Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 604 U.S. ___ (2025)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 23–1127

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WISCONSIN BELL, INC., PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES, ex rel. TODD HEATH

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

[February 21, 2025]

Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

The E-Rate (short for Education-Rate) program subsidizes internet and other telecommunications services for schools and libraries across the United States. Established under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110Stat. 56, the program disburses funds—collected from telecommunications carriers and managed by a private corporation—to cover a substantial percentage of a school’s internet costs. The funds are payable, under Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations, to either a carrier or a school upon receipt of a reimbursement request.

This case asks us to decide whether such a request can count as a “claim” under the False Claims Act (FCA or Act), 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3733. The FCA protects government funds and programs by imposing civil liability on any person who knowingly presents a false or fraudulent “claim” as statutorily defined. In the part of the definition relevant here, a request for money qualifies as a claim if the Government “provides or has provided any portion of the money . . . requested.” §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). We hold today that the E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue satisfy that requirement because the Government provided (at a minimum) a “portion” of the money applied for. In the years in which those requests were made, the Government transferred more than $100 million from the Treasury into the pool of funds used to pay E-Rate subsidies. That is enough to create a “claim” under the Act, and to allow a suit alleging fraud to go forward.

I

Congress and the FCC have long worked to ensure that “all the people of the United States” have access, at reasonable prices, to telecommunications and information services. 47 U. S. C. §151; see §254(b). In keeping with that goal, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to establish several so-called universal-service programs for populations or institutions needing improved access. See §254. That statute identified, for example, consumers in rural areas, consumers with low incomes, and—critical here—elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries as appropriate recipients of subsidies or other assistance. See §§254(b), (h)(1).

To finance those measures, Congress required that telecommunications carriers pay into a fund—now known as the Universal Service Fund—as FCC regulations prescribe. See §254(d). Under those rules, the FCC determines each quarter the percentage of revenues that a carrier must contribute. See 47 CFR §§54.706, 54.709(a) (2023). The FCC, however, does not manage the Fund’s day-to-day operations. Rather, it has “appointed” the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “Administrator.” §54.701(a); see App. 34. The Administrative Company generally bills and collects contributions from carriers—though the FCC plays a role in pursuing delinquents. See §54.702; App. 37–38, 40–43; infra, at 8. And the Company distributes the resulting pot of money, as FCC rules provide, to program beneficiaries. See §54.702(b).[1]

Among those beneficiaries are public and private schools and libraries, under what is commonly called the E-Rate program. See 47 U. S. C. §§254(b)(6), (h)(1)(B); 47 CFR §54.500 et seq. That program subsidizes between 20 and 90 percent of a school’s total charges for internet and other telecommunications services, with higher percentages for schools in rural or low-income areas. See §§54.505(a)–(c). And the program protects the value of that subsidy by preventing a carrier from inflating its non-discounted prices. Under the “lowest corresponding price” rule, a carrier may not charge a school a higher sticker price than it would charge a “similarly situated” customer. §§54.500, 54.511(b). Once an appropriate charge is set, a school can obtain its subsidy in either of two ways. See §54.514(c). The school can pay the carrier only the discounted price, thus requiring the carrier to seek the remainder from moneys held in the Fund. Or the school can pay the carrier full freight and itself apply for reimbursement.

Respondent Todd Heath is an auditor of telecommunications bills who believes that petitioner Wisconsin Bell defrauded the E-Rate program out of millions of dollars. According to Heath, the carrier flouted the FCC’s “lowest corresponding price” rule for more than a decade (from 2002 to 2015) by charging schools a higher full price than it charged other, similarly situated customers. And as Heath notes, overcharges of that kind inevitably lead to overpayments from the Fund. Take a hypothetical example. If the lowest corresponding price for a service is $1,000 and a school is entitled to a 60% subsidy, then the E-Rate program should pay out $600. But if Wisconsin Bell, in violation of the rule, instead charged the school a full price of $1,500, then the program would instead confer a subsidy of $900. (And the school, rather than pay $400, would pay $600.) The carrier, in Heath’s view, thus wrongly amassed revenues at the E-Rate program’s expense.

