administrative proceedings, the parties disagreed about what that order meant. The government read §1229c(b)(2), and thus the order, as affording Mr. Monsalvo 60 calendar days before authorities could detain and remove him—and thus before his time to file a motion to reopen effectively expired. Mr. Monsalvo interpreted the statute, and thus his order, to extend his 60-day deadline, which fell on a weekend, to the next business day. Mr. Monsalvo’s petition to the Tenth Circuit asked that court to resolve the parties’ dispute. Or, to put it in §1252’s terms, he asked the court to review his “final order of removal” and address a “questio[n] of law . . . arising from” its terms. Exactly as the law allows.

It is true that Mr. Monsalvo did not seek judicial review immediately after the Board entered its final order of removal. But, at that stage, he had no reason to do so. The Board had given him “60 days” to leave the country, and the immigration judge had already explained to him that a voluntary-departure deadline falling on a weekend rolls over to the next business day. Supra, at 2, 3. The dispute over the meaning of “60 days” arose only later, when, in ruling on his motion to reopen and without prompting from the government, the Board held that his voluntary-departure deadline expired on a Saturday. See supra, at 4; App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. Understandably, Mr. Monsalvo asked the Board to reconsider that conclusion before he proceeded to court, giving the agency in the first instance the chance to address his argument that the phrase “60 days” in §1229c(b)(2) and his order of removal extends a deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. See supra, at 4. It was only after the Board rejected that view that he required judicial intervention. And nothing prevented him from seeking it in a challenge to the Board’s reconsideration order, for that order expressly interpreted a term in his final order of removal and Mr. Monsalvo’s judicial petition contested that interpretation as a matter of law.

B

The government does not dispute that Mr. Monsalvo presented the Tenth Circuit with a legal question about how long he had to depart before facing removal. See Brief for Respondent 18–20. But, the government insists, §1252(a)(1) requires more. To secure judicial review, the government says, an individual must include in his petition some challenge to his “removability” from this country. Ibid. And because Mr. Monsalvo’s petition didn’t do that, but pressed only a question about his voluntary-departure deadline, the court was powerless to hear his case.

To be sure, the government emphasizes, things could have worked out differently for Mr. Monsalvo. All he had to do, the government says, was bundle his question about the operation of his voluntary-departure deadline with some challenge to the Board’s conclusion that he was removable. Id., at 20. So, for example, in addition to asking the Tenth Circuit to review the Board’s order denying his motion for reconsideration (and rejecting his interpretation of §1229c(b)(2)), he could have asked for review of the Board’s order denying his motion to reopen (and concluding he was not entitled to have his removal canceled). Had he done that, the government assures us, the Tenth Circuit would have had jurisdiction over his petition and could have addressed both questions. Id., at 20.

The government does not deny that, under its view, some people will have to “make up a completely meritless claim in order to get jurisdiction.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 57–58. By the conclusion of administrative proceedings, individuals like Mr. Monsalvo may no longer think they have a viable challenge to their removability, only some other colorable and consequential question about their final orders of removal. But, as the government sees it, they cannot simply bring that live question to court. They must either adorn their judicial petitions with a pointless challenge to their removability or forfeit the right to review altogether.

We see nothing in §1252 that puts litigants to that kind of choice. The statute does not say that an individual must press a challenge to one term in a final order of removal (a finding of “removability”) just to secure judicial review of another (like a voluntary-departure deadline). In fact, the word “removability” does not even appear in the statute. Instead, §1252 authorizes courts to review “final order[s] of removal” and address “questions of law . . . arising from” them. §§1252(a)(1), (b)(9). And pretty plainly, that language permits a court to review all terms in a final order of removal without anything like the qualification the government imagines.

Our dissenting colleagues see things differently. In their view, this Court’s decision in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020), requires us to adopt the government’s jurisdictional theory. See post, at 8–10 (opinion of Thomas, J.); post, at 2 (opinion of Barrett, J.). But, if anything, that case supports our conclusion. Nasrallah described a “final order of removal” subject to judicial review as a final order “ ‘concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.’ ” 590 U. S., at 581. And (again) that is exactly what we have here: a final order specifying that the government may remove Mr. Monsalvo if he fails to depart voluntarily within 60 days, and a petition asking the courts to settle a dispute over what that order means.

Justice Thomas highlights Nasrallah’s holding that a Board order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in that case was “not part of the removal order.” Post, at 9 (dissenting opinion). But we fail to see the relevance of that holding to this case. A CAT order provides that, “notwithstanding” a removal order, the government may not remove an individual to a particular “designated country.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 582. CAT orders, moreover, have a distinct statutory basis from removal orders, and different statutes govern their review. Id., at 579–580. No such order is in play here. Mr. Monsalvo has not sought judicial review of a CAT order, only review about the meaning of his final order of removal.

