SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 23A349, 23A350, 23A351 and 23A384
_________________
OHIO, et al.
23A349
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
et al.
KINDER MORGAN, INC., et al.
23A350
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
et al.
AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER ASSOCIATION,
et al.
23A351
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
et al.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION
23A384
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
et al.
on applications for stay
[June 27, 2024]
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Sotomayor,
Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson join, dissenting.
The Court today enjoins the enforcement of a
major Environmental Protection Agency rule based on an
underdeveloped theory that is unlikely to succeed on the merits. In
so doing, the Court grants emergency relief in a fact- intensive
and highly technical case without fully engaging with both the
relevant law and the voluminous record. While the Court suggests
that the EPA failed to explain itself sufficiently in response to
comments, this theory must surmount sizable procedural obstacles
and contrary record evidence. Applicants therefore cannot satisfy
the stringent conditions for relief in this posture.
I
I will start by setting the record straight
with respect to some important background.
First, the Court downplays EPA’s
statutory role in ensuring that States meet air-quality standards.
Ante, at 2–3. The Clean Air Act directs EPA to “establish
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for pollutants at
levels that will protect public health.”
EPA v.
EME Homer
City Generation, L. P.,
572 U.S.
489, 498 (2014); see 42 U. S. C. §§7408, 7409. States
must create State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure that their
air meets these standards. §7410(a)(1). But States also face an
externality problem: “Pollutants generated by upwind sources are
often transported by air currents . . . to downwind
States,” relieving upwind States “of the associated costs” and
making it difficult for downwind States to “maintain satisfactory
air quality.”
EME, 572 U. S., at 496. So the Act’s Good
Neighbor Provision requires SIPs to “prohibi[t]” the State’s
emissions sources from “emitting any air pollutant in amounts which
will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in,
or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to
any [NAAQS].” §7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
Given the incentives of upwind States to
underregulate the pollution they send downwind, the Act requires
EPA to determine whether a State “has failed to submit an adequate
SIP.”
EME, 572 U. S
., at 498; see §7410(c)(1).
If a SIP does not prevent the State’s polluters from significantly
contributing to nonattainment in downwind States, EPA “shall”
promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) that does.
§7410(c)(1). And EPA must stop the State’s significant
contributions by the statutory deadline for the affected downwind
States to achieve compliance. See
Wisconsin v.
EPA,
938 F.3d 303, 313–314 (CADC 2019) (
per curiam);
§7511.
Second, the Court fails to recognize that
EPA’s SIP disapprovals may, in fact, be valid. EPA justified its
findings that 23 States had failed to submit adequate SIPs. It
found that these States all significantly contributed to ozone
pollution in downwind States. See 88 Fed. Reg. 36656 (2023). But 21
of these States, including applicants, proposed to do
nothing to reduce their ozone-precursor (
i.e., NOx)
emissions—arguing that they did not actually contribute to downwind
nonattainment or that there were no other cost-effective
emissions-reduction measures they could impose. See 88 Fed. Reg.
9354–9361 (2023). The other two States failed to submit a SIP at
all. See 84 Fed. Reg. 66614 (2019). While 12 of EPA’s SIP
disapprovals have been
temporarily stayed, no court yet has
invalidated one. So EPA’s replacement FIP—the Good Neighbor
Plan—may yet apply to all 23 original States. Indeed, EPA and the
plaintiffs who challenged Nevada’s SIP disapproval have proposed a
settlement that would lift that stay. 89 Fed. Reg. 35091
(2024).
Third, the Court claims that commenters
on the proposed FIP warned that its emissions limits might change
if it covered fewer States, but EPA failed to respond.
Ante,
at 6–8. Not exactly. As I will elaborate below, commenters merely
criticized EPA’s decision to propose a FIP before its SIP
disapprovals were final. EPA responded that this sequencing was
“consistent with [its] past practice in [its] efforts to timely
address good neighbor obligations”: Given the August 2024 deadline
for certain States to comply with the 2015 ozone NAAQS, EPA was
“obligated” to start the years-long process of promulgating a FIP
so that one could be effective in time. EPA, Response to Public
Comments on Proposed Rule 149–150, (EPA–HQ–OAR–2021–0668–1127, June
2023) (Response to Comments); see
Wisconsin, 938 F. 3d,
at 313–314.
