Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U.S. ___ (2024)
The case revolves around Stuart Harrow, a Department of Defense employee who was furloughed for six days. Harrow challenged this decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board. After a five-year delay, the Board ruled against him. Harrow had the right to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 60 days of the Board's final order. However, Harrow did not learn about the Board's decision until after the 60-day period had elapsed, and he filed his appeal late. Harrow requested the Federal Circuit to overlook his untimeliness and equitably toll the filing deadline. The Federal Circuit, however, denied his request, believing that the deadline was an unalterable "jurisdictional requirement."
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. The main issue was whether the 60-day filing deadline under Section 7703(b)(1) was jurisdictional, meaning it marked the bounds of a court's power and could not be waived or subject to exceptions. The Supreme Court held that the 60-day filing deadline was not jurisdictional. The Court reasoned that procedural rules, even when phrased in mandatory terms, are generally subject to exceptions like waiver, forfeiture, and equitable tolling. The Court found no language in Section 7703(b)(1) that suggested it was a jurisdictional requirement. The Court also rejected the Government's argument that the term "pursuant to" in a different statute, 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(9), made the deadline jurisdictional.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Federal Circuit was directed to determine whether equitable tolling was available and, if so, whether Harrow was entitled to that relief given the facts of the case.
The 60-day limit for a federal employee subjected to an adverse personnel action to appeal from the Merit Systems Protection Board to the Federal Circuit is not jurisdictional.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HARROW v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit
No. 23–21. Argued March 25, 2024—Decided May 16, 2024
When the Department of Defense furloughed petitioner Stuart Harrow for six days, he challenged that decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board. After a five-year delay, the Board ruled against him. Harrow had the right to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, provided he did so “within 60 days” of the Board’s final order. 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(1). But Harrow did not learn about the Board’s decision until the 60-day period to appeal had run, and filed his appeal late. Given the circumstances, Harrow asked the Federal Circuit to overlook his untimeliness and equitably toll the filing deadline. But the Circuit, believing that the deadline was an unalterable “jurisdictional requirement,” denied his request.
Held: Section 7703(b)(1)’s 60-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Although the procedural rules that govern the litigation process are often phrased in mandatory terms, they are generally subject to exceptions like waiver, forfeiture, and equitable tolling. But when Congress enacts a “jurisdictional” requirement, it “mark[s] the bounds” of a court’s power, and a litigant’s failure to follow the rule “deprives a court of all authority to hear a case,” with no exceptions. Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199, 203. Mindful of those repercussions, the Court will “treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Ibid. Under that approach, “most time bars are nonjurisdictional,” even when “framed in mandatory” and “emphatic” terms. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410–411.
No language in the provision Harrow violated suggests a different result. Section 7703(b)(1) states that an appeal “shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order.” Although the deadline is stated in mandatory terms, this fact is “of no consequence” to the jurisdictional issue. Id., at 411. “What matters instead” is whether the time bar speaks to the court’s jurisdiction. Ibid. And §7703(b)(1) does not.
The Government rests its case on a different statute spelling out the Federal Circuit’s subject-matter jurisdiction, but that law provides it no better support. In 28 U. S. C. §1295(a)(9), Congress granted the Circuit jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, pursuant to section[ ] 7703(b)(1).” The Government argues that an appeal is “pursuant to” §7703(b)(1)—and so within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction—only if it fully complies with §7703(b)(1)’s requirements, including the time bar. But that interpretation is more strained than clear. When a legal drafter writes that a filing has been made “pursuant to” a statutory provision, the phrase often functions as a synonym for “under,” identifying the provision that served as the basis for the filing but without addressing whether the latter conformed to the former’s every requirement. The Court has recently used the phrase this way, as has Congress. See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. 230, 238. So to file an appeal “pursuant to” §7703(b)(1) likely just means to invoke that section as the basis for the appeal. At the very least, there is no clarity the other way. And the rest of §1295 confirms that conclusion. The law uses the phrase “pursuant to” to reference several other statutes, which in turn contain a bevy of procedural rules. The Government’s interpretation would suggest that all those rules are jurisdictional too. But the Court has almost never treated rules like these as absolute bars to judicial action.
The Government cites one kind of time limit that counts as jurisdictional even without a clear statement—deadlines to appeal a district court decision in a civil case. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205. But this Bowles exception is for appeals from one Article III court to another. As to all other time bars, like the agency appeal here, the clear-statement rule applies. And for the reasons stated, the 60-day deadline to appeal Board decisions does not satisfy it. Pp. 3–9.
Vacated and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED. Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. |
Argued. For petitioner: Joshua P. Davis, San Francisco, Cal. For respondent: Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. |
Reply of Stuart R. Harrow submitted. |
Reply of petitioner Stuart R. Harrow filed. (Distributed) |
Record received electronically from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board and available with the Clerk. |
CIRCULATED |
Brief of Department of Defense submitted. |
Brief of respondent Department of Defense filed. (Distributed) |
Record received electronically from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and available with the Clerk. |
Record requested from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Monday, March 25, 2024. |
Amicus brief of National Veterans Legal Services Program submitted. |
Amicus brief of Law Professors submitted. |
Amicus brief of American Federation of Government Employees submitted. |
Amicus brief of National Treasury Employees Union submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Law Professors filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Veterans Legal Services Program filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of American Federation of Government Employees filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Treasury Employees Union filed. |
Amicus brief of Federal Circuit Bar Association submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of Federal Circuit Bar Association filed. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED. |
Brief of Stuart R. Harrow submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Stuart R. Harrow filed. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner Stuart R. Harrow. |
Petition GRANTED. |
Rescheduled. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/8/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/1/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/17/2023. |
Rescheduled. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/9/2023. |
Reply of petitioner Stuart R. Harrow filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of respondent Department of Defense in opposition filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including October 6, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from September 6, 2023 to October 6, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including September 6, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from August 7, 2023 to September 6, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due August 7, 2023) |