That accusation is at the heart of a lawsuit Heath brought against Wisconsin Bell under the FCA. Enacted during the Civil War to protect federal programs and funds from fraud, that law enables private parties to bring civil actions on the Government’s behalf, and to share in any monetary recovery. See United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 424–425 (2023). A defendant is liable under the Act if it “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment.” 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(1)(A). In Heath’s view, Wisconsin Bell engaged in that conduct many times over by way of violating the FCC’s “lowest corresponding price” rule. App. 62–82 (complaint). All those violations led to reimbursement requests, by either Wisconsin Bell or a school, for amounts higher than the E-Rate program should have had to pay. Plus, all Wisconsin Bell’s own requests included a false certification (or so Heath alleged) that it had complied with the program’s rules, including the one about pricing.

The premise of Heath’s suit is that an E-Rate reimbursement request can give rise to FCA liability because it fits within the statute’s definition of the term “claim.” That definition varies depending on whether a “request or demand” for money is made to a federal employee or agent, or instead to an “other recipient.” §3729(b)(2)(A). Assuming that the Administrative Company—the recipient of E-Rate reimbursement requests—falls within the “other” rather than the “agent” category, such a request must meet two requirements to count as an FCA “claim.”[2] First, the money requested must be “spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest.” §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii). And second, the Government must “provide[ ] or ha[ve] provided any portion of the money” requested. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The statutory definition, though, also offers a caveat: It is immaterial, in assessing whether those requirements are met, “whether or not the United States has title to the money” at issue. §3729(b)(2)(A).[3]

Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath’s suit, arguing that under the FCA’s definition an E-Rate reimbursement request can never qualify as a “claim.” The carrier did not deny that the money so requested “advance[s] a Government program,” as the definition first requires. That money, after all, simply is the E-Rate program’s subsidy. But Wisconsin Bell contended that an E-Rate reimbursement request flunks the second requirement, because the Government does not “provide[ ] any portion of the money” requested. In Wisconsin Bell’s view, all the money in the E-Rate program is “private,” rather than “federal.” No. 2:08–cv–00724 (ED Wis., Nov. 25, 2014), ECF Doc. 97, p. 6. That is because the money comes from private carriers’ contributions, and a private corporation handles its collection and disbursement. See id., at 12–13. “The federal government,” Wisconsin Bell averred, does not provide “a single penny to the Fund.” Id., at 12.

After the District Court denied the motion, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that E-Rate reimbursement requests fit the FCA’s definition of “claim.” The Court of Appeals found two “independent paths” for concluding, contra Wisconsin Bell, that the Government “provided” E-Rate program funding. 92 F. 4th 654, 666 (2024). First, the court held that the Government provided all the money in the program through its regulatory role in the “collection and distribution” of contributions—most notably, by initially requiring the carriers to pay into the Fund. Id., at 671; see id., at 669. Second and more narrowly, the court found that the Government provided some “portion” of E-Rate funding by depositing into the Fund, in the relevant years, “more than $100 million directly from the U.S. Treasury.” Id., at 667. That contribution of Treasury money, even if a small part of the Fund’s total, was enough to qualify the E-Rate reimbursement requests as FCA “claims.” See ibid.[4]

In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that E-Rate reimbursement requests do not so qualify—although that court considered only the “broad[er] view” of how the Government “provides” E-Rate funding. United States ex rel. Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F.3d 379, 383–384 (2014) (per curiam); id., at 387–388 (finding the FCC’s “regulatory supervision” of the program insufficient to show that the Government provided E-Rate funds).

We granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over whether E-Rate reimbursement requests are FCA “claims.” 602 U. S. ___ (2024). We need reach no further today than the narrower ($100 million) ground on which the court below ruled. The requests at issue qualify as claims because, in the years they were submitted, the U. S. Treasury deposited money into the Fund for disbursement to those entitled to E-Rate subsidies.

II

The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue count as FCA “claims” if the Government “provides or has provided any portion of the money” requested. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Is that language satisfied when a school or carrier asks for E-Rate program funds? Because the Act does not define the word “provides,” we look to its ordinary meaning. To “provide” means to “supply,” to “furnish,” or to “make available.” American Heritage Dictionary 1411 (4th ed. 2000); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 713 (2d ed. 1989); see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657, 676 (2020) (defining “provide” the same way). The question thus becomes whether the Government supplied, furnished, or made available any portion of the money here sought.

The parties’ arguments on that score mirror the two “independent paths” laid out in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. 92 F. 4th, at 666; see supra, at 6. Wisconsin Bell and Heath dispute whether the Government provides all E-Rate moneys through its regulatory authority over the program, especially its mandate that carriers contribute to the Fund. But so too the parties contest whether the Government has provided some E-Rate moneys through the Treasury’s own transfer into the Fund of over $100 million, to pay for program subsidies.