Finally, the Court repeatedly
characterizes the FIP as relying on an “assumption that [it] would
apply to all covered States.”
Ante, at 6; see
ante,
at 12. But try as it might, the Court identifies no evidence that
the FIP’s emissions limits would have been different for a
different set of States or that EPA’s consideration of
state-specific inputs was anything but confirmatory of the limits
it calculated based on nationwide data. See
ante, at 5–6,
19, n. 14. The Court leans on the fact that EPA “considered data
specific to the emissions-producing facilities in [each] State” to
calculate “how much each upwind State’s [NOx] emissions would fall”
if the State’s emitters “adopted each [emissions-control] measure.”
Ante, at 5 (citing EPA, Ozone Transport Policy Analysis
Proposed Rule TSD 9–10, 13, 22–23, (EPA–HQ–OAR–2021–0668–0133, Feb.
2022) (Proposed Ozone Analysis)). But the Proposed Ozone Analysis
makes clear that EPA did these state-specific calculations to
determine each State’s “emissions budget.” Proposed Ozone Analysis
7–13. A State’s budget consists of the “emissions that would
remain”
after the State’s power plants meet the emissions
limits that EPA independently calculated. 88 Fed. Reg. 36762; see
Proposed Ozone Analysis 13 (“adjust[ed]” “unit-level emissions are
summed up to the state level”); n. 6,
infra. Of course
each State’s emissions budget will depend on the emitters in that
State. What matters is whether the
limits the FIP imposes on
each emitter depend on the number of States the FIP covers.
Tellingly, the Court does not identify any NOx limit for any
industry that relied on state-specific data.
On the contrary, as I will explain in Part II–B,
the final rule and its supporting documents suggest that EPA’s
methodology for setting emissions limits did not depend on the
number of States in the plan, but on nationwide data for the
relevant industries—and the FIP contains many examples of emissions
limits that EPA created using nationwide inputs. Moreover, EPA has
now confirmed this interpretation. During this litigation, EPA
received petitions seeking reconsideration of the FIP on the ground
that it should not be implemented in just a subset of the original
States. EPA denied these petitions on April 4, 2024. 89 Fed. Reg.
23526. It thoroughly explained how its “methodology for defining”
each State’s emissions obligations is “independent of the number of
states included in the Plan” because it “relies on a determination
regarding what emissions reductions each type of regulated source
can cost-effectively achieve.” EPA, Basis for Partial Denial of
Petitions for Reconsideration on Scope 1,
(EPA–HQ–OAR–2021–0668–1255, Apr. 2024) (Denial). The “control
technologies and cost-effectiveness figures the EPA consider[ed]
. . . do not depend in any way on the number of states
included.”
Id., at 2. So “[s]ources in the remaining upwind
states currently regulated by the Plan . . . would bear
the same actual emission reduction obligations” regardless of the
number of covered States.
Id., at 3–4.
II
To obtain emergency relief, applicants must,
at a minimum, show that they are likely to succeed on the merits,
that they will be irreparably injured absent a stay, and that the
balance of the equities favors them.
Nken v.
Holder,
556 U.S.
418, 425–426 (2009). Moreover, we should grant relief only if
we would be likely to grant certiorari were the applicants’ case to
come to us in the usual course. See
Does 1–3 v.
Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (Barrett, J.,
concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief );
Hollingsworth v.
Perry,
558 U.S.
183, 190 (2010) (
per curiam). In my view, the
applicants cannot satisfy the stay factors. Most significantly,
they have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
The Court holds that applicants are likely to
succeed on a claim that the Good Neighbor Plan is “arbitrary” or
“capricious.” 42 U. S. C. §7607(d)(9). The
“arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires that agency action” be
both “[1] reasonable and [2] reasonably explained.”
FCC v.
Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). The
Court’s theory is that EPA did not “ ‘reasonably
explai[n] ’ ” “why the number and identity of
participating States does not affect what measures maximize
cost-effective downwind air-quality improvement.”