Justice Barrett, for her part, reads Nasrallah as suggesting that an individual like Mr. Monsalvo may not challenge the Board’s interpretation of a term in his removal order. Instead, he may ask a court only to change or excise a term in his removal order. See post, at 2 (dissenting opinion). But Nasrallah held nothing of the kind. Nor is it possible to square such a view with the statutory text. Section 1252 permits individuals to petition for judicial review of “final orders of removal” and indicates that those petitions supply the exclusive means for securing “[j]udicial review of all questions of law.” §1252(b)(9). Nothing in the statutory text contains anything like the limitation the dissent supposes, permitting judicial review of only certain kinds of legal errors.[1]

III

A

That takes us to the merits. The Board’s final order of removal permitted the government to detain and remove Mr. Monsalvo if he failed to leave the country within “60 days . . . the maximum period allowed by” §1229c(b)(2). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. Everyone agrees the proper construction of that order is “governed by” the proper construction of §1229c(b)(2). 88 F. 4th, at 1308. Like Mr. Monsalvo’s final order of removal, that statute sets forth a deadline expressed in terms of a number of “days.” See §1229c(b)(2) (“Permission to depart voluntarily under this subsection shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days”). But what does that mean: Does every calendar day count? Or does the statute operate to extend a deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day?

In truth, the statute is susceptible to both understandings. An ordinary reader might understand “days” to mean calendar days, no more or less. That is how the Board and the Tenth Circuit saw it. See supra, at 4–5. And, to be sure, we usually assume statutory terms bear their ordinary meaning “until and unless someone points to evidence suggesting otherwise.” Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 163. But here, evidence suggesting the possibility of specialized meaning does exist. In legal settings, the term “days” is often understood to extend deadlines falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. Various federal rules reflect this understanding. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(a)(1)(C). As do our own. See this Court’s Rule 30(1). The Ninth Circuit and the immigration judge in this case thought §1229c(b)(2) of a piece with that practice. See supra, at 2, 5. The question before us thus boils down to whether §1229c(b)(2) uses the term “days” in its ordinary or specialized sense.

To resolve that question, we turn to one of this Court’s customary interpretive tools. When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a “longstanding administrative construction,” this Court generally presumes the new provision should be understood to work in harmony with what has come before. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297–298 (1981); accord, United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 553–554 (1993); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437 (1986).

That presumption is all but dispositive here. For many years, Congress has authorized the executive branch to draw up regulations to enforce the immigration laws. See 8 U. S. C. §1103(a)(3). And since at least the 1950s, those regulations have provided that, when calculating the deadline for the “taking of any action,” the term “day” carries its specialized meaning by excluding Sundays and legal holidays if a deadline would otherwise fall on one of those days. 8 CFR §1.1(a)(6) (1958) (emphasis added). In all the years since, the only notable change to this rule has been the addition of Saturdays to the list of excluded days. 52 Fed. Reg. 2935 (1987). Congress adopted §1229c(b)(2) against the backdrop of this consistent, longstanding administrative construction. And, given that, we presume the statute employs the same understanding.[2]

Nor do we see anything in the statute that might overcome our usual presumption. To the contrary, what evidence we have before us only supports its application. Congress set forth the maximum number of “days” allowed for voluntary departure in §304 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). In the same section of that law, Congress also provided individuals a certain number of “days” to file motions to reopen or to reconsider. §304, 110Stat. 3009–593; 8 U. S. C. §§1229a(c)(6)(B), (c)(7)(C)(i). When it comes to those latter provisions, the government concedes, the term “days” is best read in light of pre-existing regulatory practice and thus takes its specialized meaning. Brief for Respondent 43–44. Everyone agrees, then, that two provisions in §304 operate to roll a deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday over to the next business day. And if two provisions in a single section of an Act of Congress use the term “days” this way, it is all the more sensible to think a third provision in the same section does as well. After all, “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007). And, if anything, that maxim may be “doubly appropriate” where, as here, Congress employed the same term in multiple places “at the same time” in the “same section of the [same] public law.” Id., at 231–232.

Tellingly, too, if Congress meant to depart from settled immigration practice when it adopted the voluntary-departure deadline in 1996, the government itself seems not to have noticed. After Congress enacted IIRIRA, the government promulgated a new rule to enforce §1229c(b)(2)’s terms. See 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10372 (1997). Tracking the statute, that rule allows an immigration judge to grant a voluntary-departure period of up to “60 days.” 8 CFR §240.26(e) (1999). And under the government’s own regulations, remember, regulatory deadlines defined in terms of days do not expire on weekends or legal holidays. §1001.1(h) (2021). Nowhere does the government’s rule enforcing §1229c(b)(2) suggest that it is exempt from these regulations.[3] Perhaps for this reason, the immigration judge in Mr. Monsalvo’s own case understood his voluntary-departure deadline to extend past a weekend to a Monday. See supra, at 3. Perhaps for this reason, as well, many other immigration judges have done the same in other cases. See Brief for American Immigration Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae 4 (collecting examples).

B

In response to our merits analysis, the government and Justice Alito offer three principal counterarguments. But, thoughtful as they are, we find none sufficient to overcome the presumption that §1229c(b)(2) follows the government’s own longstanding practice.