If Heath prevails on either one of those theories, he has met the FCA’s definition of “claim.” Under that definition, providing some funds is just as good as providing all: The Government, recall, need provide only “any portion” of the amount requested. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 303 (CA4 2009) (“So long as ‘any portion’ of the claim is or will be funded by U.S. money,” the “full claim satisfies the definition”). Wisconsin Bell acknowledges that point, as it must. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. So if the Government, by making direct payments, has provided even a small fraction of the money used to fund E-Rate reimbursements, the question presented here is resolved. It is then immaterial whether the Government, by exercising regulatory control, provides all the money so used. Even supposing not, the reimbursement requests are “claims” for payment, and Heath’s suit for fraud can go forward.

And as the Court of Appeals explained, the Government—more specifically, the U. S. Treasury—has put substantial money into the Fund to finance E-Rate subsidies. See 92 F. 4th, at 667. The more than $100 million deposited in the relevant years came from two sources. About half consisted of delinquent contributions (plus associated interest and penalties) that the FCC and Treasury Department collected from carriers after the Administrative Company proved unable to do so. Those federal agencies, acting under a law providing for the collection of sums “owed to the United States,” placed the money they garnered in Treasury accounts. 31 U. S. C. §3701(b)(1); see §§3711, 3717; App. 35–38, 40–43. From there, the Treasury made periodic transfers to the Fund for disbursement to program participants. See id., at 37–38, 42–43. The other half of the $100 million derived from Justice Department activities. See id., at 38, 43. When that Department learns of wrongdoing in the E-Rate program, its lawyers may proceed in diverse ways against the malefactors—maybe under the FCA itself, or under antitrust laws, or under criminal bans on mail or wire fraud. Any civil settlements or criminal restitution payments resulting from those actions go into Treasury accounts. And once again, that money eventually makes its way to the Fund to bankroll E-Rate subsidies.

So to return to the language of the relevant definitional provision: The Government “provided [a] portion of the money” disbursed from the Fund to reimburse E-Rate program participants. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Or to use the synonyms previously offered: The Government supplied funds, furnished funds, and made available funds for that purpose. It is a simple matter, as the saying goes, of following the money. Again, federal agencies accumulated the roughly $100 million and placed it in the U. S. Treasury—the repository for “all monies received by the United States.” K. Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L. J. 1343, 1356 (1988). And the Treasury later transferred those sums to the Fund for use in fulfilling E-Rate reimbursement requests. Or as the Seventh Circuit put the point: Because the Treasury held and conveyed to the Fund the $100 million, “quite literally, the Treasury provide[d] money to the E-Rate program.” 92 F. 4th, at 670.[5]

Wisconsin Bell resists that conclusion, arguing that even the $100 million was provided by, and only by, the carriers. See, e.g., Brief for Wisconsin Bell 27 (“The E-rate program is funded entirely by private carriers’ contributions”). On that alternative view, the Government played no more than an intermediary role: It “merely collected and held” the carriers’ required payments “pending their return” to “their rightful owner, the Administrative Company.” Id., at 31. And “facilitat[ing] the transfer of money,” Wisconsin Bell says, does not amount to “provid[ing]” money. Id., at 30. Rather, the deposits that the Treasury put into the Fund “are no different than” the carriers’ “contributions themselves.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5; see id., at 23. The former stand in for the latter, and remain just as private.

But to start with, Wisconsin Bell mischaracterizes the Government’s role in bringing the $100 million to the Fund. The Government was not a passive throughway for the transmission of E-rate moneys from one private party (the carrier) to another (the Administrative Company). Nor were the Government’s activities confined to “facilitating” such transfers, as Wisconsin Bell would have it. Take first the $50 million in delinquent contributions, on which Wisconsin Bell almost wholly focuses. The FCC and Treasury Department extracted those moneys from carriers that, even after the Administrative Company’s entreaties, refused to pay on schedule. Without the agencies’ dunning, the contributions would have come in yet later—or might never have arrived. (And if no contributions, likely no interest or penalties either.) Still less does the other $50 million—from settlement and restitution awards—align with Wisconsin Bell’s story. Those awards came from the Justice Department’s efforts to prosecute wrongdoing in the E-Rate program. And the amounts obtained thus reflected not the carriers’ regular contributions but the harms that fraudulent conduct had imposed on the Fund and its beneficiaries. So the Government, in forwarding those payments to the Fund, did not serve as a program middleman or facilitator. Rather, the Government itself generated the moneys it provided.