Ante, at
13 (quoting only the second part of
Prometheus Radio’s
formulation (emphasis added)). So to be clear, the Court does not
conclude that EPA’s actions were
substantively
unreasonable—
e.
g., that the FIP cannot rationally be
applied to fewer States because a change in the number of
participants would undermine its rationale or render it
ineffective. Nor could it, given the significant evidence in the
record (not to mention EPA’s denial of reconsideration) that the
covered States did not, in fact, affect the plan’s
emissions-reduction obligations. See Part II–B,
infra. Thus,
the only basis for the Court’s decision is the argument that EPA
failed to provide “ ‘a satisfactory explanation for its
action’ ” and a “reasoned response” to comments.
Ante,
at 12–13 (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States,
Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)). There are at least three major barriers to
success on such a claim.
A
The Clean Air Act imposes a procedural bar on
the challenges that a plaintiff can bring in court: Only objections
that were “raised with reasonable specificity during the period for
public comment . . . may be raised during judicial
review.” §7607(d)(7)(B). If it was “impracticable to raise such
objection within such time or if the grounds for such objection
arose after the period for public comment,” the challenger may
petition for reconsideration of the rule and can obtain judicial
review only if EPA refuses.
Ibid. While EPA has now
separately denied petitions for reconsideration of the Good
Neighbor Plan, this case came to us directly; we are assessing
applicants’ likelihood of success in
challenging the plan itself, not the denial of
reconsideration. So the procedural bar on objections not raised in
the comments presents a significant obstacle—in two ways.
First, consider the Court’s basic theory:
that EPA offered “no reasoned response” to comments allegedly
questioning whether the plan’s emissions limits depend on the
States covered.
Ante, at 12. That EPA failed to adequately
explain its final rule in response to comments is “an objection to
the notice and comment process itself,” which applicants “obviously
did not and could not have raised . . . during the period
for public comment.”
EME Homer City Generation,
L. P. v.
EPA, 795 F.3d 118, 137 (CADC 2015)
(Kavanaugh, J.). No one could have raised
during the proposal’s
comment period the objection that the “
final rule was
not ‘reasonably explained.’ ”
Ante, at 13 (emphasis
added).
The D. C. Circuit, on remand in
EME
Homer, considered a similar objection that EPA had “violated
the Clean Air Act’s notice and comment requirements”: EPA had
“significantly amend[ed] the Rule between the proposed and final
versions without providing additional opportunity for notice and
comment.” 795 F. 3d, at 137. But because this procedural
objection could not have been raised during the comment period,
“the only appropriate path for petitioners” under §7607(d)(7)(B)
was to raise it “through an initial petition for reconsideration to
EPA.”
Ibid. So the D. C. Circuit lacked “authority at
th[at] time to reach this question.”
Ibid. While such
“logical outgrowth” challenges typically are cognizable under the
Administrative Procedure Act, see
Shell Oil Co. v.
EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 747 (CADC 1991), the Clean Air Act
channels these challenges through reconsideration proceedings. This
Court’s failure-to-explain objection may face the same problem: It
is not judicially reviewable in its current posture.[
1]
Second, even putting aside this aspect of
§7607(d)(7)(B), it is not clear that any commenter raised with
“reasonable specificity” the underlying substantive issue: that the
exclusion of some States from the FIP would undermine EPA’s
cost-effectiveness analyses and resulting emissions controls.
§7607(d)(7)(B); see
ante, at 13. The Court concludes
otherwise only by putting in the commenters’ mouths words they did
not say. It first cites a bevy of comments arguing that EPA’s
“disapprovals of the SIPs were legally flawed” and noting the
obvious point that EPA cannot “include a State in its FIP” unless
it validly disapproves the State’s SIP.
Ante, at 6. These
comments do not address the continued efficacy of a FIP that
applies to a subset of the originally covered States.
Another collection of the Court’s inapposite
comments relates to the inclusion of specific sources, emissions
controls, and industries in the proposed plan—
not States.