First, the government and Justice Alito stress the limited reach of the regulation defining the term “day.” Yes, they admit, that rule has long indicated that deadlines expressed in days do not expire on weekends or legal holidays. And yes, they agree, the definition applies for “computing the period of time for taking any action provided in this chapter.” 8 CFR §1.1(h) (1996) (emphasis added). But, they observe, that rule applies only to regulatory deadlines and does not purport to control statutory deadlines like the one found in §1229c(b)(2). Brief for Respondent 43; post, at 4 (dissenting opinion).

That much is true, but also irrelevant. The question before us isn’t whether a regulation can trump a statute (of course not). It is whether Congress’s work in §304 of IIRIRA should be read in light of the government’s longstanding regulatory practice. And, again, even the government concedes that the answer is (mostly) yes. Supra, at 12. When speaking of the “days” available for filing motions to reopen or to reconsider in §304, the government admits, Congress meant to follow the pre-existing regulatory practice rolling over deadlines falling on weekends and legal holidays to the next business day. Brief for Respondent 43–44. Nothing in the government’s argument here supplies a reason to suppose Congress meant the term “days” to work differently when it comes to the voluntary-departure deadline found in the same section of IIRIRA.[4]

Second, and attempting to address this deficiency, the government and Justice Alito highlight the fact that, when setting the deadlines for motions to reopen or to reconsider in §304, Congress codified pre-existing deadlines found in immigration regulations (90 days and 30 days, respectively). By contrast, when Congress selected 60 days as the voluntary-departure deadline, it did not pull that number from a pre-existing regulatory deadline. Given that difference, the argument goes, Congress must have meant the word “days” to work differently when it comes to the voluntary-departure deadline alone. Brief for Respondent 43–44; post, at 9–10 (dissenting opinion).

That conclusion, however, does not follow from its premise. Exactly nothing in §304 hints that deadlines found there should operate differently. Nor does the regulatory backdrop against which Congress legislated. Recall that, by 1996, the government’s regulations had long provided—categorically and without exception—that the term “day” excludes certain weekends and legal holidays when it comes to calculating the deadline for “taking any action,” of whatever kind, required by regulation. 8 CFR §1001.1(h) (emphasis added). Again, too, if Congress meant to pursue a more parsimonious approach for the voluntary-departure deadline in §304, it is curious that the government itself did not seem to advance that view when it promulgated its own rule to enforce that deadline. See 8 CFR §1240.26(e); supra, at 14, and n. 3.

Third, coming at the problem from a different direction, the government and Justice Alito suggest that we should divide §304’s deadlines into “procedural” and “substantive” categories. Brief for Respondent 15, 22; post, at 4, 6, 9 (dissenting opinion). For “procedural” deadlines, like those for motions to reopen and reconsider, the government and dissent concede, it makes sense to think Congress legislated against the administrative backdrop we have described, given that the agencies and courts where those motions must be filed are usually closed on weekends and legal holidays. But that consideration is immaterial, the government and Justice Alito insist, for the “substantive” duty of voluntary departure. After all, an individual can leave the country almost anytime; even if agencies and courts close for the weekend or a legal holiday, airports and roads generally remain open.

Maybe the procedural/substantive distinction the government and dissent propose would make for good policy. But if Congress had something like that in mind, it never said so. Section 304’s text does not draw any lines between procedural and substantive duties. Nor does the regulatory background against which the statute was adopted hint at such a distinction. As we have seen, the government’s longstanding definition of the term “day” excludes certain weekends and holidays when calculating the time for taking “any action” under immigration regulations—including when it comes to various “substantive” actions that can plainly be accomplished on a weekend or holiday, like “getting married after entering the United States on a fiancé(e) visa.” Brief for Petitioner 38. Notably, as well, the government’s own regulations enforcing §304 make no mention of a procedural/substantive distinction either. Supra, at 11–12.

Perhaps, too, Congress had good reason for eschewing the line the government and dissent would have us draw. Often enough, as it happens, a “substantive” duty that can be performed on any given day will be intertwined with a “procedural” duty that can be discharged only on days when agencies and courts are open. Mr. Monsalvo’s case reflects this reality. In it, the effective (procedural) deadline for his motion to reopen turned on the calculation of the (substantive) deadline for voluntary departure. See supra, at 4. In light of that reality, a rational Congress might have thought it sensible to extend the same rule to both the procedural and substantive deadlines in §304. Of course, whether anyone in Congress gave so much as a passing thought to questions like that is anyone’s guess. But one thing is certain: The statutory text Congress chose in §1229c(b)(2) shows no more sign of a procedural/substantive distinction than the government’s own longstanding rules.[5]

*

As we see it, §1229c(b)(2)’s deadline works like others found in §304 of IIRIRA—and so many others in immigration law. Here, as elsewhere, the term “days” operates to extend a deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. Because the Tenth Circuit held otherwise in addressing Mr. Monsalvo’s petition, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.