And anyway, a simple intermediary can sometimes also “provide” things to a recipient—and the Government, even if viewed only in that light, would do so here. Wisconsin Bell assumes that only one entity can provide a thing, so that if a carrier gave a contribution to the Government to give to the Fund, then the carrier alone provided the money. But why not say that both did so—the originator of the money and the transmitter alike? Consider a perhaps dated example used at oral argument. See id., at 13–14. A proctor for an exam gives out blue books and pencils to students. She has not purchased them herself; rather, she has gotten them from the school. It would still be natural to say that she (along with the school) has “provided”—has supplied, furnished, or made available—the booklets and pencils. Similar real-world examples abound. A bank teller “provides” an account holder with money, even though the recipient’s employer deposited the relevant funds. A UPS driver “provides” a person with a package, even though the driver first picked up the box from a department store. In each case, not only the original source but also the middleman (the intermediary, transmitter, facilitator, what have you) provides the thing at issue. And the same is true here. Supposing that carriers “provided” the relevant $100 million to the Fund, so too did the Government by collecting it and routing it through Treasury accounts.

Nothing about the ownership of the $100 million while in the Treasury matters to that conclusion, in the way Wisconsin Bell at times suggests. In its view, those moneys were first owned by private carriers and then owned by the private Administrative Company—but not owned by the Government in the interim period when it had “temporary possession.” Id., at 22. Perhaps. Or perhaps not—the Government (as well as Heath) takes the opposite view. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21–22. The important point here is that the answer is irrelevant. Consider the examples just given: No one would say that the proctor or the teller or the UPS driver does not “provide” (again, supply, furnish, or make available) the relevant item just because she does not own it while making the transfer. And so too here. Were there any doubt, another aspect of the FCA’s definition of the term “claim” clears it away. Recall that the definition—including its provides-the-money requirement—can be met “whether or not the United States has title to the money” at issue. §3729(b)(2)(A); see supra, at 5.[6] So as the FCA sees the matter, the technical ownership of the $100 million that the Government conveyed to the Fund makes not a whit of difference. Either way, its transfers can form the basis of an FCA suit.

Those transfers, indeed, look like most Government spending—neither more nor less private, neither more nor less public. Money usually comes to the Government from private parties—through taxes, fines, or fees of all kinds. And then money usually goes out to the broader community, to fund any number of programs and activities. Between the time money comes in and the time money goes out, it sits—as the $100 million here did—in Treasury accounts. In this broad array of schemes, the funding received may be more or less earmarked, and it may be disbursed more or less quickly. But the basic mechanism remains the same. Money enters and then exits the public fisc; the Government collects money and then furnishes it for some use. And so it was here, in the years relevant to Heath’s FCA suit. The Government obtained $100 million in delinquent contributions, settlement awards, and restitution payments related to the E-Rate program. It held that money for a time in the U. S. Treasury. And then it supplied that money to reimburse program participants—“provid[ing],” as the FCA requires, a “portion of the money” requested for schools’ E-Rate subsidies.

III

What we have said above is enough to enable Heath’s FCA suit to proceed. The reimbursement requests at issue qualify as “claims” under the FCA because, in the years they were made, the Government deposited money into the Fund to pay for E-Rate subsidies. And all the statute requires is that those deposits provide “any portion”—not the whole—of the sums requested. For that reason, we need not address the alternative theory that the Government provides all E-Rate funds by exercising regulatory control over the program. Whether or not that is so, Heath can press his claim that, by violating the “lowest corresponding price” rule, Wisconsin Bell “knowingly present[ed], or cause[d] to be presented,” a set of “false or fraudulent claim[s] for payment.” §3729(a)(1)(A).

If Heath prevails on the merits, issues about damages may well emerge. At oral argument, the parties forecast their differences on those issues—including about whether (and, if so, how) the amount of money the Government deposited should limit the damages Heath can recover. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 24–26, 29–32, 53–54, 66–68, 93–94. But those issues were not briefed in this Court, and in any event are a long way away. We therefore leave them for the courts below to decide, should it ever become necessary to do so.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.