See
ante, at 7, n. 4. For example, one commenter argued
that the “cost effectiveness of the requirement to employ SNCR will
be highly variable, and is unlikely to meet EPA expectations in
even the most optimistic case.” Comments of Indiana Municipal Power
Agency 9 (June 20, 2022). That is a challenge to EPA’s endorsement
of a particular emissions-control technology; it says nothing about
the FIP’s dependence on a particular number of States. See also,
e.
g., Comments of Lower Colorado River Authority
21–22 (June 21, 2022). Similarly, another commenter argued that
pulp and paper mills should not be included because the “maximum
estimated improvement” in ozone levels from controlling their
emissions would be “too small to even measure.” Comments of
Wisconsin Paper Council 2 (June 21, 2022).[
2] An argument that the
maximum benefits from
regulating an industry are too small is not an argument that those
benefits
would become too small if fewer States were
covered.[
3]
The closest comment that the Court can
find—which it quotes repeatedly—is one sentence that obliquely
refers to some “new assessment and modeling of contribution” that
EPA might need to perform. Comments of Air Stewardship Coalition
13–14 (June 21, 2022). The Court dresses up this comment by
characterizing it as a warning about what might happen “[i]f the
FIP did not wind up applying to all 23 States” and responding to
the concern that a “different set of States might mean that the
‘knee in the curve’ might shift” and change the cost-effective
“emissions-control measures.”
Ante, at 7. But those words
are the Court’s, not the commenter’s.
The commenter’s actual objection was to EPA’s
sequencing of its actions—proposing a FIP before it finalized its
SIP disapprovals. The commenter titled this section “EPA Step Two
Screening is Premised on the Premature Disapproval of 19 Upwind
States[’] Good Neighbor SIPs.” Air Stewardship Comments 13
(boldface omitted). And the relevant sentence reads in full:
“The proposed FIP essentially prejudges
the outcome of those pending SIP actions and, in the event EPA
takes a different action on those SIPs than contemplated in this
proposal, it would be required to conduct a new assessment and
modeling of contribution and subject those findings to public
comment.”
Id., at 14.
This sentence says nothing about what would be
required if
after EPA finalizes its SIP disapprovals and
issues a final FIP, some States drop out of the plan. Nor does it
suggest that the plan’s cost-effectiveness thresholds or emissions
controls would change with a different number of States. Nor is it
clear what the comment means by its bare reference to a “new
assessment and modeling of contribution”: Would EPA be required to
perform a new evaluation of which upwind States cause pollution in
downwind States? A new analysis of how much pollution each source
must eliminate? A new assessment of the plan’s impact on downwind
States?
It is therefore difficult to see how this
comment raised with “reasonable specificity” the objection that the
removal of some States from the final plan would invalidate EPA’s
cost-effectiveness thresholds and chosen emissions-control
measures.[
4] That is not how
EPA understood it. EPA characterized this comment as arguing that
“by taking action before considering comments on the proposed
disapprovals, the EPA is presupposing the outcome of its proposed
rulemakings on the SIPs.” Response to Comments 147 (noting this
comment’s ID number, 0518). And EPA explained that it “disagree[d]”
with the argument that the “sequence” of its actions was “improper,
unreasonable, or bad policy”; EPA had a statutory obligation to
promulgate a FIP by the August 2024 NAAQS attainment deadline.
Id., at 150. If a
commenter had said with reasonable
specificity what
the Court says today—that “a different set
of States might mean that the ‘knee in the curve’ might shift,”
ante, at 7—EPA could have responded with more explanation of
why its methodology did not depend on the number of covered
States—as it has recently explained. But EPA cannot be penalized if
it did not have reasonable notice of this objection.[
5]
In sum, §7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar likely
forecloses both the failure-to-explain objection that the Court
credits and any substantive challenge to the reasonableness of
applying the FIP to a subset of the originally covered States.
B
Even if applicants clear §7607(d)(7)(B)’s
procedural bar, they face an uphill battle on the merits. To
prevail on the Court’s theory, applicants must show that EPA’s
actions were “arbitrary” or “capricious.” §§7607(d)(9)(A), (D).
“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard
is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency.”
State Farm, 463 U. S., at 43. A rule is
arbitrary and capricious if the agency “
entirely failed to
consider an
important aspect of the problem.”
Ibid.
(emphasis added). But we will “ ‘uphold a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be
discerned.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting
Bowman Transp.,
Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974)). Given the explanations and state-agnostic
methodology apparent in the final rule and its supporting
documentation—and the paucity of comments specifically raising the
issue—EPA may well have done enough to justify its plan’s
severability.
To begin, the rule and its supporting documents
arguably make clear that EPA’s methodology for calculating
cost-effectiveness thresholds and imposing emissions controls did
not depend on the number of covered States. The rule applied EPA’s
longstanding “4-step interstate transport framework” to create
emissions limits that will prevent NOx sources in upwind States
from significantly contributing to ozone pollution in downwind
States. 88 Fed. Reg. 36659; see 42 U. S. C.
§7410(a)(2)(D). Under that framework, EPA (1) identifies “downwind
receptors that are expected to have problems attaining or
maintaining the NAAQS”; (2) identifies which upwind States are
“ ‘link[ed]’ ” to those downwind receptors because they
contribute at least 1% of a receptor’s
ozone; (3) determines which NOx sources in the
linked upwind States “significantly contribute” to downwind
nonattainment or interference; and (4) implements emissions limits
to stop those sources’ significant contributions. 88 Fed. Reg.
36659; see
EME, 572 U. S., at 500–501 (describing
similar approach used in earlier FIP). The first two steps
determine which States the FIP must cover. The rubber meets the
road at steps 3 and 4: How much do sources in those States
“significantly contribute” to downwind pollution, and what must
they do about it?
Here is how EPA explains that methodology. A
source “significantly contributes” to downwind pollution if there
are cost-effective measures it could implement to reduce its
emissions: It must halt those emissions that can be eliminated at a
cost “under the cost threshold set by the Agency” for sources in
that industry.
EME, 572 U. S., at 518 (upholding this
approach). So the “ ‘amount’ of pollution” that sources must
eliminate is “that amount . . . in excess of the
emissions control strategies the EPA has deemed cost effective.” 88
Fed. Reg. 36676. EPA calculates for each type of source a “uniform
level of NOx emissions control stringency” expressed as a “cost per
ton of emissions reduction.”
Id., at 36719. This
cost-effectiveness threshold is based on the point “at which
further emissions mitigation strategies become excessively costly
on a per-ton basis while also delivering far fewer additional
emissions reductions.”
Id., at 36683 (describing this
“ ‘knee in the curve’ ” analysis). The plan requires
sources in each covered State to reduce their emissions
accordingly.[
6]
Crucially, the final rule suggests that EPA
calculated cost-effectiveness thresholds based on the likely cost
and impact of available emissions-reduction technology given
national, industry-wide data. Contrary to the Court’s
speculations,
ante, at 12, these thresholds and the FIP’s
resulting emissions limits appear not to depend on the number of
covered States. Consider the plan’s approach to power plants
(“electric generating units,” or EGUs). EPA assessed the cost and
impact of different NOx mitigation strategies that EGUs could
implement. One strategy was to fully operate “selective catalytic
reduction” (SCR) technology. 88 Fed. Reg. 36655; see
id., at
36720. EPA estimated that a “representative marginal cost” for this
strategy would be $1,600 per ton, and a “reasonable level of
performance” would be 0.08 lb/mmBtu—based on “nationwide” power
plant “emissions data.”
Id., at 36720–36721. EPA thus
determined that SCR optimization was a “viable mitigation strategy
for the 2023 ozone season” and built this assumption into the
plan’s emissions limits.
Id., at 36720. In other words, EPA
relied on nationwide industry data to select cost thresholds that
corresponded to how much it would cost to use particular
emissions-reduction technologies, and it applied that “uniform
control stringency to EGUs within the covered upwind states.”
Id., at 36680.[
7]
In fact, some commenters criticized EPA’s
reliance on a “nationwide data set” to calculate emissions limits,
arguing that EPA should “limit the dataset to . . . just
the covered states”—an approach that
would have made the
cost- effectiveness thresholds depend on which States were covered.
Id., at 36723. But EPA expressly defended its approach based
on its “intention to identify a
technology-specific
representative emissions rate” and its interest in “the performance
potential
of a technology”—which were best served by the
“largest dataset possible (
i.
e.,
nationwide).”
Id., at 36723–36724 (emphasis added). EPA explained that it
used the same approach it had successfully applied in previous
rulemakings: It “derive[d] technology performance averages” based
on nationwide data.
Id., at 36724. Then it applied the
relevant industry standard “on a uniform basis” to each emitter
across the covered States.
Id., at 36817.[
8]
The Court, perhaps recognizing the problem that
the FIP’s seemingly state-agnostic methodology poses for its
theory, throws at the wall a cherry-picked assortment of EPA
statements mentioning state data. See
ante, at 5–6, 19, n.
14. None stick. The fundamental problem with the Court’s citations
is that they discuss analyses that EPA performed
after it
chose cost thresholds and emissions limits based on nationwide
industry data. EPA did assess the impact on downwind States if
particular upwind States met the proposed emissions limits, and
that impact depended on the States included in the modeling.
Ante, at 5, 19, n. 14. But EPA said that these
“ ‘findings regarding air quality improvement,’ ”
ante, at 19, n. 14 (quoting 88 Fed. Reg. 36741), served
only to “
cement EPA’s identification of the selected
. . . mitigation measures as the appropriate control
stringency,” 88 Fed. Reg. 36741 (emphasis added); see Denial 18.
EPA explained that the statutory requirement to “eliminate
significant contribution” depends on the implementation of
cost-effective emissions controls at individual “industrial
sources,”
not some overall impact on “downwind areas’
nonattainment and maintenance problems.” 88 Fed. Reg. 36741. EPA
assessed the FIP’s impact assuming the participation of particular
States primarily to ensure that its emissions limits did not result
in “overcontrol”—
i.
e., more reductions than necessary
to help downwind States comply with the NAAQS.
Ibid.; see
EME Homer City, 572 U. S., at 521. The technical
document that the Court cites,
ante, at 5, makes this point
clear: “The downwind air quality impacts are used to inform EPA’s
assessment of potential overcontrol.” Proposed Ozone Analysis
31.
EPA’s analysis confirmed that its chosen
emissions limits would not result in overcontrol if they were
implemented in the States originally covered by the FIP. 88 Fed.
Reg. 36741. Importantly, implementing the FIP “in fewer upwind
states does not (and cannot possibly) result in overcontrol” given
that “there was no overcontrol even when more states, making more
emission reductions, were included.” Denial 22. So the fact that
EPA used state-specific data in its overcontrol analysis does not
mean that the FIP’s emissions limits depended on the number of
States it covered. And the inclusion of fewer States in that
analysis logically could not have affected the results.
Thus, EPA generally characterized the FIP’s
emissions limits as dependent on nationwide data, not on any
particular set of States.[
9]
Confirming this interpretation, the final rule contemplates its
application to a different number of States. It recognizes that
“states may replace FIPs with SIPs if EPA approves them,” and
several sections explain how States may exit
this FIP. 88
Fed. Reg. 36753, 36838–36843. And the rule’s severability provision
explains that EPA views the plan as “severable along
. . . state and/or tribal jurisdictional lines.”
Id., at 36693.
Moreover, EPA justified the FIP’s severability:
EPA “must address good neighbor obligations as expeditiously as
practicable and by no later than the next applicable attainment
date”; severability serves “important public health and
environmental benefits” and ensures that stakeholders can “rely on
this final rule in their planning.”
Ibid. These rationales
align with EPA’s response to critics of its decision to propose a
FIP before finalizing its SIP disapprovals: Quickly proposing a
FIP—just like keeping the FIP in place even if some States drop
out—“is a reasonable and prudent means of assuring that [EPA’s]
statutory obligation to reduce air pollution affecting the health
and welfare of people in downwind states is implemented without
delay.” Response to Comments 151.
Given these justifications and the
state-agnostic methodology apparent in the final rule, EPA’s
“ ‘path may reasonably be discerned.’ ”
State
Farm, 463 U. S., at 43. The FIP’s cost thresholds and
emissions limits did not depend in any significant way on the
number of States included, so the drawbacks of severability were
minimal. On the other hand, severability was necessary so that EPA
could fulfill, to the greatest extent possible, its statutory
obligation to eliminate the significant ozone contributions of
upwind States and reduce harmful pollution in downwind States in
time to meet the attainment deadlines. See Response to Comments 150
(noting the August 2024 ozone-NAAQS attainment deadline). If the
FIP were not severable, EPA would have to go back to the drawing
board for
all States whenever a single State is
removed—thwarting its mission for little reason.[
10]
Finally, it is unlikely that EPA’s response to
comments evinces a “fail[ure] to consider an
important
aspect of the problem.”
State Farm, 463 U. S., at 43
(emphasis added). An agency must respond to
“ ‘
relevant’ and ‘
significant’ public comments,”
and that requirement is not “particularly demanding”; the “agency
need not respond at all to comments that are ‘purely speculative
and do not disclose the factual or policy basis on which they
rest.’ ”
Public Citizen, Inc. v.
FAA, 988 F.2d
186, 197 (CADC 1993) (quoting
Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35, and n. 58 (CADC 1977); emphasis
added); see §7607(d)(6)(B) (EPA must respond to “significant”
comments). EPA received hundreds of comments, and its response
numbered nearly 1,100 pages. Given the likelihood that the FIP’s
emissions limits did not depend on the covered States, the risk of
it applying to fewer States may not be “important,” and comments
purportedly raising that possibility might not be “relevant” and
“significant.” Moreover, the one comment that vaguely referred to a
need for a “new assessment and modeling,” Air Stewardship Comments
14, was “purely speculative” and “disclose[d]” no “factual or
policy basis”; it likely merited no response,
Home Box
Office, 567 F. 2d, at 35, n. 58. Requiring more from
EPA risks the “sort of unwarranted judicial examination of
perceived procedural shortcomings” that might “seriously interfere
with that process prescribed by Congress.”
Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,
435 U.S.
519, 548 (1978).[
11]
C
Applicants face one more impediment: the Clean
Air Act’s stringent harmless-error rule. A court “reviewing alleged
procedural errors . . . may invalidate [an EPA] rule only
if the errors were
so serious and related to matters of
such central relevance to the rule that there is a
substantial likelihood that the rule would have been
significantly changed if such errors had not been made.”
§7607(d)(8) (emphasis added). This provision appears “tailor-made
to undo” any “rigid presumption of vacatur” that might apply in
other contexts. N. Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative
Law, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 253, 291 (2017).
The alleged error here plausibly is subject to
§7607(d)(8)’s harmless-error rule. As explained above, the Court
does not suggest that it is
substantively “[un]reasonable”
to apply the FIP to fewer States, only that EPA did not “reasonably
explai[n]” the FIP’s severability in response to comments.
Prometheus, 592 U. S., at 423. That is arguably an
“alleged procedural error” within the meaning of §7607(d)(8). In
fact, the Act contemplates that at least some “arbitrary or
capricious” challenges allege failures to “observ[e]
. . . procedure required by law,” and such challenges may
only succeed if §7607(d)(8)’s “condition is . . . met.”
§7607(d)(9)(D).
If the Act’s harmless-error rule applies,
applicants are unlikely to prevail. Given the apparent lack of
connection between the number of States covered and the FIP’s
methodology for determining cost thresholds and emissions limits,
it is difficult to imagine a “substantial” likelihood that the rule
would have been “significantly” different had EPA just responded
more thoroughly. In fact, applicants seem to have conceded as much.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6 (“[W]ith full candor to the Court, [the cost
threshold] could be the same or even be more expensive”);
id., at 9 (“I can’t tell you what that looks like, whether
there is a difference in the obligations or not”). And EPA, the
Court says, had “notice” of the alleged concern that the cost
thresholds might change with different States.
Ante, at 15.
Yet EPA
still chose to make the FIP severable because of its
statutory obligation to reduce downwind pollution—an obligation it
repeatedly referenced. See,
e.
g., 88 Fed. Reg. 36693;
Response to Comments 149–151. Would that same EPA have
“significantly changed” the FIP had it just explained more
thoroughly why the plan did not depend on the States
covered?[
12] And on top of
all this, EPA has in fact refused to reconsider the FIP now that it
applies to fewer States, explaining in detail why its methodology
was unaffected by the States it covered.[
13]
* * *
With little to say in response to the FIP’s
apparent state-agnostic methodology for setting emissions limits
and the Clean Air Act’s stringent harmless-error rule, the Court
resorts to raising forfeiture.
Ante, at 17–19. But it is the
Court that goes out of its way to develop a failure-to-explain
theory largely absent from applicants’ briefs. One can search
diligently in the hundreds of pages of applicants’ opening briefs
for the Court’s theory—that EPA failed to explain in its final rule
why the FIP’s cost-effectiveness thresholds for imposing emissions
limits do not shift with a different mix of States—and be left
wondering where the Court found it. That theory appears not to have
crystallized until oral argument, during which counsel for the
state applicants struggled to locate it in the States’ brief. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 11–12. Consider just one illustrative example. Given
the importance to the Court’s theory of how the “knee in the curve”
might change with different States, see
ante, at 6, 7, and
n. 4, 12, one might expect to find some mention of that idea
in applicants’ briefs. One would be wrong.
Given that applicants’ theory has evolved
throughout the course of this litigation, we can hardly fault EPA
for failing to raise every potentially meritorious defense in its
response brief. That is particularly true given the compressed
briefing schedule in this litigation’s emergency posture: The Court
gave EPA less than two weeks to respond to multiple applications
raising a host of general and industry-specific technical
challenges, filed less than a week earlier. Even still, EPA raised
§7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar. Brief for Respondents 19. And on
the merits, EPA expressly argued that the FIP’s “viability and
validity do not depend on the number of jurisdictions it covers”;
the “Rule need not apply to any minimum number of States in order
to operate coherently.”
Id., at 24. EPA could also have
demonstrated how the FIP’s state-agnostic methodology for selecting
cost thresholds was apparent in the final rule. But EPA cannot have
forfeited that more specific point because applicants did not raise
it to begin with.
Because EPA did not forfeit these responses to
the merits of applicants’ arbitrary-or-capricious challenge, there
is no need to consider whether a departure from our typical
approach to forfeited arguments is justified. See
ante, at
18. It remains
applicants’ burden to show that the FIP’s
alleged dependence on the covered States likely was an “important”
problem that EPA “entirely failed to consider.”
State Farm,
463 U. S., at 43. And that is on top of their burden to
overcome §7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar and the lack of
“significant,” specific comments raising this issue.
§7607(d)(6)(B).
Finally, I would exercise our discretion to
consider §7607(d)(8)’s harmless-error rule. Even putting aside the
expedited briefing schedule and the limited discussion of the
Court’s theory in applicants’ briefs, applicants bear the burden in
seeking emergency relief to show a
likelihood of success on
the merits. In other words, we must
predict whether
applicants will overcome every barrier to relief at the end of the
day, after full merits briefing and argument in the lower courts
and, potentially, again in this Court. Section 7607(d)(8)’s
harmless-error rule is one such important obstacle, and EPA has
already signaled that it will raise it as litigation progresses.
See Denial 35, n. 38 (arguing that any failure to more fully
explain “how the Rule is not interdependent” is harmless error
under §7607(d)(8)). I see no reason not to consider it now.
III
Given the emergency posture of this
litigation, my views on the merits of the failure-to-explain
objection and the application of the Clean Air Act’s procedural bar
and harmless-error rule are tentative. But even a tentative adverse
conclusion can undermine applicants’ likelihood of success. And
applicants, to prevail, must run the table; they face the daunting
task of surmounting
all of these significant obstacles. They
are unlikely to succeed.
The Court, seizing on a barely briefed
failure-to-explain theory, grants relief anyway. It enjoins the
Good Neighbor Plan’s enforcement against any state or industry
applicant pending review in the D. C. Circuit and any petition
for certiorari.
Ante, at 19. Given the number of companies
included and the timelines for review, the Court’s injunction
leaves large swaths of upwind States free to keep contributing
significantly to their downwind neighbors’ ozone problems for the
next several years—even though the temporarily stayed SIP
disapprovals may all be upheld and the FIP may yet cover all the
original States. The Court justifies this decision based on an
alleged procedural error that likely had no impact on the plan. So
its theory would require EPA only to confirm what we already know:
EPA would have promulgated the same plan even if fewer States were
covered. Rather than require this years-long exercise in futility,
the equities counsel restraint.
Our emergency docket requires us to evaluate
quickly the merits of applications without the benefit of full
briefing and reasoned lower court opinions. See
Does 1–3,
595 U. S., at ___ (opinion of Barrett, J.). Given those
limitations, we should proceed all the more cautiously in cases
like this one with voluminous, technical records and thorny legal
questions. I respectfully dissent.